One way states can mitigate external threats is by entering into military alliances. However, threatened states are reluctant to enter into military alliances because alliance membership can require significant policy concessions. An important and unanswered question is: when will states be willing to make policy concessions in exchange for military alliances? This is the question that is investigated in this project. To address this question I develop a simple three actor bargaining model of alliance formation that endogenizes both external threat and policy concessions. I test the model's implications with two sets of large N analyses and find strong support for the hypotheses. The first set of empirical analyses uses a novel research design that takes into account the attributes of challengers to evaluate states' alliance formation decisions. The second set is based on the same research design and provides one of the first analyses of foreign policy concessions among alliance members. The results suggest that threatened states are willing to make more concessions in exchange for an alliance when they are unlikely to defeat their challengers alone and when their allies have a large effect on their probability of defeating their challengers. This research highlights both the security and non-security motivations for alliance formation and demonstrates that alliances have important influences beyond international security.

The aim of this report is to explain the effect and the outcome of the Swedish-Finnish military cooperation and propose political courses of action to improve its deterrent qualities. It gives an extensive background on the defense policies in Sweden and Finland after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the Treaty of Warsaw with a focus on the two countries reactions to Russian aggression in Georgia and the Ukraine. The report establishes that the cooperation is in fact a military alliance and analyzes the cooperation from a realistic perspective with elements based on social constructivism. Official documents, laws and legal documents are examined and an interview with a senior ranking Swedish military officer is made to provide the necessary factual base and input for the analysis. The analysis is performed with a view to both a short term and a long-term perspective. This report concludes that there is need for a binding treaty between the two countries concerning military assistance in case of an armed conflict with Russia. That there is urgent need especially for Sweden to increase defense spending. But also, that a military alliance between the two countries is a rational and politically sound idea. The cooperation should focus on mutual defense plans to increase military effectiveness, economic efficiency, and political resolve in the alliance.

This thesis aims to analyze the evolution of the security policies of Finland and Sweden within the European Union (EU) with a comparative perspective. The main argument of this thesis is that increasing European integration in the field of security and defense may lead to adaptations and modifications in the security policy formulations of two militarily non-allied EU member states, Finland and Sweden. However, the nature and extent of these adaptations will depend on each state&rsquo / s own security policy perspective and own perception of the ongoing European security integration. This thesis seeks answers to questions such as &ldquo / How does the policy of non-participation in military alliances affect these countries&rsquo / standpoints and their participation in general in the EU&rsquo / s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and in the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP)?,&rdquo / &ldquo / How do Finland and Sweden interpret and apply this policy perspective within the CFSP, and in the CESDP?&rdquo / and &ldquo / What does membership of the EU imply for the policies of the militarily non-allied countries?.&rdquo / This thesis consists of nine chapters. The second chapter gives the conceptual framework of this thesis. The third chapter focuses on the evolution of their neutrality policies until the Second World War while the fourth one presents the evolution of their security policies from the Second World War until the end of the Cold War. The fifth chapter covers the transition period from their neutrality policy to their EU membership, while the sixth chapter focuses on the evolution of their security policies especially within the CESDP. The seventh chapter draws attention to their new security policy agenda and the eighth chapter presents the comparative analysis of their security policies in the EU. The ninth, and concluding chapter, offers an overall comparative perspective about the respective security policy profiles of the two countries within the EU. This thesis has reached the conclusion that owing to their different histories, geopolitical positions and security policy concerns during the Cold War, their ways of adapting to the changes within the EU were inclined to be different too. Even though their entry to the EU in 1995 may be accepted as the starting-point for the potential future convergence of their security policies, the similarities in their security policy considerations do not outweigh the differences for the time being.

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Cette thèse étudie la dynamique entre les États-Unis et ses alliés privilégiés lorsque la coopération militaire est en jeu. Nous y proposons que les attentes de l’allié principal déterminent le niveau de coopération des autres pays mais que deux variables intermédiaires - la cohésion du gouvernement et la capacité militaire de l’allié - en déterminent l’exécution. Cette analyse porte aussi sur les stratégies utilisées par les états secondaires pour accroître leur pouvoir dans cette relation asymétrique : initier des négociations bilatérales dans le but d’obtenir des concessions stratégiques, faire valoir leur point de vue par le biais d’organisations internationales ou, encore, évoquer des principes d’ordre éthique et moral. Même si les alliés secondaires peuvent rarement influencer l’allié dominant, ils ont néanmoins la capacité d’agir de façon autonome et de résister aux pressions du plus fort. L’argument de la thèse repose sur trois propositions : dans une alliance asymétrique, les pays ne partagent pas nécessairement la même perception des menaces au niveau international; en cas de désaccord, le résultat des négociations entre alliés ne favorise pas toujours le partenaire dominant ; au moment de la prise de décision en matière de politique étrangère, l’allié secondaire doit protéger sa réputation en tant qu’allié fiable face à l’allié dominant, mais il doit en peser l’impact politique au niveau national. L’analyse théorique de ces alliances asymétrique s’inspire du réalisme néoclassique ce qui nous permet de mieux comprendre la relation entre les variables systémiques et étatiques. L’apport de cette recherche se situe au niveau de l’étude théorique des alliances militaires et de la prise de décision en politique étrangère et de défense. La recherche porte sur le comportement des alliés secondaires qui doivent réagir aux décisions prises par les États-Unis en temps de menace, en étudiant l’interaction entre variables étatiques et contraintes systémiques. Afin de préciser le lien causal entre la perception des menaces, les attentes de l’alliance et les contraintes du pays secondaire nous avons appliqué une méthode comparative en étudiant trois cas : La Grande Bretagne, le Canada, et l’Australie, et la réponse de chacun à l’appel de participer à la guerre en Afghanistan et en Iraq de 2001 à 2003. L’étude cible la prise de décision devant le choix de participer ou de ne pas participer dans une mobilisation conjointe avec les États-Unis. Le processus décisionnel est observé du point de vue de l’allié secondaire et nous permet de mesurer les facteurs explicatifs qui ont motivé la décision en vue d’une coopération militaire. / This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two intervening variables - the level of government cohesion and military capabilities - determine its implementation. This study also shows how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through bilateral concessions, international organizations and by appealing to principle. The focus of the research is on special allies, as they have the most to gain or lose by going along with American plans. My contention is that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively, but they can act autonomously and resist to pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner. The argument builds on three central claims. First, power asymmetries between allies translate into different assessments of international threats. Second, when disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Third, secondary states, as opposed to the dominant partner, face unique constraints when facing major foreign policy decisions, i.e. they face a trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner in a politically feasible way while minimizing domestic audience costs. To examine the theoretical puzzle presented by asymmetric military cooperation, I introduce a causal explanation that builds on neoclassical realism, to zone in on the interaction between systemic and domestic variables. My research makes a contribution to alliance theory and foreign policy decision-making by studying how special allies respond to American decisions in times of threat and how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables. To investigate the causal link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints, this study relies on the method of structured focused comparison with three detailed case studies. The focus is on the initial decision made by special allies regarding whether or not to participle in joint mobilization with the United States. The decision-making process is presented from the perspective of secondary allied states and measures the explanatory factors that motivated the decision on military cooperation. The case studies are the UK, Canada and Australia’s response to the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq during the period of 2001 to 2003.

Cette thèse étudie la dynamique entre les États-Unis et ses alliés privilégiés lorsque la coopération militaire est en jeu. Nous y proposons que les attentes de l’allié principal déterminent le niveau de coopération des autres pays mais que deux variables intermédiaires - la cohésion du gouvernement et la capacité militaire de l’allié - en déterminent l’exécution. Cette analyse porte aussi sur les stratégies utilisées par les états secondaires pour accroître leur pouvoir dans cette relation asymétrique : initier des négociations bilatérales dans le but d’obtenir des concessions stratégiques, faire valoir leur point de vue par le biais d’organisations internationales ou, encore, évoquer des principes d’ordre éthique et moral. Même si les alliés secondaires peuvent rarement influencer l’allié dominant, ils ont néanmoins la capacité d’agir de façon autonome et de résister aux pressions du plus fort. L’argument de la thèse repose sur trois propositions : dans une alliance asymétrique, les pays ne partagent pas nécessairement la même perception des menaces au niveau international; en cas de désaccord, le résultat des négociations entre alliés ne favorise pas toujours le partenaire dominant ; au moment de la prise de décision en matière de politique étrangère, l’allié secondaire doit protéger sa réputation en tant qu’allié fiable face à l’allié dominant, mais il doit en peser l’impact politique au niveau national. L’analyse théorique de ces alliances asymétrique s’inspire du réalisme néoclassique ce qui nous permet de mieux comprendre la relation entre les variables systémiques et étatiques. L’apport de cette recherche se situe au niveau de l’étude théorique des alliances militaires et de la prise de décision en politique étrangère et de défense. La recherche porte sur le comportement des alliés secondaires qui doivent réagir aux décisions prises par les États-Unis en temps de menace, en étudiant l’interaction entre variables étatiques et contraintes systémiques. Afin de préciser le lien causal entre la perception des menaces, les attentes de l’alliance et les contraintes du pays secondaire nous avons appliqué une méthode comparative en étudiant trois cas : La Grande Bretagne, le Canada, et l’Australie, et la réponse de chacun à l’appel de participer à la guerre en Afghanistan et en Iraq de 2001 à 2003. L’étude cible la prise de décision devant le choix de participer ou de ne pas participer dans une mobilisation conjointe avec les États-Unis. Le processus décisionnel est observé du point de vue de l’allié secondaire et nous permet de mesurer les facteurs explicatifs qui ont motivé la décision en vue d’une coopération militaire. / This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two intervening variables - the level of government cohesion and military capabilities - determine its implementation. This study also shows how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through bilateral concessions, international organizations and by appealing to principle. The focus of the research is on special allies, as they have the most to gain or lose by going along with American plans. My contention is that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively, but they can act autonomously and resist to pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner. The argument builds on three central claims. First, power asymmetries between allies translate into different assessments of international threats. Second, when disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Third, secondary states, as opposed to the dominant partner, face unique constraints when facing major foreign policy decisions, i.e. they face a trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner in a politically feasible way while minimizing domestic audience costs. To examine the theoretical puzzle presented by asymmetric military cooperation, I introduce a causal explanation that builds on neoclassical realism, to zone in on the interaction between systemic and domestic variables. My research makes a contribution to alliance theory and foreign policy decision-making by studying how special allies respond to American decisions in times of threat and how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables. To investigate the causal link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints, this study relies on the method of structured focused comparison with three detailed case studies. The focus is on the initial decision made by special allies regarding whether or not to participle in joint mobilization with the United States. The decision-making process is presented from the perspective of secondary allied states and measures the explanatory factors that motivated the decision on military cooperation. The case studies are the UK, Canada and Australia’s response to the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq during the period of 2001 to 2003.

Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka den svenska utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken i skenet av ett allt mer spänt omvärldsläge. Vi vill undersöka de bakomliggande faktorerna till den svenska alliansfria hållningen i perioden 2008-2017, där Sverige ingår militära samarbeten och gör tydliga solidaritetsförklaringar men samtidigt stint håller fast vid alliansfriheten. Vilket ger två forskningsfrågor. Hur har svensk syn på militära samarbeten och allianser i utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken utvecklats i perioden 2008-2017? och Hur förklaras å ena sidan Sveriges officiella och strikta militära alliansfrihet samt å andra sidan Sveriges ökade militära samarbeten? För att finna svar på forskningsfrågorna har vi genomfört en enfallsstudie där fallet utgörs av allianspolitik och analysenheten är Sverige. Undersökning är gjord i två steg med beskrivande analys av det empiriska underlaget och en förklarande analys som är hypotesprövande. De hypoteser som prövas är två realistiska hypoteser ur teorier kring makt- och hotbalansering samt en socialpsykologisk hypotes ur teori kring perceptioner. Undersökningsmaterielat är avgränsat till utrikesdeklarationer samt debattartiklar, tal, uttalanden och pressmedelande från sittande regerings stats- utrikes- och försvarsminister i perioden 2008-2017. I undersökningen har vi kommit fram till att farhågan att tappa sin handlingsfrihet och sin oberoende röst i världen gör att Sverige gärna ingår militära samarbeten, men fortsätter kalla sig alliansfria. / The purpose of this essay is to analyze the Swedish foreign and security policy in the light of an increasingly tense regional situation. We want to analyze the underlying factors for the Swedish alliance-free stance in the period 2008-2017, where Sweden is part of military cooperation and makes clear statements of solidarity, while at the same time maintaining the freedom of alliance. Which gives two research questions. How has Swedish view of military cooperation and alliances in foreign and security policy developed in the period 2008-2017? and How is Sweden's official and strict military alliance freedom and Sweden's increased military cooperation, on the one hand, explained? To answer the research questions we have conducted a single case study where the case is alliance policy and the analysis unit is Sweden. Analysis is divided in two steps with descriptive analysis of the empirical basis and an explanatory analysis that is hypothesis testing. The hypotheses being tested are two realistic hypotheses from theories of power and threat balancing, as well as a social psychological hypothesis from the theory of perceptions. Investigation material is limited to foreign declarations, as well as debate articles, speeches, statements and press releases from the seat minister of state, foreign affairs and defense in the period 2008-2017.In the study we have come to the conclusion that daring to lose its freedom of action and its independent voice in the world makes Sweden happy to join military cooperation, but continues to call itself alliance free.

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