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In the spring 2004 issue of WeltTrends, Professor Gunther Hellmann made a „plea for offensive idealism“ and „against the power political resocialization of German foreign policy“. To a long-time outside observer of that foreign policy, this plea is unsurprising, but depressing. In keeping with Professor Hellmann’s own willingness, „notwendige Differenzierungen [zu] vernachlässigen zugunsten einer bewussten Zuspitzung“ I will comment on the aspects of his argument that strike an American colleague as particularly disturbing.

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According to the new German defense policy concept, the German armed forces can be deployed abroad in multinational operations to establish security and to manage the aftermath of conflict in crisis areas. This paper investigates different aspects, resulting prospects and consequences connected with this challenge. It focuses on the meaning of intercultural competence with respect to the primary objective of Germany´s foreign deployment policy to achieve sustained, comprehensive and integral crisis prevention, and to generate peace in the 21st century.

In the Spring 2004 issue of WeltTrends, Gunther Hellmann sparked a debate on Germany’s foreign policy. The debate was resumed through the Summer, Fall, Winter and Spring editions (no. 43 to 46) of WeltTrends, which featured articles of German International Relations scholars as well as foreign policy-makers and experts from abroad. In his concluding article, Hellmann seizes the opportunity to outline and comment on some characteristics of the debate as revealed in the contributions of his critics.

Since the end of World War II, through the mandates of Prime Ministers Pierre Trudeau, Brian Mulroney, Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin and Stephen Harper, the Canadian government has found itself in conflict with the US Administration over the question of Arctic sovereignty. This situation is particularly difficult because of the power imbalance between the two countries. Thus, how Canada deals with the US is critical.<p> John Kirton identifies five ways in which Canada manages its differences with the US on foreign policy issues. The first is the process of ad hoc adjustment and problem-solving on individual issues. A second way is by pursuing solutions that achieve integration and cooperation. The third strategy consists of building defences and taking initiatives to reduce Canadas vulnerability to the US. The fourth strategy involves the deliberate influencing of the US domestic policy process in order to create policy that is more advantageous to Canadians.<p> In the fifth strategy, Canada aligns itself with others in the international community, building coalitions that can match the power and strength of the US; but more importantly, it establishes a place for Canada to lead the discussion and pursue its own interests. John Holmes believed that Canadian foreign policy was best served by multilateralism, as Canada often found it difficult to further its own interests within a bilateral framework. Kirton takes Holmes argument one step further by observing that by playing a leadership role in the multilateral arena on specific issues, Canada can help find global solutions that advance Canadian interests.<p> This thesis uses Kirtons analytical framework to examine the strategies that Canada has employed in dealing with conflicts with the US over the Arctic. It examines the Trudeau, Mulroney, Chrétien, Martin and Harper governments and finds a common thread in their approaches. While showing that each one adopted a number of the strategies identified by Kirton, the thesis draws particular attention to their common utilization of the fifth strategy of working with others to reshape the international or global communitys perspective on Arctic issues in the pursuit of Canadian interests.

One way states can mitigate external threats is by entering into military alliances. However, threatened states are reluctant to enter into military alliances because alliance membership can require significant policy concessions. An important and unanswered question is: when will states be willing to make policy concessions in exchange for military alliances? This is the question that is investigated in this project. To address this question I develop a simple three actor bargaining model of alliance formation that endogenizes both external threat and policy concessions. I test the model's implications with two sets of large N analyses and find strong support for the hypotheses. The first set of empirical analyses uses a novel research design that takes into account the attributes of challengers to evaluate states' alliance formation decisions. The second set is based on the same research design and provides one of the first analyses of foreign policy concessions among alliance members. The results suggest that threatened states are willing to make more concessions in exchange for an alliance when they are unlikely to defeat their challengers alone and when their allies have a large effect on their probability of defeating their challengers. This research highlights both the security and non-security motivations for alliance formation and demonstrates that alliances have important influences beyond international security.

This dissertation investigates implementation problems in economic sanctions and how a state's concerns about policy implementation affect its decisions and the outcomes of sanctions. This study builds on the premise that sanctions are carried out by firms within a sanctioning state, not the state itself. First, using a game-theoretical model, I show that firms' non-compliance with sanction policies not only undermines the effectiveness of unilateral sanctions, but also has a counter-intuitive effect on a sanctioning state's decision to impose sanctions. The model suggests that a state is more likely to impose sanctions when it anticipates firms' non-compliance. A number of empirical implications are derived from the model and corroborated with data. Second, this study also investigates a sanctioning state's decision to sanction multilaterally or unilaterally, and how its expectations about the enforcement of sanctions influence this decision. When the enforcement of unilateral sanctions is expected to be difficult, the state is more likely to sanction multilaterally, but only when it has enough resources and the bureaucratic capability to help other states enforce their sanctions. The empirical evidence also buttresses these theoretical results. This study highlights the importance of incorporating expectations about enforcement into a full understanding of the sanctions processes. The conclusion is that states' ability to influence firms' decisions at home as well as abroad is a crucial determinant of whether they impose, how they design, and the effectiveness of sanctions.

The chief purpose of this study is to develop a theoretical framework which can contribute to a broader theoretical understanding of the actions of the U.N. Security Council and its members. The framework rests upon a rationalistic foundation and it is set up with two different models of explanation; a first with focus on power and security and the second which is an institutional explanation. The framework is then applied on a case study in which the behavior of theUnited Statesand theUnited Kingdomin the Security Council are explained. The outcome of the paper is worth mentioning that the member nations have find the Security Council to be an important institution and that there is an apprehension of the precedential power of the institution. The study also points out that a permanent member is more likely to use its veto when there are strong national reasons of so doing. In general the developed theoretical framework seems to be well appropriate to explain states behavior in the Security Council and may provide a foundation for further theoretical studies on the subject.