From 1994, the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) undertook a number of cooperative regional military projects with the support of numerous Western countries. In particular, the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) was an example of efficient Western defence cooperation to generate outcomes in order to achieve military and political goals. BALTBAT became the template for other Baltic programmes: the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) and the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL). This thesis analysed the Baltic programmes, particularly BALTBAT, as a case study for identifying the elements of a model for effective military assistance projects. The focus was on the broad political decisions agreed upon by the donor and recipient states, such as the selection of development of peacekeeping capabilities, as the basis for military assistance, which provided the foundation for these initiatives. The value of the Baltic programmes as a case study and basis for identifying the elements of a model was enhanced by the fact that they succeeded at a delicate time in a sensitive region. The Baltic states had virtually no military forces upon regaining independence. Russia objected to Baltic state membership in NATO and was sensitive about a build-up of military capabilities close to Russian borders. In spite of these obstacles, the Baltic projects achieved outcomes which supported the military and political goals of the donor and recipient states. Analysis of the Baltic projects highlighted the importance of broad political decisions between donor and recipient states for military assistance initiatives. It also indicated the major factors (subsequently called Mechanisms) resulting from those decisions which were important to the outcomes from these programmes. These Mechanisms comprise the elements of a model which could be of value to academics and practitioners working in the area of military assistance.

This descriptive study focuses on analyzing the factors influencing public debate on intensified Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation, using qualitative abductive content analysis (a combination of Grounded theory analysis and text/content analysis) as the research method. The study was conducted using a model adapted from Tomas Valasek’s hypothesis on pooling and sharing (Surviving Austerity - The case for a new approach to EU military collaboration, 2011), inducted from a corpus collected from Finnish and Swedish public defence debates from 1.1.2013 to 31.3.2014. The main research question is: what are the driving forces influencing debate on intensified bilateral Finnish-Swedish defence. Secondary research questions were developed from the corpus in four categories: historical, political/military, economic and attitudinal factors. Using these as the analysis model, the corpus was deductively analyzed to increase understanding of the individual factors and to find driving forces. The main result of this study is that the existence or lack of trust is seen as a key driving force influencing debate, either furthering or hindering cooperation. Other driving forces seen as influencing debate are the existence or lack of: understanding of the historical background of cooperation from both countries’ point of view commitment and clarity of political/military goals political commitment to the political/military purposes of cooperation instead of domestic economic gain a legally binding framework for cooperation.

From 1994, the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) undertook a number of cooperative regional military projects with the support of numerous Western countries. In particular, the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) was an example of efficient Western defence cooperation to generate outcomes in order to achieve military and political goals. BALTBAT became the template for other Baltic programmes: the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) and the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL). This thesis analysed the Baltic programmes, particularly BALTBAT, as a case study for identifying the elements of a model for effective military assistance projects. The focus was on the broad political decisions agreed upon by the donor and recipient states, such as the selection of development of peacekeeping capabilities, as the basis for military assistance, which provided the foundation for these initiatives. The value of the Baltic programmes as a case study and basis for identifying the elements of a model was enhanced by the fact that they succeeded at a delicate time in a sensitive region. The Baltic states had virtually no military forces upon regaining independence. Russia objected to Baltic state membership in NATO and was sensitive about a build-up of military capabilities close to Russian borders. In spite of these obstacles, the Baltic projects achieved outcomes which supported the military and political goals of the donor and recipient states. Analysis of the Baltic projects highlighted the importance of broad political decisions between donor and recipient states for military assistance initiatives. It also indicated the major factors (subsequently called Mechanisms) resulting from those decisions which were important to the outcomes from these programmes. These Mechanisms comprise the elements of a model which could be of value to academics and practitioners working in the area of military assistance.

From especially the 1950's, campaigns had been launched by the Afro-Asian nations in the United Nations for the institution of mandatory sanctions against South Africa. In all the early campaigns, South Africa had rather enjoyed the support of the United States, although the latter had always verbally condemned the South African policy of apartheid. When Kennedy became United States president in January 1961, this fact was due to change. In August 1963, an arms embargo was instituted against South Africa by the Kennedy Administration in an attempt to bring the verbal condemnation of apartheid in line with active action. The arms embargo, although not mandatory, was the first concrete, practical step taken by the United States in its opposition to the apartheid policy of the South African Government. In 1977 the embargo was strengthened to become a mandatory one. The purpose of this study is to analyse the institution as well as the implementation of the arms embargo by the different United States Administrations up to 1977. By doing that, the observer can judge the relative commitment of the United States to the arms embargo from president to president, thus drawing a wide conclusion on the role that South Africa played in the foreign policy objectives of the United States in the years that the arms embargo was in effect. The Afro-Asian clearly had an impact on the formulation of this policy, and part of the purpose of this study is to establish just how big that impact was. In order to do this, a wide selection of archival material as well as newspaper reports, articles in journals, governmental publications and some secondary sources were researched. The outcome is the conclusion that although the different United States Administrations from Kennedy to Carter generally adhered to the arms embargo, the implementation there-of depended mainly on what role the embargo played in the foreign policy objectives of each of these Administrations. For some, like Nixon and Ford, the strategic importance of South Africa weighed heavier than gaining the favour of the African nations, in comparison with Kennedy and Johnson who followed a midway. They didn't want to loose the privileges that the United States had in South Africa, while at the same time they wanted to appease the African countries in the United Nations. In the case of Carter, the implementation of the arms embargo was directly based on gaining the favour of the African nations, resulting in the institution of a mandatory arms embargo in October 1977. A future study on the role of that embargo in the formulation of the United States foreign policy, will be conducted as continuation of this study. / Vanaf die 1950's veral, is uitgebreide veldtogte deur die Afro-Asiatiese Iande in die Verenigde Nasies vir die instelling van verpligte sanksies teen Suid Afrika gevoer. In al die vroeere veldtogte, het laasgenoemde voortdurend die ondersteuning van die Verenigde State van Amerika (VSA) geniet, alhoewel daardie land altyd die SuidAfrikaanse apartheidsbeleid mondeling veroordeel het. In Januarie 1961 het Kennedy die president van die VSA geword, en daarmee het die ondersteuning van Suid-Afrika stadig maar seker begin afneem. In Augustus 1963 het die Kennedy-administrasie 'n wapenverbod teen Suid-Afrika ingestel in 'n paging om die mondelinge veroordeling van apartheid in lyn te bring met aktiewe optrede. Die wapenverbod, alhoewel dit nie verpligtend was nie, was die eerste konkrete, praktiese stap wat deur die VSA in sy opposisie teen die apartheidsbeleid van die Suid-Afrikaanse regering geneem is. In 1977 is die verbod uitgebrei na 'n verpligte een. Die doel van hierdie studie is om die instelling sowel as die implementering van die wapenverbod deur die verskillende Amerikaanse Administrasies tot en met 1977, te analiseer. Deur dit te doen, kan die navorser die relatiewe verbintenis van die VSA tot die wapenverbod beoordeel en sodoende 'n wye gevolgtrekking maak oor die rol wat SuidAfrika gespeel het in die buitelandse beleidsdoelwitte van die VSA gedurende die jare wat die verbod ingestel was. Die Afro-Asiatiese nasies het beslis 'n impak gehad op die formulering van hierdie buitelandse beleid, en deel van die doelwit van hierdie studie is om te bepaal hoe groat daardie impak werklik was. Ten einde by h!_erdie gevolgtrekking te kon uitkom, is 'n wye verskeidenheid argivale materiaal sowel as koerantberigte, tydskrifartikels, regeringspublikasies en literatuur bestudeer. Die uitkoms van hierdie navorsing is die gevolgtrekking dat alhoewel die verskillende VSA regerings vanaf Kennedy tot Carter oor die algemeen die wapenverbod ondersteun het, die implementering daarvan hoofsaaklik afhanklik was van die rol wat die verbod in die buitelandse beleidsdoelwitte van elkeen van hierdie Administrasies gespeel het. Vir party, soos byvoorbeeld Nixon en Ford, het die strategiese waarde van Suid-Afrika vir die VSA swaarder geweeg as die guns van die Afrikalande, in vergelyking met Kennedy en Johnson wat 'n middeweg gevolg het. Hulle wou nie die voordele wat die VSA in SuidAfrika gehad het, verloor nie, maar terselfdertyd wou hulle ook die Afrikalande tevrede stel. In die geval van Carter, was die implementering van die wapenverbod direk gebaseer op die guns wat die VSA in die Afrikalande kon geniet. Dit het gelei tot die instelling van 'n verpligte wapenverbod teen Suid-Afrika in Oktober 1977. 'n Verdere studie oor die rol wat daardie verbod in die formulering van die Amerikaanse buitelandse beleid gespeel het, sal as 'n opvolg tot hierdie studie onderneem word. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 1998. / Historical and Heritage Studies / MA / Unrestricted

Europe is currently in a stage of increased military spending due to greater insecurity in the region. Previous studies claim that one consequence of such an increase may be greater reliance on the military in matters that had previously been handled by civil agencies. Are societies in Europe facing a change in which the military will be more involved in crisis incident response? The purpose of this study is to examine if the role of the military in a society depends on the level of militarization of the country. With the foundational question of why the military has different roles within different societies, this study focuses on civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) dealing with CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear)-related issues, in order to investigate the possible relationship between CIMIC and militarization. Empirical data from countries with high- and low levels of militarization are collected, and thereafter analyzed and categorized into “ideal types” of CIMIC. The forms of each country are then compared and put in the context of militarization in order to answer the foundational question. This study initiates the closing of a research gap regarding examination and analysis of the relationship between militarization and CIMIC during CBRN incident response. Additionally, this study marks the initial development of a method, including new “ideal types”, that enables the comparison of CIMIC, opening new doors for analysis of civil-military cooperation.

Humanitarian logistics is a young science and complex discipline compared to business logistics because not only are actors in that arena compelled to work with outmost speed in interrupted environments having undetermined demand, they are also forced to work closely with other unknown players. Even more complex are civil-military relations because as studies show, the differences between these two humanitarian actors run deep to include contrasting missions, humanitarian principles, organizational and cultural differences. The purpose of this work is to examine civil-military relations during the preparedness and response phases of humanitarian crises. We developed a frame of reference, set forth some operational and theoretical definitions, examined overlapping supply chains, modeled organizational structures and coordination mechanisms, established civil-military cooperation framework, disaster cycle studies and proposed a working model. Our methodology included primary data collection through an empirical study of two NGOs and the military force through a series of interviews. Data culled was then analyzed in conjunction with the models and literature outlined in the frame of reference. Based on our analysis, a number of observations were made in the conclusion. To begin with a number of strategies are employed during the preparedness and response phase where speed and agility are crucial. Also, overlapping roles between the military and NGOs have both positive and negative impact. Different organizational structures and funding outlay mean differences abound in how actors coordinate activities and share information. Cooperation, trust, information sharing and coordination are closely linked when finding a strategic fit among actors. In spite of the attempt at seeking a right formula for civil-military relations, it would be erroneous to ‘standardize’ relations as no two cases are ever the same.

<p>Humanitarian logistics is a young science and complex discipline compared to business logistics because not only are actors in that arena compelled to work with outmost speed in <em>interrupted </em>environments having undetermined demand, they are also forced to work closely with other unknown players. Even more complex are civil-military relations because as studies show, the differences between these two humanitarian actors run deep to include contrasting missions, humanitarian principles, organizational and cultural differences.</p><p>The purpose of this work is to examine civil-military relations during the preparedness and response phases of humanitarian crises. We developed a frame of reference, set forth some operational and theoretical definitions, examined overlapping supply chains, modeled organizational structures and coordination mechanisms, established civil-military cooperation framework, disaster cycle studies and proposed a working model.</p><p>Our methodology included primary data collection through an empirical study of two NGOs and the military force through a series of interviews. Data culled was then analyzed in conjunction with the models and literature outlined in the frame of reference.</p><p>Based on our analysis, a number of observations were made in the conclusion. To begin with a number of strategies are employed during the preparedness and response phase where speed and agility are crucial. Also, overlapping roles between the military and NGOs have both positive and negative impact. Different organizational structures and funding outlay mean differences abound in how actors coordinate activities and share information. Cooperation, trust, information sharing and coordination are closely linked when finding a strategic fit among actors. In spite of the attempt at seeking a right formula for civil-military relations, it would be erroneous to ‘standardize’ relations as no two cases are ever the same.</p>

The research conducted for this master’s thesis determined that the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) current participation in military operations other than war (MOOTW) does not make significant contributions to its ability to develop its capability to conduct a large-scale war. Research was performed on the PLA’s MOOTW missions from 2008 in the areas of humanitarian aid and disaster response (HA/DR), noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), and counterpiracy. General trends indicated that the PLA’s participation in these operations improved basic military capabilities that are fundamental to performing advanced tactics, but did not directly contribute to its ability to dominate air, land, and sea domains. Research also concluded that China is extremely concerned about how the international community views its role as a responsible stakeholder as an emerging global power. Consequently, the U.S. should be concerned with China’s growing capability to project goodwill as a result of its rapid military modernization. Besides the obvious military competition presented by the PLA’s modernization efforts, the U.S. should share an equal, if not greater concern for the resultant global political competition from China. This research develops a military cooperation framework based on the comparison of relative political goals and political interests between two nations. When applied to Sino-U.S. relations, it presents a spectrum of options available to U.S. decision makers, but suggests that U.S. should only participate in military cooperation with the PLA if there are relative political advantages to the U.S. Finally, it warns against decisions made out of the convenience of short-term interest alignment that do not contribute to solutions for achieving long term political goals.

Les relations internationales du Brésil sont marquées par l’omniprésence états-unienne. Nous proposons ici de déconstruire en partie cette perspective, à l’appui d’archives inédites issues des ministères français des Affaires étrangères et de la Défense. Durant les années 50, 60 et 70, la France a envoyé ses plus grands spécialistes du renseignement au Brésil. Issus d’horizons politiques très différents, ces hommes ont assuré le transfert des doctrines coloniales de l’armée française vers l’armée brésilienne mais ils ont aussi créé des débouchés pour les industries françaises reconstituées dans l’après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. En moins de vingt ans, l’armée française a entièrement remodelé la perception que les militaires brésiliens avaient de leur rôle. La technologie exportée n’était pas uniquement matérielle ; politique, elle a permis la construction d’un nouvel édifice militaire, fondé sur le principe de la guerre anti-subversive, sur l’action des services de renseignement et sur l’hégémonie des groupes industriels liés à l’armement. En ce sens, la France a largement contribué à ce que l’armée brésilienne atteigne son autonomie stratégique. Pourtant, sa technologie n’a pas apporté que des résultats positifs. Bien au contraire, à l’instar des guerres menées par l’armée française dans les colonies, la guerre anti-subversive au Brésil a refondu la société brésilienne. / Brazil's international relations are characterized by the overwhelming presence of the United States of America, both in terms of specialized bibliography and in the writings of the political actors involved. In this thesis we propose to put this established perspective into question, with the help of archives we found in the libraries of the French Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defense which had never been studied previously. In the 1950s, 60s and 70s, France sent their best experts in information to Brazil. They came from very different political backgrounds; their mission was to pass on the colonial doctrines of the French Army to the Brazilian officers. They also created new outlets for the recently reformed French industries which had suffered great losses in the War. Within less than twenty years, the French Army has thoroughly reshaped the perception Brazilian officers entertained of their own role. The exported technology was not only of a material nature : it was also a political technology which paved the way for a new military edifice, based on the principle of the anti-subversive war, on the action of the information services and on the leading role given to the industrial groups linked with the armament sector. Thus, France can be said to have greatly contributed to the process leading to the strategic autonomy of the Brazilian Army. And yet, France's imported technologies did not only bring about positive results. On the contrary, as in the wars led by France in the colonies, the anti-subversive war in Brazil has deeply restructured the former Brazilian society.

Initiée dans les années 1960 avec les indépendances des territoires de l’ancien empire français, la coopération de défense a permis à la France ancienne puissance coloniale de continuer à maintenir son influence en Afrique tout en participant à la construction d’armées nationales africaines autonomes. Malheureusement, certains choix politiques et militaires de la France, les risques d’instrumentalisation d’un engagement strictement bilatéral, ont révélé l’archaïsme des relations France-Afrique et engendré la crise de la coopération. Devenue inadaptée en raison des bouleversements du champ politique international intervenus dans les années 1990 caractérisé par la fin de la bipolarisation, la coopération de défense France-Afrique a souffert de la compétition internationale, de l’adhésion de l’Afrique à la mondialisation et à de nouvelles solidarités internationales, et de la menace terroriste.En souscrivant à l’approche réaliste de sécurité, en considérant la théorie politico-sociologique constructiviste de l’intérêt national défendue par Alexander Wendt d’une part, et le concept de complexe régional de sécurité de Barry Buzan d’autre, cette étude se propose de montrer comment la France met en oeuvre une nouvelle politique de sécurité et de défense sur la base de nouveaux accords de défense en Afrique, continent le plus proche de l’Europe dans un contexte de rupture stratégique avérée et de menace contre la sécurité. Après avoir défini celle-ci dans un contexte régional global, cette étude démontre les stratégies de la France et des puissances internationales dans la gestion des conflits et la prévention des crises en Afrique dans un partenariat qui soit à la fois transparent et efficace. / Established in the 1960s with the independence of territories of the former French empire, the defense cooperation allowed the old French, colonial power to continue to maintain its influence in Africa, while at the same time establishing autonomous national African armies. Unfortunately some of the political and military choices made by France and the instrumentalization risks of a strictly bilateral involvement, have revealed the archaism of French – African relations, and have generated a crisis in cooperation. Having become inadequate due to changes in the international political arena that occurred in the 1990s characterized by the end of bipolarity, the French defense cooperation African has suffered from international competition from the commitment of African States to the effective exercise of their sovereignty as well as their full involvement in globalization and in new areas of solidarity and international cooperation, and from terrorist threats.In subscribing to the realist security approach, and considering the political-sociological constructivist theory of national interest defended by Alexander Wendt on the one hand, and on the other hand the regional security complex concept by Barry Buzan, this study proposes to show how France has put in place a new security policy based on new defense agreements in Africa, the continent closest to Europe in a context of proven strategic breakdown and security threats. Defined in a global regional context, this study demonstrates the strategy of France for security in Africa in a partnership that should be both transparent and efficient.