This thesis is focused on Virginia Woolf¡¦s mourning in her Mrs. Dalloway and To the Lighthouse based on the theory of the work of mourning. Since Freud¡¦s grounding essay, ¡§Mourning and Melancholia¡¨ first appeared in 1918, numerous critics, like John Bowlby and Therese Rando, have followed Freud¡¦s path to study the process of the work of mourning. Julia kristeva also proposes ¡§the sublimatory hold over the lost Thing¡¨ as a way of curbing mourning. In To the Lighthouse, Virginia Woolf restarts her work of mourning, which she fails when her mother, Julia Stephen dies. Woolf writes down and expresses her memories and affections of her mother through her fictional surrogate, Lily Briscoe. Through Lily¡¦s completion of her painting in the end of the novel, Woolf also completes her own work, not only the work of art but also her belated work of mourning. The reason that Woolf writes about her work of mourning in a belated time is that she has not find an appropriate voice of her own to speak out her mind. It is until the creation of Mrs. Dalloway, in which she experiments with the technique of stream-of-consciousness, that Woolf finds a voice of her own. As a result, after the composition of Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf starts her work of mourning in To the Lighthouse. The first chapter begins with an introduction to the theories of mourning and Robert Humsphrey¡¦s theory of the techniques of stream-of-consciousness in modern novel. The second chapter is the discussion of Mrs. Dalloway. By means of her experiment of the new technique of narration, Woolf is able to reveal her belief of the work of mourning through the doubling of the sane Clarissa Dalloway and the insane Septimus, that any suppression of the work of mourning may cause insanity. The third chapter explains how Woolf restarts her belated work of mourning in To the Lighthouse. Since some of the plots of the novel derive from Woolf¡¦s own experiences, verbalizing her past is Woolf¡¦s first step of her work of mourning. Moreover, Woolf expresses her feelings and sentiments for her mother, represented as Mrs. Ramsay, through Lily Briscoe, the surrogate mourner in the novel. By means of the technique of stream-of-consciousness, Woolf is able to speak out her true thoughts about her mother through Lily¡¦s observation of Mrs. Ramsay. Therefore, in the end of the novel, Woolf and her surrogate, Lily, are finally able to finish their own work of art and of mourning as the story ends. In the last chapter, I suggest that Woolf¡¦s new invention of the technique of stream-of-consciousness as her own voice in Mrs. Dalloway initiates her next novel, To the Lighthouse. This is why Woolf restarts her work of mourning of her mother three decades later¡Xbecause she is finally able to speak of her own.

Dans cette thèse, nous traitons du transfert, concept fondamental de la psychanalyse, en explicitant ses lignes de forces qui commencent chez Freud et trouvent ses formes les plus achevées chez Lacan. Pour Freud, le transfert est essentiellement une résistance à la cure analytique. Dans ses différentes analyses, Freud pourra constater l'apparition de phénomènes qui façonnent les cures, depuis le « cas Dora» jusqu'au cas connu comme « l'homme aux rats ». Freud fera rapidement équivaloir le transfert à l'Oedipe et, par la même, à la répétition : le patient répète en analyse ce qui a été vécu/raté pendant son enfance en rapport avec ses parents. Nous sommes là dans l'aire freudienne. Depuis lors, en psychanalyse, le transfert est lié à la répétition et la cure réduite à la résolution du conflit oedipien, moyennant quoi, il faudra naturellement « interpréter le transfert ». Lacan aborde le transfert relativement tard dans son enseignement. C'est dans le séminaire sur le transfert qu'il avance que l'antécédent historique du psychanalyste est Socrate. Mais c'est en 1964, dans le séminaire intitulé Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de /a psychanalyse, que Lacan va sépare transfert de répétition. Par la suite, il mettra en rapport le transfert et le sujet supposé savoir (1967). Notre thèse dégage donc l'essentiel de cet axe qui va de l'un à l'autre maîtres de la psychanalyse, mais aussi, elle apporte surtout des exemples cliniques depuis la psychanalyse pure à la « psychanalyse appliquée », en prenant comme matériel clinique notre travail aussi bien dans les institutions que dans notre pratique privée.

Thèse de doctorat : Psychologie clinique : Rennes 2 : 2007. / Bibliogr. f. 296-299.

Thèse de doctorat : Etudes germaniques : Metz : 2006. / Thèse soutenue sur ensemble de travaux. Bibliogr. p. 292-302. Résumé en français p. 303-341.

Thèse de doctorat : Philosophie : Metz : 1997. / 1997METZ005L. 200 ref.

Zugl.: Klagenfurt, Univ., Diss., 2009

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 358-363). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--York University, 2001. Graduate Programme in Social & Political Thought. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 297-323). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ66341.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 358-363). Also available on the Internet.

In this dissertation I direct critique at a conception of self-deception prevalent in analytical philosophy, where self-deception is seen as a rational form of irrationality in which the self-deceiver strategically deceives himself on the basis of having judged that this is the best thing to do or, in order to achieve something advantageous. In Chapter One, I criticize the conception of self-deception as analogous to deceiving someone else, the so-called “standard approach to self-deception”. The account under investigation is Donald Davidson’s. I criticize Davidson’s outline of self-deception as involving contradictory beliefs, and his portrayal of self-deception as a rational and strategic action. I trace the assumptions involved in Davidson’s account back to his account of radical interpretation and argue that the problems and paradoxes that Davidson discusses are not inherent in self-deception as such but are problems arising in and out of his account. In Chapter Two, I present Sebastian Gardner’s account of self-deception. Gardner is concerned with distinguishing self-deception as a form of “ordinary” irrationality that shares the structure of normal, rational thinking and action in being manipulation of beliefs from forms of irrationality treated by psychoanalysis. I object to the way in which Gardner makes this distinction and further argue that Gardner is mistaken in finding support in Freud for his claim that self-deception involves preference. In Chapter Three, I present a different understanding of self-deception. I discuss self-deception in the context of Sigmund Freud’s writings on illusion, delusion, different kinds of knowledge, etc., and propose a view of self-deception where it is not seen as a lie to oneself but rather as motivated lack of self-knowledge and as a flight from anxiety. In Chapter Four, I discuss some problems inherent in the three accounts under investigation, for example, problems arising because first-person awareness is conflated with knowledge of objects.