Thesis (Ph. D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of Philosophy, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2006. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 253-259).

Thesis (doctoral)--Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität zu München, 1979. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 112-177).

Thesis--Copenhagen. / "Resumé paa dansk" (1 leaf) laid in.

Talent management is an organisational process aimed at maximising the benefit gained from the organisation's workforce, mostly by assessing the future potential of senior organisational members to fill key positions based on their proportional contribution to the business. Despite the increasing prevalence of talent management, evidence is accumulating to indicate an extremely low success rate of just 20-25% in predicting high performers. While talent management continues to address a growing business need, a better understanding of the process may help to refine its practice. The underpinning assumptions of the practice of talent management are that organisations are systemic and linear, and that talent management must produce a single answer identifying what it means to be a 'talent' in any specific circumstance. As a profession, talent management also maintains a fantasy of control: the expectation that assessed individuals will indeed behave as anticipated, and that stated targets will remain unchanged. As a progressive and trending HR process, talent management's close connection to organisational power relations and political dynamics is rarely acknowledged. The emotional toll on assessed senior executives, as well as potential ramifications for their colleagues, is also often overlooked, despite the significant implications for individual careers and broader inferences of inclusion-exclusion inherent in the process of talent selection. Talent management practitioners and scholars tend not to consider the impact on individuals of inaccurate assessments and mistaken decisions. As a talent manager practitioner who decrees the fate of individuals, such glaring oversights provoked in me an acute ethical anxiety that drove this research. This work offers a critical perspective on the practice of talent management - in particular, the process of judgment involved in the assessment of 'high potentials' and the potent dynamics of inclusion in/exclusion from the talent group. Having witnessed first-hand the inconsistency between apparently robust predictions (based on best practice) and subsequent outcomes, I began this research with strong feelings of ambivalence towards my practice of 25 years and my prospering business of 10 years. The critical perspective of the current study took shape within the research framework, which is based on the philosophy of pragmatism and the complex responsive process of relating that draws on it, as well as on process sociology and complexity sciences. The research methodology insists that scholars take their own direct experience seriously, collect their raw data through writing narratives, and then exercise reflection and reflexivity both as individuals and as part of the Doctor of Management (DMan) learning community. The narratives 'translate experience so that it is meaningful to the reader' (Cunliffe, 2010, p. 228). Applying this innovative approach not only to my research, but also to my professional practice, has led me to challenge the most fundamental assumptions of talent management. I now have a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the process of judgment at its core, and have developed a new way to approach and implement this process within my work. This thesis culminates in three main arguments describing talent management from a new perspective, as well as redefining the role and degree of involvement of talent management consultants. First, the central process of judgment emerged not as an objective analysis communicated in a unidirectional, linear way from the assessor to the assessed, but rather as a relational and social process that involves shifting power relations and an inclusion-exclusion dynamic influenced by many unpredictable factors. Second, from the perspective of the research framework, the assessor can no longer be seen as an objective observer, but must be regarded as a participant who is simultaneously both involved and detached and who must rely on their practical judgment. Talent management's traditional promise of future-oriented focus and reliable predictions is illusory, given that all participants are continuously merging their ongoing experiences to spontaneously co-create the future in unpredictable ways. . Understanding that the assessment process is not a simple numerical exercise (ranking individuals on various scales) and that no single truth can be obtained through an assessment process (since assessment results are co-created with all participants in the process) has eased my ethical concerns and enabled me to continue practising my profession with confidence, by taking a fresh viewpoint of what it is that I am doing. It is my hope that other talent management practitioners will find these insights useful and generalisable, and valid to their own practice - extrapolating from the local to the global.

The graduation thesis The first Wave of Reception of Rukopis Královédvorský and Rukopis Zelenohorský in the period 1817 - 1852 documents the first wave of reception of Rukopis Královédvorský and Rukopis Zelenohorský. Mostly we drew from materials from periodical references and also from contemporary literature. In the first part of this thesis we introduce RKZ closer, we bring chronological survey of RKZ?s publications and we interpret them. In separate chapter we present reaction to Germen professors J. H. Dambeck and J. G. Meinert to discovery RKZ. Also we acquaint with foreign language translations of RKZ. The conclusion summarizes we represent work of art, that are affected by the existence of manuscripts RKZ.

A sample of 656 undergraduate students from multiple sections of an introductory nutrition course, a personal health course, and a physical fitness course at a large Midwestern University completed one of four surveys. Using matrix sampling, each participant completed a survey measuring one of four personal and social competence constructs; coping skills, interpersonal skills, intrapersonal skills, or judgment skills; 11 health risk behaviors, and college grade point average (GPA). Descriptive statistics, correlations, and multiple regression analyses were calculated to determine relationships among these variables. Thirteen statistically significant correlations were found among personal and social competence constructs and health risk behaviors. Health risk behaviors statistically significantly correlated with one or more constructs of personal and social competence included: frequency of marijuana use, number of days cigarettes were smoked, number of days alcohol was consumed, incidences of binge drinking, incidences of driving and drinking alcohol, alcohol or drug use prior to last incidence of sexual intercourse, non-use of condoms during sexual intercourse, feelings of sadness or hopelessness for two weeks or more that resulted in ceasing some usual activities, and number of physically inactive days. Statistically significant correlations were found most often among perceived judgment skills and health risk behaviors and perceived intrapersonal skills and health risk behaviors. Variance in academic success due to perceived personal and social competence and health risk behaviors was limited. Only a small percentage of variance in self-reported, college GPA could be attributed to perceived coping skills and judgment skills, while no variance could be attributed to perceived intrapersonal skills or interpersonal personal skills. Also, few health risk behaviors accounted for any variance in self-reported, college GPA. Results suggest strategies to improve undergraduates' personal and social skills may reduce engagement in some health risk behaviors.

The dissertation explores factors influencing consumers' payments in anonymous Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) pricing contexts. Consumers often pay more than zero when given the opportunity to self-determine payments. However, most PWYW research has focused on contexts where the possibility of social influence from a salesperson or clerk is present. I suggest that in anonymous exchange contexts where social pressure does not exist, consumers will nevertheless make voluntary payments greater than zero. The present research explores PWYW in anonymous purchase contexts. Results from eight studies indicate that PWYW payment amounts are affected by heuristics and biases. In Essay 1, the influence of reference price on PWYW payments is explored. Firm-provided external reference prices (ERPs) framed as injunctive norms (e.g., suggested price) and descriptive norms (e.g., average payment) caused anchoring effects on voluntary payments such that those with higher ERPs reported higher payments. Further, ERPs framed as descriptive (vs. injunctive) norms were more predictive of payment amounts, but only when the ERP is high. Recalling internal reference price information is more effortful than simply reacting to a firm-provided price. The possibility that decreased cognitive processing results in higher payments, violating the concept of self-interest primacy, is explored in Essay 2. Four studies manipulate processing styles and demonstrate that when consumers use more effortful cognitive processing, they tend to make lower PWYW payments. These results suggest that consumers are likely to rely on a normal price heuristic when using more superficial processing. The dissertation demonstrates the importance of reference price information and cognitive processing styles when voluntary anonymous payments are made anonymously. PWYW decisions are influenced by the exchange context and how the information is cognitively processed. At a theoretical level, the findings demonstrate that consumers make voluntary payments in the absence of social pressure and that those payments can be predictably influenced by features in the exchange setting. Finally, the research suggests that consumers who exert less cognitive effort in PWYW situations make higher payments. It therefore appears that the first instinct is not to act self-interestedly by making little or no payments, but rather payments seem to be guided by heuristic-based decision making. / 2016-09-29

Dans les Règles pour la direction de l’esprit, Descartes fonde sa première théorie de la science sur deux « actes de l’intellect » : intuitus et deductio. Au moment de définir le concept d’intuition, Descartes précise qu’il en fait un « usage nouveau », qui ne doit pas être confonduavec la signification courante qu’on lui a donnée dans les Écoles. L’exposition de ses premières découvertes scientifiques impliquerait donc une noétique différente de celle que lui ont enseignée ses maîtres jésuites. Reprenant un mot ancien, Descartes lui donne une signification neuve et un rôle inédit dans l’édifice de la connaissance humaine. Mais on n’a pas toujours compris le sens historique et philosophique de cette démarcation : de qui et de quoi Descartes entend-il se démarquer ? Et qu’y avait-il au juste de nouveau dans l’usage qu’il proposait ? Notre enquête propose de retracer l’histoire de cette idée d’intuition intellectuelle au cours de l’âge classique, chez les premiers lecteurs des Regulae, Malebranche, Locke, dans les entrées des dictionnaires et des encyclopédies du XVIIIe siècle,dans les nouveaux manuels de logique inspirés de Locke. Nous retraçons cette histoire jusqu’à ce que Kant, en 1770, semble y mettre le point final, en affirmant qu’il n’y a pas en l’homme de connaissance intuitive intellectuelle. Pourtant, et c’est tout le paradoxe, lorsque Kant formule ce constat d’échec, le mot même d’intuition s’est enfin, et pour la première fois,imposé dans le vocabulaire philosophique européen. / In the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes grounds his first theory of knowledge upon two "acts of the understanding" : intuitus and deductio. When he explains what he means by intuition, he warns the reader that he intends to make a "new use" of this word, which shall not be confused with the way the "schoolmen" understood it in the past. Descartes' first scientific discoveries seem to imply a new noetic, different from the one his Jesuit masters taught him while he was a student at La Fleche. But what, exactly, was new about the way Descartes used this ancient word ? The present inquiry is an attempt to give this question an answer, and also to trace this concept of intuition through the whole early modern period; in the works of the first readers of the Regulae (Baillet, Port-Royal, Malebranche), in the theory of knowledge of John Locke, in the dictionaries, lexicons and encyclopedias of the 18th century, in the new textbooks of Logic, inspired by Locken in some theological discussions over the nature of beatific vision.Our inquiry ends in 1770 when Kant declares that there's no such thing as "intellectual intuition" in man's mind, and that the only kind of intuition man's capable of is a sensitive one. Kant seems to put an endpoint to this chapter of European philosophy. But, on the other hand, when Kant writes this sentence, the word" intuition" has fully entered the European philosophical vocabulary, for the first time with its new meaning.

Les travaux présentés dans cette thèse s'intéressent à l'intime relation entre la rationalité de l'homme et sa conscience de la mort. Ils utilisent conjointement deux théories, la Théorie de la Gestion de la Terreur, et la théorie Dual-Process de la pensée. La Théorie de la Gestion de la Terreur décrit les mécanismes qui se déclenchent lorsque des pensées liées à notre propre mort sont activées. De façon importante, ces mécanismes consomment des ressources mentales que la théorie Dual-Process identifie comme nécessaires à la pensée rationnelle. Sommes-nous dès lors capables de raisonner de manière rationnelle lorsque nous pensons à notre propre mort ? En d'autres termes, pouvons-nous utiliser correctement notre capacité analytique lorsque des pensées liées à notre propre mort sont conscientes ? Les personnes ayant de grandes capacités cognitives sont elles mieux armées pour penser à la mort ? Quel est le réel impact des pensées de mort sur notre raisonnement, mais aussi sur nos jugements et décisions ? Nous cherchons à répondre à ces questions dans différents domaines de la pensée : les inférences logiques, les décisions stratégiques, et le jugement moral. Différents protocoles expérimentaux sont mis en œuvre dans le but d'explorer de manière exhaustive l'influence des pensées de mort lorsque nous devons utiliser ces hautes fonctions cognitives. Les résultats mettent en lumière de sinistres, mais fascinants effets et ce sur toutes nos activités nécessitant des ressources cognitives. De manière générale, les participants qui ont pensé à leur propre mort semblent ne plus avoir accès à leurs ressources cognitives et montrent par conséquent des comportements moins élaborés, intuitifs et heuristiques, au détriment des règles normatives de raisonnement. Ces découvertes laissent apparaître un étrange paradoxe en termes d'évolution et d'adaptation puisque nos capacités analytiques semblent finalement nous servir à oublier ce qu'elles nous ont justement fait découvrir. / The work presented in this thesis is concerned with the intimate relationship between human rationality and the consciousness of death. They jointly use two theories, that is, the terror management theory, and the dual-process theory of thinking. Terror management theory describes the mechanisms that are triggered when thoughts related to our own death are activated. Importantly, these mechanisms consume mental resources that the dual-process theory identifies as necessary for rational thought. Therefore, are we able to think rationally when thinking about our own death? In other words, can our analytical skills be efficiently used when thoughts of our own death are conscious? Are people with high cognitive abilities better equipped to think about death? What is the real impact of these thoughts on our reasoning, but also on our judgments and decisions? We seek to answer these questions in different areas of thought: logical inferences, strategic decisions, and moral judgment. Different experimental protocols are implemented in order to comprehensively explore the influence of thoughts of death while using these higher order cognitive functions. The results highlight grim, but fascinating effects on all our activities that require to mobilize cognitive resources. In general, participants who thought about their own death seem to no longer have access to their resources and therefore exhibit less elaborate behaviors, based on intuitions or heuristics, at the expense of normative rules of reasoning. These findings let appear a strange paradox in terms of evolution and adaptation because our analytical capacities finally seem to serve us to forget precisely what they made us discover.