This study examines the extent to which principal-principal agency conflicts within venture capital (VC) syndicates lead to additional principal-agent conflicts in IPO firms in two institutional contexts. Using a matched sample of 274 VC-backed IPOs in the US and the UK, it shows that the diversity of a VC syndicate increases pre-IPO discretionary current accruals, used as a proxy for earnings management, but the impact of such diversity is higher in the US. There is also evidence of higher underpricing and lower aftermarket performance in firms with higher earnings management and VC diversity, and these negative performance effects are also higher in the US. Our findings indicate that local and informal institutions have a significant effect on multiple agency conflicts in IPO firms and performance outcomes.

Emerging research on real earnings management [REM] has expressed the concern that firms deviating from normal business practices may endure a negative impact on future cash flows and performance. This dissertation (in three essays) investigates the phenomenon of real earnings management in its association with: 1) enterprise resource planning systems [ERPs]; 2) audit report lags [ARLs]; and 3) future firm performance. In the first investigation I hypothesize that the increased monitoring associated with the implementation of an ERP will result in a decline in REM. In the second investigation I hypothesize that higher levels of REM will evoke greater auditor scrutiny and be associated with longer ARLs. In the third investigation I hypothesize that managerial actions that would ordinarily be classified as REM: reductions in discretionary expenditures or overproduction, are not REM but indicative of enhanced efficiencies when found in concert with prior period restructurings or expected future sales growth respectively. In each of the three investigations, my hypotheses are confirmed.

Earnings management has had consequence in financial disasters, such as Enron, WorldCom and Nortel. More recently, it is alleged in the Lehman bankruptcy, which ushered in a global financial meltdown. Yet despite increased regulation and focus on governance and auditing, researchers find that earnings management remains a common practice. Accounting academics have responded to the earnings management problem by conducting studies using secondary data for governance variables and financial models to measure earnings management indirectly. Meanwhile, governance variables measured with secondary data now show little variability because of improved best practice and regulation, and there is strong evidence that the agency causal model and the earnings management measures are seriously flawed. This study uses a mixed-mode research model based on agency and stewardship theory to explain earnings management, and uses a more direct measure of its occurrence, namely the level of board information asymmetries and board monitoring and control actions, as a proxy for earnings management. Primary data is used to provide direct measures of important governance variables, which produce mixed results relative to earnings management using secondary data. In a survey of 245 Canadian public company directors, this study finds that an independent chair, less busy directors, and a smaller board does reduce earnings management, but that this impact is strongly moderated by the CEO's attributes. A CEO with stewardship attributes reduces earnings management, and a CEO with agency attributes increases earnings management. There also is evidence in the study that agency conflict variables improve governance outcomes, in this case, reducing the level of earnings management, and that board processes around monitoring and control actions could be a problem.

In my dissertation, I examine factors associated with firms’ submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification and test if shareholder ratification of auditor selection is associated with the extent of price competition in the audit market (as measured by audit fees) and audit quality (as measured by clients’ earnings management). The dissertation is motivated from the recent recommendation of the U.S. Treasury’s Advisory Committee on Auditing Profession (ACAP) regarding the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification votes. The ACAP suggests that this practice may improve the competition in the audit market; yet, there is no empirical evidence supporting the ACAP’s recommendation. My dissertation attempts to fill the gap in the literature on an issue of current interest to the auditing profession. I find that firm size, CEO-Chair duality, insider ownership and institutional ownership are associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. However, I do not find an association between audit committee variables and the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The second essay investigates the association between auditor ratification and audit fees. Audit fees are higher in firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification. The finding is not consistent with the increased price competition predicted by the ACAP. The third essay of my dissertation examine whether the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification is associated with earnings management. I find that firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification are more likely to have lower level of earnings management. Overall, the results suggest that the same factors that are associated with higher quality monitoring also may be associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The results call into question the one-size-fits-all approach recommended by the ACAP.

This thesis comprises of three essays. The first essay is titled 'Do Acquiring Firms Manage Earnings?' and is co-authored with Professor Anand M. Vijh. The second essay is titled 'Do Firms Have a Target Leverage? Evidence from Credit Markets' and is joint work with Professors Anand M. Vijh and Redouane Elkamhi. The third is essay is single authored and titled 'Bondholder Wealth Effects of Fraudulent Reporting.' In the first essay, we investigate possible earnings management by inflating discretionary accruals in a sample of 1,719 cash acquirers and 895 stock acquirers during 1989-2005. Following previous literature, we document higher ROA-matched discretionary accruals for stock acquirers than for cash acquirers. However, simulation evidence with quarterly data shows that ROA-matched discretionary accruals are misspecified for both high-growth and low-growth firms. This is relevant to the current investigation because the median sales growth rate equals 12.1% for cash acquirers and 38.5% for stock acquirers (besides similar differences in other growth measures). We propose a new discretionary accrual measure that controls for both ROA and sales growth. This measure is well-specified and powerful in detecting earnings management in stratified random samples, and it leads to an insignificant difference between discretionary accruals of cash and stock acquirers. Other tests of acquirer incentives to manage earnings, market reaction to earnings management, and time delay between earnings announcement and merger announcement strengthen the evidence against earnings management attributed to stock acquisitions. In the second essay, we propose credit market based test of whether firms have a target leverage. The static tradeoff theory of capital structure hypothesizes that firms have a target leverage which optimizes firm value in the presence of benefits and costs of leverage (such as taxes and bankruptcy costs). If firms adjust their actual leverage toward this target leverage over time, then rational investors should consider both current and target leverage in pricing contracts whose value depends on the firm's default risk. Using a large sample of corporate bonds and credit default swap (CDS) contracts during 2000 to 2007, we document evidence consistent with this prediction. In particular, target leverage is both an economically and statistically significant determinant of bond and CDS spreads, and its role increases with contract maturity. Credit ratings also reflect the effect of target leverage, which suggests that the credit rating agencies rate firms as if their capital structure decisions are consistent with the tradeoff theory. In the third and final essay, I examine how the disclosure of fraudulent reporting affects bondholder wealth, credit ratings, and contract features of new bond issues. I find that fraud announcements trigger swift, sharp, and long lasting credit rating downgrades and are associated with significant declines in bondholder wealth. An examination of new bond issues confirms a significant increase in both the yield spread and the gross spread charged by the investment bank compared to pre-fraud levels. Moreover, a significant proportion of bonds issued after a fraud contain call provisions that are more expensive in the short run but may be potentially value maximizing in the long run if credit conditions improve. Thus, I argue that managers are optimistic that the increase in the cost of debt induced by the fraud is temporary. However, contrary to managers' optimistic beliefs, I find that corporate credit ratings, once decreased, remain significantly depressed for at least three years following the fraud announcement.

Background: The recent decades there has been a big shift in the focus of accounting standards, going from mostly being based on historical cost to being more based on fair value. How to account for goodwill has been widely discussed for many years. Assets, such as goodwill, that are never traded individually are difficult to assign a fair value to. This opens up for discretionary behavior and earnings management. One of the foundations of financial reporting is that it should contribute to informed decisions, thus the numbers need to be accurate. Goodwill has become an increasing part of firms’ balance sheets, making up 19,3% of the assets of firms listed on Nasdaq Stockholm. Purpose: This study’s purpose is to examine how impairment factors affect discretionary goodwill impairment decisions in Swedish Large Cap and Mid Cap firms. The first part is to examine the occurrence of goodwill impairment, and the second part is to examine the size of goodwill impairment losses. Method: The study examines Swedish Large Cap and Mid Cap firms during the years 2006-2012. After excluding some companies for various reasons, we are left with a sample size of 483 firm years. First a logistic regression is run, to investigate what indicators causes firms to make goodwill impairments. The concepts examined are CEO Change, Big Bath, Income Smoothing and Leverage, operationalized into variables and checked to see if they have a relationship with the dependent variable goodwill impairment. Firm size, change in return on assets, change in sales and finally industry are used as control variables. The second regression examines what influences the amount of goodwill impaired, looking at the same independent variables as in the first one, using a censored tobit regression. Conclusion: The result shows that two variables, Leverage and Big Bath have a significant influence on the occurrence of goodwill impairment. Both variables show a negative influence on the dependent variable, meaning that when they increase, goodwill impairment are less likely to happen. Accepting a lower level of significance, CEO change showed a positive influence on goodwill impairment.When looking at the 91 firm years when impairment occurs, we see that two variables have a significant influence on the size of the goodwill impairments, that is Leverage and Big Bath.

Prior literature suggests two competing theories regarding the role of venture capitalists (VCs) in their portfolio companies. The VC monitoring hypothesis argues that VCs effectively resolve the managerial agency problem through close monitoring and restraining managers' earnings management behavior. The VC moral hazard hypothesis argues that VCs aggravate the private benefits agency problem by exerting influence over managers to artificially inflate exit stock price through earnings management. Using a sample of IPO firms between 1987 and 2002, after controlling for the magnitude of accruals manipulation (AM), I compare the magnitude of real activities manipulation (RM) between venture-backed and non-venture-backed companies. I find that relative to non-venture-backed companies, venture-backed companies show significantly less RM in the first post-IPO fiscal year. The results are robust after controlling for the VC selection endogeneity. The finding supports the VC monitoring hypothesis that VCs restrain managers' RM behavior. Furthermore, I document that venture-backed companies exhibit a significant difference from non-venture-backed companies only in the first post-IPO fiscal year. The difference between the two groups in either the IPO year or the second post-IPO fiscal year is not significant, or at best, is weak. This finding is consistent with the argument that VCs tighten their control during the lockup expiration period when insiders such as managers or founders have strong incentives to inflate earnings. By the end of the second post-IPO fiscal year when VCs exit the portfolio companies, their impact on portfolio companies' RM decreases dramatically which makes the difference between the two groups less significant. In addition, using a sample of venture-backed IPOs from 1987 to 2002, I find that companies backed by high-reputation VCs show significantly less RM than those backed by low-reputation VCs in the first post-IPO fiscal year. The results are robust to alternative VC reputation proxies. This finding is consistent with the argument that high-reputation VCs have more incentives to preserve reputation and better ability to monitor managers than low-reputation VCs.

Purpose: The aim of this thesis is to examine the link between CSR and EM in the EU manufacturing sector. The former is measured by ESG scores whereas the latter is approximated by discretionary accruals. Moreover, the corporate governance theories of stakeholder and agency are used as starting points. Method: Accruals are calculated using the so-called Modified Jones model. A linear regression equation with five variables is used to calculate the effect of CSR scores on the levels EM. In order to capture the difference, if any, regarding the link between CSR and EM between companies with high CSR scores and those with lower scores, three models are developed – the top 30 percent (model 1), the bottom 70 percent (model 2) and all companies (model 3). Findings: The results indicate CSR scores negatively affect the levels of EM. The causation is statistically significant. Implication: The findings of this study imply CSR practices are not used to hide weaker earnings in the manufacturing sector of the EU. Value: The study contributes to the literature on the link between CSR and EM by focusing on a specific sector that is often scrutinized for its negative environmental footprint. The choice of using three models is also seen to be of additional value.

På Stockholmsbörsen under 2019 skedde i genomsnitt 355 612 handelsavslut per dag och under Corona-året 2020 slogs flera rekord i antalet avslut, bland annat den 12 mars då över 1 400 000 stycken gjordes på den svenska Stockholmsbörsen (Avanza, 2020). Något som påverkar investerare till att göra avslut på börsprodukter är naturligtvis nyheter kring bolagen, framför allt nyheter kring årsredovisningen. En bra årsrapport har i generella termer historiskt fått investerare att vilja köpa fler aktier i ett bolag, medan en dålig rapport har fått dem att vilja sälja av sina andelar (Lopez & Rees, 2002, s.155). Några typer av tillgångar som anses ha blivit särskilt svåra att bedöma efter regelverket IFRS intåg är goodwill och immateriella tillgångars avskrivnings- och nedskrivningsmetoder,då dessa bygger på en delvis subjektiv bedömning av framtida kassaflöden kopplade till tillgången. Det har även lett till att det blivit svårare för investerare att göra jämförelser mellan bolags tillgångar och användningen av dessa på marknaden (Hoogendoorn, 2006, s.24). Studien grundar sig utifrån tidigare forskning som analyserat bolag som befinner sig i tillstånd där det tycks föreligga starka incitament till resultatmanipulering, till exempel bolag i stigande resultattrend eller rapporterat ett resultat just över noll, även kallat loss avoidance. Då den tidigare forskningen främst riktat in sig på nyckeltalet periodiseringar finner vi det intressant att även utforska andra nyckeltal som potentiellt kan användas i liknande syften.Denna studie ämnar undersöka om det förekommer tendenser hos de svenska bolagen som är listade på börslistorna large cap och small cap att använda avskrivningar av immateriella tillgångar för att undvika bryta stigande resultattrender som varat i minst 3 åreller att undvika att rapportera en förlust.Syftet är vidare att undersöka om det förekommer skillnader i avskrivningar av immateriella tillgångar mellan företag med starka incitament, där bolagen harkategoriseratssom loss avoidance-bolag och stigande resultattrend-bolag.Studien visar ett resultat där det kan finnas svenska bolag på börslistan large cap som använder sig av immateriella tillgångar med hjälp av storleken på avskrivningar för att undvika att brytaen stigande resultattrend som varar i minst 3 år.Med detta sagt, har studien också kommit fram till att det inte förekommer något samband för stigande resultattrend vad gäller börslistan small cap. Studien visar också att det kan finnas svenska bolag på börslistan large cap och small cap som använder sig av immateriella tillgångar med hjälp av avskrivningar för att undvika att rapportera en förlust. För large cap-bolagen finner vi ett starkt samband för detta, medan det för small cap-bolagen inte finns något samband i vår utförda studie.

In this thesis the relationship between company performance and top management stock ownership in the Swedish market was examined. As well as conducting research on the influence real earnings management has on company performance, and how real earnings management relates to the top management stock ownership. The study was based on a quantitative approach with secondary data that was retrieved from Eikon Refinitiv database, where the data stretched back from 2018-2020. This research found no clear relationship between the main concepts under investigation, that is stock ownership of top management and stock returns. The authors explain this by the sampling method in this research only include companies with share holdings. Furthermore, compared to other studies looking this research considers multiple market capitalizations who may operate differently. Finally, there is a suspicion in the field of research that the relationship between the two is not of a linear nature as such a linear methodology will not find any clear results. In conclusion, this research could be added to the list that does not find a relationship between the above stated variables to the literature which could further be applied to the Swedish market. In terms of real earnings management, a strong negative influence was found on share returns. The authors suggest that this finding can be used as a basis to form investment strategies through monitoring the occurrence of REM to predict when insiders are going to buy and sell. Through pursuing this strategy, it may be possible to create superior return as this study found support for the semi-strong form of market efficiency. Unfortunately, this study found no clear guidance of resolving agency issues. Rather it was concluded that shareholdings in the top management does not resolve agency problems given the occurrence of REM. The management most likely benefit from this through trading the company stock. However, further investigation on the topic should be conducted as it seems that alignment using holdings become more or less effective at certain levels of management share ownership. Furthermore, the notion that American ways of agency alignment may not be appropriate in the Swedish market was considered but no clear conclusion could be made in this research.