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This thesis examines and critiques the concept of 'legal knowledge-based’ systems. Work on legal knowledge-based systems is dominated by work in 'artificial intelligence and law’. It seeks to automate the application of law and to automate the solution of legal problems. Automation however, has proved elusive. In contrast to such automation, this thesis proposes the creation of legal knowledge-based systems based on the concept of augmentation of legal work. Focusing on systems that augment legal work opens new possibilities for system creation and use. To inform how systems might augment legal work, this thesis examines philosophy, psychology and legal theory for information they provide on how processes of legal reasoning operate. It is argued that, in contrast to conceptions of law adopted in artificial intelligence and law, 'sensemaking' provides a useful perspective with which to create systems. It is argued that visualisation, and particularly diagrams, are an important and under considered element of reasoning and that producing systems that support diagramming of processes of legal reasoning would provide useful support for legal work. This thesis reviews techniques for diagramming aspects of sensemaking. In particular this thesis examines standard methods for diagramming arguments and methods for diagramming reasoning. These techniques are applied in the diagramming of legal judgments. A review is conducted of systems that have been constructed to support the construction of diagrams of argument and reasoning. Drawing upon these examinations, this thesis highlights the necessity of appropriate representations for supporting reasoning. The literature examining diagramming for reasoning support provides little discussion of appropriate representations. This thesis examines theories of representation for insight they can provide into the design of appropriate representations. It is concluded that while the theories of representation that are examined do not determine what amounts to a good representation, guidelines for the design and choice of representations can be distilled. These guidelines cannot map the class of legal knowledge-based systems that augment legal sensemaking, they can however, be used to explore this class and to inform construction of systems.

What makes a good common law argument? Ronald Dworkin’s answer commands much respect within legal practice. To him, the correctness of a legal conclusion rests upon its capacity to fit within a narrative of normative progress that judges deliberately impose for the sake of (i) rendering overt the shared membership of discretely decided cases within a single determinate category (ii) depictive of moral attractiveness at its best. Yet, the inherent plausibility of Dworkin’s presentation of judicial reasoning has ironically resulted in the erosion of respect for the common law. If judicial narratives are imposed for aesthetic considerations, then legal conclusions must – per Kant – be mere idiosyncratic judicial desires that have the added quality of being objectively intelligible to other individuals who could nonetheless – owing to the absence of any criteria of norm correctness – justifiably disagree. If accurate, this characterization of legal decision-making would be anemic with modernity’s conviction that law is an entity inherently distinguishable from power because of the rationality – and therefore non-dogmatic nature – of its dictates. This thesis demonstrates – contra Dworkin – that judicial narratives go hand-in-hand with rationality. Judicial reasoning is thus of great importance to the aspirational goal of governance through law. As will be seen, only a constructed narrative renders possible the objective demonstrability (i) of the membership of discrete judicial decisions within the classificatory ambit of a specific norm and (ii) the legitimacy of that specific norm’s selection – from a set of countless other possibilities - via its evidential capacity to order those same discrete decisions tentatively asserted to be under its ambit into a coherent whole. Thus, because (i) the narrative is the methodological process by which a norm comes into agreement with its observed applications and (ii) truth is exactly this just-mentioned correspondence between intellect and reality, narrative construction is – quite properly – logic.

L’analyse comparée du raisonnement du juge européen et du juge de l’OMC est menée en deux temps. Le raisonnement est, d’une part, déterminé, et d’autre part, finalisé. Il apparaît tout d’abord que le raisonnement du juge de l’Union et du juge de l’OMC est déterminé par des caractéristiques systémiques et normatives de ces organisations. Ainsi, la fonction assignée au juge et le caractère incohérent ou lacunaire des systèmes européen et de l’OMC conduisent les juges à raisonner de façon comparable. De même, l’indétermination des règles juridiques et la substance économique du droit ont une influence sur leur raisonnement. Il apparaît ensuite que le raisonnement est finalisé. La première finalité est inhérente au juge d’une organisation internationale ou supra nationale, et le raisonnement est alors un instrument mis au service de la réalisation des objectifs des Traités. La seconde finalité est consubstantielle au juge qui raisonne afin d’assurer l'acceptabilité de ses décisions. / Comparative analysis of legal reasoning of the EU and WTO judge is conducted in two steps.On the one hand, reasoning is determined, on the other hand, harnessed. First, it appears that the reasoning of both judges is determined by the systemic and normative characteristics of these organizations. Thus, the function the judge is given, along with the incompleteness and inconsistencies of the european and multilateral systems, lead both judges to reason in asimilar way. Likewise, the indeterminacy of legal rules and the economic nature of the lawboth have an impact on reasoning. Second, it appears that reasoning is harnessed. As it is true for any supranational or international judge, reasoning is used as an instrument to achieve theTreaties' objectives. Furthermore, reasoning is an integral part of the judge who uses it in order to ensure the acceptability of his ruling.

O raciocínio jurídico analógico tem sido visto ora como forma de raciocínio essencial ao Direito, ora como mecanismo pernicioso e arbitrário de tomada de decisões, em prejuízo ao Estado de Direito. O presente trabalho parte da hipótese de que o raciocínio analógico é mecanismo que promove segurança jurídica, e, não, indeterminação. Para sustentar tal ideia, a primeira parte desta discussão apresenta o ponto de vista de diferentes teóricos do direito que procuraram expor ou negar a existência de uma estrutura própria dessa forma de raciocínio. A segunda parte, por sua vez, propõe um balanço acerca dessas perspectivas, identificando-se elementos pertinentes à estrutura do raciocínio analógico e passíveis de análise específica e de crítica, com possibilidade de reformulação ou de melhor compreensão dos pontos colocados em evidência. A terceira parte, por fim, estabelece relação entre raciocínio analógico e coerência, entendendo esta como essencial para compreender de que maneira tal espécie de raciocínio pode promover segurança jurídica; para tanto, discute os conceitos de coerência e de integridade do direito, e, então, propõe que é possível verificar, do ponto de vista prático, relação entre a forma de desenvolvimento de raciocínios analógicos e os institutos jurídicos, de maneira a sustentar, por fim, que a analogia pode constituir mecanismo de segurança jurídica e de densificação do direito. O trabalho conclui que o raciocínio analógico desempenha papel relevante no Estado de Direito, nem sempre percebido como tal. / Analogical legal reasoning has been seen both as a form of reasoning essential to the law and as a pernicious and arbitrary mechanism of decision-making, undermining the rule of law. The present work is based on the hypothesis that analogical reasoning is a mechanism that increases legal certainty, not indetermination. To support this idea, the first part of this discussion presents the point of view of different legal theorists who sought to expose or deny the existence of a proper structure of this form of reasoning. The second part, in turn, proposes a balance on these perspectives, identifying pertinent elements to the structure of analogical reasoning, which are subject to specific analysis and criticism, with the possibility of reformulation or better understanding of the highlighted points. The third part, finally, establishes a relation between analogical reasoning and coherence, understanding this as essential to comprehend how this kind of reasoning can promote legal certainty; for this, it discusses the concepts of coherence and integrity of the law, and then it proposes that it is possible to verify, from a practical point of view, the relationship between the development of analogical reasoning and institutions of law, in order to sustain, lastly, that analogy can constitute a mechanism of legal certainty and densification of the law. This work concludes that analogical reasoning plays a relevant role in the rule of law, not always perceived as such.

O presente trabalho se estrutura em torno da resposta a duas questões: O que é uma decisão motivada? e Quais as consequências de uma decisão imotivada?. Nesta perspectiva, partese da definição da motivação como um discurso cuja função é a de justificar racionalmente a decisão judicial. Esta justificativa racional tem funções endoprocessuais e extraprocessuais. Dentre as funções extraprocessuais, destaca-se a de conferir legitimidade à atuação jurisdicional no Estado Democrático de Direito. Ainda no âmbito da norma constitucional que impõe ao juiz o dever de fundamentar suas decisões, demonstra-se que ela se estrutura sob a forma de regra, nos termos da teoria dos princípios de ALEXY, com a consequência de que os limites para a caracterização de uma decisão como motivada são rígidos. Passa-se, então, à construção de um modelo teórico de estrutura da motivação sob a ótica funcional. Na construção desse modelo, demonstra-se que a estrutura e conteúdo da motivação no caso concreto dependem da interação de um modelo mínimo de justificação adequada, um modelo intermediário delimitado pelo contraditório e um limite máximo delimitado pela linguagem. A partir desse modelo interativo exploram-se as consequências dos vícios de motivação segundo uma teoria das nulidades dos atos processuais e, assim, conclui-se que a motivação só será considerada inexistente em caso de omissão gráfica e que qualquer vício de fundamentação é uma atipicidade relevante que deve ser nulificada. / The present work is structured around answering two questions: \"What is a motivated decision?\" and \"What are the consequences of an unjustified decision?. In this perspective, we start from the definition of motivation as a speech whose function is to rationally justify the decision. This rational justification has legal and constitutional functions. Among the constitutional functions one that stands out is to legitimate the courts role under in the rule of law. Also as part of the constitutional rule determining courts to motivate their decisions, it is shown that it is structured in the form of a rule in accordance with the principles theory of ALEXY, resulting that the limits for the characterization of a motivated decision are rigid. Then it is possible to create a theoretical model of the structure of motivation from a functional perspective. When building this model, we demonstrate that the structure and content of motivation depends on the interaction of a minimal model of proper justification, an intermediate model bounded by the adversarial principle, and another model, bigger than the others, defined by the language. From this interactive model it becomes possible to explore he consequences of the defects of motivation according to a nullity of procedural acts theory and thus it is concluded that motivation wont be considered existent only in case of graphical omission and that any defective reasoning must be nullified.

Doctor of Philosophy / There has been dissatisfaction over some court rulings among lay people in Japan. In this thesis I propose a model to explain the discrepancies between legal experts and lay people. Chapter 1 presents the purpose of this thesis, and an overview of the model called the Linguistic Legal Model. Chapter 2 shows the Japanese legal system including a new lay-participation system, the mixed court system. Chapter 3 provides background information on Japanese trademark issues. In Chapter 4 and 5, the Linguistic Legal Model is explored with Layer Analysis and Register Analysis. For Layer Analysis in Chapter 4, the notion of layering is presented from a linguistic perspective whereas legal reasoning is discussed from the notion of different modes of thought. Register Analysis in Chapter 5 is discussed in terms of genre and register. Japanese legal language is examined together with English legal language. In Chapter 6 and 7 I examine trademark cases. The Golden Horse case in Chapter 6 presents court’s judgment of the likelihood of confusion which is in common with that of lay people. However, it is argued that the thought process in the legal judgment court was not convincing. In Chapter 7, the Snack Chanel case portrays a judgment characteristic of the legal layer, which is quite different from the common sense of lay people. This discrepancy is explained from the perspective of different layers and different modes of thought. Chapter 8 concludes with a brief summary of this thesis.

Doctor of Philosophy / There has been dissatisfaction over some court rulings among lay people in Japan. In this thesis I propose a model to explain the discrepancies between legal experts and lay people. Chapter 1 presents the purpose of this thesis, and an overview of the model called the Linguistic Legal Model. Chapter 2 shows the Japanese legal system including a new lay-participation system, the mixed court system. Chapter 3 provides background information on Japanese trademark issues. In Chapter 4 and 5, the Linguistic Legal Model is explored with Layer Analysis and Register Analysis. For Layer Analysis in Chapter 4, the notion of layering is presented from a linguistic perspective whereas legal reasoning is discussed from the notion of different modes of thought. Register Analysis in Chapter 5 is discussed in terms of genre and register. Japanese legal language is examined together with English legal language. In Chapter 6 and 7 I examine trademark cases. The Golden Horse case in Chapter 6 presents court’s judgment of the likelihood of confusion which is in common with that of lay people. However, it is argued that the thought process in the legal judgment court was not convincing. In Chapter 7, the Snack Chanel case portrays a judgment characteristic of the legal layer, which is quite different from the common sense of lay people. This discrepancy is explained from the perspective of different layers and different modes of thought. Chapter 8 concludes with a brief summary of this thesis.

A distinção entre ser obrigado a fazer alguma coisa por meio de coerção e ter a obrigação jurídica de fazê-la foi apresentada por H. L. A. Hart como a distinção entre atos coercitivos praticados com ou sem o respaldo de uma regra jurídica válida. Para o esse autor, a validade jurídica de uma regra está condicionada à aceitação do ordenamento ao qual pertence por parte significativa da sociedade, principalmente das autoridades responsáveis por aplicar as sanções correspondentes ao seu descumprimento. A aceitação, por seu turno, pode ter fundamento nos mais diversos tipos de razão, não sendo necessária a concordância moral. Ainda que essa possa ser uma boa descrição do funcionamento do direito enquanto prática social, ela carece de elementos para justificar certos atos coercitivos praticados pelos aparatos estatais como a imposição de deveres jurídicos autênticos àqueles que porventura não os percebam assim. Esta tese busca esclarecer quais seriam os requisitos para a justificação da imposição de tais deveres e a importância dessa investigação na fundamentação das decisões judiciais. / The distinction between being obliged to do something by coercion and having the legal obligation of doing it was presented by H. L. A. Hart as the distinction between coercive acts either backed or not by a valid legal rule. According to him, the legal validity of a rule is conditioned to the acceptation of the legal system to which it belongs by a large part of the society, especially by the officials who are responsible for the application of the sanctions related to their infringement. The acceptation, in turn, may be founded in several kinds of reasons, which do not entail moral approbation. Even though that might be a good description of law as a social practice, it lacks the necessary elements to justify certain coercive acts practised by the officials as the imposition of authentic legal duties to those who happen to see them as mere acts of violence. This dissertation seeks to elucidate the requirements for justifying the imposition of legal duties and the importance of this investigation to the justification in judgements.

O raciocínio jurídico analógico tem sido visto ora como forma de raciocínio essencial ao Direito, ora como mecanismo pernicioso e arbitrário de tomada de decisões, em prejuízo ao Estado de Direito. O presente trabalho parte da hipótese de que o raciocínio analógico é mecanismo que promove segurança jurídica, e, não, indeterminação. Para sustentar tal ideia, a primeira parte desta discussão apresenta o ponto de vista de diferentes teóricos do direito que procuraram expor ou negar a existência de uma estrutura própria dessa forma de raciocínio. A segunda parte, por sua vez, propõe um balanço acerca dessas perspectivas, identificando-se elementos pertinentes à estrutura do raciocínio analógico e passíveis de análise específica e de crítica, com possibilidade de reformulação ou de melhor compreensão dos pontos colocados em evidência. A terceira parte, por fim, estabelece relação entre raciocínio analógico e coerência, entendendo esta como essencial para compreender de que maneira tal espécie de raciocínio pode promover segurança jurídica; para tanto, discute os conceitos de coerência e de integridade do direito, e, então, propõe que é possível verificar, do ponto de vista prático, relação entre a forma de desenvolvimento de raciocínios analógicos e os institutos jurídicos, de maneira a sustentar, por fim, que a analogia pode constituir mecanismo de segurança jurídica e de densificação do direito. O trabalho conclui que o raciocínio analógico desempenha papel relevante no Estado de Direito, nem sempre percebido como tal. / Analogical legal reasoning has been seen both as a form of reasoning essential to the law and as a pernicious and arbitrary mechanism of decision-making, undermining the rule of law. The present work is based on the hypothesis that analogical reasoning is a mechanism that increases legal certainty, not indetermination. To support this idea, the first part of this discussion presents the point of view of different legal theorists who sought to expose or deny the existence of a proper structure of this form of reasoning. The second part, in turn, proposes a balance on these perspectives, identifying pertinent elements to the structure of analogical reasoning, which are subject to specific analysis and criticism, with the possibility of reformulation or better understanding of the highlighted points. The third part, finally, establishes a relation between analogical reasoning and coherence, understanding this as essential to comprehend how this kind of reasoning can promote legal certainty; for this, it discusses the concepts of coherence and integrity of the law, and then it proposes that it is possible to verify, from a practical point of view, the relationship between the development of analogical reasoning and institutions of law, in order to sustain, lastly, that analogy can constitute a mechanism of legal certainty and densification of the law. This work concludes that analogical reasoning plays a relevant role in the rule of law, not always perceived as such.