Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1996. / Shipping list no.: 1998-0921-M. "August 1997." Includes bibliographical references. Also available via Internet from the Air University Press web site. Address as of 10/28/03: http://aupress.au.af.mil/SAAS%5FTheses/Lewis/lewis.pdf; current access is available via PURL.

Should U.S. political decision-makers decide to wage a moral war, it is not as easy a merely saying go do it. To ensure moral targeting decisions, American national political leaders must suffer the costs of monitoring in terms of time and money, and provide not only detailed direction, but also constant oversight to ensure objectives are clear and subordinates carry out directions. Military officers must ensure that their motivations align with those of their principals, and they must ensure that constraining doctrine for planning and executing combat operations is followed. Having satisfied these variables, moral targeting decisions, wherein proportionality of non-combatant casualties is weighed against target necessity, should then be easily attainable. The process of aligning motivations with respect to desired outcomes, and the process of planning strategies according to doctrine together lead to moral targeting decisions. By following the processes of getting war plans approved according to published U.S. doctrine, a deliberate dialogue is followed with direction and feedback through several steps of planning and approval that result in multiple people working on a product that results in a sort of corporate buy- in. I posit that it is difficult to follow this process and end up with targeting decisions that do not weigh harm to non-combatants against the necessity of individual targets, especially when principals and agents come together to deliberately ensure they align their motivations with respect to objectives. This theory is applicable to U.S. involvement in war, but is not necessarily generalizable to other countries. Through case studies of American involvement in Desert Storm (the first Gulf War), Operation Allied Force (NATOs air war over Serbia), and the U.S. War on Terror (campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq), I find that only in the War on Terror were moral targeting decisions consistently made by US national leaders. Furthermore, that was the only case study wherein both constraining doctrine was present and principal-agent motivations were aligned with respect to objectives. The other two cases showed that the variables were not followed and proportionality- necessity decisions were not made.

The US military has proven its strengths many times over through its ability to dominate opponents on the conventional battlefield. However, when it comes to irregular wars and insurgent conflicts, which are defined by enemies who conduct war from the shadows and refuse to meet on the open field, finding success has been far more difficult. The nature and dynamics of these unconventional wars are dramatically different from the conventional warfare realm, and require innovative approaches and rethinking of many long held conceptions of waging war. Conducting unconventional warfare has been the core mission of US Army Special Forces (USSF) since they were founded in 1952. Throughout a relatively short history, USSF have shown a broad utility in conducting operations with indigenous military, paramilitary, and civilian personnel in "irregular wars" and low intensity conflicts (LICs), and thus Special Forces have been widely regarded as the preeminent experts in this particular field of warfare. Now more than ever, the capabilities of Special Forces are invaluable in supporting US national security strategy, continuing the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and supporting efforts to transform military capabilities for irregular warfare and unconventional conflicts. USSF are now faced with a difficult challenge: high demand and operations tempo require that USSF must find new ways to more effectively and efficiently employ their skills in unconventional environments. In order to enhance the capabilities of USSF in conducting unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, this thesis proposes that USSF develop a training program that allows recruitment and selection of both indigenous personnel and US foreign-born as auxiliaries and surrogates to USSF operations. Training would take place in the US and would be for the explicit purpose of creating indigenous cadres for assisting Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (SFODAs) in developing operational/security forces and intelligence networks at the local level in order to create long-term stability in unconventional conflict areas.

This study examines processes of military doctrinal change during periods of peace. Given the conventional wisdom of hidebound bureaucratic military organizations, why do these organizations innovate doctrinally? Rather than conduct competitive hypothesis testing between two or more theories of military innovation or pursue a heretofore undiscovered monocausal theory, I develop and test a theoretical framework that synthesizes more than one approach to military doctrinal innovation. I use this framework to conduct a structured, focused, case-study comparison of two military organizations - the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps - from the post-World War II period until 2001. The study yields seven findings. First, the systemic causes of military doctrinal innovation are best described by balance of threat theory. Second, contrary to the existing literature, civilian intervention is not a necessary or sufficient cause of doctrinal innovation. Third, militaries consistently strive to establish a monopoly over warfare in a particular jurisdictional domain. Fourth, the frequency of military doctrinal change is a function of the complexity of the strategic problem that doctrine is designed to solve. Fifth, the complexity of the cases studied supports the argument that monocausal explanations fail to account for the interaction of multiple variables that affect doctrinal innovation. Sixth, military doctrinal innovation during peacetime is not anomalous because military organizations constantly revise their theories of victory as threats change in the external environment. Finally, the existence of doctrinal institutions creates a norm for a reliance on military doctrine.

This dissertation explores civil-military relations in democratizing contexts, specifically how the historical relationship between the military and the broader public shapes responses to political crises such as riots and revolutions. I develop a novel theory, rooted in civil-military relations literature from political science and sociology, for how an army's historical interactions with the population and with foreign sponsors create doctrine by shaping organizational culture and practices toward the population. Doctrine, in turn, influences the military’s response to a popular uprising. The foundations of military doctrine are historical and include the military's institutional origins, role in national independence, and relationship to the ruling party. Subsequently, doctrinal innovation occurs as a result of interacting with the domestic population and foreign military sponsors. The dissertation features qualitative case studies of Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria during the Arab Spring and a quantitative data analysis of major uprisings worldwide since 1950. Both qualitative and quantitative evidence demonstrate that the nature of military doctrine explains soldiers' behavior during popular uprisings better than alternative arguments based on capacity, patronage, and ethnicity.

Student report -- Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, 1988. Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of requirements for graduation; Sponsor, Col Robert J. Courter, Director, Force development, HQ/DED; Faculty advisor Lt Col Rober L. Peters, ACSC/3823 Stus / "Apr 1988" "Report number 88-2300"

In this thesis the Russian Federation is investigated to understand if it still tries to continue its classic Soviet style of security perception in the post-Cold War era and its views concerning national security as reflected in Russia&#039 / s military doctrines. It is so obvious that the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emrgence of Russia as an independent entity in the post-cold war era have compelled the Russian Federation to redefine its national interest. In this context it experienced a crisis of describing its identity and national interests in changing security environment. Although in the early years of Yeltsin it preferred close cooperation with the West then abandoned this approach. It was implied that some states and coalitions were still main threats to the security of the Russian Federation in the military doctrine and the near-abroad policy re-gained importance. In addition with the inauguration of Putin as the Russian President the reaction of the Russian Federation regarding both internal and external security issues displayed the growing significance of traditional interests and old-style security issues. Thus in this thesis it is asserted that the Russian Federation still tries to sustain its well-known traditional interests the classic Soviet style of security perception in the post-Cold War period. Therefore this study tries to explain this argument through examining the effects of its imperial past, transformation years and its situation in the new security environment of post-Cold War era under Yeltsin and Putin.

Thesis (M.S.)--School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. / "June 2008." Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 130-134). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Cover title. "December 2002." AD-A411 335. Includes bibliographical references. Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.S. in Systems TEchnology (Command, Control, and Communications))--Naval Postgraduate School, June 1990. / Thesis Advisor(s): Sovereign, Michael G. Second Reader: Caldwell, William. "June 1990." Description based on signature page as viewed on October 21, 2009. DTIC Identifier(s): Military doctrines, air land battles, command and control systems, Warsaw pact countries, theses. Author(s) subject terms: NATO, C³, C², Warsaw Pact, warfighting doctrine, Airland Battle. Includes bibliographical references (p. 125-128). Also available online.