Poor Insight is a common symptom of schizophrenia and it is conceptualised as having at least three principal components, namely unawareness of symptoms, unawareness of the need for treatment, and unawareness of the consequences of the disorder. These deficits have long been of clinical interest and have been shown to predict poorer treatment compliance, clinical outcome, social function, and response to vocational rehabilitation (Amador & David, 2004). Additionally, difficulties to establish and maintain social relationships are core features of schizophrenia, and there is evidence that these may to some extent stem from an alteration of the neural circuits that regulate social behaviour, and in particular deficits in Theory of Mind (ToM) (Lee et al., 2004). While deficits in insight in schizophrenia have been widely and consistently reported in the literature, evidence on the nature of the ToM dysfunction in this disorder is still controversial. This is mainly due to methodological differences across studies as well as limitations regarding the instruments used for ToM assessment. The first aim of this research consisted of clarifying some of these issues -whether a specific ToM dysfunction existed in schizophrenia and whether this most suitably fitted in the state or trait deficit views- trying to overcome previous methodological drawbacks. We did so by the use of a well matched control group, by controlling for important confounds and by the inclusion of ToM instruments of different nature (verbal and pictorial tasks). Results of this project were included in a first paper (Pousa et al., 2008a) and also led to the publication of a letter discussing part of the conclusions of a recent meta-analysis on ToM in schizophrenia (Pousa, Ruiz & David, 2008). Following this preliminary work and on the basis of a number of phenomenological parallelisms between insight and ToM dysfunctions that could be appreciated both clinically and in the literature, we decided to explore the relationship between insight and ToM. Given the scarcity of previous studies specifically focused on this issue, the nature of the study was mainly exploratory. The most relevant results of this investigation led to a second paper (Pousa et al., 2008b).Besides the mentioned publications, two complementary published works are added in the present thesis for their relevance to the project. The first is the manuscript of the Spanish adaptation of the SUMD (Ruiz et al., 2007). The second is a chapter of a book on mental disorders from an evolutionary perspective, titled "Theory of Mind as an evolutionary brain module". This chapter describes the concept of ToM, its measurement, as well as its neurobiological basis and philogenetic development, and was part of the literature review carried out while working on the design of the project (Obiols & Pousa, 2005). References:- Amador X & David A. Insight and Psychosis. Awareness of illness in schizophrenia and Related Disorders. (2nd Edition) (2004). Oxford University Press. - Lee KH; Farrow TFD; Spence SA & Woodruff PWR. (2004) Social cognition, brain networks and schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine 34: 391-400.- Obiols, JE; Pousa, E. (2005) La Teoría de la Mente como módulo cerebral evolutivo. En J Sanjuan y CJ Cela Conde (Eds) 2005, cap 6, pp105-119. La Profecia de Darwin. Ars Médica. ISBN: 84-9751-090-9- Pousa, E; Duñó, R; Brébion, G; David, AS; Ruiz, AI; Obiols, JE. (2008a) Theory of mind deficits in chronic schizophrenia: evidence for state dependence. Psychiatry Research, 158: 1-10.- Pousa, E; Duñó, R; Navarro, B; Ruiz, AI, Obiols, JE; David, AS. (2008b) Exploratory study of the association between insight and Theory of Mind (ToM) in stable schizophrenia patients. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 13, 210-232.- Pousa, E; Ruiz, AI; David, AS. (2008). Mentalising impairment as a trait marker of schizophrenia? Correspondence. British Journal of Psychiatry, 192, 312-315.- Ruiz, AI; Pousa, E; Duñó, R; Crosas, JM; Cuppa, S; Garcia-Ribera, C. (2008). Adaptación al español de la Escala de Valoración de la No Conciencia de Trastorno Mental SUMD. Actas Españolas de Psiquiatria, 36, 111-118.

This thesis looks at a relatively new line of research in Cognitive Science – embodied cognition. Its relation to the computational-representational paradigm, primarily symbolicism, is extensively discussed. It is argued that embodied cognition is compatible with the established paradigm but challenges its research focus and traditionally assumed segregation of cognition from bodily and worldly activities Subsequently the impact of embodied cognition on philosophy of Cognitive Science is considered. The second chapter defends the applicability of mechanistic explanation to cases of embodied cognition. Further, it argues that a proposed alternative, dynamic systems theory, is not a substitute to the mechanistic approach. The last chapter critically examines the thesis that mind is extended beyond the bodily boundary and into the world. It is concluded that arguments in favour of the extended mind thesis are inadequate. Considerations in favour of the orthodox view that the does not “leak” out into the world are also presented.

Theories of perception can broadly be divided into two groups: orthodox and heterodox theories (Noë & Thompson, 2002). Orthodox theories of perception consider perception as a neurological process, i.e. as a phenomenon which can be explained solely in terms of intracranial facts. Heterodox views expand this scope, maintaining that an understanding of perception must include extracranial facts, or facts about the environment in which a perceiver is situated (ibid.). This thesis will attempt to defend a particular exemplar of this heterodox approach, namely the enactive theory of perception proposed by Alva Noë. The thesis has two primary goals. First, I will attempt to offer an exegesis of Noë's theory, attempting to clarify the scope and strength of Noë's view. Secondly, I will consider the particular objections leveled against Noë, and heterodox theories more generally, by Ken Aizawa. I conclude that Noë's theory can better account for the nature of perception.

This thesis explores the implications of non-human primates’ propensity to hyperbolically discount the future. Hyperbolic discounting occurs when small, near-term rewards are preferred over larger rewards that are realized at a future point in time, but these preferences do not hold when the choice between long term and short term rewards is made at a time far removed from when the choice produces rewards-- i.e., at a time when the payoff of the choice is distant. I discuss two mutually exclusive models that attempt to explain why non-human primates hyperbolically discount: the cognitivist and the behaviorist model. I then present evidence that supports the cognitivist model and undermines the behaviorist model. I then argue that a “War of Interests” (WOI) occurs within the non-human primate mind. I explain this WOI model, discuss its philosophical implications, and then conclude with a general theory of the non-human primate mind.

This thesis looks at a relatively new line of research in Cognitive Science – embodied cognition. Its relation to the computational-representational paradigm, primarily symbolicism, is extensively discussed. It is argued that embodied cognition is compatible with the established paradigm but challenges its research focus and traditionally assumed segregation of cognition from bodily and worldly activities Subsequently the impact of embodied cognition on philosophy of Cognitive Science is considered. The second chapter defends the applicability of mechanistic explanation to cases of embodied cognition. Further, it argues that a proposed alternative, dynamic systems theory, is not a substitute to the mechanistic approach. The last chapter critically examines the thesis that mind is extended beyond the bodily boundary and into the world. It is concluded that arguments in favour of the extended mind thesis are inadequate. Considerations in favour of the orthodox view that the does not “leak” out into the world are also presented.

Stroke rehabilitation is to train the motor function of a patients limb. In this process, functional assessment is of importance, and it is primarily based on a patients task performance. The context of the rehabilitation discussed in this thesis is such that functional assessment is conducted through a computer system and the Internet. In particular, a patient performs the task at home in a haptic virtual environment, and the task performance is transmitted to the therapist over the Internet. One problem with this approach to functional assessment is that a patients mind state is little known to the therapist. This immediately leads to one question, that is, whether an elevated mind state will have some significant effect on the patients task performance? If so, this approach can result in a considerable error. The overall objective of this thesis study was to generate an answer to the aforementioned question. The study focused on a patients elevated fatigue state. The specific objectives of the study include: (i) developing a haptic virtual environment prototype system for functional assessment, (ii) developing a physiological-based inference system for fatigue state, and (iii) performing an experiment to generate knowledge regarding the fatigue effect on task performance. With a limited resource in recruiting patients in the experiment, the study conducted few experiments on patients but mostly on healthy subjects. The study has concluded: (1) the proposed haptic virtual environment system is effective for the wrist coordination task and is likely promising to other tasks, (2) the accuracy of proposed fatigue inference system achieves 89.54%, for two levels of fatigue state, which is promising, (3) the elevated fatigue state significantly affects task performance in the context of wrist coordination task, and (4) the accuracy of the individual-based inference approach is significantly higher than that of the group-based inference approach. The main contributions of the thesis are (1) generation of the new knowledge regarding the fatigue effect on task performance in the context of home-based rehabilitation, (2) provision of the new fatigue inference system with the highest accuracy in comparison with the existing approaches in literature, and (3) generation of the new knowledge regarding the difference between the individual-based inference and group-based inference approaches.

Theory of mind är att kunna tillskriva andra människor mentala tillstånd som förklarar deras beteenden. Dessa mentala tillstånd kan röra sig om uppfattningar, intentioner eller känslor.    Theory of Mind Scale är en bedömningsskala utformad av Wellman och Liu (2004), som undersöker olika nivåer av theory of mind. Theory of Mind Scale är uppbyggd i skalsteg med stigande svårighetsgrad. Syftet med föreliggande studie var att översätta Theory of Mind Scale från engelska till svenska samt validera bedömningsskalan för barn mellan 3 och 4 år. Studien syftade även till att se om det fanns ett samband mellan dessa barns förmåga till theory of mind, impressiva grammatiska förmåga och impressiva ordförråd.      Valideringen i föreliggande studie visade att skalstegen i den amerikanska originalversionen av Theory of Mind Scale var applicerbara på barnen i föreliggande studie, med undantag för den sista uppgiften. Istället för att exkludera den sista uppgiften skulle ett alternativ till en bedömningsskala kunna vara att jämföra barns resultat mot ett medelvärde med en normalvariation. I föreliggande studie kunde ett barn mellan 3;0 och 3;11 års ålder förväntas klara 2,83 ± 2,50 uppgifter och ett barn mellan 4;0 och 4;11 års ålder förväntas klara 3,71 ± 1,50 uppgifter.    Resultaten visade att sambandet var starkare mellan ickeverbal intelligens och theory of mind än mellan impressivt ordförråd och theory of mind. Inget signifikant samband fanns mellan impressiv grammatisk förmåga och theory of mind. Översättningen och valideringen som gjorts i samband med föreliggande uppsats gör det möjligt att kvalitativt använda bedömningsskalan i det kliniska arbetet med barn som misstänks ha svårigheter med theory of mind. / Theory of mind is an ability to ascribe other people mental states to explain their behaviors. These mental states may regard beliefs, intentions or feelings.    Theory of Mind Scale is an evaluation scale designed by Wellman and Liu (2004). The scale consists of different scale steps of theory of mind, with an increasing difficulty. The purpose of this study was to translate Theory of Mind Scale from English to Swedish and validate the scale for children from the age of 3 to 4 years. The study also aims to examine if there is any relationship between children’s theory of mind, grammatical understanding, receptive vocabulary and non-verbal intelligence.    The validation of the present study showed that the order of the scale steps in the American original version of the Theory of Mind Scale was applicable to the children in the present study, with an exeption of the last task (real-apparent emotion). An alternative to the scale would be to compare the children’s performance against a normal variation. According to the present study a child between the age of 3;0 and 3;11 years could be expected to complete 2,83 ± 2,50 tasks and a child between the age of 4;0 and 4;11 years could be expected to complete 3,71 ± 1,50 tasks.    The results indicated a stronger correlation between theory of mind and non-verbal inteligence than between theory of mind and receptive vocabulary in children between the age of 3;0 and 4;11 years. No significant correlation existed between receptive grammar and theory of mind. The translation and validation of Theory of Mind Scale enables qualitative clinical investigations of theory of mind deficits in children.

¡@¡@This action study aimed to investigate the process and impact of the use of mind mapping on Chinese language teaching and learning of sixth grade students. There were twenty-five students participated in this action research. The teacher/researcher constantly reviewed and modified teaching process to develop appropriate learning models during two cycles of action research. Data were collected from pre and post reading comprehension tests, reflection notes, video recordings, interviews, questionnaires, learning sheets and students¡¦ assignments of mind mapping. ¡@¡@The findings were as follows¡G 1. Mind mapping used in Chinese language teaching could improve reading comprehension based on the results of pre and post reading comprehension tests. 2. Based on students¡¦ prior knowledge, the teacher/researcher used fill-in content types mind mapping, structure models, reading materials and vocabularies, thus teaching has the best effect on students. 3. In the beginning stage, students just focused on the aspect of drawing skill of mind mapping. Later, they learned to focus on how to catch the main idea of the article. Most of students can emphasis on both skills in the end. In the process, most of students had positive attitudes toward mind mapping instruction, especially in the group mind mapping activity. 4. The teacher/researcher has promoted her own professional development through constant refelection and adjustment in her teaching practice. ¡@¡@Based on the findings mentioned, the researcher provdied some suggestions regarding practical teaching practice and recommendations for further research.

A landmark experiment by Kiley Hamlin, Karen Wynn, and Paul Bloom demonstrated that infants as young as 6 months old possess previously unrecognized abilities to form social evaluations. In the experiment, infants were shown a shape that was made to appear as if it was climbing a hill. In one event, another shape helped the climber up the hill, while in a separate event, a different shape prevented the climber from reaching the top. When offered a choice between the helping and hindering shapes, both 6- and 10-month-olds chose the helping shape over the hindering shape, showing that they had evaluated the actions and preferred the helper as a result. In an additional test, the climber was made to appear as if it was "choosing" the helping shape or the hindering shape. Infant looking times were measured in order to assess which "choice" was more surprising. Interestingly, the 6-month-olds looked equally for both events, while the 10-month-olds looked longer when the hinderer was approached. This demonstrated that the 10-month-olds were attributing preferences to the climber, and expected that the climber would prefer the helper just as they had. This ability was apparently beyond that of the 6-month-olds, but no assessment or explanation has been offered for why this would be. The current study attempted to remedy this problem by replicating this experiment with 7- and 8-month-olds. The 7-month-olds in this experiment performed as expected, preferring the helper over the hinderer. The 8-month-olds, however, showed no clear preference. This was unexpected and not easily explainable. Neither age showed a difference in looking time whether the climber approached the helper or the hinderer. These looking time data suggest that 7- and 8-month-olds are closer to 6-month-olds in their ability to attribute evaluations to other agents, indicating that these abilities do not develop until later infancy, around 9 or 10 months. However, lack of significant results on the looking time test need not indicate a lack of social knowledge, and may instead stem more directly from developing theory of mind abilities. Options for future studies pitting social knowledge against theory of mind are explored.

Extract This article studies the Mind and Nature View of Chuan Shan, using this realistic emotional content presenting: exquisite subtle; unequivocal mind; nature; feelings and so forth in relation. Moreover, this article uses ether and mind connecting the entire context, discovering the emphasis of Chuan Shan Mind and Nature View that is the utilization of mind and nature. Hence the author raises propriety and education which both pose contemporary significance in this morality ethics, analysis of the morality ethics thus arises the basis of mind and nature. In discussion sequence, according to Chuan Shan using ether as the first perception, initially view mind and nature as the originality - - ether, mind, nature, lastly the art of cultivating mind and nature , including ¡V cultivating skills already achieved and morality ethics as secondary objective . Now presenting following chapter as below: There are six sections of this article. The first chapter, introduction, explained the research motive of this article, research scope, research methods and the writer¡¦s biography. Second chapter explained the originality and relations of mind and nature, raising ether; heaven; principle and way. Third chapter discussed themes about sensibility; heart and mind uniting; body and feelings uniting and subjects of so forth. Fourth chapter regarded nature; discussing feelings and talents; originality of ill-intentions. Fifth chapter discussed about an individual¡¦s self-cultivation with the two items of morality ethics: propriety and education. Sixth chapter concluded. From beginning to the end of this literacy, manly it is using the means of analysis; comparison; deduction; induction; in addition, the author classifies some complex concepts together, using diagrams method as presentation, which is also part of his significant research.