After Shleifer and Vishny (1997) introduce agency conflicts between controlling insiders and outside investors, a new research trend has emerged, which focuses on controlling insiders' incentives for opportunistic behavior and assumes that controlling insiders may want more opaque corporate information environment to mask their pursuance of private control benefits. However, there are still open issues on the topic of how different controlling shareholder types, such as business group owners, institutional owners and family owners, each affect corporate information environment. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the different roles of controlling ownership types on corporate informational environment. Chapter 1 examines earnings management behaviors of firms affiliated with business groups, using a unique dataset for South Korean business groups (chaebols) between 1993 and 2007. Contrary to predictions of agency theory, we find that group firms are actually less engaged in earnings management than non-group firms, and we offer controlling family's concern for group reputation as an explanation. Group firms are also shown to use more real cash flow-based earnings management than discretionary accruals management. The results are robust with respect to the method of control sample construction, alternative models and group definitions, and endogeneity. There is also evidence that corporate reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, including regulations on auditing and combined group-wide financial reports, appear to have mitigated the use of earnings management by group firms. These results are consistent with the notion that concerns for group reputation may mitigate agency-based opportunistic earnings management behaviors. Chapter 2 examines whether domestic and foreign institutional investors improve corporate transparency in the presence of controlling benefits. We construct the transparency index, as well as its sub-indices based on firm- and market-level information, using group and non-group firm-level data for South Korea between 2001 and 2007. The results show that foreign institutional ownership improves overall corporate transparency, while the effects of domestic institutional ownership are insignificant. This is traceable to sub-index findings that foreign investors are associated with improvement in both firm-level and market-level transparency, while domestic institutional investors are associated with a decrease in firm-level transparency, but with an increase in market-level transparency, which may offset each other. The effects are non-linear for domestic institutional ownership, while those of foreign institutional ownership remain monotonic. These findings are consistent with the notion that domestic institutional investors are conflicted by their role as monitors to boost transparency and by their desire to pursue control benefits by exploiting insider information and promoting selective transparency. Foreign investors, lacking such controlling benefit opportunities, tend to promote general transparency. Chapter 3 examines how the dynamics between family owners and market participants, such as analysts, market makers and investors determine a firm's overall transparency, using South Korean data between 2001 and 2007. Our results show that family ownership has a positive relation with earning-based transparency, while it has a negative relation with market-based transparency. As a result, family ownership seems to have no impact on overall transparency. However, an analysis based on sorting of family ownership shows that firms with less than 30% family ownership show a positive significant relation to overall transparency, but firms with family ownership of 30% or higher have an insignificant relation with overall transparency. This discrepancy may exist because family owners may want to promote corporate transparency through better earning-based information dissemination, but market participants discount such efforts and this discount increases as family ownership increases. / Business Administration/Finance

In this dissertation, I investigate the economic consequences of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158 (SFAS 158). SFAS 158 requires firms to move pension funding status from the footnotes to the balance sheet. Moving pension funding status from a footnote to the balance sheet improves the transparency and understandability of pension accounting, however it at the same time increases the pension liability recognized and decreases the shareholder's equity reported for firms with underfunded pension plans. I investigate whether firms take actions to mitigate the impact of SFAS 158. I also examine whether the market perceptions of the risk and cost of capital differ because of SFAS 158. I first find that while firms reduce the non-pension debt to equity ratio to minimize the cost of SFAS 158, they did not use discretionary accruals to offset the impact of SFAS 158. One interpretation of these findings is that firms' potential responses to the rule depend on the costs and benefits associated with that discretionary behavior. While accrual manipulations do not affect either real operations or cash flows, aggressive accrual manipulations can increase the probability of a qualified opinion from auditors, and financial penalties from regulators (SEC litigation). In contrast, real activity manipulation is more opaque than accounting earnings management, making it more difficult to detect by shareholders, SEC regulators, or auditors. I then find that the market perceived risk proxied by total equity risk increased after SFAS 158. However, I fail to find that the increased total equity risk is generally priced by the equity capital markets. Further analysis indicates that bond spread yield decreases after SFAS 158 for firms with underfunded pension plans, suggesting different behavior of debt investors and equity investors. This finding might be explained by the rich information environment specific to the debt market. Compared with the equity market, the debt market includes mainly sophisticated investors. Sophisticated investors have access to more firm-specific information than other investors. Given their access to potentially more informative data, the debt market response to SFAS 158 is different from the equity market. This dissertation contributes to the debate regarding the effectiveness of the pension accounting reforms incorporated in SFAS 158, and is useful to legislators, regulators, and researchers in assessing the anticipated costs and benefits of SFAS 158. In addition, this study lends support to the stream of research which documents that managers take actions to achieve certain financial reporting goals in response to new accounting rules. This study also provides insight into how firms take real actions to minimize the cost of having an under-funded defined benefit pension plan. Understanding these relationships have implications for interpreting pension numbers reported in the financial statements and designing pension accounting rules that prevent or minimize the possibility that managers take advantage of the complexity and subjectivity associated with pension accounting to influence reported earnings. Finally, this study contributes to the existing literature by highlighting the importance and necessity of considering investor sophistication in studies on recognition vs. disclosure. / Business Administration/Accounting

I study how the decisions of corporate individuals, firm culture, corporate behavior, and the broader financial markets are interconnected. In the first chapter, I examine insider trade reporting violations by corporate insiders, such as executives, officers, and directors, who have access to nonpublic information. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) mandates prompt insider trade reporting within two business days to reduce information asymmetry. However, frequent violations of this deadline breach securities law and may indicate a broader culture of noncompliance. I investigate whether insiders’ adherence to or disregard for filing deadlines reflects the firm’s stance on unethical behavior and its fiduciary duty to shareholders. Using a dataset of 18,567 firm-year observations post-SOX, I find a significant positive association between insider filing violations and future corporate misconduct, especially in firms without a Chief Compliance Officer (CCO). This suggests that strong internal regulatory systems are crucial for promoting a culture of compliance. In the second chapter, I explore the link between incoming CEO incentives and real earnings management (REM), which involves purposeful deviations from normal business operations to meet specific earnings targets. New CEOs face significant scrutiny from shareholders, boards, and the market, which may pressure them to manage earnings. I find a negative association between CEO risk-taking incentives (vega) and REM and a positive association between CEO stock price sensitivity (delta) and REM when the firm is in financial distress. These findings suggest that CEO incentives are closely related to REM. In the third chapter, using hand-collected data, I explore the labor market response to executives’ off-the-job personal misconduct, such as sexual misadventure, substance abuse, violence, and dishonesty. I observe that executives with a record of indiscretion are 12% more likely to switch firms, 11% more likely to lose board seats, and 10% more likely to experience a lower rank the next year. Furthermore, they are 34.5% to 37.3% more likely to join firms with low integrity culture scores. This research highlights the career repercussions of personal indiscretions for executives.

A presente pesquisa investiga os impactos da regulação econômica nas escolhas de práticas contábeis. Buscando identificar a relação existente, são apresentadas pesquisas em gerenciamento da informação contábil (de resultado e do balanço patrimonial) e as teorias econômicas da regulação. Em seguida, são apresentadas as evidências empíricas de como a regulação econômica incentiva a adoção de determinadas práticas contábeis. Nesse mister, é apresentada a regulação financeira exercida pela Agência Nacional de Saúde Suplementar (ANS) sobre as entidades operadoras de planos de assistência à saúde (OPS), também chamadas de planos de saúde. Essa regulação financeira consiste no acompanhamento, pela ANS, da situação econômico-financeira das OPS. A ANS compara os índices calculados a partir das informações contábeis recebidas, eletronicamente, das OPS, com parâmetros estabelecidos a priori. Se determinada OPS não atender, satisfatoriamente, os parâmetros, fica sujeita ao afastamento de seus administradores de suas funções e até à liquidação de seus ativos. Por fim, as teorias da regulação e do gerenciamento da informação contábil são revisitadas à luz da Nova Economia Institucional, identificando-se, portanto, a Contabilidade como parte integrante de um contrato (regulação) cujos custos são diferentes de zero (custos de transação), de forma que a informação contábil é a cola que mantém a firma unida e a regulação financeira em atividade. / This study analyzes how the economic regulation impacts on accounting policy choices. With a view to identifying the existing relationship between both, the economic theories of regulation and research on earnings and balance sheet management are discussed. Then, empirical evidence is presented of how economic regulation stimulates the choice of certain accounting policies, related to the Brazilian Health Care Agencys (ANS) equivalent to the US Federal governments Office of Health Maintenance Organizations financial regulation of health maintenance organizations (HMO), called OPS in Brazil. OPS have their economic-financial situation monitored by the ANS, which compares the indices calculated on the basis of electronically received financial information with some previously established financial thresholds. If these are not complied with to a reasonable extent, this may lead to the HMOs liquidation. Finally, the regulation and earnings and balance sheet management theories are discussed under the lens of New Institutional Economics, which sees Accounting as part of a contract (regulation), whose costs are positive (transaction costs), and accounting information as the glue that keeps the firm together and keeps the financial regulation working.

Die vorliegende kumulative Dissertation analysiert Determinanten und Konsequenzen der Berichterstattung von Unternehmen im deutschen Kaiserreich. Das erste Papier analysiert den Zusammenhang zwischen der freiwilligen Publizität und dem Produktmarktwettbewerb. Auf der Grundlage einer Stichprobe von 570 Unternehmensjahren lässt sich ein negativer Zusammenhang zwischen der freiwilligen Publizität und dem potentiellen Wettbewerb zeigen. Darüber hinaus finde ich einen negativen Zusammenhang zwischen der freiwilligen Publizität und der Branchenprofitabilität. Schließlich finde ich einen positiven Zusammenhang zwischen der freiwilligen Publizität und dem existierenden Wettbewerb. Dieser Zusammenhang ist jedoch nur für Branchenfolger statistisch signifikant. Im zweiten Papier analysiere ich den Einfluss von (überraschenden) Dividendenankündigungen auf die Berliner Börse im Jahr 1895. Auf der Grundlage einer Stichprobe von 166 Unternehmen finde ich positive (negative) kumulierte abnormale Renditen als Reaktion auf eine positive (negative) Dividendenüberraschung. Querschnittsanalysen zeigen, dass diese Effekte mit der Signaling Theorie vereinbar sind. Darüber hinaus lässt sich zeigen, dass der Handel auf dem Kapitalmarkt um die Dividendenankündigungen herum erhöht ist. Dies ist vereinbar mit der differentiellen Erwartungsrevision. Das dritte Papier analysiert schließlich den Zusammenhang zwischen der Zusammensetzung des Aufsichtsrats und dem bilanzpolitischen Verhalten von Unternehmen zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts. Bei diesen Unternehmen lässt sich der von Burgstahler/Dichev (1997) dargestellte „earnings kink“ nachweisen. Darüber hinaus lässt sich zeigen, dass dieser „earnings kink“ nicht mehr präsent ist, sobald die Gewinne um Abschreibungen korrigiert werden. Es lässt sich allerdings nicht zeigen, dass die Präsenz von Bankdirektoren im Aufsichtsrat mit dem „earnings kink“ oder der Höhe der abnormalen Abschreibungen verbunden ist. / This cumulative Ph.D. thesis analyzes determinants and consequences of financial accounting practices in Imperial Germany. The first paper analyzes the relationship between product market competition and voluntary disclosure. Based on a balanced panel of 570 firm-years, I find a negative association between voluntary disclosure and potential competition. I also find a negative association between industry profitability and voluntary disclosure. Finally, I find a positive association between existing competition and voluntary disclosure for industry followers. The second paper analyzes share price and trading effects around dividend announcements of firms listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange in 1895. Based on a sample of 166 firms, I find a statistically and economically significant positive (negative) cumulative average abnormal return following a positive (negative) dividend surprise. Cross-sectional analyses show that these effects are consistent with the dividend signaling hypothesis. I furthermore find that trading is increased around the announcements. This is consistent with a differential belief revision among individual investors. The third paper analyzes the earnings of 50 public and 50 private German firms for the fiscal years 1903-1907. I find the earnings kinks reported by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). I also find that these kinks disappear once I adjust earnings for depreciations. However, my analyses do not support a divergent probability to avoid small losses and earnings decreases when firms are monitored by bank directors. Based on a propensity score matching I do also not find systematic differences in discretionary depreciations between firms monitored by bank directors and firms without such bank attachments in general.

本研究係以裁量性應計數字及其組成成分衡量盈餘管理，以審計人員產業別市場佔有率與產業別客戶集中度之綜合衡量捕捉審計品質，探討不同樣本公司之盈餘管理特性，以及審計品質對不同盈餘管理特性之影響。管理者對應計項目的認列通常有某種裁量權，此裁量權可用以顯露私有資訊而增進盈餘的價值攸關性，或可投機性地管理盈餘而減低盈餘為公司績效衡量的可靠性。所以探究盈餘管理行為是增加財務報告資訊性(information)或雜訊(noise)即非常重要。研究內容依盈餘管理特性區分為投機性盈餘管理與訊息發放性盈餘管理二大部分。每一研究內容則是先辨認盈餘管理本質，其次探討審計品質對盈餘管理之影響。在研究設計上，為避免實證代理變數之衡量誤差重大影響結果，乃採用實驗組公司與控制組配對公司相比較，以凸顯出前者之盈餘管理型態。 　　研究結果顯示，門檻公司從事盈餘管理以達前期盈餘門檻，且此盈餘管理不具未來現金流量持續性之涵義，係符合「隱藏當期不利績效、遞延本期不尋常盈餘至未來年度」以減低會計盈餘數字波動性之特性。就自願性盈餘預測此一資訊揭露工具而言，在盈餘預測偏屬樂觀之傾向下，仍有管理者自願揭露壞消息預期，即可知管理者之誠意，不失為一可資信賴之訊號。但自願預測盈餘增加，則不必然具有高公信力。甚至在管理者降低盈餘差距之動機下，易引起管理者操縱盈餘。此為財務報表使用者所需注意。就持股變動此一資訊揭露工具而言，在我國家族企業居多之情形下，增加持股並未代表任何特定之涵義。反而是減少持股所透露之訊息，值得投資人注意，尤須慎防其盈餘操縱行為。 　　面對增加所得之裁量性應計數字，審計品質有效阻止投機性盈餘管理。面對顯露私有資訊之盈餘管理，審計品質能夠協助管理者選擇最能彰顯未來現金流量預期之會計方法，以增強裁量性應計數字與未來現金流量變動之關聯性。在高審計品質所賦予之資訊公信力下，盈餘資訊在投資人之決策過程中有一定之重要性，故投資人發現裁量性應計數字增加（減低）盈餘價值攸關性，因而增加（減低）盈餘評價係數。然而對低審計品質所查核的財務報表，較低的資訊公信力，使盈餘未在投資人評價過程中扮演重要角色，因而盈餘管理特性亦不受投資人重視。 / This research examined characteristics of earnings management and effects of audit quality therein. Specifically, the magnitude of earnings management was proxied by the discretionary accruals, which are estimated using a cross-sectional version of the Jones model. Different from prior research, the audit quality was captured by a combined measure of the auditor's market share and client concentration. The market share measured the auditor's competence (industry specialty) and the client concentration measured the auditor's independence. Managers usually exercised discretion to recognize accruals. They could either signal private information to enhance earnings' value relevance, or opportunistically manage earnings to reduce the reliability of earnings as the performance measure of the firm. As a result, it was important to examine earnings management and to identify whether it would increase the informativeness or noise of financial reports. This study was organized according to the characteristics of earnings management: opportunistic earnings management and signaling earnings management. For both parts, the nature of earnings management was identified first, and then the effects of audit quality therein examined. To reduce the impact of measurement errors of proxy variables, the treatment group and controlled group were compared and contrasted to make earnings management pattern of the treatment group more evident. 　　The results showed that threshold firms managed earnings to sustain last year's earnings level. Discretionary accruals of the threshold firms were not significantly associated with future cash flow changes. Those discretionary accruals were used to hide the current unfavorable performance, or to defer current unusual earnings to the future, so that managers could reduce the volatility of accounting earnings. As a means of information disclosure, voluntary earnings forecasts tended to be optimistic, but we still could observe some voluntary forecasts which decreased earnings. In those situations, we might conclude that managers tried to convey credible signals. However, it was not necessarily credible in the case of voluntary forecasting which increased earnings. Managers would manipulate earnings to reduce the difference between forecasted earnings and reported earnings. In respect of the information signal of changes in directors' share holding percentages, it signaled nothing when directors increased holding percentages because most companies were family businesses in Taiwan. Nonetheless, investors should look out the possibility of earnings manipulation when directors decreased their holding percentages. 　　Audit quality could effectively deter opportunistic earnings management but not the income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Based on information signaling perspective of earnings management, auditors with higher audit quality tended to assist managers to choose accounting methods that might signal cash flow expectations. Stronger associations between discretionary accruals and future cash flows were observed for firms audited by higher quality auditors. Because higher audit quality might increase information credibility, earnings would play a more important role in the decision process of investors. When discretionary accruals increased (decreased) earnings' value relevance, earnings association coefficients would be increased (decreased). However, for the financial reports audited by lower quality auditors, earnings did not play an important role in the valuation process because of lower information credibility. Therefore, empirical results showed that investors of firms audited by lower quality auditors did not make decisions according to different characteristics of earnings management.

Unterlassen die Vorstände deutscher Unternehmen wirtschaftlich sinnvolle Investitionen, um einer auf Quartalszahlen fokussierten Financial Community befriedigende Ergebnisse präsentieren zu können? In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird die Frage nach der Existenz von solch kurzfristigem Verhalten, bezeichnet als Managermyopie bzw. Managerial Myopia, sowie den Einflussfaktoren auf dieses Verhalten gestellt. Zur Beantwortung wurden eine postalische, anonymisierte Fragebogenumfrage unter den Finanzvorständen der CDAX-Unternehmen mit einer Rücklaufquote von 21% sowie teilstrukturierte Interviews durchgeführt. Die Ergebnisse liefern deutliche Hinweise auf die Existenz von kurzfristigem Verhalten. Die Faktoren Kapitalmarktdruck, Unternehmensgröße und Fremdkapitalquote besitzen einen statistisch messbaren Einfluss auf kurzfristiges Verhalten. Die Untersuchung liefert direkte Erkenntnisse über Kapitalmarktdruck, das tatsächlich ausgeübte Maß von kurzfristigem Verhalten und die aktuelle Debatte über die verpflichtende Einführung von Quartalsberichterstattung.

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Inledning: Svenska kommuners verksamhet betecknas som säregen. Till detta hör att kommunerna skiljer sig från den privata sektorn i avseende på målsättning och utförande. En utav de särdrag som finns inom kommunerna är deras redovisning av pensionerna som skall ske enligt blandmodellen. Ett flertal studier har lyft upp farhågor om att redovisningen enligt blandmodellen anses leda till diskretionära tolkningsutrymmen som troligtvis kommer utnyttjas av politikerna i syfte att påverka redovisningen. En del av de diskretionära åtgärder som antas vara möjliga är pensionsförvaltning av de förmånsbestämda pensionerna. Syfte: Studiens syfte är att förklara kommunernas val av förvaltning av de förmånsbestämda pensionerna. Metod: En deduktiv ansats har använts i studien för att kartlägga de olika teoretiska förhållandena mellan pensionsförvaltning och pensionsredovisning. Studiens utförande grundar sig i att tillföra en ny inblick i redovisningsforskningen. För att åstadkomma detta har tolv hypoteser sammanställts och prövats utifrån den statistiska analysen. Slutsatser: Studien har visat att variabeln lönsamhet har varit signifikant inom samtliga analyser. Detta har lett till att hypotesen om resultatutjämning har använts som en förklaring till kommunernas val av pensionsförvaltning. Variablerna befolkningsstorlek och befolkningsförändring har även de visat sig påverka valet av pensionsförvaltningen. I den logistiska regressionen har det dock varit problematiskt att införa samtliga variabler i samma modell. Därför har hypoteserna om befolkningsstorlek och befolkningsförändring förkastats tillsvidare. Hypoteserna som utformades har stundom växlat mellan positiv redovisningsteori och institutionell teori för att på så vis ge en mer utförligt förklaring. De anses därför ha bidragit var på sitt sätt till att förklara valet av pensionsförvaltningen. / Introduction: Swedish municipalities’ operations are described as being distinctive. This means that the municipalities differ from the private sector in terms of goal settings and performance. One of the characteristics found in the municipalities is their reporting of pensions that is to be accounted for according to the mixed model. Several studies have brought forward concerns that the accounting according to the mixed model may give rise to discretionary interpretations that assumedly are going to be exploited by the politicians in order to affect the financial reporting. A part of the discretion that is used in the earnings management is assumed to occur in the pension management of the defined benefit pension plans. Aim: The aim of the study is to explain the municipalities’ choice of management of the defined benefit pension plans. Method: A deductive approach has been used in the study to identify different theoretical relationships between the pension management and pension accounting. The study's design was based on providing a new insight into accounting research. To achieve this, twelve hypotheses were formulated and later tested using the statistical analysis. Conclusions: The study has shown that the variable profitability has been significant in the overall analyzes. This has led to the hypothesis that income smoothing could be used as to explain the municipalities’ choice of pension management. The variables population size and population change have also been shown to affect the choice of pension management. Doing the logistical regression with all the variables was however problematic. Therefore, the hypotheses on population size and population change have been rejected for the time being. The hypotheses that were designed have been interchangeable at different points between positive accounting theory and institutional theory, which has led to a more detailed explanation. They are therefore considered to have contributed each in its own way to explain the choice of pension management.

I tidigare studier har det framkommit att amerikanska företag manipulerar sina finansiella räkenskaper inför en nyemission med hjälp av Earnings Management genom oförklarliga periodiseringar. Detta görs i syfte att reflektera en bättre bild av företagets finansiella ställning gentemot hur det i verkligheten ser ut. Företeelsen tillämpas med avsikt att erhålla ett större finansiellt riskkapital då företaget utfärdar nyemission. Denna studie undersöker om svenska företag agerar likt amerikanska företag vid en nyemission och därför är syftet i studien att undersöka om svenska företag tillämpar Earnings Management genom oförklarliga periodiseringar vid perioden då de utfärdar nyemission. Svenska företag har varit av intresse i följande studie då svenska företag verkar under ett annorlunda redovisnings- och skattesystem än amerikanska företag gör, varpå vi vill testa om teorin Earnings Management genom oförklarliga periodiseringar är tillämpbar på även svenska företag, trots de skillnader som föreligger mellan ländernas lagsystem. Studien har genomförts med hjälp av en kvantitativ metod som vi presenterat med hjälp av en deskriptiv statistisk analys. De resultat som framkommit i studien är att även svenska, såväl som amerikanska, företag tillämpar Earnings Management genom oförklarliga periodiseringar vid de kvartal då ska utfärda nyemission, trots de olikheter i redovisnings- och skattesystem som råder länderna emellan. Förutom detta visar studien på att svenska företag även tillämpar en extrem form av Earnings Management samt att olika branscher tillämpar Earnings Management genom oförklarliga periodiseringar i olika grad då de ska utfärda nyemission. De resultat som framkommer i följande studie visar att det är av stor betydelse att investerare har en medvetenhet om att Earnings Management genom oförklarliga periodiseringar förekommer när svenska företag ska utfärda nyemission. Detta är av vikt då tidigare studier har påvisat att många investerare som förvärvat aktier i företagen som tillämpat Earnings Management genom oförklarliga periodiseringar har känt en besvikelse samt upplevt att de blivit missledda av företagens publicerade finansiella rapporter efter nyemissionen. Besvikelsen grundar sig i att det rapporterade resultatet vanligtvis kraftigt sjunker kvartalen efter nyemission då företagen tillämpat Earnings management genom oförklarliga periodiseringar. / In previous studies, it has been found that US companies manipulate their financial statements before issuing Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO) using Accrual-based Earnings Management. This is done by the company in order to reflect a better financial position compared to their true underlying financial performance. Accrual-based Earnings Management is applied with the intention of obtaining larger financial capital when issuing SEOs. This study examines whether Swedish companies, consistent with US companies, apply the phenomenon in a similar way while issuing SEOs and the purpose of our study is therefore to investigate whether Swedish companies apply Accrual-based Earnings Management in the period they issue SEOs. Swedish companies have been of interest in the following study, as Swedish companies operate under a different accounting and tax law compared to that of American companies. As a result, we want to test the theory of Accrual-based Earnings Management to see if it is applicable to Swedish companies, despite the differences in tax law that exists between the countries. The study has been conducted using a quantitative methodology which has been presented through a descriptive statistical analysis. Our results imply that Swedish- as well as American companies, apply Accrual-based Earnings Management in the period they issue SEOs. This is found despite differences in accounting and tax law between the two countries. In addition to this, the study also shows that Swedish companies apply an extreme form of Accrual-based Earnings Management, and that it exist industrial differences in the level of Accrual-based Earnings Management that is applied when issuing SEOs. The results found in the following study show that it is of the utmost importance that investors have an awareness regarding Accrual-based Earnings Management and that it occurs when Swedish companies issue a SEO. This is important as previous studies have shown that many investors who acquired shares in the companies who applied Accrual-based Earnings Management when issuing SEOs, have felt disappointed and have found that they have been misled by the companies published financial reports following the SEO. The disappointment is based on the fact that as companies apply Accrual-based Earnings Management, the companies reported earnings usually fall in the period after issuing a SEO.