The principles of war have been around for a long time. The principles have been discussed among military theorists and they have come to include just one to over twenty. Sun Tzus wrote in 490 b.c about the importance of using concentration of force when attacking an enemy. Officers are today trained in the principles of war even though the principles hasn´t been systematically tested. The problem that occur is that every theorist has its own principles and definition of the same. Marco Smedberg claims that the air force has its own principles and that they are apart from the army and the navy. The principles have been around a long time, and today theorists Clausewitz an Jomini have found their way into Armed Forces doctrines. But are their theories still valid today. To answer that question this essay will analyse known military theorists Clausewitz and Jomini and find variables in their theories about the principle concentration of force, and seek thus variables in a modern naval war such as the battle of the Falklands.

Clausewitz and Jomini are two big figures in the military science community. Their principles of the concentration of force are still prevalent today in the further development of principles. With this in mind there have been some studies where computer games have been used to improve military training. The study aims to study how the principles of war can lead to victory in the real-time strategy game Starcraft II. The purpose of this study to contribute to the body of scientific knowledge with using computer games to increase the understanding of the principles of war. The method used in this study is a quantitative content analysis to gather data for analysis in the SPSS-program. The results of the study were that all the use of principles that were chosen, with the exception of surprise, correlated with victory. It also showed that spatial ability leads to higher win probability, this find lowers the reliability of the study since it cannot prove to what extent this leads to victory. However, this result is not applicable in the physical world, it can only contribute to a theoretical understanding of the principles of war.

Denna uppsats behandlar tysk operationskonst under andra världskriget utifrån ett tidsperspektiv med betoning på rörligt försvar inom ramen för en operativ defensiv. Detta är en teorikonsumerande uppsast som syftar till att utveckla förståelsen av begreppet kraftsamling i tid. Robert Leonhards teori om tidsaspektens betydelse appliceras på en teoretisk ansats om tysk operationskonst  och på den tyska defensiven i Donkröken vintern 1942-1943.

Many theorists have discussed the question of the fundamental principles of warfare. But the importance of the principle of concentration of force for warfare is controversial and the theories about the principle are too general to say something about the reality. So what is required to achieve success with a concentration of force? In order to answer this question, this essay deals with the basic principle of warfare on the concentration of force from recognized theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, Sir B.H. Liddell Hart, John M. Collins and Milan Vego, in the context of submarine attacks. The study has a deductible theoretical research effort and the purpose is to identify and describe which variables that contribute to success in implementing a concentration of force and how they affect submarine attacks. To create a coherent image of the principle, the principle is measurable by identifying variables to achieve success with concentration of force. From the theories, the author identifies five variables: aggregate strength, spread, opponent knowledge, mobility and misleading. To investigate the principle, the variables are tested against two submarine attacks during World War II, which are known to be cases where the concentration of force was used. The result shows that during the two attacks only two variables, combined strength and spread were identified. During the attack on the HX 229/SC 122 convoys, which from the attacking party are considered a successful concentration of force, all variables were identified. However, the attack on the SC 130 convoy was considered as a failed concentration of force, since only two variables were identified.

Theorists of military effectiveness have, through the course of time, developed principles explaining ways in which victory is efficiently enabled in battle. However, as a result of technological developments as well as a lack of empirical research, the principle of concentration is now questioned in terms of its explanatory value when applied in the context of modern naval warfare. Its questioning finds even more foundation in light of the fact that it still has a place in naval doctrines. This study therefore aims to examine whether the fundamental basics of the principle are applicable as a concept leading to success in modern naval operations where missiles are used as the main source of weaponry. Thus, are theories on concentration of force, formed by Sun Zi, Antonie- Henri Jomini and Alfred Thayer Mahan, used to create a theoretical framework which then functions as an analytical tool in analysing the Israeli success in 1973 and the Argentine failure in 1982. Accordingly, the result of this analysis offers convincing evidence for the principle of concentration in terms of its continued applicability in modern naval warfare in spite of environmental changes caused by technology. However, more research is needed if further conclusions are to be drawn in terms of generalizability.

The principles of war are often used to describe the essential parts of warfare. There is however a discussion regarding what purpose they are supposed to have, what role they shall play or even how many principles there are. The military theorist Antoine-Henri Jomini stated that there was one fundamental principle: the principle of concentration of forces. Is this however true, and is Jomini’s theory still valid? The purpose of the thesis is to examine whether his theory is valid on cases from after Jomini’s career and to examine whether the principle of concentration of forces should be considered as one of the principles of war. The theory is tested on the Ardennes offensive in 1940, and Operation Overlord in 1944. The result of the examination shows that concentration of forces was one of the reasons that the examined cases were successful, but not the only one. As a result of this the theory that Jomini stated may be regarded as partly, but not fully valid. It also indicates that the principle of concentration of forces very well could qualify to be considered as one of the principles of war.

The principles of war have for a long time been contested and criticized for being too imprecise and vague, even questioned as to their validity and applicability in modern warfare. Despite military thinkers and officers having questioned them, the principles of war constitute a central part of the western military doctrines and regulations. The purpose of this study is to examine the meaning of the principle of concentration of force and surprise in modern naval warfare. Due to the ambiguity of the principles of war, both principles have been analysed through the theoretical views of Clausewitz, Fuller, Montgomery and Collins. Using a case study method, the two principles of war have been tested hypothetically on the battle of Baltim during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. The result of the study shows that all hypotheses were confirmed in the analysis and the principles of concentration of force and surprise were applicable in modern naval warfare. There is however, a need for further empirical studies regarding the principles of war in order to strengthen this study’s result and to test the validity of other principles in modern warfare.

This paper examines how Argentina’s tactical successes during the Falklands war can be understood by analysing through two of the principles of war namely, concentration of forces and surprise. Previous research on the Falklands war tends to analyse the war through the entire 74-day period or through special disciplines such as history or politics. Therefore, this study was undertaken to obtain a deeper understanding on how an inferior party can achieve tactical successes even if they are defeated in the war. HMS Sheffield and Atlantic Conveyor where both struck by the Argentinian Exocet-missiles and foundered during the war. These two particular incidents are evidence of the tactical successes for Argentina during the war, even if they were defeated. These events affected and shocked the British Task Force and knowledge regarding how they achieved tactical success is important for future warfare. The principles of war are theories explained in many states’ doctrines to explain warfare and are therefore relevant to use as theoretical framework in this study. The analytical results reveal that the tactical success can be perceived as the theory of surprise, although the theory of concentration of forces can partially explain it. The result contributes to existing research by adding a deeper understanding regarding the situations and conclusions, which can be drawn and that are relevant to studies of this nature, to improve future warfare capability for an inferior party in a conflict.

<p>Syftet med uppsatsen är att analysera luftvärnsbataljonen och undersöka om de tillämpar manövertänkande, dels i teorin men även i praktiken.</p><p>Kärnfrågan i uppsatsen blir således:</p><p> Tillämpas manövertänkande i teorin och praktiken inom luftvärnsbataljonen?</p><p> Uppsatsen utgår från en definition av manövertänkande enligt den svenska Försvarsmakten där fyra indikatorer togs fram i syfte att kunna analysera och spåra om manövertänkande tillämpas inom luftvärnsbataljonen.</p><p> Resultatet visar att det är ett tudelat svar, å ena sidan är luftvärnsbataljonen långt framme i de teoretiska delarna. I styrdokumenten och i ett utgrupperingsskede finns det tydliga spår av hur manövertänkande skall nyttjas. Å andra sidan kan det påstås att indikatorerna överraskning, vilseledning och kraftsamling ofta används som uttryck istället för att dra dem riktigt i botten. Med det menas att indikatorerna inte alltid används för att utnyttja motståndarens svagheter utan används snarare för att parera dennes troliga attack.</p><p> Slutsatserna som dragits är att luftvärnsbataljonen har kommit en bit på vägen för att kunna tillämpa manövertänkande. En viktig punkt är att få med all personal inom bataljonen till att arbeta utifrån ett manövertänkande sätt. För att manövertänkande skall utvecklas och bli tillämpbart inom bataljonen måste praktisk övning ske. Övning ger färdighet.</p>

Syftet med uppsatsen är att analysera luftvärnsbataljonen och undersöka om de tillämpar manövertänkande, dels i teorin men även i praktiken. Kärnfrågan i uppsatsen blir således:  Tillämpas manövertänkande i teorin och praktiken inom luftvärnsbataljonen?  Uppsatsen utgår från en definition av manövertänkande enligt den svenska Försvarsmakten där fyra indikatorer togs fram i syfte att kunna analysera och spåra om manövertänkande tillämpas inom luftvärnsbataljonen.  Resultatet visar att det är ett tudelat svar, å ena sidan är luftvärnsbataljonen långt framme i de teoretiska delarna. I styrdokumenten och i ett utgrupperingsskede finns det tydliga spår av hur manövertänkande skall nyttjas. Å andra sidan kan det påstås att indikatorerna överraskning, vilseledning och kraftsamling ofta används som uttryck istället för att dra dem riktigt i botten. Med det menas att indikatorerna inte alltid används för att utnyttja motståndarens svagheter utan används snarare för att parera dennes troliga attack.  Slutsatserna som dragits är att luftvärnsbataljonen har kommit en bit på vägen för att kunna tillämpa manövertänkande. En viktig punkt är att få med all personal inom bataljonen till att arbeta utifrån ett manövertänkande sätt. För att manövertänkande skall utvecklas och bli tillämpbart inom bataljonen måste praktisk övning ske. Övning ger färdighet.