Sunk costs play a central role in antitrust economics, but are often misunderstood and mismeasured. I will try to clarify some of the conceptual and empirical issues related to sunk costs, and explain their implications for antitrust analysis. I will be particularly concerned with the role of uncertainty. When market conditions evolve unpredictably (as they almost always do), firms incur an opportunity cost when they invest in new capital, because they give up the option to wait for the arrival of new information about the likely returns from the investment. This option value is a sunk cost, and is just as relevant for antitrust analysis as the direct cost of a machine or a factory.

[pt] Trabalhos recentes sugerem que as instituições financeiras brasileiras têm algum grau de poder de mercado no setor de serviços bancários. Será que elas conseguem estender esse poder para o mercado de fundos de investimento? Esta dissertação analisa os retornos e as taxas de administração dos fundos de ações no Brasil entre os anos de 2002 a 2006. Os dados revelam que os fundos administrados pelos cinco maiores bancos privados no Brasil não têm um retorno ajustado pelo risco significativamente inferior ao dos demais fundos de ações, nem cobram taxas de administração mais elevadas. A conclusão é que mesmo que os maiores bancos brasileiros tenham poder de mercado, eles não conseguem estendê-lo para o mercado de fundos de ações. / [en] Recent work suggests that Brazilian Banks have a power market in bankings services. Is it possible for these banks to extend this behavior to the equity funds market? This study analyses the brazilian funds´ returns and fees from 2002 to 2006. Our analysis shows that funds managed by the five largest Brazilian private banks don´t appear to have smaller risk adjusted returns or higher fees when compared to other funds.We conclude that even if the largest banks have a power market in Brazil, they have not been able to extendent this to the equity funds market.

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T20:54:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 3 RaphaelAlmeidaVideira2005.pdf.jpg: 14673 bytes, checksum: 6bb82016c88319ba325f1405c78187a1 (MD5) RaphaelAlmeidaVideira2005.pdf.txt: 115776 bytes, checksum: bf2ac1c722c9f885c08ea24a71569ba6 (MD5) RaphaelAlmeidaVideira2005.pdf: 192934 bytes, checksum: 3b05da2be234891400d65dc59ceae526 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005-12-15T00:00:00Z / This paper studies the brazilian pulp industry and tries to answer two main questions. The first is about the definition of geographic relevant market. The second one intends to verify the existance of market power in this industry. The product relevant market, bleached eucalyptus pulp, was defined by qualitative aspects. The first question used a methodology proposed by Forni (2004), who used unit root tests (ADF and KPSS) to define the geographic relevant market. The results of these tests indicated an international geographic relevant market which was corroborated analysing the functioning of this market. After these tests, a market power test was done, because in this market, the world leader is a brazilian company, Aracruz. This test was proposed by Mayo, Kaserman e Kahai (1996) and they used a demand residual model. The estimation of this test was proposed by Motta (2004). The results indicated that Aracruz does not have market power in this sector. / Este trabalho analisa o setor brasileiro de celulose e tenta responder a duas questões principais: a abrangência do mercado relevante e a existência de poder de mercado das empresas que atuam neste setor. A dimensão produto do mercado relevante foi definida a partir de dados qualitativos. Devido à indisponibilidade de dados para uma análise qualitativa mais apurada, a opção foi pela celulose de fibra curta de eucalipto, produto mais importante do setor, tanto pela posição brasileira em tecnologia como pela pauta de exportações. Já quanto à dimensão geográfica, o procedimento realizado baseou-se em Forni (2004) que utiliza testes de raiz unitária para a definição do mercado. Concluiu-se que, com os dados disponíveis, o mercado deste produto pode ser considerado como internacional, não somente pelo resultado do teste como também pelo modo de funcionamento deste mercado. Definido o mercado de produto e geográfico, realizou-se um teste de poder de mercado, pois neste nicho, a Aracruz é líder mundial. Tal teste foi realizado com base na demanda residual descrita por Mayo, Kaserman e Kahai (1996) e estimado segundo Motta (2004). Concluiu-se que, apesar de a Aracruz possuir um elevado market share no setor, ela não possui poder de mercado.

x, 94 p. : ill. (some col.) / This paper examines how competition faced by firms affects asset risk and expected returns. Contrary to Hou and Robinson's (2006) findings, I find that cross-industry variation in competition, as measured by the concentration ratio, is not a robust determinant of unconditional expected stock returns. In contrast, within-industry competition, as measured by relative price markup, is positively related to expected stock returns. Moreover, this relation is not captured by commonly used models of expected returns. When using the Markov regime-switching model advocated by Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000), I test and find support for Aguerrevere's (2009) recent model of competition find risk dynamics. In particular, systematic risk is greater in more competitive industries during bad times and greater in more concentrated industries during good times. In addition, real investment by firms facing greater competition leads real investment by firms facing less competition, supporting Aguerrevere's notion that less competition results in higher growth options and hence higher risk in good times. / Committee in charge: Dr. Roberto Gutierrez, Chair; Dr. Roberto Gutierrez, Advisor; Dr. Diane Del Guercio, Inside Member; Dr. John Chalmers， Inside Member； Dr. Bruce Blonigen， Outside Member

nÃo hà / O setor da telefonia mÃvel no Brasil tem crescido muito nas Ãltimas dÃcadas. O paÃs passou do perÃodo em que o governo detinha o monopÃlio estatal para o da privatizaÃÃo do setor. A telefonia mÃvel comeÃou a se expandir em 1988 e jà acumulava, no fim de 2012, 260 milhÃes de linhas aproximadamente. Quatro grandes operadoras dominam o mercado brasileiro: Vivo, Claro, Tim e Oi. A Vivo à a lÃder no Ãmbito nacional. No Estado do CearÃ, foi a Ãltima a comeÃar a operar. Para analisar o impacto causado pelo ingresso da Vivo no mercado cearense, adotou-se o modelo de Cournot, que relaciona Ãndice de Lerner com concentraÃÃo do mercado e elasticidade. Para calcular a evoluÃÃo da concentraÃÃo desse mercado, usou-se o Ãndice de Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) e, para avaliar o poder de mercado, trabalhou-se com o Ãndice de Lerner. A fim de tentar isolar o efeito do impacto causado pelo ingresso da Vivo, realizou-se um contrafactual. O poder de mercado, apÃs a entrada da Vivo, reduziu 10,69% , enquanto que no contrafactual, o qual simula o mercado sem a Vivo, a reduÃÃo foi apenas de 5,19%. O impacto econÃmico calculado entre a diferenÃa do mercado real e do contrafactual foi de 5,5%. Realizou-se o mesmo trabalho para o Estado do PiauÃ, a fim de confrontar-se o resultado com outra Ãrea de atuaÃÃo da operadora. O impacto econÃmico produzido foi de 22,27%. Isso mostra o efeito positivo causado pelo ingresso da Vivo nesses dois mercados analisados. / The Brazilian cell phone industry becomes increasingly successful in the late decades. Indeed, in Brazil the government is not the state-owned telecommunication monopoly. With the prominent introduction of the service into the ceareanse market in 1988, it has lured over 260 million telephone lines by late 2012. The four BrazilianÂs dominant telecommunications companies are Vivo, Claro, Tim and Oi. Vivo is the national leader, though it operates in Ceara only recently. Vivo has tightened its grasp on the local phone market, as in consequence one intends to assess its results by means of Cournot model, which is related with the Lerner index. This one puts much greater emphasis on the market concentration and elasticity. To calculate the evolution in the remaining market, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is applied, and to evaluate the market consistence, one considered Lerner index. Besides, we take a contrafactual test in which Vivo advantages are considered in isolation. Rather, the market force, after VivoÂs introduction, down from 10,69 per cent, while in face of contrafactual test, i.e, without Vivo, accounted for only 5,19 per cent. From the economics viewpoint, the difference between the real market and contrafactual was 5,5 per cent. The same research was done bearing in mind Piaui state, in order to compare how the company operated in another area. The economics gains was 22,27 per cent. This just shows the valuable gains issued from VivoÂs introduction in the two states.

Esse trabalho faz da indústria de combustível de aviação no Brasil, especificamente o querosene de aviação - QAV, o seu objeto de pesquisa, uma vez que a mesma, do ponto de vista da estrutura de mercado, se caracteriza pela presença de poucas empresas atuantes desde a produção do bem até a sua distribuição, possibilitando o exercício de poder de mercado, levando à perda de bem estar social e alocação ineficiente de recursos. Ademais, busca analisar o ambiente institucional e como são formados os preços desse combustível no Brasil, tanto a nível de produtor quanto a nível do distribuidor, visto que os preços nacionais do querosene de aviação ao consumidor são elevados em relação aos preços praticados no mercado internacional. Devido a isso, esse estudo visa identificar também a existência de poder de mercado no segmento de distribuição desse combustível. O que tem se verificado no período de análise desta pesquisa é o Estado intervindo na política de preços de alguns combustíveis, por exemplo a gasolina, através da Petrobras, empresa aberta de capital misto sendo o governo nacional o maior acionista, e que é líder no mercado de refino e distribuição de derivados no país, apesar da desregulamentação nacional do setor do petróleo e seus derivados iniciada na década de 1990 e finalizada em 2001. A indústria nacional de querosene de aviação tem apresentado consideráveis índices de consumo e produção no período recente, devido principalmente ao aumento na demanda pelo transporte aéreo no país na última década. Por fim, a lacuna existente na literatura sobre a indústria referida motivou a realização da pesquisa, almejando contribuir para o entendimento da estrutura de mercado e formação de preços, bem como apresentar o ambiente institucional em que tal sistema produtivo está inserido. Para tanto, são utilizadas vertentes teóricas da Organização Industrial, especificamente o paradigma Estrutura-Conduta-Desempenho (ECD), a Nova Economia das Instituições (NEI) e a NEIO (New Empirical Industrial Organization). / This paper has the Brazilian aviation fuel industry (specifically the jet fuel) as object of research since that, from the point of structural view, is characterized by the presence of few firms operating in the production and in the distribution segment, which ones may exert market power, leading to loss of social welfare and inefficient allocation of resources in the economy. Moreover, aims to analyze the institutional environment of that industry and how the jet fuel prices are formed in national market, both at the producer and distributor level, since domestic prices of aviation fuel to consumers are high in comparison to that in the international market. Because of this aspect, the study also aims to identify the existence, or not, of market power in the Brazilian jet fuel distribution segment. Currently, what has been verified during the analysis period of this research is the Union intervening in pricing policy of some fuel, e.g. gasoline, through Petrobras, a mixed capital company, being the national government the largest shareholder, leader in the refining and distribution of oil products in the Brazilian market, despite the national deregulation oil and its derivatives, which started in the 1990s and was completed in 2001. Beyond these issues, the potential of the jet fuel industry is remarkable, showing considerable rates of consumption and production in the recent period, due to an increase in the national demand by air transportation in the last decade. Finally, the gap in the literature about the Brazil\'s industry of jet fuel is a notable fact to accomplish this study witch will contribute to the structural and institutional understanding of it. Therefore, to support this paper, theoretical stands of Industrial Organization are used, specifically the paradigm Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP), the New Institutional Economics (NIE) and the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO).

Dado o crescente aumento na demanda de etanol combustível, bem como as estratégias de fusões e aquisições entre produtores e distribuidores observadas no Brasil recentemente, muito se tem discutido a respeito do poder de mercado que pode estar sendo, ou pode vir a ser exercido por esses agentes envolvidos na cadeia do produto. Discussões sobre um possível responsável por elevações do preço do produto têm levantado o interesse sobre a existência de poder de mercado por parte dos produtores de etanol, e/ou por parte das distribuidoras de combustíveis. O presente trabalho utiliza o ferramental da Nova Organização Industrial Empírica (NEIO), que estima um parâmetro de conduta de mercado através da resposta dos preços a variações na elasticidadepreço da demanda, para analisar a questão da existência e do grau de poder de mercado no elo da distribuição e da produção de etanol no estado de São Paulo. Apóia-se no trabalho de Genesove e Mullin (1998) para a aplicação empírica da NEIO, e também para verificar se a metodologia é adequada ao mercado brasileiro de etanol. Conclui-se que a metodologia NEIO mostra-se adequada aos dois elos da cadeia de etanol analisados. Além disso, produtores e distribuidores de etanol combustível não exercem efetivamente poder de mercado, no período compreendido pela análise. Os valores dos parâmetros de conduta de mercado estimados mostram que a conduta, nos referidos elos da cadeia do etanol, esteve mais próxima à concorrência perfeita que ao monopólio. Assim, não se observou o efetivo exercício de poder de mercado nos dois elos da cadeia de etanol estudados. / Given the increasing demand for ethanol fuel, as well as strategies for mergers and acquisitions among producers and distributors in Brazil recently observed, much has been discussed about the market power which is being, or may be exercised by those agents involved in the ethanol sector in the country. Discussions about a possible price increase have raised concern about the existence of market power from producers of ethanol, and/or from the distributors. This work uses the tools of the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO), which estimates a parameter of market conduct through the response of prices to changes in price elasticity of demand, to examine the question of the existence and degree of market power on the link of the distribution and production of ethanol in the state of Sao Paulo. The Genesove and Mullin (1998) work is used for the NEIOs empirical application, and also to check whether the methodology is appropriate to the Brazilian ethanol market. Then, it has been concluded that NEIOs methodology proved to be suitable for the two links in the chain of ethanol analyzed. Also producers and distributors of ethanol fuel had not effectively exercised market power, in the period of analysis. The estimated values of market conducts parameter show that the conduct, in those links in the ethanols chain, was closer to that perfect competition to monopoly. Thus, it has not been observed the effective exercise of market power in the two links of the chain of ethanol studied.

Dans le cadre de cette thèse, nous nous interrogeons sur la concurrence que peut potentiellement apporter les recycleurs sur un marché des matières premières traditionnellement dominé par un oligopole minier. Dans quelle mesure les recycleurs peuvent-ils concurrencer les firmes minières et quels sont les effets sur l'oligopole? Comme deuxième axe de recherche, nous tenons compte du différentiel d'externalités environnementales qui existe entre les deux types d'offre. Nous intégrons donc dans notre modèle une subvention au recyclage ainsi qu'une taxe sur la pollution minière, ceci, en réponse aux deux distorsions de marché que sont la structure non concurrentielle de l'extraction minière et les externalités qui sont associées à cette activité. Pour donner une dimension empirique à cette thèse, nous utilisons les marchés du minerai de fer et de l'acier. Préalablement à l'analyse de la concurrence avec les recycleurs, nous effectuons dans le cadre du Chapitre 1, une analyse de l'évolution des marchés du fer et de l'acier suite au choc de demande des années 2000. La concentration de la demande autour des sidérurgistes chinois ainsi que la stratégie mise en place par les autorités à partir de 2010, aboutissent à l'existence d'un monopsone contrarié sur le marché mondial du minerai de fer.En se recentrant sur l'amont de la chaîne de valeur, notre Chapitre 2 pose le cadre théorique de la concurrence entre les entreprises minières et les recycleurs. A travers un modèle Cournot-Stackelberg, nous montrons que la part de marché du secteur minier augmente avec le degré de concurrence de ce secteur. Les recycleurs ne peuvent en effet pas augmenter de manière significative leur part de marché si une technologie de recyclage efficace n'est pas, dans le même temps, associée à une importante disponibilité de déchets. Cette double condition est également nécessaire pour garantir la diminution de la rente minière. Par ailleurs, nous mettons en avant l'existence d'un niveau de technologie de recyclage minimum pour que les recycleurs puissent entrer sur le marché. La prise en compte du différentiel d'externalités environnementales dans le Chapitre 3 renforce la nécessité d'une augmentation de l'offre de matières secondaires, au regard de son effet bénéfique sur le bien-être. L'instauration d'une taxe environnementale sur la production minière s'avère, à cet effet, moins pertinente qu'une subvention au recyclage. La taxe renforce la contrainte de capacités pour les recycleurs, repose sur une nécessaire évaluation de la pollution minière difficile à réaliser pour certaines matières premières, et des limites quant à sa mise en œuvre semblent également se poser. A l'inverse, l'instauration d'une subvention au recyclage aurait des effets significatifs sur les parts de marché des recycleurs et sur la nécessaire baisse des dommages liés à l'extraction. Comme nous le montrons, la différence d'effets entre les deux politiques est d'autant plus forte lorsque le niveau de recyclage initial est faible. Enfin, en s'intéressant à une politique publique axée sur la demande de matières plutôt que sur l'offre, le Chapitre 4 met en exergue la faible incitation du marché européen du carbone sur la baisse des émissions de CO$_2$ des sidérurgistes, et donc sur un potentiel recours accru à la matière secondaire. Nous montrons également comment cette politique climatique interfère avec la politique de concurrence car elle bénéficie essentiellement aux leaders du marché, au détriment du principe de concurrence libre et non faussée qui prévaut au sein du marché commun. Plus surprenant, nos résultats indiquent que le leader du marché est la firme la moins efficace dans la consommation de matières premières, par rapport à la quantité d'acier produite et aux émissions de CO2 générées. A l'inverse, la firme qui semble être la plus efficace est, dans le même temps, celle qui aurait été la moins avantagée dans l'attribution des quotas gratuits depuis 2007. / In addition to a solution for managing end-of-life products, recycling is also an alternative to the production of virgin raw materials. In this thesis, we are therefore wondering about this new form of competition that could potentially include recyclers, on a commodity market traditionally dominated by a mining oligopoly. To what extent can recyclers compete with mining firms and what are the effects on oligopoly? As a second line of research, we consider the differential of environmental externalities that exists between the two types of supply. We therefore include in our model a recycling subsidy and a tax on mining pollution, in response to the two market distortions: the non-competitive structure of mining extraction and the externalities that are associated with this activity. To give an empirical dimension to this thesis, we use the iron and steel industry. Prior to the analysis of the competition with recyclers, we carry out in Chapter 1, an analysis of the evolution of the markets of iron and steel following the demand shock since the year 2000. The concentration of the demand from Chinese steelmakers as well as the strategy put in place by the authorities from 2010, led to a new market structure of the world iron ore market: a thwarted monopsony.By focusing on the upstream value chain, Chapter 2 sets the theoretical framework for competition between mining firms and recyclers. Through a Cournot-Stackelberg model, we show that the market share of the mining sector increases with the degree of competition in this sector. Recyclers cannot significantly increase their market share if an efficient recycling technology is not associated with a high availability of waste. This dual condition is also necessary to ensure the reduction of the mining rent. In addition, we highlight the requirement of a minimum level of recycling technology for recyclers to enter the market.Taking into account the differential of environmental externalities in Chapter 3 strengthens the need for increasing the supply of secondary materials, with regard to its positive effect on social wellfare. For this purpose, the introduction of an environmental tax on mining extraction is less relevant than a subsidy for recycling. The tax reinforces the capacity constraint for recyclers, relies on a necessary assessment of mining pollution that is difficult to achieve for certain raw materials, and there are limits on its implementation which also seem to arise. On the other hand, the introduction of a recycling subsidy would have a significant impact on recyclers' market share and the necessary reduction of extraction-related damages. As we show, the difference in effects between the two policies is even stronger when the initial level of recycling is low.Finally, by focusing on a public policy based on the demand for materials rather than on supply, Chapter 4 highlights the weak incentive of the EU-ETS to reduce CO2 emissions from steelmakers, and therefore a potential increase of the secondary input instead of the virgin one. We also show how this climate policy interferes with the EU competition policy because it mainly benefits market leaders, to the detriment of the principle of free and undistorted competition prevailing in the EU market. More surprisingly, our results indicate that the market leader is the least efficient firm in the consumption of raw materials, considering the quantity of steel produced and the CO$_2$ emissions generated. Conversely, the firm that seems to be the most efficient would also have been least favoured when free allowances were allocated from 2007 onwards.

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