Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 358-363). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--York University, 2001. Graduate Programme in Social & Political Thought. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 297-323). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ66341.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 358-363). Also available on the Internet.

In this dissertation I direct critique at a conception of self-deception prevalent in analytical philosophy, where self-deception is seen as a rational form of irrationality in which the self-deceiver strategically deceives himself on the basis of having judged that this is the best thing to do or, in order to achieve something advantageous. In Chapter One, I criticize the conception of self-deception as analogous to deceiving someone else, the so-called “standard approach to self-deception”. The account under investigation is Donald Davidson’s. I criticize Davidson’s outline of self-deception as involving contradictory beliefs, and his portrayal of self-deception as a rational and strategic action. I trace the assumptions involved in Davidson’s account back to his account of radical interpretation and argue that the problems and paradoxes that Davidson discusses are not inherent in self-deception as such but are problems arising in and out of his account. In Chapter Two, I present Sebastian Gardner’s account of self-deception. Gardner is concerned with distinguishing self-deception as a form of “ordinary” irrationality that shares the structure of normal, rational thinking and action in being manipulation of beliefs from forms of irrationality treated by psychoanalysis. I object to the way in which Gardner makes this distinction and further argue that Gardner is mistaken in finding support in Freud for his claim that self-deception involves preference. In Chapter Three, I present a different understanding of self-deception. I discuss self-deception in the context of Sigmund Freud’s writings on illusion, delusion, different kinds of knowledge, etc., and propose a view of self-deception where it is not seen as a lie to oneself but rather as motivated lack of self-knowledge and as a flight from anxiety. In Chapter Four, I discuss some problems inherent in the three accounts under investigation, for example, problems arising because first-person awareness is conflated with knowledge of objects.

In the works of Weber, Freud, and Foucault we find a distinct depiction of the relation between the self and modern civilization. This thesis describes that relation as "entrapment": the self has become mired in the life orders of modernity and is unable to reign over them. The primary hazard of these orders is their imposition of subjectivities that are highly circumscribed, subjectivities more responsive to external functions and imperatives than to the expression of individuality. Underlying this outlook is a new consciousness of time; in lieu of evolutionary and progressive theories of history, a tragic view emerges. History is seen as devoid of any deterministic necessity, yet its collective products have become too weighty and entrenched to allow for radical, over-arching political transformations. The thesis examines how, beginning with these shared presuppositions, Weber, Freud, and Foucault develop very different understandings of entrapment, understandings that pose fundamental challenges to one another.

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This mini-thesis attempts to understand what it means to fear death. It does this by first investigating how Heidegger and then Freud explain fear of death. Heidegger believes that the relationship Dasein has towards its own death allows it the possibility of 'authenticity'. Death presents to Dasein its ownmost potentiality for being. Heidegger explains that this means that in facing death Dasein has the possibility of completeness and absolute individuality. Dasein is called to this possibility of authenticity by the anxiety it experiences in the face of its own death. However, Dasein does not necessarily respond to this call. By reducing anxiety to a fear it is possible for Dasein to disregard its fear of death and correspondingly not respond to the call of authenticity. Thus, for Heidegger, fear of death is symptomatic of inauthentic Dasein's relationship towards its own death. For Freud, on the other hand, death cannot be conceptualised without reference to the social world. Freud believes that the relationship we have towards our own death is learnt through living in this world. Furthermore, Freud argues that it is impossible for the human being to ever understand that death can be an annihilation. When the human being dreads, fears or even desires death, Freud believes it does so symbolically. In this regard Freud explains, by way of the death instinct, that the psyche understands death as a return to before birth. One of Freud's explanations of fear of death is that this fear is actually for the loss of Eros. This fear, however, is in conflict with the phantasy to return to before birth. One of the results of this conflict is the arousal of anxiety. The differences and similarities between Freud's and Heidegger's explanations are detailed in the final chapter. Examining these details leads to a closer investigation of Freud's and Heidegger's explanations of anxiety. On this issue this mini-thesis finds that Freud's and Heidegger's explanations of anxiety are in conflict with each other. After attempting to avoid placing Freud and Heidegger against each other, this mini-thesis demonstrates that Heidegger's explanation of anxiety is lacking in detail. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sci.)-University of Natal, 1999.

Even if they rely on apparently quite different investigation domains and ideologies, both Freud and Bakhtin participate to that current which in the XXth century would upset the foundation of the positivist thought and would modify profoundly the traditional conception of science, language and the cartesian vision of the conscience and of the human subject. The thought of one as of the other, therefore, surpasses largely the principal reason of their research: If Freud applies the principles of the interpretation of dreams to the study of literary works, Bakhtin expands on the novel theory and questions polyphony and dialogism of all language. In conception of the literary speech of Bakhtin and of the dreams of Freud, the signs, the speeches and the multiple intentions or affects that animate them are constantly in dynamic interaction and obey it seems, to mechanism of similar transformation. The problem of interpretation is at the center of their works. The two authors are at the same time theoreticians and analysts of whom the theory of literature, of speeches, of work and dreams, pass necessarily by an act of interpretation. We are aware of the role played by the novels of Dostoievski on the theoretical work of Bakhtin. For Freud also, the principles of the work on dreams, according to his own affirmation develop with the interpretation process. We have to think that for him as for the Russian researcher, the theory is always in a link of active complicity with the interpretation; that one and the other are constantly mutually reflected and determined. A compared analysis of their texts can put in evidence the proximity of the thought processes of the thinkers, but can reveal also the differences, with their consequences from the point of view of ideology, ontology, even ethics.

The thesis examines the nature of political reform and the role of culture in the liberal utopia envisaged by Richard Rorty in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Rorty's overall project is outlined, and situated within the anti-foundationalist critique that has been the hallmark of his recent career. The perilous position of nonintellectuals within the otherwise-acceptable utopia is detailed. Harold Bloom's conception of the strong poet is then examined and compared to the use Rorty makes of Bloom; I conclude that the faults of the liberal utopia lie primarily in establishing the strong poet as that culture's hero. I turn to Rorty's reading of Sigmund Freud, a reading which consistently inverts Freud's insights in order to make Freud fit into Rorty's plan. Finally, I re-examine Freud and suggest ways in which he can be used to correct the faults of the liberal utopia.

This thesis traces Freud's debt to classical Greece and argues that the development of his theory should not be considered apart from its roots in this legacy. The psychoanalytic project sheltered under the umbrella of Altertumswissenschaft and used the "ancient world to illuminate the modern". Winckelmann's Hellenism provided the foundations to German culture in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and dominated the educational and cultural institutions in which Freud lived and worked. Nietzsche later challenged Winckelmann's Apollian vision of Greece, and his "psychology of the Dionysian condition" acknowledged both irrational passion and sexuality. Freud is heir to both Winckelmann's and Nietzsche's Greece, and the dialectical tension between the rational and irrational, the mind and the body, that is evident in the reception of classical Greece in the nineteenth century is often paralleled in Freud's work. Hellenism is an essential element in Freud's theory of dreams and the unconscious. Greek mythology grounds the Oedipus complex, and informs his theorising on human sexuality. It plays an influential role in early sexology, and many of the challenges to psychiatry and neurology have their origin in Greek classicism. Not only does psychoanalysis rely on content drawn from this legacy, but its methodology as well as it structure are deeply influenced by Freud's knowledge of ancient Greece and his involvement in classical scholarship. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2008.