Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2006. / "14 April 2006." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / Title from title screen; viewed on July 9, 2007. "05 April 2007." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 64-67).

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / Title from title screen; viewed on July 9, 2007. "05 April 2007." AD-A 468 760. Includes bibliographical references (p. 64-67).

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / "5 April 2007." "National Defense Univ Norfolk VA"--DTIC cover. AD-A468 782. Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-101). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.A.) -- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 97-109). Also available via Internet from the University of North Carolina Libraries Electronic Thesis and Dissertation web site.

The purpose of this research is to study the effects that Russian, U.S., and NATO policies of deterrence have on strategic missile defense as well as how these policies and strategic missile defense affect future weapons proliferation. The aspects explored are the current Russian strategic forces and quality, Russian policies and strategies, the Phased Adaptive Approach, and U.S. and NATO policies and strategies. Mitigation of this pressing issue may be through open dialogue, a system to limit future U.S. and NATO interceptors and sensors, and a possible joint data exchange center.

L’histoire politique et militaire française en Afrique s’inscrit au sein d’une longue tradition qui, depuis l’époque coloniale, a conduit à l’élaboration et à la mise en œuvre de doctrines et de pratiques stratégiques rarement questionnées et analysées de manière approfondie. Alors même que l’Afrique est le théâtre d’une présence militaire régulière et continue de la France, les conditions philosophiques d’une stratégie française sur le continent restent encore à décrire. D’un autre côté, la théorie de la stratégie a longtemps mis de côté le rôle des idées et des représentations dans la constitution de ses propres savoirs. En tant que philosophie de l’action et philosophie politique, la stratégie entretient pourtant des rapports épistémologiques constants avec toute une série d’idées, d’opinions, de croyances ou encore de normes qui irriguent et influencent, de manière plus ou moins avouée son orientation. Le but de la présente étude consiste donc à proposer une interprétation philosophique de l’évolution des idées militaires françaises en Afrique en déterminant les conditions structurantes fondamentales qui façonnent les différentes doctrines et pratiques stratégiques mises en œuvre depuis l’époque coloniale jusqu’à nos jours. / French political and military history in Africa is part of a great tradition which, since the colonial era, has led to production and implementation of doctrines and strategic practices rarely interrogated and deeply analyzed. Even though Africa is exposed to a settled and permanent french military presence, the philosophical conditions of a french strategy on the continent remains undescribed. From another side, theory of strategy has forgotten for a long time representations and ideas in the construction of its own knowledge. As a political and action theory, strategy keep constant relations with all kinds of ideas, opinions, beliefs and norms which have influenced its orientations. The purpose of this study is to offer a philosophical interpretation of the evolution of french military ideas in Africa to identify the structural conditions that shape the several doctrines and strategic practices which has been elaborated since the colonial era.

This thesis examines the relationship between foreign policy and military doctrine, specifically the problems that arise when military doctrine is politicized and the military is used as an instrument of diplomatic or economic power rather than military power. It contains original research on the conduct of military civic action (MCA) by the United States Air Force in Thailand from 1964 until 1976, based largely on archival material from the Air Force Historical Research Agency. MCA has been an element of counterinsurgency doctrine since President Kennedy directed it in 1961, a role often labeled "nation-building." Like Kennedy's foreign policy, MCA had its intellectual origins in the social scientific concept of modernization theory. MCA represents the politicization of military doctrine, a method of employing forces based on social scientific theory rather than military experience. As a result of this and the realities on the ground in Thailand, the objectives of MCA did not fit the context of the Thai situation, training did not provide necessary cultural awareness, and execution was haphazard. Ultimately, the USAF failed to achieve the policy goals of MCA in Thailand. Today the U.S. continues to employ military manpower in the diplomatic, economic, and information realms while only training service members in their core specialty. Policymakers and military leaders need to determine whether to sacrifice proficiency in core specialties to enhance cultural and diplomatic skills or to rely more on those agencies traditionally responsible for those instruments of national power. / History

The politicization of military forces is not a development of the 21st century. Throughout history, armies have taken on roles traditionally relegated to non-military entities and accepted the notion that the actions of even the most junior members of their force may have substantial political implications. The development of the politicization of the U.S. military in Iraq since 2003 has been particularly ubiquitous. Although the politicization of military forces is not a recent development, little effort has been made to locate the manner in which the politicization has been reflected by the doctrines included in the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24). I hypothesize that the doctrines included in FM 3-24 not only codified many systemic strategic and tactical changes for the U.S. military, but also supported the politicization of the military in the 21st century. I conclude that while not at the level I initially suspected, the doctrines included in the FM 3-24 reflected the politicization of the U.S. military in Iraq following its release in early 2007. / Master of Arts

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies. / Title from title screen (viewed Oct. 27, 2003). "June 1993." Includes bibliographical references.