This thesis has as its focus five argumentative modes that lie at the heart of Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism. They are the modes of disagreement, hypothesis, infinite regression, reciprocity and relativity. They are analysed, individually, in the first five chapters of the thesis (one mode per chapter) and, collectively, in the sixth. The first four chapters deal, respectively, with the modes of disagreement, hypothesis, infinite regression and reciprocity. They distinguish between two versions of these modes: “dogmatic versions”, on the basis of which a dogmatic philosopher, who holds some theoretical beliefs, might reach a sceptical conclusion; and “sceptical versions”, on the basis of which a sceptical philosopher, who lacks all theoretical beliefs, might do so. It is argued that scholars such as Jonathan Barnes have offered reconstructions of these modes which are dogmatic in the sense just described, and alternative sceptical versions of the modes are presented. A stand-alone fifth chapter offers an analysis of a stand-alone mode - the mode of relativity. It argues that there are in fact three different modes of relativity at play in the Outlines, that only one of them is non-trivial, and that the non-trivial version is incompatible with the mode of disagreement. The sixth and final chapter offers an analysis of how the modes (excluding relativity) are meant to work in combination with one another. Four different combinations are presented and it is argued that all of them are underscored by a variety of theoretical assumptions, which a sceptic, who lacks all theoretical beliefs, cannot make. The ultimate conclusion of the thesis is that, though the sceptic can deploy the various modes individually (by means of exercising his particular sceptical ability), he is not able to systematise them into a net by means of which he might trap his dogmatic opponent. Unless specified otherwise, translations are based on Annas, J., and Barnes, J., Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

The production of equipollence is the most important part of the Pyrrhonian skeptic’s method for bringing about the suspension of judgment. The skeptic produces equipollence methodically, by opposing arguments, propositions, or appearances, in anyway whatsoever, until he produces an equality of “weightiness” on both sides of the conflicting views. Having no appropriate criterion to break the deadlock of equipollence, the skeptic (or his interlocutor) is left with no reason to accept either view. I have two main aims in this paper. My first aim is to distinguish between two different types of equipollence; that produced in the Pyrrhonist, called Psychological Equipollence, and that demonstrated to the dogmatist by the Pyrrhonist, called Normative Equipollence. My second aim in this paper is to argue that equipollence cannot be produced when the skeptic uses only epistemic possibility of error to oppose some compelling p.

Recent work on the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel has emphasized his interest in skeptical concerns. These contemporary scholars argue that, despite common opinions to the contrary, Hegel actually had a very keen interest in skepticism, one that informed and motivated much of his overall project. While I welcome this recent literature, I argue here that contemporary scholars have overemphasized the importance of skepticism for Hegel. By looking closely at Hegel’s arguments against skepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit, I argue that Hegel’s anti-skeptical arguments are in fact major failures. Hegel’s failure is at odds with the emphasis that contemporary literature places on Hegel’s interests in skepticism. For a philosopher who was supposedly centrally concerned with skeptical issues, Hegel sure does not act like it. I conclude that the tension here is the result of contemporary scholars’ overemphasis of the role that skepticism plays in Hegel’s project.

Diss.--Bern--Universität, 1990.

In his Outlines of Skepticism, Sextus Empiricus claims that the Pyrrhonian Skeptic can live without holding beliefs. According to the 'Rustic' interpretation of this claim, Sextus holds that the Skeptic lives without beliefs of any kind. According to the 'Urbane' interpretation, Sextus' claim concerns only a restricted category of beliefs. I discuss each interpretation in the context of Sextus' broader philosophical stance, and argue for an Urbane interpretation. On this view, Pyrrhonism represents a practicable stance towards the world. / Master of Arts

A tese defende a ideia de que uma compreensão adequada da suspensão cética de juízo (epokhé) pressupõe o estudo dos textos de Sexto Empírico que, direta ou indiretamente, abordam o problema da concepção pirrônica da linguagem ou discurso (lógos), e também daqueles que fornecem elementos para a compreensão da posição sextiana acerca da linguagem cotidiana das pessoas comuns. Os primeiros capítulos lidam com a conhecida distinção entre as assim chamadas interpretações rústica e urbana da filosofia pirrônica. A seguir, o texto discute o problema do lógos quando considerado a partir de uma perspectiva pirrônica, onde uma nova argumentação em favor da interpretação rústica é desenvolvida, baseada na ideia de um percurso cético. No quarto capítulo, é examinada a noção de phainómenon e sua relação com o lógos cético, através da formulação de uma interpretação mais geral do ceticismo antigo e do seu discurso fenomênico. O quinto e último capítulo procede então a uma avaliação da força filosófica tanto da filosofia pirrônica como da neopirrônica / The dissertation defends the idea that an adequate understanding of the sceptical suspension of judgement (epoché) presupposes the study of the Sextus Empiricus texts which, either directly or indirectly, address the problem of the pyrrhonian conception of language or discourse (lógos), and also the study of those texts that provide elements for the understanding of the Sextian position about the everyday language of common people. The first chapters deal with the well-known distinction between the so-called rustic and urbane interpretations of the pyrrhonian philosophy. In the sequence, the dissertation discusses the problem of the lógos, as viewed from a pyrrhonian perspective, also by developing a new argument in favor of the rustic interpretation, based upon the idea of a sceptic path. Subsequently, the notion of phainómenon and its relation to the sceptic lógos are analyzed through a general approach to ancient scepticism. The fith and last chapter proceeds to an avaluation of the philosophical strength of both the pyrrhonian and neopyrrhonian philosophies

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Ancient Greek philosophical schools are said to share a common structure in their ethical theories which is characterized by a eudaimonistic teleology based in an understanding of human nature. At first glance, the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus as described in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism seems to fit into this model insofar as he describes the end of the skeptic as ataraxia, a common account of the expression of human happiness. I argue that this is a misunderstanding of Sextus’s philosophy for several reasons. “The end of skepticism” cannot be eudaimonistic or teleological in the way that other ancient ethical theories are typically understood; moreover, ataraxia is not an end derived from a theory about human nature. For these reasons, the skeptical way of life is radically different than the ethical theories proposed by other schools. I argue that this difference is a result of the character of the skeptical enterprise which involves the implicit rejection of norms in both the epistemological and the ethical spheres.

A tese defende a ideia de que uma compreensão adequada da suspensão cética de juízo (epokhé) pressupõe o estudo dos textos de Sexto Empírico que, direta ou indiretamente, abordam o problema da concepção pirrônica da linguagem ou discurso (lógos), e também daqueles que fornecem elementos para a compreensão da posição sextiana acerca da linguagem cotidiana das pessoas comuns. Os primeiros capítulos lidam com a conhecida distinção entre as assim chamadas interpretações rústica e urbana da filosofia pirrônica. A seguir, o texto discute o problema do lógos quando considerado a partir de uma perspectiva pirrônica, onde uma nova argumentação em favor da interpretação rústica é desenvolvida, baseada na ideia de um percurso cético. No quarto capítulo, é examinada a noção de phainómenon e sua relação com o lógos cético, através da formulação de uma interpretação mais geral do ceticismo antigo e do seu discurso fenomênico. O quinto e último capítulo procede então a uma avaliação da força filosófica tanto da filosofia pirrônica como da neopirrônica / The dissertation defends the idea that an adequate understanding of the sceptical suspension of judgement (epoché) presupposes the study of the Sextus Empiricus texts which, either directly or indirectly, address the problem of the pyrrhonian conception of language or discourse (lógos), and also the study of those texts that provide elements for the understanding of the Sextian position about the everyday language of common people. The first chapters deal with the well-known distinction between the so-called rustic and urbane interpretations of the pyrrhonian philosophy. In the sequence, the dissertation discusses the problem of the lógos, as viewed from a pyrrhonian perspective, also by developing a new argument in favor of the rustic interpretation, based upon the idea of a sceptic path. Subsequently, the notion of phainómenon and its relation to the sceptic lógos are analyzed through a general approach to ancient scepticism. The fith and last chapter proceeds to an avaluation of the philosophical strength of both the pyrrhonian and neopyrrhonian philosophies

Nous nous proposons, dans le cadre de cette étude, de démontrer que les Essais de Montaigne contiennent bel et bien, en dépit d’une forme éclatée et d’un propos non systématique, ce qu’il convient d’appeler une morale. Non seulement cette morale ne s’oppose-t-elle pas au scepticisme des Essais, mais elle lui est même d’une certaine façon coextensive : la morale de Montaigne est une morale de l’essai, lequel constitue l’expression la plus achevée de son scepticisme. Ce dernier, pour être bien compris, doit préalablement être mis en parallèle avec la « voie » (ἀγωγή) que propose Sextus Empiricus dans ses Hypotyposes pyrrhoniennes, dont l’influence sur Montaigne pourrait être bien plus importante que ne le laissent croire plusieurs travaux récents. / We will argue, in the following study, that Montaigne’s Essays, despite their fragmented writing and unsystematic form, indeed contain what deserves to be called an ethics. This ethics, far from contradicting his scepticism, identifies with it in a certain way: Montaigne’s ethics is an ethics of the essay, which is the definitive expression of his scepticisim. The latter, to be correctly understood, needs to be compared with Sextus Empiricus’ « way » (ἀγωγή), whose influence on Montaigne may be more important than it has been argued in recent years.