Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: What does it mean that the violence of aggression could justify the violence of resistance? What does such justification accomplish, and when, and how? What underlies the conditions and limitations of justified violence, as, for example, these have been formulated in western doctrines of "just war"? Most critically, how could one think about the possibility of a resistance to evil that would be effective without itself instituting further violence? The theoretical ground of this investigation is found in a close reading of the work of Emmanuel Levinas, specifically the section of his Otheruiise than Being, or Beyond Essence in which human consciousness is shown to be, from the first, called to justice in responsibility for others. For Levinas, to be a subject is to be always already for-the-other as a substitute or hostage. This is both a persecution and the "glory" of human being. Thus Levinas introduces an enigmatic "good violence" prior to any distinction between aggressive and just violences. The idea of an originary good violence opens up a reconsideration of the evil of aggression and the joyfulness of resistance. This in turn shows the instability or equivocation of just violence: even if it is inspired by goodness - by one's responsibility for the useless suffering of others - it is never finally good enough, and always at risk of slipping into injustice. The responsibility of a "just warrior" is thus not cancelled by the justness of the cause. The justness of the cause indeed demands ever greater responsibility, even for and before one's enemy. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Wat sou dit kon beteken dat die geweld van aggressie die geweld van verset regverdig? Wat word bewerkstellig deur sodanige regverdiging, en wanneer, en . hoe? Waarop berus die voorwaardes en beperkinge van geregverdigde geweld, soos dit byvoorbeeld geformuleer is in Westerse leerstellings oor "regverdige oorlog"? Nog belangriker: hoe kan 'n mens dink oor die moontlikheid van verset teen die bose wat effektief is, maar sonder om self verdere geweld daar te stel? Die teoretiese grondslag van hierdie ondersoek is 'n nougesette bestudering van die werk van Emmanuel Levinas, meer spesifiek die afdeling van sy Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, waarin hy argumenteer dat die menslike bewussyn van meet af aan tot geregtigheid opgeroep word in verantwoordelikheid vir andere. Om 'n subjek te wees is vir Levinas om altyd alreeds vir-dié-ander te wees as 'n plaasvervanger of gyselaar. Dit is sowel 'n vervolging as die "heerlikheid" van menswees. Levinas argumenteer dus ten gunste van 'n "goeie geweld" voorafgaande aan enige onderskeidinge tussen aggressiewe en geregverdigde geweld. Die idee van 'n oorspronklike goeie geweld maak 'n herdenking van die boosheid van agressie en die vreugdevolheid van verset moontlik. Op sy beurt toon dit die onstabiliteit of dubbelsinnigheid van geregverdigde geweld: selfs al word dit geïnspireer deur goedheid - deur 'n mens se verantwoordelikheid vir die nuttelose lyding van ander - is dit nooit goed genoeg nie en loop dit altyd die gevaar om om te slaan in onreg. Die verantwoordelikheid van 'n "regverdige vegter" word daarom nie uitgekanselleer deur die regverdigheid van sy saak nie. Die regverdigheid van die saak eis trouens nog groter verantwoordelikheid, selfs vir en vóór jou vyand.

This thesis analyses the United States Marine Corps’ counterinsurgency strategy in Vietnam between March 1965 and November 1968, filling a major gap in the existing literature by forensically examining the primary source records maintained by the United States Marines to produce an assessment of the effectiveness of the strategy. It provides a useful corollary to the diplomatic and military histories of the war because not only does it examine operational-level thinking about the war but it analyses the intellectual antecedents of the Marines’ counterinsurgency strategy to answer the important questions about why the Marines chose to emphasis pacification and the ‘ink blot’ strategy rather than conducting a more conventional campaign that focused upon the destruction of enemy forces. The Marines’ own experience of counterinsurgency in the early part of the 20th Century, as well as the work of counterinsurgency theorists of the 1950s and 1960s, had a considerable impact upon their approach to the Vietnam War. The decision of the senior Marine commanders to adopt a pacification strategy along the lines of the ‘ink blot’ approach promulgated by these French and British counterinsurgency experts was partly the result of their view of the political nature of the war and partly the result of the reality they faced on the ground. At the time the Marines deployed to Vietnam their mission was to protect three bases on the coast in the northern provinces of South Vietnam and the Marines realised that the security of these establishments could be greatly improved if the population supported the Marines (and, by extension the South Vietnamese government) rather than the insurgents. Therefore, the ‘spreading ink blot’ of pacification was a product of the need to improve security as well as an attempt to challenge the political nature of communist revolutionary warfare. The metrics used to measure progress in the war were flawed, but there are other indicators within the Marines’ records that show they were conducting an effective and appropriate counterinsurgency campaign, within the limitations imposed by lack of resources and general inability to influence the war as a whole. When the Tet Offensive was launched in early 1968, the Marines use of pacification as ‘defence in depth’ allowed them to successfully defend the coastal enclaves by countering both the political and military efforts of the North Vietnamese in those areas.

Should U.S. political decision-makers decide to wage a moral war, it is not as easy a merely saying go do it. To ensure moral targeting decisions, American national political leaders must suffer the costs of monitoring in terms of time and money, and provide not only detailed direction, but also constant oversight to ensure objectives are clear and subordinates carry out directions. Military officers must ensure that their motivations align with those of their principals, and they must ensure that constraining doctrine for planning and executing combat operations is followed. Having satisfied these variables, moral targeting decisions, wherein proportionality of non-combatant casualties is weighed against target necessity, should then be easily attainable. The process of aligning motivations with respect to desired outcomes, and the process of planning strategies according to doctrine together lead to moral targeting decisions. By following the processes of getting war plans approved according to published U.S. doctrine, a deliberate dialogue is followed with direction and feedback through several steps of planning and approval that result in multiple people working on a product that results in a sort of corporate buy- in. I posit that it is difficult to follow this process and end up with targeting decisions that do not weigh harm to non-combatants against the necessity of individual targets, especially when principals and agents come together to deliberately ensure they align their motivations with respect to objectives. This theory is applicable to U.S. involvement in war, but is not necessarily generalizable to other countries. Through case studies of American involvement in Desert Storm (the first Gulf War), Operation Allied Force (NATOs air war over Serbia), and the U.S. War on Terror (campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq), I find that only in the War on Terror were moral targeting decisions consistently made by US national leaders. Furthermore, that was the only case study wherein both constraining doctrine was present and principal-agent motivations were aligned with respect to objectives. The other two cases showed that the variables were not followed and proportionality- necessity decisions were not made.

<p>This paper concerns the ideas on society, policies and economic thoughts on Ireland before the cataclysmal famine of the 1840s. Senior, classified as one of the classical economists, elaborated these in the period 1829 – 1836, thus during the period of Parliamentary reform. As a trusted counsellor of the Whig governments, Senior advocated measures opposite to the common notions of laissez-faire. His basic ideas are contrasted to those of Malthus concerning economics and, in particular, the population doctrine that Senior never believed in and in its crudest form refuted. Senior regarded Malthus’ doctrine as devastating to governmental policies. Senior wanted an efficient and strong government. Moreover, Senior evolved ideas, in fact a strategy, for raising Ireland out of her common destitution instead of institutionalizing poor laws. This strategy embraced Catholic emancipation, education, public investments in infrastructure and emigration. His ideas, and proposals akin to Senior’s, are related to the political discourse of the day, which took a more common view of laissez-faire during the period considered. Nevertheless, there is consistency in his ideas on government, public investments and laissez-faire. Senior cannot be described as anything other than an early liberal and a classical economist and, hence, an advocator of economic laissez-faire. This paper underlines the need for a clear distinction between economic laissez-faire as a concept and the concept of political laissez-faire, whereas the former concerns thoughts on economics and the latter is related to the notion of the impassivity of the period of today’s discourse.</p>

From Chapter 1: It was shortly after receiving his Master of Arts degree at Cambridge that Goodwin was converted, by his own report, recorded by his son Goodwin's conversion gives us remarkable insight into the spiritual condition of the early seventeenth century and William HaIler cites it as "worthy in its way to be compared to the most notable self-revelations of the Puritan soul "[1] Born on the 5th of October, 1600 in the Norfolk village of Rolesby and reared in Yarmouth, the eldest son of Richard and Catherine Goodwin came to Christ's College, Cambridge in 1613, at twelve years old, where he learned the Heidelberg Catechism and Ursinus' Commentary It was also a time when the Dutch church was in convulsions over the Arminian controversy With the memory of Perkins, deceased ten years, lingering in everyone's minds, Richard Sibbes - Perkins's successor - was preaching at Trinity Church, and his famous sermons attracted those who were dissatisfied with the embellished rhetoric of others Most notable among them was Dr Senhouse, an Arminian orator [2] At fourteen, Goodwin eagerly anticipated Easter, when he would receive his first Communion and he prepared earnestly for it by attending Sibbes' lectures and reading Calvin's Institutes ("and 0 how sweet was the reading of some Parts of that Book to me1") [3] In addition, he had many fine examples of godly and learned tutors As Whitsunday approached, Goodwin felt, "I should be so confirm'd that I should never fall away," but much to his surprise and embarrassment, he was too young Alas, when the day arrived, his tutor kindly kept him from receiving the Supper [4].

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This thesis strives to shed light on the genuine significance of the current transformation of the U.S. foreign and strategic policy. In essence, this thesis concludes that the Bush doctrine of preemption is inconsistent with the American strategic culture and view of the use of force displayed throughout the American foreign policy ever since the Truman administration. Although not a revolution per se in the American goals, the new foreign policy represents a radical change in the manner to pursue them. While promoting a unilateralist foreign policy and revived "warfighting" strategies, the current administration takes old rationales a step further. By elevating preemption from the tactical to strategic level, the doctrine transforms a last resort policy option into a primary offensive strategy with destabilizing consequences for international relations. The analysis concludes that the increased authority of the hard-line approach in the American foreign and security policy is circumstantial, and the likelihood of its endurance is unrealistic. The international system comprises built-in constraints that raise the cost of isolationist and unilateralist impulses to unbearable levels in the long term. These constraints are the end result of the American national values' projection at international level. / Civilian, Romania Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The US military has proven its strengths many times over through its ability to dominate opponents on the conventional battlefield. However, when it comes to irregular wars and insurgent conflicts, which are defined by enemies who conduct war from the shadows and refuse to meet on the open field, finding success has been far more difficult. The nature and dynamics of these unconventional wars are dramatically different from the conventional warfare realm, and require innovative approaches and rethinking of many long held conceptions of waging war. Conducting unconventional warfare has been the core mission of US Army Special Forces (USSF) since they were founded in 1952. Throughout a relatively short history, USSF have shown a broad utility in conducting operations with indigenous military, paramilitary, and civilian personnel in "irregular wars" and low intensity conflicts (LICs), and thus Special Forces have been widely regarded as the preeminent experts in this particular field of warfare. Now more than ever, the capabilities of Special Forces are invaluable in supporting US national security strategy, continuing the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and supporting efforts to transform military capabilities for irregular warfare and unconventional conflicts. USSF are now faced with a difficult challenge: high demand and operations tempo require that USSF must find new ways to more effectively and efficiently employ their skills in unconventional environments. In order to enhance the capabilities of USSF in conducting unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, this thesis proposes that USSF develop a training program that allows recruitment and selection of both indigenous personnel and US foreign-born as auxiliaries and surrogates to USSF operations. Training would take place in the US and would be for the explicit purpose of creating indigenous cadres for assisting Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (SFODAs) in developing operational/security forces and intelligence networks at the local level in order to create long-term stability in unconventional conflict areas.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

The doctrine of piercing the veil and its application in Czech corporate law The theses concerns with the doctrine of piercing the veil and its application in Czech corporate law. Firstly, the crucial term of the separateness of assets is described as a characteristic feature of a legal subject under Czech law, followed with explanation of the concept of the shareholders' guarantee in the Czech law based on the fact that all companies are legal persons with the asset separateness, even though their function is similar to the partnership. The doctrine of piercing the veil was developed by judiciary decisions dealing with different situations and circumstances, under which the legal separateness of a corporation and separateness of assets are misused by shareholders and creditors (voluntary or involuntary) are harmed. The main question asked is whether in specific cases of "corporate form abuse" law can find a way to reimburse directly the harmed creditors or the company. Based on the description of development of judiciary in the United States, Great Britain and Germany and its conclusions, specific factors for application the doctrine were researched, such as alter ego, instrumentality, undercapitalization, agency, commingling of funds etc. These factors are used differently by courts and can be analyzed...