Thesis (MMAS)--Command and General Staff College (CGSC), 2006. / AD-A451 259. Includes bibliographical references.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / During the Cold War, the United States’ foreign policy relied heavily on its ability to project military power. More often than not, the central component of force projection rested on the United States military’s effectiveness in employing air power both by establishing air superiority and through accurate delivery of ordnance. As the primary service tasked with conducting aerial warfare, the United States Air Force (USAF) was expected to maintain this capability either to achieve deterrence or, when necessary, to military action. In January 1973, the USAF seemed incapable of performing the latter task due to the North Vietnamese Integrated Air Defense System’s (NV-IAD’s) effectiveness in Operation Rolling Thunder and its successor, Operation Linebacker. Eighteen years later, Air Force aircraft spearheaded the Coalition’s air attack on the Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System (I-IADS) in January 1991. Considered by many to be the most effective air defense system outside the Soviet Union’s, the I-IADS was expected to exact heavy casualties from the allied forces. Instead, in less than twenty days, the USAF’s dominance was so complete that politicians, analysts and military historians quickly proclaimed a “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA). The majority of the current historiography credits advances in precision-guided munitions (PGMs), airframes, and computer technology as the impetus for the RMA. Others have claimed that the USAF’s training methodology and construction of advanced training sites such as the Red Flag complex at Nellis Air Force Base were the primary drivers for the Air Force’s success. While acknowledging the role all of these factors played, this dissertation also demonstrates the key role played by the development of Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) doctrine from January 1973 through August 1991. In the aftermath of the American war in Vietnam, the Air Force considered defense suppression a tactical task that was secondary to the primary mission of putting ordnance on target. At the end of Desert Storm, proponents of the Air Force’s SEAD doctrine had convincing evidence that an enemy IADS was not just an ancillary weapons array, but functioned a critical national system just like manufacturing, government, or the people’s will. The process by which this viewpoint changed had effects on the development of the United States Air Force’s Cold War conventional capability in general, and the development of training methods, electronic warfare platforms, and modern airframes specifically.

Master of Arts / Department of History / Michael A. Ramsay / In 1989, the United States Marine Corps published the document Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting. Its appearance signaled the official adoption of maneuver warfare as the Corps's organizational philosophy and the basis of its doctrine for preparing and conducting operations. The decade of debate and experimentation that preceded the publication of Warfighting has not received detailed examination, but merits such for the insights it can provide to understanding intellectual change and military reform. Beginning in 1979, Marine Corps officers engaged in an intraservice debate over the issue of maneuver warfare, a new concept that began to circulate among military reformers in the latter half of the 1970s. A group of Marine officers known as "maneuverists" began meeting in unofficial seminars to study, refine, and promote the idea. Maneuverists believed that maneuver warfare was a more fluid and dynamic way of fighting because it stressed flexibility, creativity, and a focus on enemy behavior. They also thought the new idea offered a more effective alternative for fighting war than contemporary practices, which they thought focused too much on rigid application of standardized procedures and methods of existing manuals. The intellectual transformation of the Marine Corps involved three main mechanisms. The first was a theoretical mechanism centered on public debate in the pages of Marine Corps Gazette to introduce and defend maneuver warfare to Marine audience. The second was a functional/practical mechanism that involved educational and training initiatives at the Amphibious Warfare School and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The third mechanism was the use of institutional authority made possible with the appointment of General Alfred M. Gray, a senior and vocal maneuver warfare champion, to the position Commandant of the Marine Corps. Using the authority of his office, Gray directed the writing of a doctrinal manual encapsulating the ideas of maneuver warfare to provide the Corps organizational focus and direction. The resulting manual FMFM 1, Warfighting, officially adopted maneuver warfare as service doctrine and organizational warfighting philosophy.

本文的研究目的，企圖從地緣政治與克里姆林宮政治研究的角度，就俄羅斯聯邦新軍事準則的形成因素作一研究與分析。 本論文發現俄羅斯聯邦新軍事準則形成的主要動因有二： 一、地緣政治惡化是促使俄羅斯調整軍事準則的根本動因。 由於冷戰結束後全球戰略格局的變遷，俄羅斯在國際地位明顯下降，地緣政治環境日益惡化，傳統勢力範圍受到侵蝕，國力嚴重衰退，為續與美國保持低水準戰略平衡以及抗衡北約東擴，確保其國家利益和國際地位。另面對解決境內及獨立國協宗教、民族衝突所爆發局部戰爭及軍事衝突，在軍事上重新制定了俄羅斯聯邦軍事基本準則由單一注重外部威脅，轉為同時注重國內、外兩種威脅，重點由世界戰爭轉向地區性衝突。這說明了俄羅斯的新軍事準則在相當大程度上受到地緣戰略的影響。 二、俄羅斯軍方的態度及國內政治生態是促使軍事準則調整變化的另一因素。 隨著俄羅斯超級大國地位的喪失、地緣政治環境惡化、軍隊地位和待遇的不斷下降及士氣日益低落，軍隊對國家的安全和強烈不滿。強烈要求重樹大國地位、恢復軍隊實力。俄羅斯軍隊一些將領紛紛公開批評外交政策和軍事政策。同時，由於在1993年10月流血事件中，葉爾欽動用軍隊戰勝議會，增大了政府對軍隊的依賴，使俄羅斯軍隊在國家政治生活中的發言權和影響力日益增大。故葉爾欽在制定安全政策和軍事準則時不得不更多地考慮軍隊的利益和主張：如在制定新軍事準則中明確保障軍人及其家屬福利、增加軍費開支、放慢軍轉民步伐、以及在境外顯示軍事存在等方面，都採取了一系列迎合軍隊主張的措施和行動。而葉爾欽為贏得民心，鞏固地位，即開始了以恢復大國地位為中心的內外政策的大調整。在這種特定的政治氣氛中，新的俄羅斯軍事準則應運而生。可見，俄羅斯軍方的態度是促使俄羅斯軍隊準則調整與轉變的重要因素之一。 在此兩個主因中以俄羅斯國內政治生態互動，特別是葉爾欽與軍隊間關係影響最大，加上冷戰後美中俄戰略三角互動的架構的國際政治格局，在此條件下，形成了俄羅斯聯邦新軍事準則。 / The purpose of the thesis is attempting to analyze the factors that exert great impact on the formation of the Russian Federation's military doctrine from the perspective of geopolitics and Kremlin politics. This thesis is taking the position that Russian Federation's military doctrine has been shaped by two main motives: First, the worsening geopolitical situation demands that Russia adjust its military doctrine. Due to the changes of global strategy after the end of the cold war, the decline of Russia's international prestige, worsening geopolitical situation and the severe threat to Russia's traditional sphere of interest, Russia takes important measures to adjust its military doctrine accordingly. In order to keep minimum strategic balance with the United States, ensure its national interest and international status and settle local wars or military conflicts caused by religion and ethnic conflicts within Russia's own territory and Commonwealth of Independent States, new military thinking has to emphasize both internal and external threats. Second, the attitude of Russian army and domestic political struggle also force Russia to adjust its military doctrine. Owing to the loss of superpower status and the decline of army's status and wellbeing, leading generals of the Russian army became increasingly dissatisfied with government's foreign policy and military thinking. They demanded that Russia restore her great power status and restrengthen its army's forces. In the blooding event of October 1993, Yeltsin used army to defeat the parliament, for this reason Yeltsin had to depend more on army. Russian army has became more influential in politics. Yeltsin had to consider army's interests and opinions in draw up security policy and military doctrine. For example, new military thinking clearly ensures welfare of soldiers and their family, increases military expense, slows down the speed of conversion and other measures to satisfy army. Besides, in order to gain people's support and consolidate political power, Yeltsin started to adopt policy to restore status of great power. Among these two dynamics, domestic political struggle－the relationship between Yeltsin and army－plays more influential role. Russian Federation's military doctrine was thus formulated under Kremlin politics and the interaction of strategic triangle.

<p>Rysslands doktrinella hierarki fungerar utan arenaspecifika doktriner. Det finns ett övergripande säkerhetsstrategiskt dokument, direkt underställt detta dokument finns den militära doktrinen. Ändå utformades 2001 en maritim doktrin som skall behandla det maritima läget och rysslands ekonomiska intressen på haven fram till år 2020. Varför denna doktrin utformades kan ha sitt svar i Rysslands ökade maritima intresse i och kring ryskt havsterritorium, men det kan även vara ett sätt att visa sina officiella ställningstaganden, intressen och intentioner öppet för världssamfundet. 2010 publicerades ett nytt säkerhetsstrategiskt dokument och samma år offentliggjordes även den nya militäradoktrinen. Det utformades i samma veva även en strategisk Arktisk doktrin som tillkännagav Rysslands intentioner och intressen i denna nya och oexploaterade region som tack vare jordens förhöjda medeltemperatur de senare åren har öppnat upp nya områden. Många nationer har blivit intresserade av detta nya område, bland annat USA, Kanada, Danmark och Norge. Detta har i sin tur skapat en grogrund, för tvister om gränsdragningar och om vem som har rätten till resursextraheringen i området. Det som detta arbete kommer att avhandla är, vad den äldre ryska maritima doktrinen har haft för inverkan påde senare utvecklade doktrinerna. Vad finns det för skillnader, likheter och vilka punkter har höjts till en merbeslutad nivå? Utifrån dessa kriterier kommer sedermera en estimering, om vad dessa variabler kan ha förinverkan, på ryska marinstridskrafters uppträdande i Arktis regionen i ett framtidsperspektiv.</p> / <p>Russian doctrine on set hierarchy works without specific arena doctrines. There is a comprehensive security strategy document, and as a direct subordinate to this document is the military doctrine. Yet in the year of 2001 a maritime doctrine was developed to deal with the maritime situation and Russia's economic interests in the seas until 2020. Why this doctrine was designed might have its answer in Russia's increased interest in maritime and Russian waters around the territory, but it can also be a way to show their official positions, interests and intentions open to the world community. In 2010 Russia published a new security strategy document, and the same year the new military doctrine was presented to the public. A strategic doctrine was also produced that announced Russia’s Arctic intentions and interests in this new and undeveloped region. That thanks to the earth's average temperature incensement in recent years has opened up new areas. Many nations are now interested in this new area, including the U.S., Canada, Denmark and Norway. This has created a dispute about the boundaries and who have the right to excavate the resources in the area. What this paper will discuss, is how the older Russian maritime doctrine has influenced the later developed doctrines. What are the differences, similarities, and what points have been raised to amore decision-making level? The based off these criteria will subsequently result, in an estimation of what impact these variables could have, on the Russian naval forces behaviour in the Arctic region ina future perspective.</p>

<p>Augusti 2008, Ryssland går in i Georgien med en överväldigande militär styrka i syfte att som mansäger, avbryta folkrättsliga kränkningar i utbrytarrepublikerna Syd Ossetien och Abkhazien. Men var det verkligen det som var huvudsyftet med operationen? Eller var Georgienkriget Rysslands tillfälle att för omvärlden visa att Ryssland återigen är en stormakt? Nästan två år senare släpps en ny militärdoktrin, Den Ryska Federationens Militärdoktrin 2010, finns det ett samband mellan det överraskande Georgienkriget och den nya ryska doktrinen? Det främsta syftet med den här uppsatsen är att genom att utgå ifrån två av de taktiska grundprinciperna, kraftsamling och vilseledning, undersöka om det faktiskt finns ett samband mellan kriget och doktrinen. Finns det händelser under kriget och formuleringar i doktrinen vilka överensstämmer med definitionen av Kraftsamling och Vilseledning som tyder på ett samband däremellan? Det är det jag avser att svara på med denna uppsats. Avsikten med uppsatsen är även att för läsaren beskriva Georgienkriget och händelseförloppet däri, samt att kortfattat beskriva den Ryska federationens militärdoktrin 2010 utifrån den svenska försvarsavdelningen i Moskvas översättning. Syftet med uppsatsen är även att belysa exempel på kraftsamling och vilseledning, både ur doktrinen och ur kriget.</p> / <p>August 2008, Russia goes into Georgia with an overwhelming military force to which it is said, stop violations of international law in the breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But was that really the main aim of the operation? Or was the war in Georgia Russia's opportunity to demonstrate to the world that Russia is once again a major player on the international scene? Almost two years later a new military doctrine was released, the Russian Federation Military Doctrine 2010, is there a link between the surprising war in Georgia and the new Russian doctrine? The main purpose with this essay to investigate, through the view of two of the principles of war, Concentration and Deception if there is a link, or connection, between the war and the doctrine. Are there actions during the war and paragraphs in the doctrine suggesting such a connection? That is what the author aims to answer with essay. The purpose with this essay is also to the reader describe the war and shortly describe the Russian Federation Military Doctrine 2010. The purpose with this essay is also to present examples of Concentration and Deception from the doctrine and the war.</p>

Augusti 2008, Ryssland går in i Georgien med en överväldigande militär styrka i syfte att som mansäger, avbryta folkrättsliga kränkningar i utbrytarrepublikerna Syd Ossetien och Abkhazien. Men var det verkligen det som var huvudsyftet med operationen? Eller var Georgienkriget Rysslands tillfälle att för omvärlden visa att Ryssland återigen är en stormakt? Nästan två år senare släpps en ny militärdoktrin, Den Ryska Federationens Militärdoktrin 2010, finns det ett samband mellan det överraskande Georgienkriget och den nya ryska doktrinen? Det främsta syftet med den här uppsatsen är att genom att utgå ifrån två av de taktiska grundprinciperna, kraftsamling och vilseledning, undersöka om det faktiskt finns ett samband mellan kriget och doktrinen. Finns det händelser under kriget och formuleringar i doktrinen vilka överensstämmer med definitionen av Kraftsamling och Vilseledning som tyder på ett samband däremellan? Det är det jag avser att svara på med denna uppsats. Avsikten med uppsatsen är även att för läsaren beskriva Georgienkriget och händelseförloppet däri, samt att kortfattat beskriva den Ryska federationens militärdoktrin 2010 utifrån den svenska försvarsavdelningen i Moskvas översättning. Syftet med uppsatsen är även att belysa exempel på kraftsamling och vilseledning, både ur doktrinen och ur kriget. / August 2008, Russia goes into Georgia with an overwhelming military force to which it is said, stop violations of international law in the breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But was that really the main aim of the operation? Or was the war in Georgia Russia's opportunity to demonstrate to the world that Russia is once again a major player on the international scene? Almost two years later a new military doctrine was released, the Russian Federation Military Doctrine 2010, is there a link between the surprising war in Georgia and the new Russian doctrine? The main purpose with this essay to investigate, through the view of two of the principles of war, Concentration and Deception if there is a link, or connection, between the war and the doctrine. Are there actions during the war and paragraphs in the doctrine suggesting such a connection? That is what the author aims to answer with essay. The purpose with this essay is also to the reader describe the war and shortly describe the Russian Federation Military Doctrine 2010. The purpose with this essay is also to present examples of Concentration and Deception from the doctrine and the war.

Rysslands doktrinella hierarki fungerar utan arenaspecifika doktriner. Det finns ett övergripande säkerhetsstrategiskt dokument, direkt underställt detta dokument finns den militära doktrinen. Ändå utformades 2001 en maritim doktrin som skall behandla det maritima läget och rysslands ekonomiska intressen på haven fram till år 2020. Varför denna doktrin utformades kan ha sitt svar i Rysslands ökade maritima intresse i och kring ryskt havsterritorium, men det kan även vara ett sätt att visa sina officiella ställningstaganden, intressen och intentioner öppet för världssamfundet. 2010 publicerades ett nytt säkerhetsstrategiskt dokument och samma år offentliggjordes även den nya militäradoktrinen. Det utformades i samma veva även en strategisk Arktisk doktrin som tillkännagav Rysslands intentioner och intressen i denna nya och oexploaterade region som tack vare jordens förhöjda medeltemperatur de senare åren har öppnat upp nya områden. Många nationer har blivit intresserade av detta nya område, bland annat USA, Kanada, Danmark och Norge. Detta har i sin tur skapat en grogrund, för tvister om gränsdragningar och om vem som har rätten till resursextraheringen i området. Det som detta arbete kommer att avhandla är, vad den äldre ryska maritima doktrinen har haft för inverkan påde senare utvecklade doktrinerna. Vad finns det för skillnader, likheter och vilka punkter har höjts till en merbeslutad nivå? Utifrån dessa kriterier kommer sedermera en estimering, om vad dessa variabler kan ha förinverkan, på ryska marinstridskrafters uppträdande i Arktis regionen i ett framtidsperspektiv. / Russian doctrine on set hierarchy works without specific arena doctrines. There is a comprehensive security strategy document, and as a direct subordinate to this document is the military doctrine. Yet in the year of 2001 a maritime doctrine was developed to deal with the maritime situation and Russia's economic interests in the seas until 2020. Why this doctrine was designed might have its answer in Russia's increased interest in maritime and Russian waters around the territory, but it can also be a way to show their official positions, interests and intentions open to the world community. In 2010 Russia published a new security strategy document, and the same year the new military doctrine was presented to the public. A strategic doctrine was also produced that announced Russia’s Arctic intentions and interests in this new and undeveloped region. That thanks to the earth's average temperature incensement in recent years has opened up new areas. Many nations are now interested in this new area, including the U.S., Canada, Denmark and Norway. This has created a dispute about the boundaries and who have the right to excavate the resources in the area. What this paper will discuss, is how the older Russian maritime doctrine has influenced the later developed doctrines. What are the differences, similarities, and what points have been raised to amore decision-making level? The based off these criteria will subsequently result, in an estimation of what impact these variables could have, on the Russian naval forces behaviour in the Arctic region ina future perspective.

Bolstering local perceptions of legitimacy in armed intervention has emerged as an important feature of increasingly complex international peace and statebuilding efforts. Yet, previous research has only begun to explore what local legitimacy entails to those involved in, and affected by, armed intervention. This dissertation advances an understanding of local legitimacy as a perception-based, relational phenomenon. Through this lens, it examines armed intervention in Afghanistan (2001-2014). In particular, this dissertation studies how the relationship between Afghan citizens and intervening armed forces interacts with, and shapes, perspectives on local legitimacy held by the main 'interveners' and those 'intervened upon'. This dissertation consists of an introduction, which situates the study in a wider context, and four essays. Beginning with the organizational perspectives of the main intervening actors in Afghanistan, Essay I finds that the UN and NATO initially conceptualized problems of local legitimacy as principally the consequence of a fragile Afghan state, and not as failings of the intervention. When negative dimensions of intervention became increasingly recognized, principal responsibility for the legitimacy process shifted away from intervening authorities and onto the Afghan state. Similarly, Essay II shows how key U.S. military doctrine, over time, reconceptualized the formal duty of intervening forces in the local legitimacy process, ultimately considering it contingent on, and subordinate to, the will and capabilities of host-state authorities and the local population. Turning thereafter to firsthand accounts from the field, Essay III and Essay IV together contrast personal perspectives on the intervention held by U.S. Army Officers and Afghan citizens. Essay III finds that personal experiences of noncombat contact with Afghans reinforced the Officers' sense of duty toward the local population. Conversely, Essay IV suggests that the local legitimacy of intervening forces became increasingly contested among Afghans, due largely to the perceived intensification of foreign intrusion on 'everyday' life. Taken together, the findings of this dissertation lay the foundation for the development of a new concept, the host-citizen contract. In so doing, it provides a social contract framework to better understand the complex dynamics of local legitimacy in Afghanistan, and beyond.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Dec 29, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.