During the Second World War, training was the Canadian Army’s longest sustained activity. Aside from isolated engagements at Hong Kong and Dieppe, the Canadians did not fight in a protracted campaign until the invasion of Sicily in July 1943. The years that Canadian infantry units spent training in the United Kingdom were formative in the history of the Canadian Army. Despite what much of the historical literature has suggested, training succeeded in making the Canadian infantry capable of succeeding in battle against German forces. Canadian infantry training showed a definite progression towards professionalism and away from a pervasive prewar mentality that the infantry was a largely unskilled arm and that training infantrymen did not require special expertise. From 1939 to 1941, Canadian infantry training suffered from problems ranging from equipment shortages to poor senior leadership. In late 1941, the Canadians were introduced to a new method of training called “battle drill,” which broke tactical manoeuvres into simple movements, encouraged initiative among junior leaders, and greatly boosted the men’s morale. The Canadians participated in numerous military exercises of varying sizes that exposed problems with their senior leadership. The replacement of unsuitable officers greatly enhanced the fighting potential of Canadian units and formations. As time went on, infantry training became more rigorous and realistic, and tactical concepts became increasingly sophisticated. By the time of the invasion of Normandy in June 1944, infantry training was intense, suited to units’ assigned tasks, and highly technical, which belied the false prewar assumption that the infantry was an unskilled arm. By the time Canadian divisions entered battle, they were as prepared as they would ever be. The exception to this was the training of the overseas reinforcement units, which reached an acceptable standard only in the last months of the war. This study ultimately represents a substantial contribution to understanding the history of the Canadian Army and its role in the Second World War.

Daniel Dolejší The causes of continuing existence of the French Foreign Legion 2015 Abstract The core theme of this diploma thesis is the French Foreign Legion that is examined from the point of view of national interests and strategic culture of France. It is very unusual in developed countries to have foreigners as a part of national army. Goal of the thesis is to discover and describe the causes of continuing existence of the French Foreign Legion. First of all, the author defines national interests and strategic culture of France for certain periods, and then he assesses the contribution of the Legion to fulfillment of goals connected to the national interests and the strategic culture. To the main conclusions of this work belongs that the first hypothesis was confirmed, the French Foreign Legion helped to reach goals based on national interests in certain periods. On the other hand, the second hypothesis was not completely confirmed. The author expected that the strategic culture always stabilizes and supports the role of the Legion, but he found out the opposite for the interwar period. The author supposes higher importance of the Legion in the area of peacekeeping operations under a mandate of the UN or NATO because the EU currently lacks troops prepared to be deployed abroad.

[pt] O Exército Brasileiro publicou em maio de 2021 o Manual de Campanha de Assuntos Civis, em substituição ao Manual de Campanha de Cooperação Civil Militar (2017) e ao Manual de Assuntos de Governo (1981). Baseado na recente modificação doutrinária ocorrida através da publicação do manual em questão, este estudo tem o objetivo de analisar como se deu o processo de produção da Doutrina de Assuntos Civis do Exército Brasileiro e como ela se traduz e se desenvolve a partir de um conjunto de práticas e experiências que visa a melhor coordenação entre civis e militares em operações militares. O estudo utiliza a revisão de bibliografia especializada e a condução de entrevistas como métodos de análise qualitativa. Argumenta-se que o processo de produção da Doutrina de Assuntos Civis se baseia largamente na experiência dos militares do Exército na condução de atividades de assuntos civis em operações de paz, operações humanitárias e operações de apoio aos órgãos governamentais, na realização de experimentações doutrinárias e no contato de militares brasileiros com doutrinas estrangeiras através de cursos realizados no exterior, resultando na utilização de conhecimentos doutrinários de países parceiros e organizações internacionais. Dessa maneira, constata-se que a produção doutrinária atravessa campos de experiências que conjugam o engajamento militar externo e interno. Adicionalmente, conclui-se que o Manual de Assuntos Civis visa consolidar uma doutrina que informe mais objetivamente a missão do Exército Brasileiro na sua relação com atores civis. / [en] The Brazilian Army published the Civil Affairs Field Manual in May 2021, replacing the Civil Military Cooperation Field Manual (2017) and the Government Affairs Manual (1981). Based on the recent doctrinal modification that occurred through the publication of the referenced manual, this study aims to analyze how the process of producing the Brazilian Army s Civil Affairs doctrine took place and how it translates and develops from a set of practices and experiences aimed at improving coordination between civilians and the military in military operations. The study uses a review of specialized literature and the conduct of interviews as methods of qualitative analysis. It is argued that the process of producing civil affairs doctrine is largely based on the experience of the Army military personnel in conducting civil affairs activities in peace operations, humanitarian operations, operations supporting government agencies, in conducting doctrinal experimentation and in the contact of Brazilian military personnel with foreign doctrines through courses conducted abroad, resulting in the use of doctrinal knowledge from partner countries and international organizations. In this way, it can be argued that doctrinal production crosses fields of experiences that combine external and internal military engagement. Additionally, one can conclude that the Manual of Civil Affairs aims to consolidate a doctrine that more objectively informs the Brazilian Army s mission in its relationship with civilian actors.

No description available.

Thesis (M. of Military Art and Science)--U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007. / "A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Military Art and Science, Military History." Title from cover page of PDF file (viewed: May 29, 2008).

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 8, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

This dissertation examines the practice of writing military history in conjunction with military theory. It shows that in the pursuit of establishing military theory, military history is often actively distorted and manipulated by military theorists. Those military theorists who, consciously or subconsciously, succumb to this practice are identified here as "theorist-historians". The effect of this manipulation, its implications and consequences for the field of study as a whole are examined, as is the didactic nature of military history in the light of historical accuracy. In conclusion the role and effect of the military theorist~historians are evaluated against those of purely academic historians. The unique didactic needs of military history are also highlighted. Two twentieth century British military theorists, B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller, were chosen as being representative of the military theorist-historian group. / Political Science / M.A. (International Politics)

本論文旨試圖透過克里姆林宮政治暨嚇阻戰略研究途徑，剖析俄羅斯將獨立軍種「戰略火箭軍」裁併至空軍編制的原因。 本論文假設戰略火箭軍遭到裁併是基於下列兩項原因： 第一、俄羅斯武裝力量本身的態度與國內幾次重大政治鬥爭，導致俄羅斯必須修正軍事準則。 由於總統葉里欽在獨立初期，並沒有為俄羅斯的外交與國家安全政策領域構築一個法制化、有效率的決策系統，造成諸如國防部、外交部、總參謀部、聯邦安全會議、國防會議與國家軍事檢察署等相關機構，彼此間不斷爭奪軍事資源、議題詮釋權，政治鬥爭頻仍。另外，在某些政治危機中，例如1993年砲轟國會事件、第一次車臣戰爭以及1996年總統大選，葉里欽需要拉攏軍方支持以應付反對勢力，這就讓俄羅斯武裝力量有機會涉足克里姆林宮政治。結果是國家安全政策領域呈現各行其道、莫衷一是的混亂局面，並且有愈來愈多的政府官員對於在國家安全政策領域中攫取政治利益躍躍欲試。 其次，俄羅斯地緣政治環境的劇烈惡化導致龐大的反軍事改革勢力。 為了要在冷戰後與美國保持最低限度的戰略均勢狀態，好保障俄羅斯的國家利益及國際地位，並且順利解決因宗教或種族要素在俄羅斯或獨立國協境內所引發的區域戰爭或軍事衝突，有些官員諸如思科可夫、謝爾蓋耶夫等人主張俄羅斯應該繼續維持強大的戰略武力，特別是著名的戰略火箭軍。他們反對軍事改革以及裁減軍備。而由於當前國防預算困窘，葉里欽與普欽必須兩害相權取其輕，整肅拒絕裁軍的官員或是部隊。 在謝爾蓋耶夫與克瓦什寧激烈的政治鬥爭結束後，最後的贏家克瓦什寧終於如願以償，將戰略火箭軍予以裁併，由軍種單位降為兵種單位。不過俄羅斯的戰略武力仍然將在未來扮演極具影響力的角色。 / The purpose of the thesis is to attempt to analyze the factors that exert great impact on the reduction of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces(SMF) in status from a separate branch of service to a separate command from the perspective of Kremlin politics and Strategy of Deterrence. This thesis takes the position that the SMF has been reduced by two main motives: First, the attitude of the Russian army and domestic political struggle has forced the Russian government to adjust its military doctrine. Due to Yeltsin failing to set up a well-organized and efficient system for foreign and national security policy decision-making, so the struggle between the key ministries involved in foreign and security policy- the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the National Security Council, the Defense Council, the State Military Inspectorate- was hard. And in some political crises, such as the bloody event of Oct. 1993, the presidential election in 1996, and the crisis in Chechnya, Yeltsin needed army to defeat the counterforces. The Russian army has became more influential in politics. As a result, the decision-making process has been chaotic and confused, and various bureaucratic players have often been able to impose their their own special interests on the security policy agenda. Second, the worsening geopolitical situation has brought about considerable resistance to the military reform. In order to keep minimum strategic balance with the United States, ensure its national interest and international status and settle local wars or military conflicts caused by religion and ethnic conflicts within Russia’s own territory and Commonwealth of Independent States, some officials like Yuri Skokov and Igor Sergeyev advocated maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent force, especially the prominent role for the SMF. The president was likely to face considerable resistance to the reform. Owing to the current financial constraints on defense spending, Yeltsin and Putin carried out a purge of army officers who were against arms reduction. After the hard political struggle between Igor Sergeyev and Anatoliy Kvashnin, the winner- Kvashnin demanded the SMF must be reduced in status from a separate branch of service to a separate command. But the Russian strategic force will still play influential role in the near future.

Ce mémoire vise la compréhension du mécanisme des choix stratégiques de l’Inde en fonction de la menace perçue de la Chine. Selon une logique réaliste néoclassique, l’étude de l’effet des contraintes systémiques et domestiques présente un paradoxe dans les volontés stratégiques indiennes. L’Inde est soumise à la pression systémique de la montée de la Chine dans un monde post-Guerre froide qui la verrouille dans sa position traditionnellement défensive, alors que sa volonté de projection de la puissance guidée par sa perception, ses idées et sa culture stratégique la porte à adopter une position plus offensive. L’Inde perçoit la menace chinoise de manière dissonante avec l’orientation stratégique chinoi-se. Elle se concentre ainsi sur des signaux et des indices particuliers afin de justifier cette me-nace perçue. C’est pourquoi l’ambiguïté du langage diplomatique de la Chine envers l’Arunachal Pradesh et de sa présence dans l’océan Indien engendre un accroissement de la menace chinoise et une réponse plus agressive conséquemment. La réponse stratégique in-dienne doit s’adapter aux changements de la puissance relative de la Chine. N’ayant pas les capacités relatives suffisantes, l’Inde choisit une stratégie située entre une émulation dans une logique de poursuite aux armements afin de maintenir la parité technologique et un engage-ment afin de désamorcer la rivalité et éviter une réaction chinoise pré-emptive. La culture stratégique de l’Inde traditionnellement défensive se transforme vers une position offensive sous l’effet du nation building du nationalisme hindou. Les préférences stratégiques indiennes agressives s’illustrent principalement dans le choc multidirectionnel des sphères d’influence sino-indiennes en Asie. / This thesis seeks to understand the process of India strategic choice based on the perceived threat of China. According to a neoclassical realism framework, the study of the effect of sys-temic and domestic constraints shows a paradox in India strategic intentions. India is lock in a defensive posture by the systemic pressure of China rise in a post-Cold War era, although its desire to project his power lead by its perception, ideas, and strategic culture shows a progres-sive shift for an offensive posture. India perceives China threat in dissonance with the strategic aims of China. It is focusing on specific signals and indices in order to justify the perceived threat. This is why China’s ambi-guity toward its diplomatic discourse concerning Arunachal Pradesh and its presence in the Indian Ocean creates an increase Chinese threat and therefore a more aggressive response. India’s strategic response must cope with the changes in China’s relative power. Without the necessary relative capacity, India chooses a strategy between emulation defined by a pursuit of armaments logic in order to keep the technologic parity and engagement for the purpose of defusing the rivalry and avoiding a pre-emptive reaction from China. Traditionally defensive India’s strategic culture progressively transforms itself under the influence of the Hindu na-tion building that clash with the nehruvian nationalism. The aggressive Indian strategic pref-erences principally show themselves in the multidirectional clash of India and China spheres of influence in Asia.

Blue Force Tracking (BFT) är en term för system som lokaliserar och övervakar egna militära förband inom operationsområdet. Ett potentiellt användningsområde för BFT är som hjälpmedel för förbättrad förmåga till eld och rörelse. Innan ett sådant användningsområde undersöks vidare är det dock nödvändigt att studera hur BFT påverkar tillämpandet av uppdragstaktik och manöverkrigföring.      Syftet med detta arbete är att skapa en förståelse för hur teknik och doktrin förhåller sig till varandra, för att besvara om användandet av BFT för eld och rörelse är möjligt inom Försvarsmakten med tanke på rådande doktrin. För att studera detta genomfördes en fallstudie där det undersöktes hur teknik och doktrin påverkar varandra, kopplat mot användandet av ledningssystem med BFT inom Försvarsmakten. För analys av empirin användes ett sociotekniskt synsätt för att förstå förhållandet mellan teknik och doktrin.   Resultatet visade på att användningen av BFT inte påverkade tillämpandet av uppdragstaktik. Däremot försvårar BFT-användningen tillämpandet av manöverkrigföring, främst genom att röja det egna handlandet. Diskussionen berörde skillnader i nyttjande av BFT mellan Flygvapnet och Armén. Diskussionen ledde också fram till rekommendationen, att om BFT ska implementeras på manöverbataljonerna så bör det till förändringar i rådande doktrin för att skapa ett fungerande sociotekniskt system / Blue Force Tracking (BFT) refers to systems for monitor and location of friendly military forces in a particular area of operation. A possible use for BFT is as an aid to improve fire and movement skills. Before such use is investigated further, it is necessary to examine the impact of BFT on the application of mission command and manoeuvre warfare. The purpose of this paper is to create an understanding of what effects technology and doctrine have on each other. The aim is to be able to answer the question whether or not BFT can be used to improve fire and movement in the Swedish Armed Forces. To do this, a case study of the relationship between technology and doctrine in the Swedish Armed Forces was carried out. For analysis of the empirical data, a socio-technical approach was used to understand the relationship between technology and doctrine.  The results showed that the use of BFT had no effect on the application of mission command. However, the use of BFT had a negative effect on the ability to carry out manoeuvre warfare, mainly on the ability to hide our own actions from the enemy. The discussion concerned differences in the use of BFT between the Air Force and the Army. The discussion also concluded with the recommendation that a change in doctrine is necessary, if BFT is to be introduced to battalions, in order to create a functioning sociotechnical system.