Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T20:20:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcelo Buzetto.pdf: 1600822 bytes, checksum: 4ebd29ac535cbe031d1b8e2acdeaed90 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-06-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The focus of this research is the strategic importance of national defense in the development of so-called "Bolivarian Revolution", a process underway in Venezuela. We intend to use as a reference several theoretical works that are in the field of Marxism, and authors who, while not having total affinity with this current of contemporary thought, made a significant contribution to the study of Art of War and the Theory of Strategy. The key to our work will be an evaluation of the Bolivarian New Military Doctrine and its relation to the strategy known as "War of All the People" (WAP). We also seek to check what are the contradictions and innovations brought about by the process of political, economical and social transformation in Venezuela for the study of national defense in an anti-imperialist perspective / O foco desta pesquisa é a importância estratégica da defesa nacional no desenvolvimento da chamada Revolução Bolivariana, processo em curso na Venezuela. Pretendemos utilizar como referência teórica diversas obras que se encontram no campo do marxismo, além de autores que, mesmo não tendo total afinidade com esta corrente do pensamento contemporâneo, deram uma contribuição significativa para o estudo da Arte da Guerra e da Teoria da Estratégia. O principal em nosso trabalho será uma avaliação da Nova Doutrina Militar Bolivariana e sua relação com a estratégia conhecida como Guerra de Todo o Povo (GTP). Também procuramos verificar quais são as contradições e as inovações trazidas pelo processo de transformação política, econômica e social na Venezuela para o estudo da defesa nacional numa perspectiva antiimperialista

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T14:53:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcelo Buzetto.pdf: 1600822 bytes, checksum: 4ebd29ac535cbe031d1b8e2acdeaed90 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-06-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The focus of this research is the strategic importance of national defense in the development of so-called "Bolivarian Revolution", a process underway in Venezuela. We intend to use as a reference several theoretical works that are in the field of Marxism, and authors who, while not having total affinity with this current of contemporary thought, made a significant contribution to the study of Art of War and the Theory of Strategy. The key to our work will be an evaluation of the Bolivarian New Military Doctrine and its relation to the strategy known as "War of All the People" (WAP). We also seek to check what are the contradictions and innovations brought about by the process of political, economical and social transformation in Venezuela for the study of national defense in an anti-imperialist perspective / O foco desta pesquisa é a importância estratégica da defesa nacional no desenvolvimento da chamada Revolução Bolivariana, processo em curso na Venezuela. Pretendemos utilizar como referência teórica diversas obras que se encontram no campo do marxismo, além de autores que, mesmo não tendo total afinidade com esta corrente do pensamento contemporâneo, deram uma contribuição significativa para o estudo da Arte da Guerra e da Teoria da Estratégia. O principal em nosso trabalho será uma avaliação da Nova Doutrina Militar Bolivariana e sua relação com a estratégia conhecida como Guerra de Todo o Povo (GTP). Também procuramos verificar quais são as contradições e as inovações trazidas pelo processo de transformação política, econômica e social na Venezuela para o estudo da defesa nacional numa perspectiva antiimperialista

Ce mémoire vise la compréhension du mécanisme des choix stratégiques de l’Inde en fonction de la menace perçue de la Chine. Selon une logique réaliste néoclassique, l’étude de l’effet des contraintes systémiques et domestiques présente un paradoxe dans les volontés stratégiques indiennes. L’Inde est soumise à la pression systémique de la montée de la Chine dans un monde post-Guerre froide qui la verrouille dans sa position traditionnellement défensive, alors que sa volonté de projection de la puissance guidée par sa perception, ses idées et sa culture stratégique la porte à adopter une position plus offensive. L’Inde perçoit la menace chinoise de manière dissonante avec l’orientation stratégique chinoi-se. Elle se concentre ainsi sur des signaux et des indices particuliers afin de justifier cette me-nace perçue. C’est pourquoi l’ambiguïté du langage diplomatique de la Chine envers l’Arunachal Pradesh et de sa présence dans l’océan Indien engendre un accroissement de la menace chinoise et une réponse plus agressive conséquemment. La réponse stratégique in-dienne doit s’adapter aux changements de la puissance relative de la Chine. N’ayant pas les capacités relatives suffisantes, l’Inde choisit une stratégie située entre une émulation dans une logique de poursuite aux armements afin de maintenir la parité technologique et un engage-ment afin de désamorcer la rivalité et éviter une réaction chinoise pré-emptive. La culture stratégique de l’Inde traditionnellement défensive se transforme vers une position offensive sous l’effet du nation building du nationalisme hindou. Les préférences stratégiques indiennes agressives s’illustrent principalement dans le choc multidirectionnel des sphères d’influence sino-indiennes en Asie. / This thesis seeks to understand the process of India strategic choice based on the perceived threat of China. According to a neoclassical realism framework, the study of the effect of sys-temic and domestic constraints shows a paradox in India strategic intentions. India is lock in a defensive posture by the systemic pressure of China rise in a post-Cold War era, although its desire to project his power lead by its perception, ideas, and strategic culture shows a progres-sive shift for an offensive posture. India perceives China threat in dissonance with the strategic aims of China. It is focusing on specific signals and indices in order to justify the perceived threat. This is why China’s ambi-guity toward its diplomatic discourse concerning Arunachal Pradesh and its presence in the Indian Ocean creates an increase Chinese threat and therefore a more aggressive response. India’s strategic response must cope with the changes in China’s relative power. Without the necessary relative capacity, India chooses a strategy between emulation defined by a pursuit of armaments logic in order to keep the technologic parity and engagement for the purpose of defusing the rivalry and avoiding a pre-emptive reaction from China. Traditionally defensive India’s strategic culture progressively transforms itself under the influence of the Hindu na-tion building that clash with the nehruvian nationalism. The aggressive Indian strategic pref-erences principally show themselves in the multidirectional clash of India and China spheres of influence in Asia.

The objective of this thesis is to analyze the changes in Israeli security policy. The thesis consists of four main parts. In the first part, the factors influencing the formation of Israeli security policy such as history, religion, ideology and threat perceptions are examined. Israeli military doctrine and its offensive, defensive and deterrence strategies are identified as the most important subcomponents of the security policy. The following part analyzes the changes and continuities in Israeli threat perceptions and the implementation of the military doctrine during and after the six main wars of the War of Independence, the war against Egypt in 1956, the Six Day War, the War of Attrition, the Yom Kippur War and the War in Lebanon in 1982. In the third part, the changes in Israeli security policy during 1990s are scrutinized. With the peace process, Israel&rsquo / s existential threat perception decreased but new threat perceptions of terrorism and conventional and nuclear military buildup in the region emerged / therefore security was redefined by the Israeli political and military decision-makers. In the last part the impact of the collapse of peace process and Sharon&rsquo / s coming to power on Israeli security policy is analyzed. Sharon&rsquo / s period can be defined by offensive security strategies aiming at preventing terror which has been the top security problem since the Al Aqsa Intifada. As a result, this thesis argues that Israeli security policy did not indicate significant changes until 1990s, however during 1990s Israeli security situation and security policy changed as a response to the regional and international developments. Post-2000 period witnessed changes as well with Sharon&rsquo / s returning to offensive strategies.

本論文之研究目的是企圖從前蘇聯文武關係研究途徑與克里姆林宮政治研究途徑來探討蘇聯解體後俄羅斯軍方之政治參與範疇與背後之動機。 就軍方政治參與之範疇而言，蘇聯於1991年底解體後，俄羅斯軍方在政治舞台上扮演了重要的角色。首先，我們可以從軍方在1993年俄羅斯新軍事準則成型的過程中，其強硬主張佔了主導的地位。第二、軍方在「近鄰」與前南斯拉夫維和行動的政策即便與外交部意見相衝突仍獲得最後主導權。第三、軍方在1993年10月政爭中並未完全保持中立，而最後軍方是站在葉里欽總統一方結束了此一政治危機。第四、軍方試圖從俄羅斯獨立後歷屆國家杜馬選舉中，藉由其投票行為或是主動參與競選來表達其政治態度與影響有關軍事方面之政策。 本論文以為，蘇後俄羅斯軍方的政治參與背後動機之主要原因有二。其一是蘇聯解體以後俄羅斯軍方制度利益嚴重惡化：蘇聯解體以後，軍方在軍事改革上無法有效進展、軍事預算嚴重不足、軍中生活條件惡化以及國防工業轉產上面臨了嚴重的問題。這些皆使得軍方為了自救不得不試圖從政治層面來解決軍隊之問題。其二是受到克里姆林宮政治互動之影響：葉里欽為了鞏固政軍大權，運用高超的政治手腕以及「分而治之」的統御方式，引用軍方的力量來打擊政治對手，另一方面也運用政治危機分化軍隊之團結性，使其無法在政治上形成對統治者之威脅。 / The purpose of the thesis attempts to analyze the scope and motives of post-soviet Russian military’s political participation by using former Soviet civil-military relations approach and Kremlin politics approach. As far as the scope of military’s political participation is concerned, since the dissolution of USSR in 1991, the Russian military has been playing an important role in Russian politics. First of all, during the process of formulating Russian new military doctrine in 1993, Russian military’s hard-line position dominated this process and its opinion finally won out. Secondly, peacekeeping operation took by the Russian military in the “Near Abroad” and former Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo, usually conflicted the peaceful option hold by the Ministry of Russian Foreign Affairs, but the Russian military still took control of the final policy initiative. Thirdly, in October 1993, the Russian military didn’t remain neutral in the political struggle between president and Congress of People’s Deputies. It sided with president and therefore ended this severe political crisis. Fourthly, in each Duma election hold after Russia’s independence, the Russian military tried to express its political inclination and exerted its influence by voting, even actively took part in the election. This thesis is taking the position that the political participation of post-soviet Russian military is driven by two motives. First and foremost is the institutional interest of Russian military suffered great damage since the breakup of the USSR：military reform hasn’t made much progress; military budget received hasn’t sufficed the need of military; military faced the growing acute social problems within itself; the conversion of defense industry encountered difficulties. These problems made the Russian military try to preserve itself by political means. The second motive is affected by Kremlin political interaction：in order to strengthen his control over politics and military, Yeltsin used brilliant political art and managed the military by means of “divide and rule”. He used the military to attack his political opponent, on the other hand, he made use of each political crisis to split the military and therefore the military couldn’t constitute a political threat to the ruler of Russian polity.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 11, 2010).

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 1, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

This dissertation examines the practice of writing military history in conjunction with military theory. It shows that in the pursuit of establishing military theory, military history is often actively distorted and manipulated by military theorists. Those military theorists who, consciously or subconsciously, succumb to this practice are identified here as "theorist-historians". The effect of this manipulation, its implications and consequences for the field of study as a whole are examined, as is the didactic nature of military history in the light of historical accuracy. In conclusion the role and effect of the military theorist~historians are evaluated against those of purely academic historians. The unique didactic needs of military history are also highlighted. Two twentieth century British military theorists, B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller, were chosen as being representative of the military theorist-historian group. / Political Science / M.A. (International Politics)

Text in Afrikaans / Die twee boeke waarin J.J. Collyer die kampanjes in Duits Suidwes-Afrika (Namibie) en Duits Oos-Afrika (Tanzanie) beskryf, bevat enkele kennis stellings wat vandag nog bruikbaar is. Collyer verduidelik dat militere foute van die verlede histories deur die staf ontleed moet word om sodanige foute in die toekoms te vermy. Hy gaan egter verder en verduidelik dat die moontlikheid om toekomsti.ge optrede te verbeter nodig is om onnodige bloedvergieting te verhoed. Hierdie verhandeling het ten doel gehad om die laaste stelling van Collyer te ondersoek en te bepaal of dit wel in Suid-Afrika toegepas is. Die navorsingsprobleem van die verhandeling was om te bepaal ofKrygsgeskiedenis aangewend is om die militere doktrine in Suid-Afrika mee te verbeter. Die bevinding van die verhandeling was dat daar slegs in enkele gevalle deur die SuidAfrikaanse Nasionale Weermag (en sy voorgangers) wel van Krygsgeskiedenis gebruik gemaak was om doktrine mee te ontwikkel en dat baie meer gedoen behoort te word. / The two books of 1.1. Collyer which discuss the campaigns in German South West Africa (Namibia) and German East Africa (Tanzania) contain knowledge propositions that are still valid today. Collyer explains that the military mistakes that were made in the past should be analysed especially by the staff today to prevent making the same mistakes in the future. He goes on to explain that future conduct should be improved in order to prevent unnecessary bloodshed. This dissertation's aim was to investigate Collyer's proposition and to determine whether this was applied in South Africa. The research problem of the dissertation was to determine whether Military History was utilised to improve South Africa's military doctrine. The finding of the dissertation was that the South African National Defence Force (and its predecessors) utilised Military History only in very few cases to develop doctrine and that much remains to be done. / Political Sciences

Thesis (M. of Military Art and Science)--U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007. / The original document contains color images.