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Housing markets, business cycles and monetary policyRubio, Margarita January 2008 (has links)
Thesis advisor: Fabio Ghironi / Thesis advisor: Matteo Iacoviello / This dissertation studies the implications of housing market heterogeneity for the trans- mission of shocks, welfare and the conduct of monetary policy. In the first chapter I focus on mortgage contract heterogeneity (fixed vs. variable-rate mortgages). I develop and solve a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that features a housing market and a group of constrained individuals who need housing collateral to obtain loans. A given proportion of constrained households borrows at a variable rate, while the rest borrows at a fixed rate. The model predicts that in an economy with mostly variable-rate mortgages, an exogenous interest rate shock has larger effects on borrowers than in a fixed-rate economy. For plausible parametrizations, aggregate differences are muted by wealth effects on labor supply and by the presence of savers. More persistent shocks cause larger aggregate differences. From a normative perspective I find that, in the presence of collateral constraints, the optimal Taylor rule is less aggressive against inflation than in the standard sticky-price model. Furthermore, for given monetary policy, a high proportion of fixed-rate mortgages is welfare enhancing. Then, I develop a two-country version of the model to study the implications of housing market heterogeneity for a monetary union as well as costs and benefits of being in a monetary union when there are asymmetric shocks. Results show that consumption reacts more strongly to common shocks in countries with high loan-to-value ratios (LTVs), a high proportion of borrowers or variable-rate mortgages. I also find that country-specific housing price shocks increase consumption not only in the country where the shock takes place. Welfare analysis shows that housing-market homogeneization is not beneficial per se, only when it is towards low LTVs or predominantly fixed-rate mortgages. As for costs and benefits of monetary unions, when there is a technology shock in one of the countries and they are symmetric, the monetary union regime is welfare worsening. However, results are dependent on whether or not countries are symmetric and on the source of the asymmetry. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2008. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.
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Comércio e ciclos na União Monetária Européia / Trade and cycles in the European Monetary UnionSoares, Tiago de Menezes 10 September 2007 (has links)
O objetivo deste estudo é investigar, através do estimador de diferenças em diferenças, se a adoção da união monetária européia ampliou tanto o comércio quanto a correlação bilateral dos ciclos econômicos entre seus membros, em comparação com outras economias da OCDE. A evidência apresentada sugere ser esse o caso, nos indicando que a união monetária, como processo último das teorias de integração, pode não ser um fim, mas sim um meio para o alcance da integração entre as economias. / The goal of this paper is to investigate, by means of a simple difs-in-difs technique, whether the adoption of the monetary union among the members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has increased both bilateral trade and bilateral correlation of business cycles between them rather than amidst other OECD economies. We present evidence suggesting this to be the case, witch tells us that monetary union, as the last stage of the theories of economic integration, may not be an end by itself, but means of achieving the economic integration.
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Diferentes arranjos de uniões monetárias : Estados Unidos e União EuropeiaRomero, Suelen Mascarini de Souza January 2017 (has links)
Esta dissertação possui como objetivo entender as principais diferenças de duas uniões monetárias, e assim compreender quais são os impactos da estrutura institucional sobre o crescimento e desenvolvimento econômico dos países membros e/ou estados membros das uniões monetárias. Especificamente, foca nas estruturas institucionais da União Europeia e da União Federalista dos Estados Unidos. Para tal, o trabalho apresenta os diferentes arcabouços institucionais da União Europeia e da União Federalista dos EUA e faz uma análise comparativa entre eles. O método escolhido para tal foi de analise descritiva das experiências da União Monetária Europeia em comparação a União Federativa dos Estados Unidos. Neste sentido, dividiu-se a dissertação em cinco capítulos, incluindo o capítulo introdutório e as considerações finais. No capítulo 2, “Integração Econômica”, realiza-se uma revisão da teoria sobre áreas monetárias ótimas e federalismo fiscal. O intuito deste capítulo é a compreensão teórica para a análise dos capítulos seguintes. No capítulo 3, “Uniões Monetárias”, analisa-se a experiência da União Monetária Europeia, apresentando os principais desdobramentos de sua criação e o desempenho macroeconômico ao longo dos dezessete anos de existência, destacando a crise vivida pela zona do euro. A experiência da União Federalista dos Estados Unidos é analisada de forma comparativa com a União Europeia no capítulo 4, “Análise Comparativa”, bem como seus arranjos institucionais. Por fim, nas considerações finais, são apresentadas as reflexões do trabalho. Em geral, as diferenças encontradas nos arranjos institucionais das duas uniões monetárias estudadas justificam os principais impulsionadores das desigualdades no desempenho econômico das mesmas. / The aim of this study is to understand the main differences of two monetary unions, and thus understand what the impacts of the institutional framework for economic growth and development of member countries and/or member states of monetary unions. In particular, it analyses the institutional structures of the European Union and the United States Union. For this, the work presents a revision the different institutional frameworks of the EU and the US and makes a comparative analysis between them. The method chosen for this purpose was a descriptive analysis of the experiences of the European Monetary Union in comparison with of the Federal Union of the United States. In this sense, it divided the work into five chapters, including a brief introduction chapter and the conclusion. In Chapter 2, "Economic Integration", it is carried out a review of the theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) and fiscal federalism. The purpose of this chapter is the theoretical understanding for the analysis of the following chapters. In Chapter 3, "Monetary Unions", it is analysed the experience of the European Monetary Union, with the main consequences of its creation and macroeconomic performance over the seventeen years of existence, highlighting the crisis of the euro zone. The experience of the US Federalist Union is analysed in comparison with the European Union in Chapter 4, "Comparative Analysis", and its institutional arrangements. Finally, the final remarks, presents the reflections of this work. Overall, the differences in the institutional arrangements of the two studied monetary unions justify the main drivers of inequalities in economic performance both of them.
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對貨幣單一化理論之研究 / The research on the theory of monetary unification蔡淳如, Tsai,Ch'un Ru Unknown Date (has links)
區域經濟整合為 1990年代國際經濟發展之主要潮流,其中尤以歐洲聯盟
之演變最引人注目。歐洲聯盟正進行中之貨幣單一化乃區域經濟整合之最
高目標,亦為其未來政治聯盟之基礎與成敗關鍵所繫。就目前情況來看,
歐洲單一貨幣的實施遭遇若干阻礙,但不論此目標能否如期達成,其勢必
會對國際金融市場與全球經濟造成重大影響。由於我國之經濟發展與對外
貿易之成長息息相關,因此對於此種區域貨幣整合之形成有必要加以深入
瞭解。對參加貨幣同盟之各會員國而言,貨幣整合之利弊兼而有之。本論
文將由組成貨幣同盟之成本效益問題出發,探討能使各會員國在加入貨幣
同盟後獲得淨效益之條件;並就歐洲聯盟推動貨幣單一化過程中所遭遇之
問題,例如:貨幣同盟應採取何種貨幣整合方式、各會員國之財政政策應
扮演何種角色、貨幣整合時所選擇之貨幣兌換率將對貨幣同盟造成何種影
響、以及為維繫各會員國之貨幣整合關係不致瓦解,貨幣同盟於共同決策
方面將形成何種權力分配等,作一整理分析。
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貨幣聯盟中最適的財政政策合作 / The optimal coordination of fiscal policy in a monetary union朱詩閔, Chu, Shih Min Unknown Date (has links)
本研究目的是在動態隨機一般均衡模型中,討論在貨幣聯盟中,一個中央的財政政府面對衝擊時如何反應。我們根據Gali and Monacelli (2008)的架構並加入一個基金機制來模擬會員國間的財政合作。此基金機制設定為有一中央財政政府向各會員國收取固定的基金費用並將此基金費用全部重新分配給各會員國,故基金在每一期都會結清。在這樣的設定下,聯盟的財政合作和個別國家政府面對波動時的反應相同。 / The objective of this paper is to investigate how the central fiscal authority copes with shocks in a monetary union with a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. We follow the framework of Gali and Monacelli (2008) and set a fund mechanism to simulate one cast of fiscal coordination among member countries. The central fiscal authority raises the constant fund payment from all member countries and redistributes it to member states, so the budget of the transfer is balanced in each period. Under our design of fund mechanism, we find that this cast of fiscal coordination plays the same rule as the government sector.
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To have the Euro or not? : A comparison of Sweden and FinlandProos, Julia January 2010 (has links)
<p>The purpose of this paper is to study whether Sweden or Finland was initially better suited for the euro, and whether Sweden has benefited from remaining outside the third step of the European Monetary Union as opposed to Finland. The analysis is based on the optimum currency area theory. The findings show that Sweden initially was better suited for euro adoption than Finland, but the ECB’s monetary policy has suite Finland quite well. However, Sweden appears to have benefited from remaining outside the euro.</p>
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Unter welchen Bedingungen ist ein Beitritt zu einer Währungsunion optimal? : Eine Analyse stabilitätspolitischer Konsequenzen, statischer Effekte und wachstumstheoretischer Implikationen einer Osterweiterung der Europäischen Währungsunion / The optimal strategy for monetary union accession countriesBaas, Timo January 2010 (has links)
Die Europäische Währungsunion (EWU) umfasst heute 16 Staaten mit insgesamt 321 Millionen Einwohnern, sie ist mit einem Bruttoinlandsprodukt von 22,9 Billionen Euro einer der größten Wirtschaftsräume der Erde. In den nächsten Jahren wird die EWU durch die Aufnahme der 2004 und 2007 beigetretenen neuen EU-Länder weiter wachsen. Da der Beitritt von der Erfüllung der Kriterien von Maastricht abhängt, erfolgt die Erweiterung im Gegensatz zur 5. Erweiterungsrunde der EU nicht als Block, sondern sequentiell. Nach den Beitritten von Slowenien am 1.1.2007 und der Slowakei zum 1.1.2009 steht der Beitritt eines ersten großen Landes in den nächsten Jahren bevor. Daher stößt die Frage der Effekte eines solchen Beitritts seit geraumer Zeit auf breites Interesse in der ökonomischen Literatur.
Das Forschungsziel der Dissertation ist es, die theoretischen Wirkungsmechanismen eines Beitritts der neuen Mitgliedsländer zur Europäischen Währungsunion abzubilden. Hierzu werden mögliche stabilitätspolitische Konsequenzen sowie die Auswirkungen eines Beitritts auf die geografische Wirtschaftsstruktur und das Wachstum dieser Länder in theoretischen Modellen abgeleitet. Die direkten Effekte des Beitritts werden in einem angewandt-theoretischen Modell zudem quantifiziert.
Insgesamt wird der Beitritt aus drei verschiedenen Perspektiven analysiert: Erstens werden die Konsequenzen der Währungsunion für die Stabilitätspolitik der neuen Mitgliedsländer im Rahmen eines neukeynesianischen Modells betrachtet. Zweitens werden die mit der Transaktionskostensenkung verbundenen Gewinne in einem angewandten Gleichgewichtsmodell quantifiziert. Drittens werden die wachstumstheoretischen Wirkungen der Finanzmarktintegration in einem dynamischen Gleichgewichtsmodell untersucht. Da die drei Aspekte der makroökonomischen Stabilität, der Transaktionskostensenkung und der dynamischen Wirkungen der Finanzmarktintegration weitgehend unabhängig voneinander auftreten, ist die Verwendung verschiedener Modelle mit geringen Kosten verbunden.
In der Gesamtbeurteilung des EWU-Beitritts der neuen EU-Länder kommt diese Arbeit zu einer anderen Einschätzung als bisherige Studien. Die in Teil eins ermittelten stabilitätspolitischen Konsequenzen sind entweder neutral oder implizieren bei Beitritt zur Währungsunion eine größere Stabilität. Die in Teil zwei und drei ermittelten statischen und dynamischen Gewinne eines Beitritts sind zudem erheblich, so dass ein schneller Beitritt zur Währungsunion für die neuen EU-Mitgliedsländer vorteilhaft ist. Unter Berücksichtigung der Ziele der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (EWWU) müssen hierzu jedoch zwei Bedingungen erfüllt sein. Einerseits sind hinreichend entwickelte Finanzmärkte notwendig, um das Ziel einer Konvergenz der neuen und alten EU-Mitgliedsländer zu erreichen. Andererseits wird der Gesamtraum von einer stärkeren Finanzmarktintegration und einer Senkung der Transaktionskosten profitieren, jedoch durch die Übertragung von Schocks der neuen Mitgliedsländer instabiler. Daher kann der Beitritt der neuen Mitgliedsländer zur EWU für den Gesamtraum negativ sein. Diese Kosten sind nur dann zu rechtfertigen, falls über die schnellere Entwicklung der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten eine höhere Stabilität des Währungsraumes erzielt wird. Das neukeynesianische Wachstumsmodell gibt Hinweise, dass eine solche Entwicklung eintreten könnte. / The European Monetary Union consists of 16 member states, is inhabited by 321 million people and has a joint GDP of 22.9 trillion Euros. It is one of the largest economic areas in the world. In the next years the Eurozone will growth further, eight remaining new EU member states will join after their fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria. This makes accession rather sequential, Slovenia joined in 2007, Slovakia in 2009 and Estonia is about to join the Eurozone in 2010. However, these rules open the opportunity for a new EU-member state to postpone membership of EMU in violating the Maastricht criteria like Sweden. The contribution of my Ph.D. thesis is to derive channels of the impact of an EMU accession on the macro-economy. To this aim, I analyze the effects of accession on stability, growth and the geographical structure within theoretical models. The static effects of accession are quantified within a computable equilibrium model. In the conclusions I answer the question whether there are economic reasons for a new member state to avoid EMU membership.
The thesis is organized in three parts reflecting three perspectives of accession. Within the first main chapter, the effects of accession on stability are analyzed within a dynamic general equilibrium framework (DSGE). After a short discussion of the effects of monetary arrangements on the stability of an economy, I analyze the well-known arguments of the theory of optimum currency areas. Thereafter the model is used to analyze the transmission of shocks within the monetary union. The second main chapter of the thesis is related to static effects of accession. I show that in five new member states gains from accession outpace costs. Nevertheless, the gain from accession varies among accession countries and economic activities. Overall, small open economies tend to benefit to a greater extent than medium-size, more closed economies. In the third main chapter of the thesis a multiregional growth model is developed. In this model further integration leads to more efficient financial markets which foster growth. Nevertheless, like in all new economic geography (NEG) models, there could be the outcome of a catastrophic agglomeration. Capital could move from poor accession countries to rich western Eurozone countries. To prevent such a catastrophic agglomeration, financial markets should show a minimum degree of development.
The conclusion of the thesis supports the accession of new member states to the Eurozone. I argue that the consequences of EMU accession will be either neutral or positive for the accession countries. Since these countries tend to be more instable, they could gain from an equalization of shocks within the Eurozone. The static effects outpace the costs of accession. Within the last years we saw huge progress in the integration of new EU-member states into the international financial system. A catastrophic agglomeration should therefore be unlikely. However, market capitalization remains low and bank lending is less profitable than in western EU-countries so that a risk remains which could justify a postponement of accession.
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To have the Euro or not? : A comparison of Sweden and FinlandProos, Julia January 2010 (has links)
The purpose of this paper is to study whether Sweden or Finland was initially better suited for the euro, and whether Sweden has benefited from remaining outside the third step of the European Monetary Union as opposed to Finland. The analysis is based on the optimum currency area theory. The findings show that Sweden initially was better suited for euro adoption than Finland, but the ECB’s monetary policy has suite Finland quite well. However, Sweden appears to have benefited from remaining outside the euro.
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A Structural Analysis of the European Monetary Union and its Effect on Greece in Light of the European Financial CrisisRamos, Stephanie C 01 January 2011 (has links)
The intent of this paper is to analyze the structural composition of the European Monetary Union and its implications for the European Financial Crisis, specifically with respect to Greece. This analysis will be driven by a trend analysis of several economic variables from 1999-2010. These variables range from the four requirements set under the Maastricht criteria, competitiveness indicators, and relative European trade balances, to international investment position. A quantitative and empirical analysis of this data finds that the Greek crisis was a result of structural issues with the EMU and the Greek government. The ECB’s inability to enforce the Maastricht Criteria and independent fiscal policy, as well as Greece’s inability to implement efficient fiscal and economic policy, resulted in growing imbalances within the Euro area, as well as a loss of competitiveness and irresponsible rise in sovereign debt for Greece. It is inferred that the EMU was ineffective in achieving its goals of integration; that Greece was not ready to join the EMU when it did; and therefore Greece as a Member State of the EMU was destined to fail.
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The Difficult Decision to Devalue a CurrencyBizuneh, Menna 07 August 2012 (has links)
The switch from a fixed exchange rate regime to a flexible exchange rate regime seldom goes smoothly. A major reason why devaluations are so disruptive is that countries are reluctant to abandon their fixed exchange rate regimes. This “reluctance to devalue” phenomenon is one of the puzzles in international finance. This dissertation makes towards understanding this “reluctance to devalue”. First, I investigate the factors that may influence the probability of a switch from a fixed to a flexible exchange rate regime using survival models. I find that pegs have non-monotonic duration dependence. Moreover, I find that GDP growth strongly influences the probability of abandoning a peg. Second, I propose that the “reluctance to devalue” could stem from uncertainty about the control over inflation after devaluation which raises the threshold of economic pain that could convince policy makers to devalue. I develop this argument in a rules-vs-discretion theoretical framework. Empirical analysis based on survey data from Bulgaria supports this hypothesis. Given that abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime is one of the three options that are available to countries on a peg, I investigate whether a periphery country's decision to abandon its peg is impacted by a potential move to a currency union. I find that the perception of “insurance” justified by expected-bailouts in a currency union increase the support for joining a currency union. The strength of this “safety net” perception is strong despite expected negative impact of the currency union on the country’s macroeconomic indicators.
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