Univ., Diss.-2006--Zürich, 2005. / Literaturverz. 209 - 221. Literaturverz. S. [205] - 221.

Thesis--Freiburg i. Br. / Cover title. Vita. Bibliography: p.iii-iv.

Os estudos sobre o direito natural costumam dividi-lo em três períodos característicos, cosmológico, teológico e racional, a depender do critério usado para a sua fundamentação, respectivamente, o kósmos, Deus ou a razão humana, sendo que Tomás de Aquino e Hugo Grotius podem ser considerados, cada um, grandes expoentes dos dois últimos períodos. Um dos objetivos do jusracionalismo foi buscar uma fundamentação do direito natural, e do direito como um todo, apenas na razão e natureza humanas, prescindindo-se de Deus. Entretanto, as mudanças nas mais diversas áreas ocorrem cada uma a seu tempo e não todas de uma vez. Por isso, apesar dos esforços empreendidos para se separar os campos do direito e da teologia, é possível que eles continuassem mais interligados do que se imaginava na passagem do jusnaturalismo teológico para o racional. No intuito de identificar se permaneceram algumas características, e quais, da fundamentação teológica nas doutrinas do direito natural racional, será feita uma comparação entre os sistemas de Tomás e Grotius, avaliando também se o holandês foi influenciado pelo italiano. Os resultados alcançados mostram que é possível se afirmar que Grotius, tendo feito mais de cinquenta referências a Tomás em apenas uma obra, foi por ele influenciado, havendo grandes semelhanças entre a fundamentação dos autores em questões cruciais de suas doutrinas, uma vez que concordam que a finalidade do homem não está nesse mundo, que Deus é o criador de tudo o que existe, especialmente do homem, cuja natureza e instrumentos peculiares, notadamente a razão, a linguagem e a vontade, são reflexo da própria natureza divina expressa na Trindade, que é dada aos homens a dignidade de criar, por si mesmos, regras para a organização da sociedade, com grande liberdade de ação dentro de uma moldura divina da lei, uma vez que a Providência não interfere ou suprime o livre-arbítrio, ainda que a Revelação seja um auxílio não apenas para a obtenção da beatitude, mas também para a convivência social e conhecimento da lei natural, e que mesmo o exercício da função de poder só existe por autorização divina, pois se os soberanos não podiam ser julgados por qualquer outra vontade humana, eles o seriam por Deus. Com isso, desde Tomás já se pode reconhecer que a lei natural é campo de atuação por excelência da criatura racional, e ela só adquire significado próprio quando aplicado a elas, bem como que o caráter teológico da obra de Grotius não pode ser negligenciado, e deve ser levado em conta em sua teoria. / Studies on natural rights tends to divide it into three characteristic periods, cosmological, theological and rational, depending on the criteria used as their fundament, respectively, the kósmos, God or the human reason, being possible to account Thomas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius as two major thinkers in the latter, and each, periods. Amongst the goals of the jusrationalism was to seek for a foundation of natural right, and right as a whole, based solely on reason and human nature, with no recourse to God. However, changes in diverse areas occur each at its own time and not altogether. Hence, despite the efforts taken to split rights and theologys fields, it is possible that they remained more interconnected than one imagined in the transition from theological to rational jusnaturalism. In order to identify if some characteristics, and which, of theological fundament remain in rational natural laws doctrines, a comparison shall be made between Aquinas and Grotius systems, assessing whether or not the Dutch was influenced by the Italian. The results achieved show that is possible to say that Grotius, having made more than fifty references to Aquinas in just one work, was influenced by him, acknowledging great similarities in the fundament used by both in crucial aspects of their doctrine, since they agree that mans end is not in this world, that God is the creator of everything there is, specially man, whose nature and peculiar instruments, notably reason, language and will, are a reflect of divine nature itself as expressed in the Trinity, that is given to men the dignity to create the rules to organize, by themselves, society, with great freedom of action within the laws divine frame, inasmuch as Providence does not interfere or suppress free-will, although Revelation is meant to assist not only in beatitudes acquisition, but also in social life and natural laws knowledge, and that even exercising functions of power only exists in virtue of divine authorization, therefore if sovereigns couldnt be judged by any other human will, they would by God. Henceforth, since Aquinas it is possible to recognize that natural law is by excellence the acting field of rational creature, and it only acquires proper meaning when applied to them, as well as the theological character of Grotius works cannot be neglected and must be accounted in his theories.

Os estudos sobre o direito natural costumam dividi-lo em três períodos característicos, cosmológico, teológico e racional, a depender do critério usado para a sua fundamentação, respectivamente, o kósmos, Deus ou a razão humana, sendo que Tomás de Aquino e Hugo Grotius podem ser considerados, cada um, grandes expoentes dos dois últimos períodos. Um dos objetivos do jusracionalismo foi buscar uma fundamentação do direito natural, e do direito como um todo, apenas na razão e natureza humanas, prescindindo-se de Deus. Entretanto, as mudanças nas mais diversas áreas ocorrem cada uma a seu tempo e não todas de uma vez. Por isso, apesar dos esforços empreendidos para se separar os campos do direito e da teologia, é possível que eles continuassem mais interligados do que se imaginava na passagem do jusnaturalismo teológico para o racional. No intuito de identificar se permaneceram algumas características, e quais, da fundamentação teológica nas doutrinas do direito natural racional, será feita uma comparação entre os sistemas de Tomás e Grotius, avaliando também se o holandês foi influenciado pelo italiano. Os resultados alcançados mostram que é possível se afirmar que Grotius, tendo feito mais de cinquenta referências a Tomás em apenas uma obra, foi por ele influenciado, havendo grandes semelhanças entre a fundamentação dos autores em questões cruciais de suas doutrinas, uma vez que concordam que a finalidade do homem não está nesse mundo, que Deus é o criador de tudo o que existe, especialmente do homem, cuja natureza e instrumentos peculiares, notadamente a razão, a linguagem e a vontade, são reflexo da própria natureza divina expressa na Trindade, que é dada aos homens a dignidade de criar, por si mesmos, regras para a organização da sociedade, com grande liberdade de ação dentro de uma moldura divina da lei, uma vez que a Providência não interfere ou suprime o livre-arbítrio, ainda que a Revelação seja um auxílio não apenas para a obtenção da beatitude, mas também para a convivência social e conhecimento da lei natural, e que mesmo o exercício da função de poder só existe por autorização divina, pois se os soberanos não podiam ser julgados por qualquer outra vontade humana, eles o seriam por Deus. Com isso, desde Tomás já se pode reconhecer que a lei natural é campo de atuação por excelência da criatura racional, e ela só adquire significado próprio quando aplicado a elas, bem como que o caráter teológico da obra de Grotius não pode ser negligenciado, e deve ser levado em conta em sua teoria. / Studies on natural rights tends to divide it into three characteristic periods, cosmological, theological and rational, depending on the criteria used as their fundament, respectively, the kósmos, God or the human reason, being possible to account Thomas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius as two major thinkers in the latter, and each, periods. Amongst the goals of the jusrationalism was to seek for a foundation of natural right, and right as a whole, based solely on reason and human nature, with no recourse to God. However, changes in diverse areas occur each at its own time and not altogether. Hence, despite the efforts taken to split rights and theologys fields, it is possible that they remained more interconnected than one imagined in the transition from theological to rational jusnaturalism. In order to identify if some characteristics, and which, of theological fundament remain in rational natural laws doctrines, a comparison shall be made between Aquinas and Grotius systems, assessing whether or not the Dutch was influenced by the Italian. The results achieved show that is possible to say that Grotius, having made more than fifty references to Aquinas in just one work, was influenced by him, acknowledging great similarities in the fundament used by both in crucial aspects of their doctrine, since they agree that mans end is not in this world, that God is the creator of everything there is, specially man, whose nature and peculiar instruments, notably reason, language and will, are a reflect of divine nature itself as expressed in the Trinity, that is given to men the dignity to create the rules to organize, by themselves, society, with great freedom of action within the laws divine frame, inasmuch as Providence does not interfere or suppress free-will, although Revelation is meant to assist not only in beatitudes acquisition, but also in social life and natural laws knowledge, and that even exercising functions of power only exists in virtue of divine authorization, therefore if sovereigns couldnt be judged by any other human will, they would by God. Henceforth, since Aquinas it is possible to recognize that natural law is by excellence the acting field of rational creature, and it only acquires proper meaning when applied to them, as well as the theological character of Grotius works cannot be neglected and must be accounted in his theories.

One approach in contemporary international relations theory is the moralist position. Most moralists argue that obligations which an individual has toward the state and toward persons qua fellow citizens should not override the obligations which every individual has toward other persons qua members of humanity. Essential to a moralist approach is the idea that every individual shares some feature, such as rights, which is universal to all men and incontrovertible by any body. Many moralists base their theory upon the thought of Hugo Grotius, equating Grotius ' s thought with their own moralist approach. This thesis argues that Grotius does not present a universal ethic and that his thought does not serve as a foundation for contemporary moralist theory. Individualist elements of Grotius's thought which do uphold a universalist ethic should not be viewed in isolation; his natural law argument includes a notion of community as well as individual rights. Grotius accommodates individualism and community in what I call a Grotian "conciliation." To argue that Grotius's theory is one of conciliation, I analyze his discussions of society and contend that throughout his discussions Grotius identifies man as an individual with obligations to respect the rights of all others as well as a citizen with obligations to the superior rights of the sovereign. I then compare Grotius's thought to that of Immanuel Kant in order to demonstrate that the accommodation found in Grotius is not equivalent to Kant's universalist ethic. To equate his thought to Kant's thought, or to any other universalist ethic, is to attribute concerns to Grotius which are not necessarily addressed in his theory. Not only may this do an injustice to the different concerns by Grotius, but it overlooks the possibility that Grotius's conciliation may offer an alternative to, rather than a substantiation of, the moralist approach in international relations theory.

Foreword This paper will be of value in answering continuing questions regarding John Milton's position on war and peace. The questions continue and are valid because Milton's works, as considered in the paper, offer support for both pro-war and pro-peace interpretations. The paper also addresses a middle-ground interpretation-that Milton's position can best be understood in light of the legal theories of Hugo Grotius, the seventeenth-century Dutch scholar who is generally accepted as the father of modern international law. The works considered include, among others, the Nativity Ode, the sonnets, Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained, Samson Agonistes (including post 9/11 controversy involving its alleged endorsement of terrorism), Christian Doctrine, and Milton's infrequently cited History of Britain. No ultimate answers are suggested except that more than three hundred years of Milton scholarship have left little unexplored regarding Milton's views on war and peace. Milton will always be known for his admiration of soldiers, particularly his employer, Oliver Cromwell, and for his military imagery, particularly in Paradise Lost. He will also be known as a man who lived in a time of constant warfare, and yet who valued and sought individual inner peace.

<p>The dissertation takes up the subject of humanitarian intervention in contemporary international law. It identifies a problem, The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention, which underlies almost all contemporary theorizing about the subject. In an attempt to find a more palatable means to address the problem of the violation of human rights, the dissertation turns to the work of Hugo Grotius. Through an analysis of international law and its theoretical and philosophical bases, a thorough critique of the state of contemporary international law is made. Using a close-text reading of Grotius, alternative theories are established concerning human rights and humanitarian intervention. The dissertation finds that when the concept of human rights is attached to other normative concepts like moderation or faith, the pressure to resolve all questions of justice in terms of rights can be lessened. Further, if contemporary theorists recognize that the opposition of sovereignty and intervention is a structural and institutional feature of international law, and not a necessary feature of the concept of sovereignty itself, the Dilemma may be overcome by not forcing policymakers to choose either a defense of sovereignty or a defense of human rights.</p> / Dissertation

In this doctoral thesis, Kant's distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is examined. The thesis begins with an exploration of how the distinction originates and evolves in the writings of three of Kant's most prominent natural law predecessors: Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, and Christian Wolff. The thesis then moves on to Kant's own writings. It is argued that Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction in as many as twelve different ways, that these ways are not entirely consistent with one another, and that many of them, even taken by themselves, do not hold up to scrutiny. Furthermore, it is argued that Kant's claim that perfect duties always trump imperfect duties - which can be referred to as "the priority claim" - is not actually supported by any one of the ways in which Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction. After this critical reading of Kant's writings, the thesis then switches gears and a more "positive" project is attempted. It is argued that the perfect-imperfect distinction, even though it does not support the priority claim, is not altogether normatively neutral or uninteresting. In particular, for some of the ways in which the distinction is drawn, it is shown that the distinction yields the following normative implication: Sometimes perfect duties override imperfect duties and all other times there is no priority one way or the other. Finally, it is explained that this normative implication - which can be referred to as the "privilege claim" - translates into the following practical directive: When there is a conflict between a perfect duty and an imperfect duty, sometimes one must act in conformity with the former duty and all other times one is free to choose which of the two duties to act in conformity with. This practical directive represents the ultimate finding of this thesis.

Today, some twelve million immigrants are unlawfully present in the United States. What response to this situation does Christian theology suggest for these immigrants and those who receive them? To this question about the status of immigrants before the law, the theological literature lacks an understanding of how federal U.S. immigration law developed, and it lacks a robust theological account of the governance of immigration. To fill this gap, the thesis presents three stages in the formation of the laws that designate some immigrants as aliens unlawfully present or illegal aliens, drawing out the moral argumentation in each phase and responding with moral theology. In the first stage, non-citizens were called aliens in U.S. law. In response to the argument that aliens exist as a consequence of natural law, Christian teaching indicates that immigrants are not alien either in creation or for the church. In the second stage, the authority of the federal government to exclude and expel aliens was established, leaving those who do not comply to be designated illegal aliens. To the claim that the federal government has unlimited sovereignty over immigration, interpretations of the Christian Scriptures respond that divine sovereignty limits and directs civil authority over immigration. In the third stage, legal reforms that were intended to end discrimination between countries allowed millions from countries neighboring the U.S. to become illegal aliens. These reforms turn out to be unjust on philosophical grounds and unneighborly on theological grounds. While federal law classes many as aliens unlawfully present in the United States, Christian political theology indicates that immigrants are not alien, the government of immigration is limited by divine judgment, and nationals of neighboring countries deserve special regard.

La protection des populations civiles en cas de conflits armés, internationaux ou internes est au centre des préoccupations du droit international humanitaire contemporain. C’est un sujet digne d’intérêt et d’études plus approfondies. Dès lors, la recherche ici entreprise concernant l’apport du droit musulman à l’universalité des règles humanitaires protégeant les personnes civiles ainsi que des spécificités de ces règles, surtout en termes de leurs compatibilités avec celles développées par le droit international humanitaire contemporain ne pourraient que répondre à cet objectif. En effet, cette thèse, née du constat selon lequel les pays musulmans ont rapidement adhéré aux différents instruments du droit international humanitaire, tentera de démontrer pourquoi et comment se manifeste une telle convergence, voire homologie, entre les règles du droit musulman protégeant les personnes civiles en cas de conflits armés et celles développées par le droit international humanitaire contemporain. La confrontation-association entre ces deux systèmes - qui tiendra compte du contexte historique et de l’environnement dans lequel s’est développé le droit musulman- nous autorise, en effet, à défendre l’idée selon laquelle le droit musulman et le droit international humanitaire contemporain partagent les mêmes valeurs fondamentales en ce qui concerne la protection des populations civiles dans les conflits armés. Cette démarche nous permet également d’affirmer que la convergence entre les deux systèmes est en grande partie tributaire, tout d’abord, de l’originalité de la conception humanitaire du droit musulman. Cette convergence est ensuite, tributaire de la volonté qui a animé les concepteurs du droit international humanitaire de rechercher les dénominateurs communs entre les civilisations et d’élaborer des règles acceptables pour tous. Elle est, enfin et essentiellement, tributaire de l’effort de relecture et d’interprétation de l’institution du jihad, qu’ont entamé les jurisconsultes et les penseurs musulmans surtout depuis le XIXe siècle dans le but de limiter le jihad à sa vocation d’origine, soit la vocation défensive. Notre thèse n’abordera pas le sujet sous ses seuls aspects théoriques. Elle tentera, aussi, de comprendre et de jauger l’application de ce droit en se référant aux guerres menées par le prophète et ses compagnons durant les premiers siècles de l’Islam et de voir les implications de ce droit, ainsi que celles du droit international humanitaire contemporain, dans les conflits armés qui ont secoué le monde musulman, notamment ceux qui se déroulent actuellement en Irak, en Afghanistan, au Darfour soudanais et en Somalie. Cette thèse comporte trois parties. La partie introductive traitera du cadre général du droit international musulman. La deuxième partie sera consacrée à la détermination et à l’étude des facteurs qui ont permis la convergence entre les règles humanitaires du droit musulman et celles construites par le droit international humanitaire contemporain. La dernière partie de notre thèse consistera dans l’analyse des différents types de garanties et de protection que le droit musulman et le droit international humanitaire offrent aux populations civiles. En d’autres termes, cette partie sera le témoin de cette convergence et de cette parenté.