Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / The 1992 European Union (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP, Maastricht Treaty) marked a turning point in the trans-Atlantic relationship. The Balkan conflicts and broader political changes in the 1990s compelled the EU to assume more responsibility in peace operations. The EU's 60,000 strong Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) is planned to be operational in 2003. Will the EU be able to conduct Petersberg-type peace operations? This thesis analyzes policy and military shortfalls of the Balkan peacekeeping effort. Questions about the legitimacy of armed humanitarian interventions, about difficulties in common policy formulation and translation to sound military objectives are the core problems of civil-military relations in European peace operations. The case studies focus on the EU failure to resolve the Bosnian crises between 1992-95, and on the gaps between NATO policies and military objectives in the operations of 'Implementation Force' in Bosnia and 'Allied Force' in Kosovo. The thesis considers developments in EU CFSP institutions and EU-NATO relationship as well as the EU's response to terrorist attacks on September 11 2001. The thesis argues that the difficulty in EU CFSP formulation limits the effective use of RRF in military operations. / Major, Hungarian Army

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / In response to the 9/11 attacks and continuing threats of mass-casualty terrorism, the United States has adopted a new security strategy that emphasizes anticipatory actions including preventive war. Prevention, undertaken in the absence of an act of aggression or an imminent threat, is prohibited by modern conceptions of just war and international law. Many critics of the strategy fear that any legitimization of preventive war would endanger international stability. But an examination of the relevant ethical issues from the perspective of just war doctrine reveals contradictions within a blanket prohibition of preventive war. Preventive "strategic interventions" against illiberal regimes-states that correlate with the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction-parallel humanitarian interventions in that they have an ethical basis in the relationship between human rights and the right of state sovereignty. A widely-accepted minimum standard of human rights, incorporated into new international institutions and/or an explicit revision of the definition of just war, could serve as an ethical boundary for both preventive wars and humanitarian interventions. The formal qualification of prevention and its merger with humanitarian goals could bring enhanced international legitimacy and support to preventive actions by the United States and its allies. / Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 395-406). / This dissertation explores the causes of, and possible remedies for, extremely violent ethnic conflict. It starts from a robust yet under-explored finding in the literature: Most groups that fall victim to genocidal violence actually trigger their own demise by launching armed secessions or revolutions against state authorities that only then retaliate with genocide or forced migration ("ethnic cleansing"). Accordingly, the dissertation asks why groups that are vulnerable to genocidal retaliation would provoke that very outcome by launching such "tragic challenges." To explain this phenomenon, the dissertation employs three case studies to test three hypotheses drawn from rational deterrence theory. The cases focus on three subordinate groups whose armed challenges provoked genocidal retaliation: Bosnia's Muslims in 1992-95; Rwanda's Tutsi in 1990-94; and Kosovo's Albanians in 1998-99. To gain further insight by adding variation on the theory's dependent variable, the dissertation also examines an earlier period of the third case during which the subordinate group did not launch a violent challenge, despite having substantial grievances, and thereby avoided genocidal violence (Kosovo's Albanians in 1989-97). he three hypotheses are as follows: (1) the group did not expect its armed challenge to provoke genocidal retaliation; (2) the group expected to suffer genocidal violence regardless of whether or not it launched an armed challenge; (3) the group expected its armed challenge to provoke genocidal retaliation but viewed this as an acceptable cost to achieve its goal of secession or revolution. The dissertation confirms the third hypothesis: subordinate groups launch tragic challenges when they expect to prevail and are willing to civilians as the cost of doing so. / (cont.) Most surprisingly, the dissertation finds that a key cause of the optimism leading to tragic challenges is the expectation by subordinate groups of receiving humanitarian military intervention if they provoke genocidal retaliation against themselves. This reveals that international policies of humanitarian intervention create moral hazard, encouraging vulnerable groups to launch armed challenges and thereby potentially causing the tragic outcomes that these policies are intended to prevent. The dissertation concludes by exploring prescriptions to mitigate this newly discovered "moral hazard of humanitarian intervention." / Alan J. Kuperman. / Ph.D.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the performances of gender that permeated the justifications for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, focusing on the representational practices that dominated the Bush administration's narratives of rescue and circumscribed our understanding of the actors involved. In particular, I will argue that the image of Afghan women as the helpless victim of Taliban oppression not only allowed the United States and its coalition allies to cast themselves as heroic masculine warriors but also helped to reinforce the idea that Afghan women were little more than mere symbols of helplessness, placing them in a position of absolute inferiority and dependency. Crucially, I will claim that this image of Afghan women as the passive prisoners of the Taliban was contingent upon the suppression of a series of alternative perspectives that could not be accommodated within the parameters established by the prevailing frames of war. On the one hand, I argue that the dominant representations of Afghan women tended to show them in decidedly monolithic and one-dimensional terms, with the Bush administration and its coalition allies defining them almost entirely by the suffering they experienced. Absent from these accounts, however, was any mention of women's resistance to Taliban rule or their criticisms of the military intervention. On the other hand, I will show how the international community relied upon a particular historical narrative that allowed them to present Afghanistan as a barbaric aberration in the modern world whilst allowing them to dismiss the period of Taliban rule as a terrifying oddity in the country's history, destroying many of the freedoms that were said to exist under previous regimes. As well as ignoring the myriad of interactions between Afghanistan and the outside world and the complex social, economic and political forces that helped to precipitate the rise of the Taliban, I will argue that this historical narrative reinforced the idea that the lives of Afghan women were in a state of suspense during this period, their very existence as human beings held in abeyance until coalition troops could intervene to redeem them. What distinguishes my argument from the work of other feminists is my attention to the way in which these representational practices are contingent upon an uneasy process of repetition and reiteration, leaving them vulnerable to the possibility for subversion and resignification. Drawing on Judith Butler's work on performativity, normative violence and the politics of intelligibility along with Gayatri C. Spivak's work on the subaltern subject, I show how the activities of organisations such as the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) and the voices of individuals such as Malalai Joya help to expose the limits of the dominant norms of intelligibility, opening up the possibility for a less violent and less exclusionary re-imagining.

This thesis considers how the international response to egregious crimes can be made more consistent and effective. It focuses in particular on the Security Council as the authorising mechanism for intervention and comprehensively evaluates the proposals for its reform. It shows that contrary to several existing proposals, reform to the Security Council would not improve its authorisation of international action to address atrocity crimes. Similarly, the thesis considers proposals that seek to circumvent the authority of the Security Council but rejects their capacity to bring about a more consistent humanitarian regime. Finally, it robustly considers and argues for the use of regional organisations as alternative authorising mechanisms during mass atrocities.

In Martha Nussbaum’s book Frontiers of Global Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, she presents the capabilities approach, a new theoretical framework that in her view better responds to the urgent problems of social inequality than existing theories of social justice. This thesis evaluates her descriptive claim by applying the capabilities approach to the French burqa ban and assessing whether the ban is unjust, and if so, what forms of intervention are most appropriate. In doing this, I will argue that Nussbaum’s theory is unsatisfactory unless she extends it to include the obligation to criticize in cases where we are certain that an injustice is being committed.

The differences in the international responses to the violent conflicts in East Timor (1998–1999), Maluku (1999–2003) and Aceh (1998–2005) are examined in this research. Given the growing acceptance of the significance of the use of military force for humanitarian purposes, the humanitarian crises in Maluku and Aceh might prima facie have justified humanitarian intervention similar to that in East Timor. By analysing the differences from the Indonesia’s domestic political point of view it is clear that the conscience-shocking situation caused by the violent conflicts was not the compelling factor for the international community to militarily intervene. The deployment of a multinational force in East Timor (INTERFET) was decided only after the UN and foreign major countries believed that such military intervention would not jeopardize the ongoing process of democratization in Indonesia. This suggested that Indonesia’s domestic circumstance was central to whether a similar measure in Maluku and Aceh would take place or not. Due to the reformasi (political reform) in Indonesia within which the independence of East Timor took place, two main changes within Indonesian politics, namely the growing sentiment of anti-international intervention and the continuing democratization process, helped to ensure that humanitarian intervention in the two other regions did not happen. / These two conditions were fortified by the increasingly consolidated democratic politics which brought the communal conflict in Maluku to the Malino Peace Agreement. The emergence of a stronger and democratic government in Indonesia, furthermore, made cooperation with the international community possible in seeking a peaceful resolution to the armed conflict in Aceh. By involving the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) agreed to the Helsinki peace agreement and accepted the role of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) to secure its implementation. Thus, a strong democratic government made an international military intervention for humanitarian purposes unnecessary.

The object of this thesis is to consider the relationship between sovereignty and responsibility and to examine how this relationship has developed over time. There is a conventional story told by many scholars of International Relations which holds that sovereignty has ‘traditionally’ entailed the absence of responsibility and accountability. It has meant that states have a right to govern themselves however they choose, free from outside interference. Only in recent years, the tale goes, have the indefeasible rights that sovereigns have long enjoyed been challenged by notions that sovereigns are responsible and accountable for the protection of their populations. Ideas of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ and ‘the responsibility to protect’ which have emerged since the end of the Cold War are framed as radical departures from the way in which sovereignty has been ‘traditionally’ understood. This thesis challenges this conventional account of the history of sovereignty. It argues that the notion that sovereignty entails responsibilities is not new. Rather, responsibilities have been an enduring feature of the social and historical construction of sovereignty. The thesis demonstrates that sovereignty has been understood to involve varied and evolving responsibilities since it was first articulated in early modern Europe and it traces the historical development of the particular tension between the right of sovereign states to be self-governing and free from outside interference and their responsibility to secure the safety of their populations.

<p>The dissertation takes up the subject of humanitarian intervention in contemporary international law. It identifies a problem, The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention, which underlies almost all contemporary theorizing about the subject. In an attempt to find a more palatable means to address the problem of the violation of human rights, the dissertation turns to the work of Hugo Grotius. Through an analysis of international law and its theoretical and philosophical bases, a thorough critique of the state of contemporary international law is made. Using a close-text reading of Grotius, alternative theories are established concerning human rights and humanitarian intervention. The dissertation finds that when the concept of human rights is attached to other normative concepts like moderation or faith, the pressure to resolve all questions of justice in terms of rights can be lessened. Further, if contemporary theorists recognize that the opposition of sovereignty and intervention is a structural and institutional feature of international law, and not a necessary feature of the concept of sovereignty itself, the Dilemma may be overcome by not forcing policymakers to choose either a defense of sovereignty or a defense of human rights.</p> / Dissertation

<p>The purpose of this thesis is to look into the differences between the theoretical frame-works of Realism and Feminism in general as well as their differences with regards to security and referent objects to security. With the differences noted applied upon the Humanitarian Intervention that took place in Kosovo 1999. That is how a shift in the referent objects could change outcome and success or failure in the case studied.</p><p>This is done by a theory testing study based upon literature within the topics of Realism and Feminism, by mainly Morgenthau (1993) with regards to Realism and Tickner (1992) with regards to Feminism. The reason for these authors in particular is due to their importance in the field and the fact that they are found liberally quoted in academic articles and other literature.</p><p>By shifting the referent object of security from e.g. territory (state), that Realism uses, to the individuals in general and the women in particular within the territory (state), like Feminism does, there is bound to be a change in outcome and success. The result of this thesis is that a different referent object offers a new perspective.</p>