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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
51

Assessment of multinational federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Solar, Mustafa Ferhat January 2013 (has links)
Proposed Topic: "Assessment of Multinational Federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina" Registered in SIS: Yes Date of registration: 21.10.2011 Topic Characteristics: This research proposal will basically refer to functionality of federal values that lead to a federal political culture in the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Peace Agreement signed in 1995 by focusing on the federal model that has been applied with Constitution, as a part of the said agreement. Hence, it will show to what extent the conflict that had led to the Bosnian War of 1992-1995 was resolved by implementing a federal model and constitution in 1995 and if so, what is the role of federalism in it. I have chosen the way of assessing multinational federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina to evaluate federal system in post-war period in order to have a better perspective to observe the ability of federal state to enhance Bosnia as a unity. Today Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks constitute the main national identities, in Republika Srpska and in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, two constituent entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina .Republika Srpska, as it could be understood from the name- Serb Republic, is led by an administration representing a Serbian majority whereas Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), known...
52

Accommodative Capacity of Multinational States

Basta, Karlo 20 August 2012 (has links)
This dissertation explains the extent and durability of the institutions of territorial autonomy in multinational states. Its main argument is that the viability of territorial autonomy hinges on the relative economic importance of the minority-inhabited region for the central government. If the fiscal resources of the minority-inhabited region are critical for the funding of the central government’s policy objectives, autonomy is likely to be limited and short lived. If those resources are not as crucial for the governability of the entire state, autonomy is likely to be more extensive and durable. The importance of the minority-inhabited region depends on two sets of factors. The first is the relative level of economic development of majority and minority-inhabited areas. The second is the strategy of governance adopted by the central state elites. Strategies of governance determine the extent of the fiscal burden that the central government will place on the population of the state, thereby exerting significant influence on accommodative outcomes. The theoretical framework developed in this dissertation refers to statist (high spending) and laissez-faire (low spending) strategies of governance. The framework is tested in four multinational states: the former Yugoslavia, the former Czechoslovakia, Canada and Spain. The empirical chapters combine structured-focused comparison with longitudinal case study analysis. The cases largely bear out the hypotheses presented in the dissertation. However, analysis of the cases also demonstrates the importance of minority-group influence at the central state level in accounting for accommodative outcomes. In cases where minority elites have extensive influence at the centre, attempts at limiting the autonomy of minority-inhabited regions tend to be unsuccessful. This thesis contributes to a greater understanding of the design and durability of the institutions of territorial autonomy, which have important consequences for the stability and viability of multinational states.
53

Accommodative Capacity of Multinational States

Basta, Karlo 20 August 2012 (has links)
This dissertation explains the extent and durability of the institutions of territorial autonomy in multinational states. Its main argument is that the viability of territorial autonomy hinges on the relative economic importance of the minority-inhabited region for the central government. If the fiscal resources of the minority-inhabited region are critical for the funding of the central government’s policy objectives, autonomy is likely to be limited and short lived. If those resources are not as crucial for the governability of the entire state, autonomy is likely to be more extensive and durable. The importance of the minority-inhabited region depends on two sets of factors. The first is the relative level of economic development of majority and minority-inhabited areas. The second is the strategy of governance adopted by the central state elites. Strategies of governance determine the extent of the fiscal burden that the central government will place on the population of the state, thereby exerting significant influence on accommodative outcomes. The theoretical framework developed in this dissertation refers to statist (high spending) and laissez-faire (low spending) strategies of governance. The framework is tested in four multinational states: the former Yugoslavia, the former Czechoslovakia, Canada and Spain. The empirical chapters combine structured-focused comparison with longitudinal case study analysis. The cases largely bear out the hypotheses presented in the dissertation. However, analysis of the cases also demonstrates the importance of minority-group influence at the central state level in accounting for accommodative outcomes. In cases where minority elites have extensive influence at the centre, attempts at limiting the autonomy of minority-inhabited regions tend to be unsuccessful. This thesis contributes to a greater understanding of the design and durability of the institutions of territorial autonomy, which have important consequences for the stability and viability of multinational states.
54

Federal Bargaining In Post-soviet Russia: A Comparative Study On Moscow&#039 / s Negotiations With Tatarstan And Bashkortostan

Yalcin, Deniz 01 May 2005 (has links) (PDF)
The objective of this thesis is to examine the nature of federal bargaining in post-Soviet Russia by comparing Moscow&rsquo / s negotiations with Russia&rsquo / s two oil-rich republics in the Middle Volga: Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. In particular, the thesis attempts to explain how Bashkortostan was able to gain autonomy from Moscow that is very close to the level of autonomy enjoyed by Tatarstan, despite the fact that Bashkortostan is clearly in a disadvantageous position when compared to Tatarstan and the Bashkorts form only the third largest ethnic group in the Republic after the Russians and the Tatars. The central hypothesis of this thesis is that sometimes the relatively disadvantageous party in federal bargaining might be given more autonomy not because of its bargaining power, but because of the general bargaining strategy of the federal center. Therefore this thesis is an attempt to understand how Moscow, fearing that Tatarstan might emerge as the hegemonic power in the Middle Volga, sought to strengthen the position of Bashkortostan against Tatarstan, and how the success of the Bashkort political elite to manipulate the weaknesses of Moscow in the post-Soviet arena provided Bashkortostan with more or less same degree of autonomy compared to that of Tatarstan&rsquo / s.
55

Pacto federativo e o desenho institucional brasileiro após 1988

Faria, Giuliana Mendonça de January 2011 (has links)
O Federalismo é uma das formas mais difundidas de organização política, marcado pela coexistência de duas ou mais instâncias de governo, a União e as unidades federadas. Em termos institucionais, um arranjo federal origina-se de um pacto entre unidades territoriais, estabelecido através de um contrato federativo, a Constituição, através da qual, procura-se garantir a participação equânime de todos os entes federados. O Federalismo pressupõe uma divisão de poder entre o governo central e os demais níveis de governo, através da qual, diferentes instâncias de poder moldam as relações intergovernamentais. A busca de um relacionamento intergovernamental, que permita a compatibilização da autonomia e a interdependência de cada ente federativo, evidencia a natureza de conflito inerente aos sistemas federais. Essa natureza de conflito do Federalismo está relacionada com o fato de todo arranjo federal enfrentar um trade-off básico: o risco de um governo central muito forte intimidar os demais níveis de governo, desrespeitando sua autonomia e; o risco de um governo central muito fraco possibilitar o comportamento oportunista e a falta de cooperação dos demais níveis de governo. O objetivo da tese é analisar em que medida as instituições criadas a partir da promulgação da Constituição de 1988 até a instituição da Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF) no ano de 2000, possibilitaram o desenvolvimento de uma trajetória de equilíbrio no arranjo federativo brasileiro. Através de um modelo de teoria dos jogos, propõem-se duas hipóteses sobre quando uma Federação pode ser sustentada em equilíbrio: quando existem incentivos e mecanismos de enforcement para que todos os níveis de governo cumpram as regras e; quando existe renda excedente a ser dividida. O arranjo federativo brasileiro desde sua criação enfrenta o trade-off fundamental do Federalismo, alternando períodos de maior ou menor poder institucional da União, evidenciando dessa maneira o conflito entre a busca de maior autonomia dos governos subnacionais e a natureza centralizadora da União. O arcabouço institucional criado após a promulgação da Constituição de 1988 aumentou o poder dos governos subnacionais vis-à-vis a União, possibilitando que estes níveis de governo adotassem comportamentos oportunistas. Somente a partir da estabilização econômica obtida através do Plano Real e através da criação de mecanismos de enforcement, com destaque para a Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF), a correlação de forças entre a União e os governos subnacionais foi alterada, através do aumento do poder institucional da União, podendo dessa maneira a Federação brasileira ser sustentada em uma trajetória de equilíbrio. / The Federalism is one of the most widespread forms of political organization, marked by the coexistence of two or more levels of government, the Union and federal units. In institutional terms, a federal arrangement stems from a pact between territorial units, established through a federal contract, the Constitution, through which seeks to ensure the equitable participation of all counties. Federalism presupposes a division of power between central government and other levels of government, in which different levels of power mold the intergovernmental relations. The search for an intergovernmental relationship that allows the compatibility of autonomy and interdependence of each federal entity shows the nature of the inherent conflict in federal systems. This kind of conflict is related to the fact that every federal arrangement faces a basic trade-off: the risk of a strong central government intimidate the other levels of government, disrespecting their autonomy and the risk of a weak government behave taking advantage of that and with lack of cooperation with the other levels of government. The aim of the thesis is to analyze the extension of the institutions created from the Constitution of 1988 until the institution of the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF) in 2000, that enabled the development of an equilibrate path to the Brazilian federal arrangement. Through a game theoretic model, we propose two hypotheses about when a federation can be sustained in equilibrium: when there are incentives and enforcement mechanisms for all levels of government abide by the rules and; when there is surplus income to be divided. The Brazilian federal arrangement faces, since its creation, the fundamental trade-off of Federalism, alternating periods of greater or lesser institutional power of the Union, thus highlighting the conflict between the pursuit of greater autonomy of subnational governments and the centralizing nature of the Union. The institutional framework created after the 1988 Constitution increased the power of subnational governments in relation to the Union, enabling these levels of government to adopt opportunistic behaviors. Only after the economic stabilization by the Real Plan and through the creation of enforcement mechanisms, with emphasis on the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF), the balance of power between the Union and the subnational governments has changed in order to sustain the Brazilian Federation in equilibrium path.
56

Pacto federativo e o desenho institucional brasileiro após 1988

Faria, Giuliana Mendonça de January 2011 (has links)
O Federalismo é uma das formas mais difundidas de organização política, marcado pela coexistência de duas ou mais instâncias de governo, a União e as unidades federadas. Em termos institucionais, um arranjo federal origina-se de um pacto entre unidades territoriais, estabelecido através de um contrato federativo, a Constituição, através da qual, procura-se garantir a participação equânime de todos os entes federados. O Federalismo pressupõe uma divisão de poder entre o governo central e os demais níveis de governo, através da qual, diferentes instâncias de poder moldam as relações intergovernamentais. A busca de um relacionamento intergovernamental, que permita a compatibilização da autonomia e a interdependência de cada ente federativo, evidencia a natureza de conflito inerente aos sistemas federais. Essa natureza de conflito do Federalismo está relacionada com o fato de todo arranjo federal enfrentar um trade-off básico: o risco de um governo central muito forte intimidar os demais níveis de governo, desrespeitando sua autonomia e; o risco de um governo central muito fraco possibilitar o comportamento oportunista e a falta de cooperação dos demais níveis de governo. O objetivo da tese é analisar em que medida as instituições criadas a partir da promulgação da Constituição de 1988 até a instituição da Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF) no ano de 2000, possibilitaram o desenvolvimento de uma trajetória de equilíbrio no arranjo federativo brasileiro. Através de um modelo de teoria dos jogos, propõem-se duas hipóteses sobre quando uma Federação pode ser sustentada em equilíbrio: quando existem incentivos e mecanismos de enforcement para que todos os níveis de governo cumpram as regras e; quando existe renda excedente a ser dividida. O arranjo federativo brasileiro desde sua criação enfrenta o trade-off fundamental do Federalismo, alternando períodos de maior ou menor poder institucional da União, evidenciando dessa maneira o conflito entre a busca de maior autonomia dos governos subnacionais e a natureza centralizadora da União. O arcabouço institucional criado após a promulgação da Constituição de 1988 aumentou o poder dos governos subnacionais vis-à-vis a União, possibilitando que estes níveis de governo adotassem comportamentos oportunistas. Somente a partir da estabilização econômica obtida através do Plano Real e através da criação de mecanismos de enforcement, com destaque para a Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF), a correlação de forças entre a União e os governos subnacionais foi alterada, através do aumento do poder institucional da União, podendo dessa maneira a Federação brasileira ser sustentada em uma trajetória de equilíbrio. / The Federalism is one of the most widespread forms of political organization, marked by the coexistence of two or more levels of government, the Union and federal units. In institutional terms, a federal arrangement stems from a pact between territorial units, established through a federal contract, the Constitution, through which seeks to ensure the equitable participation of all counties. Federalism presupposes a division of power between central government and other levels of government, in which different levels of power mold the intergovernmental relations. The search for an intergovernmental relationship that allows the compatibility of autonomy and interdependence of each federal entity shows the nature of the inherent conflict in federal systems. This kind of conflict is related to the fact that every federal arrangement faces a basic trade-off: the risk of a strong central government intimidate the other levels of government, disrespecting their autonomy and the risk of a weak government behave taking advantage of that and with lack of cooperation with the other levels of government. The aim of the thesis is to analyze the extension of the institutions created from the Constitution of 1988 until the institution of the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF) in 2000, that enabled the development of an equilibrate path to the Brazilian federal arrangement. Through a game theoretic model, we propose two hypotheses about when a federation can be sustained in equilibrium: when there are incentives and enforcement mechanisms for all levels of government abide by the rules and; when there is surplus income to be divided. The Brazilian federal arrangement faces, since its creation, the fundamental trade-off of Federalism, alternating periods of greater or lesser institutional power of the Union, thus highlighting the conflict between the pursuit of greater autonomy of subnational governments and the centralizing nature of the Union. The institutional framework created after the 1988 Constitution increased the power of subnational governments in relation to the Union, enabling these levels of government to adopt opportunistic behaviors. Only after the economic stabilization by the Real Plan and through the creation of enforcement mechanisms, with emphasis on the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF), the balance of power between the Union and the subnational governments has changed in order to sustain the Brazilian Federation in equilibrium path.
57

Pacto federativo e o desenho institucional brasileiro após 1988

Faria, Giuliana Mendonça de January 2011 (has links)
O Federalismo é uma das formas mais difundidas de organização política, marcado pela coexistência de duas ou mais instâncias de governo, a União e as unidades federadas. Em termos institucionais, um arranjo federal origina-se de um pacto entre unidades territoriais, estabelecido através de um contrato federativo, a Constituição, através da qual, procura-se garantir a participação equânime de todos os entes federados. O Federalismo pressupõe uma divisão de poder entre o governo central e os demais níveis de governo, através da qual, diferentes instâncias de poder moldam as relações intergovernamentais. A busca de um relacionamento intergovernamental, que permita a compatibilização da autonomia e a interdependência de cada ente federativo, evidencia a natureza de conflito inerente aos sistemas federais. Essa natureza de conflito do Federalismo está relacionada com o fato de todo arranjo federal enfrentar um trade-off básico: o risco de um governo central muito forte intimidar os demais níveis de governo, desrespeitando sua autonomia e; o risco de um governo central muito fraco possibilitar o comportamento oportunista e a falta de cooperação dos demais níveis de governo. O objetivo da tese é analisar em que medida as instituições criadas a partir da promulgação da Constituição de 1988 até a instituição da Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF) no ano de 2000, possibilitaram o desenvolvimento de uma trajetória de equilíbrio no arranjo federativo brasileiro. Através de um modelo de teoria dos jogos, propõem-se duas hipóteses sobre quando uma Federação pode ser sustentada em equilíbrio: quando existem incentivos e mecanismos de enforcement para que todos os níveis de governo cumpram as regras e; quando existe renda excedente a ser dividida. O arranjo federativo brasileiro desde sua criação enfrenta o trade-off fundamental do Federalismo, alternando períodos de maior ou menor poder institucional da União, evidenciando dessa maneira o conflito entre a busca de maior autonomia dos governos subnacionais e a natureza centralizadora da União. O arcabouço institucional criado após a promulgação da Constituição de 1988 aumentou o poder dos governos subnacionais vis-à-vis a União, possibilitando que estes níveis de governo adotassem comportamentos oportunistas. Somente a partir da estabilização econômica obtida através do Plano Real e através da criação de mecanismos de enforcement, com destaque para a Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF), a correlação de forças entre a União e os governos subnacionais foi alterada, através do aumento do poder institucional da União, podendo dessa maneira a Federação brasileira ser sustentada em uma trajetória de equilíbrio. / The Federalism is one of the most widespread forms of political organization, marked by the coexistence of two or more levels of government, the Union and federal units. In institutional terms, a federal arrangement stems from a pact between territorial units, established through a federal contract, the Constitution, through which seeks to ensure the equitable participation of all counties. Federalism presupposes a division of power between central government and other levels of government, in which different levels of power mold the intergovernmental relations. The search for an intergovernmental relationship that allows the compatibility of autonomy and interdependence of each federal entity shows the nature of the inherent conflict in federal systems. This kind of conflict is related to the fact that every federal arrangement faces a basic trade-off: the risk of a strong central government intimidate the other levels of government, disrespecting their autonomy and the risk of a weak government behave taking advantage of that and with lack of cooperation with the other levels of government. The aim of the thesis is to analyze the extension of the institutions created from the Constitution of 1988 until the institution of the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF) in 2000, that enabled the development of an equilibrate path to the Brazilian federal arrangement. Through a game theoretic model, we propose two hypotheses about when a federation can be sustained in equilibrium: when there are incentives and enforcement mechanisms for all levels of government abide by the rules and; when there is surplus income to be divided. The Brazilian federal arrangement faces, since its creation, the fundamental trade-off of Federalism, alternating periods of greater or lesser institutional power of the Union, thus highlighting the conflict between the pursuit of greater autonomy of subnational governments and the centralizing nature of the Union. The institutional framework created after the 1988 Constitution increased the power of subnational governments in relation to the Union, enabling these levels of government to adopt opportunistic behaviors. Only after the economic stabilization by the Real Plan and through the creation of enforcement mechanisms, with emphasis on the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF), the balance of power between the Union and the subnational governments has changed in order to sustain the Brazilian Federation in equilibrium path.
58

American Federalisms and Climate Policy

Shryock, Allison 18 May 2021 (has links)
No description available.
59

LOYALISTS IN WAR, AMERICANS IN PEACE: THE REINTEGRATION OF THE LOYALISTS, 1775-1800

Coleman, Aaron N. 01 January 2008 (has links)
After the American Revolution a number of Loyalists, those colonial Americans who remained loyal to England during the War for Independence, did not relocate to the other dominions of the British Empire. Instead, they sought to return to their homes and restart their lives. Despite fierce opposition to their return from all across the Confederation, their attempts to become part of a newly independent America were generally successful. Thus, after several years of struggle most former Loyalists who wanted to return were able to do so. Various studies have concentrated on the wartime activities of Loyalists, but few have examined their post-war return to America. This dissertation corrects this oversight by tracing the process of the reintegration of the Loyalists. It analyzes this development from a primarily American perspective, although former Loyalists are consistent members of the story. The work considers the emotional significance families and friends played in affecting the desire to return. On the American reception of their former enemies, this work explains that the nascent idea of federalism required the process to occur on a state-by-state basis. Also important to Loyalist assimilation was a critical shift from the republican ideological belief in the necessary of virtue to the survival of the community to a growing awareness, tolerance, and respect for individual rights, for those who held views perhaps inimical to the polity. Critical to the process of reintegration was a jurisprudential transformation from an older, English common law understanding of the law to a more modern view that law is commanded by a sovereign. It is my contention that popular sovereignty drove this transformation and allowed for the wartime legal persecution of the Loyalists, but in order for former Loyalists to peacefully co-exist, popular sovereignty had to be reined in by the very same and new legal ideology that it had helped develop. Finally, the process of reintegration required Americans to permit citizenship to their former traitors. Thus, the dissertation closes by showing the procedure former English subjects underwent to renounce their allegiance to England and become republican citizens.
60

Three Essays on Fiscal Federalism and the Role of Intergovernmental Tranfers

Saunoris, James W 01 January 2012 (has links)
This dissertation is composed of three essays, each examining a unique question relating to the role of intergovernmental transfers in fiscal federalism. Using a panel of the 48 contiguous U.S. states along with recent advances in nonstationary panel and spatial econometric methods this dissertation offers a number of important insights into the workings of intergovernmental transfers and therefore a clearer understanding of the interactions among the different layers of government. The third chapter examines the relationship between intergovernmental revenues from the federal government and intergovernmental expenditures to local governments. As observed by Wildasin (2010), there remains remarkable stability in the ratio of state-tolocal transfers to federal-to-state transfers despite the disparate programs being financed by each. Therefore, the purpose of this essay is to examine the extent to which states serve as a conduit for funds from the federal government to local governments. In particular, the research question asks to what degree do federal transfers stimulate transfers to local governments. The fourth chapter explores the direction of causality between tax revenues and expenditures in answering the four hypotheses set forth in the literature: tax-spend, spend-tax, fiscal synchronization, and institutional separation. Furthermore, along with exploring the role served by intergovernmental transfers within the revenue-expenditure nexus, this essay also examines differences relating to the revenue-expenditure nexus between states with relatively higher debt levels and states with low debt levels, in order to better understand the fiscal causal links favorable for debt accumulation. The purpose of the fifth chapter is to ascertain the effect interstate fiscal interactions on the stimulative effect of grants on state level expenditures. The vast literature on fiscal competition suggests that states do not make decisions in isolation, therefore, spatial econometrics are used to capture spillovers and mimicking behavior across states. Following Boarnet and Glazer (2002), the effect of informational externalities arising from grants awarded to neighboring states are examined as well as the effect of spending spillovers from neighboring states. The results show that the flypaper anomaly (i.e. the stimulative effect of grants greater than a pure income effect) can be explained by interstate fiscal interactions.

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