[pt] O objetivo desta dissertação foi o de analisar as três demonstrações da existência de Deus nas Meditações Metafísicas de René Descartes. Ela contém três capítulos. No primeiro, tratamos de forma geral do método de Descartes, tendo a intenção de mostrar que este mesmo método será aplicado às Meditações Metafísicas influenciando em grande medida as provas da existência de Deus. No segundo capítulo, já no interior das Meditações Metafísicas, nos detemos na análise da dúvida metódica e do cogito. Estes dois temas são os antecedentes fundamentais para as provas da existência de Deus, na medida em que, através da dúvida, é vedado o recurso ao conhecimento dos seres materiais e à própria Natureza e, através do cogito, é descoberta a única via possível para se chegar a Deus. No terceiro e último capítulo, apresentamos a primeira, a segunda e a terceira prova da existência de Deus. Em todas essas três provas o nó da questão foi a aplicação do principio de causalidade especificado na forma da causalidade eficiente. Na primeira prova, Deus é inferido como causa eficiente de sua idéia presente no intelecto humano. Na segunda, Deus é provado como causa do próprio intelecto que tem sua idéia. Por fim, na última prova, Deus é concebido como causa formal e eficiente de si mesmo. / [en] The objective of this dissertation was to analyze three demonstrations of the existence of God in the Metaphysical Meditations of René Descartes. It contains three chapters. In the first one, we deal with general form of the method of Descartes, having the intention to show that this method will be applied to the Metaphysical Meditations influencing significantly on the tests of the existence of God. In the second chapter, where we are already talking about the Metaphysical Meditations, we withhold them in the analysis of the methodical doubt and cogitation. These two subjects are the basic antecedents for the tests of the existence of God, while through the doubt the resource to the knowledge of material beings and to the proper Nature is forbidden, and through the cogitation is discovered the only possible way to reach the God. In the third and last chapter, we present the first one, the second and third test of the existence of God. In all these three tests the main question was the application of beginning of specified cause to the form of the efficient cause. In the first test, God is inferred as the efficient cause of its present idea in the human intellect. In second, God is proven as a cause of the proper intellect that has its idea. Finally, in the last test, God is conceived as a formal and efficient cause of itself.

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Bibliographical references at end of each chapter / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)

La doctrine leibnizienne de la science repose-t-elle sur une théorie de la connaissance? Après avoir montré, dans des travaux préalables, qu’une telle dépendance ne se rencontre pas dans l’œuvre de la maturité, nous nous intéressons ici aux premiers écrits de Leibniz. La Nova Methodus discendae docendaeque Jurisprudentiae (1667) dresse, suivant l’exemple de Bacon, un inventaire raisonné des disciplines que doit réunir la nouvelle encyclopédie. Comme dans les projets leibniziens ultérieurs, cet inventaire est précédé de la distinction entre types de savoir en fonction des critères logiques selon lesquels les propositions se répartissent entre histoires, observations et théorèmes. Nous nous attachons en particulier à la définition de ceux-ci comme propositions « démontrables ex terminis ». Cette norme de la science étant posée, quels fondements in re Leibniz entend-t-il donner au savoir démonstratif ? Prenant pour fil conducteur sa polémique avec l’humaniste Marius Nizolius, nous étudions sa tentative pour fonder la validité des propositions de vérité éternelle sur des universaux subsistant indépendamment de l’existence des individus. Ce n’est cependant que dans les premiers écrits parisiens (1672-1673) que se dégage sa réponse définitive à ce problème : apparue d’abord comme un autre nom de la signification qu’« exprime » une définition, la notion d’idée y prend consistance en tant qu’archétype subsistant en Dieu. Les principaux traits de la théorie leibnizienne de la science sont ainsi fixés, indépendamment de toute « doctrine de l’entendement ». / Does Leibniz’s doctrine of demonstrative knowledge rest upon a theory of cognition? Having shown in previous articles that such was not the case in his mature works, we now turn to his early writings. The Nova Methodus discendae docendaeque Jurisprudentiae (1667) contains a reasoned inventory of the disciplines that should constitute the new encyclopaedia. As in later projects, Leibniz precedes this inventory with a classification of the types of knowledge based on the logical criteria according to which propositions are divided in histories, observations and theorems. Particular attention is given to the definition of the latter as propositions « demonstrable ex terminis ».This norm of scientific necessity once defined, what real (in re) foundation does Leibniz give to demonstrative knowledge? Following the various threads offered by his polemic against the Italian humanist Marius Nizolius, we study Leibniz’s attempt to ground the validity of propositions of eternal truth on universals subsisting independently of the existence of individuals. But one has to wait until the first Paris writings (1672-1673) to see the emergence of his mature answer to that problem: first conceived after the model of the significatio which a definition « expresses », the notion of idea reaches its latter ontological status as an archetype subsisting in God’s mind. The principal features of Leibniz’s theory of demonstrative knowledge are thus in place, prior to and independently of what he will later call his « doctrine of the understanding ».