G.E. Moore’s argument in Proof of an External World” seems to beg the question against the skeptic and to miss the point of the challenge posed by skeptical hypotheses. I propose an interpretation that frees the argument from both charges. Starting from a distinction between the way Moore understood his dialectical position against the idealist and the skeptic, I attempt to illuminate the conception of skepticism that lies behind his argument. I propose that the argument’s core is found in a strong anti-Cartesian statement, even though its relevance for epistemology is to be found in its potential as a stance regarding justification which is closer to the problematic of Pyrrhonic skepticism. / El argumento de G.E. Moore en Prueba del mundo exterior” parece consistir en una flagrante petición de principio y adolecer de una incomprensión del  desafío  representado  por  las  hipótesis  escépticas.  Aquí  intentaremos  una interpretación que evite ambos cargos. A tal fin, distinguiré entre los modos en que Moore concibe su posición dialéctica frente a sus rivales idealistas y escépticos,  y  abordaré  la  concepción  del  problema  escéptico  que  subyace  al  planteo mooreano. Finalmente, defenderé que el núcleo del argumento consiste en una afirmación anticartesiana aun cuando su relevancia epistemológica se encuentra en  su  potencial  como  respuesta  a  una  problemática  sobre  la  justificación  más cercana a un escepticismo de tipo pirrónico.

Ce mémoire présente une analyse critique de la solution contextualiste de David Lewis au problème sceptique. Pour Lewis, il s’agit d’un problème de possibilités d’erreur à éliminer. En effet, puisque l’on ne peut pas éliminer diverses hypothèses sceptiques, il semble que la connaissance soit impossible. Ce travail est d’abord une présentation du problème sceptique et de la solution que Lewis lui apporte. On verra que son objectif est de rendre compte de la plausibilité de l’argument sceptique tout en protégeant certaines intuitions au sujet de la connaissance. Ainsi, la théorie de Lewis explique quelles sont les présuppositions qu’il est légitime d’entretenir dans les attributions de connaissance. Ces attributions sont les énoncés de type « S sait que P ». On verra que cela prend la forme d’une théorie contextualiste des possibilités d’erreur pertinentes. Ce travail vise ensuite à situer la thèse de Lewis dans la littérature sur le contextualisme épistémique, c’est-à-dire en général, l’idée selon laquelle le contexte de conversation joue un rôle dans la détermination de la valeur de vérité d’une attribution de connaissance. Nous verrons que les solutions contextualistes au problème sceptique peuvent avoir des résultats significativement différents. Enfin, ce travail présentera des critiques importantes sur Elusive Knowledge. Elles prendront la forme d’un retour sur la manière dont Lewis conçoit le problème du scepticisme et celui de l’élimination des possibilités d’erreur. / This thesis is a critical analysis of David Lewis’s contextualist solution to the skeptical problem. The skeptical problem, for Lewis, is a problem of relevant possibilities of error : given that we cannot rule out various skeptical hypotheses, it seems that knowledge is impossible. The first chapter introduces Lewis’s solution to skepticism. We’ll see that his aim is to account for the plausibility of the skeptical argument, while at the same time to protect some of our intuitions concerning knowledge. To that end, Lewis’s solution points to the specific possibilities which can be properly ignored in our knowledge attributions. Knowledge attributions are sentences like « S knows that P. » We’ll see that this explanation takes the form of a contextualist theory about relevant possibilities of error. The second chapter’s task is to locate Lewis’s theory within the literature on epistemic contextualism. Epistemic contextualism, in general, is the claim that the truth value of knowledge attributions is strongly determined by the context of the conversation. But, as this chapter should emphasize, several solutions to skepticism may share the « contextualist » label, while yielding significantly different results. The final chapter will address some important objections to Elusive Knowledge. They are related to the reasons why, according to Lewis, skepticism is a genuine problem for epistemology; on the other hand, they question the notion of elimination of error possibilities.

We live in a time of changing climate and global warming, creating an urgency for policy- and societal ameliorative action. Increasing climate change skepticism in the Anglo-Saxon parts of the world as well as in Europe risks delaying urgent actions needed. This thesis studies a climate skeptical blog site and network in Sweden, Klimatupplysningen, and analyzes strategies used. A comparative framing analysis is conducted where frames compiled from previous research is searched for and analyzed in a randomly selected material of 150 blog posts. The results from the research show that strategies and frames from previous research to a large extent match those in Klimatupplysningen. Two new frames appeared from the material; Media & Debate and Humor. The new frames are indicative of a contextuality of online social media as main platform for communication and networking. More research is needed on effects on audiences from blogs and other social media.

The present dissertation deals with the topic of the relationship between political and moral philosophy and the epistemological and methodological arguments of Friedrich August von Hayek. The aim of the dissertation is to defend in general the assertion that Hayek's philosophy is the application of epistemological and methodological positions to moral and political philosophy and that this application is implemented through the continuous process of defining the basic theoretical positions towards philosophical tradition. This general statement is elaborated on in several perspectives. The first perspective puts the concept of knowledge in the forefront, both in the sense of a certain concept of rationality, i.e. the nature of reason and human thinking, and also in the sense of defining the nature and limits of scientific inquiry. The latter follows the development of Hayek's thinking, pointing out the aspects of his philosophy, which are the elaboration of the theories of his predecessors in thought within the Austrian economic school or classical sociology. This perspective also shows that, at a certain stage of his thinking, Hayek considerably moves away from these predecessors, particularly in the context of grasping individualism. The third perspective shows the deeper roots of some of...

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Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Currently, the predominant view in research ethics maintains that physicians can morally justify offering randomized clinical trial enrollment to their patients only if some form of equipoise is present. Thus, the physician must experience (either individually or communally) a state of reasoned uncertainty concerning the relative merits of two or more competing treatments for a given disease before she may recommend that her patient participate in a clinical trial. Increasingly, however, this position has been subject to critical attention and considerable negative scrutiny. My argument engages this trend by turning to the history of philosophy; here I claim that the use of the term “equipoise” in the medical research context is extremely similar to terms and concepts from the philosophical tradition of skepticism, and as a result of this similarity it is possible to understand the principle of equipoise’s vulnerability to already published criticisms. A comparison of the criticisms of equipoise within the medical research literature to criticisms of philosophical skepticism reveals a potentially grim future for equipoise as a legitimate guiding principle for the ethical conduct of clinical research.

[pt] Este estudo tem como objetivo examinar as relações de influência e tensão entre a filosofia dita natural e a dita metafísica entre o Renascimento e a Modernidade. Para tanto, tomou-se a anatomia como estudo de caso. Mais especificamente, os trabalhos de três anatomistas foram escolhidos. São eles: Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564) e o seu de Humani corporis fabrica libri septem (1543); William Harvey (1578-1657) e o Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in Animalibus (1628); e Nicolas Steno (1638-1686) e seu Discours sur l’anatomie du cerveau (1669). Vesalius foi selecionado como representante do pensamento renascentista, Harvey localiza-se na transição para a Modernidade, ao passo que Steno é eminentemente um moderno. Foram igualmente abordados algo dos contextos filosóficos e científicos dos três, de modo que as filosofias de Aristóteles, Galeno, Paracelso, Francisco Sanches, Descartes, Hobbes e Spinoza foram parcialmente estudadas. Destaque-se a transição de um pensamento científico médico vitalista para outro, mecanicista. No cotejamento das obras dos três anatomistas, foram observadas diferenças e semelhanças e o Ceticismo acabou por emergir como um protagonista. / [en] This study aims to examine the relations of influence and tension between the so-called natural philosophy and the metaphysics between the Renaissance and Modernity. Therefore, anatomy was taken as a case study. More specifically, the works of three anatomists were chosen. They are: Andreas Vesalius (1514- 1564) and his De humani corporis fabrica libri septem (1543); William Harvey (1578-1657) and the Exercitatio anatomica de motu cordis et sanguinis in animalibus (1628); and Nicolas Steno (1638-1686) and his Discours sur l anatomie du cerveau (1669). Vesalius was selected as a representative of Renaissance thought, Harvey is located in the transition to Modernity, while Steno is eminently a modern. Moreover, some of the philosophical and scientific contexts in which the three lived were also addressed, so the philosophies of Aristotle, Galen, Paracelsus, Francisco Sanches, Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza were partially studied. Emphasis is given to the transition from a vitalist medical scientific thought to a mechanistic one. In comparing the works of the three anatomists, differences and similarities were observed and Skepticism eventually emerged as a protagonist.

[pt] Neste trabalho, defendo a tese de que o livre arbítrio, entendido como o controle necessário para a responsabilidade moral baseada no mérito, não existe, pois é impossível. A tese é um desenvolvimento da visão de Galen Strawson que baseia a impossibilidade da responsabilidade última na impossibilidade da autodeterminação. Aqui, defendo uma abordagem ao problema que conecta os seguintes temas: livre arbítrio, sorte moral e autocriação, mantendo que o fato necessário da sorte constitutiva é o que torna impossível de satisfazer a condição de fonte última do controle necessário para a responsabilidade moral. Minha estratégia argumentativa é mostrar como as tentativas de satisfazer e de rejeitar essa condição falham. / [en] In this work, I defend the thesis that free will, understood as the control necessary for merit-based moral responsibility, does not exist, for it is impossible. The thesis is a development of Galen Strawson’s view, which bases the impossibility of ultimate responsibility on the impossibility of self-determination. Here, I defend an approach to the problem that connects the following themes: free will, moral luck and self-creation, holding that the necessary fact of constitutive luck is what makes the ultimate sourcehood condition for the control required for moral responsibility impossible to satisfy. My argumentative strategy is to show how attempts both to satisfy and reject this condition fail.

As the workplace has evolved over the past few years, several studies have documented perceived differences in personalities, values, and preferences between generations in the workplace, including in public accounting. In this study, I examine whether exposure to a negative preconceived belief about a staff auditor's generation (generational stereotype) influences the affective state of staff auditors and ultimately causes them to reduce the extent to which they communicate with a client manager to gather the necessary information to perform an audit adequately. I also investigate whether attribute affirmation from a work buddy helps elicit positive affect to mitigate the effects that exposure to negative generational stereotypes may have on audit evidence collection. I conducted a 2 x 2 experiment using graduate auditing students as a proxy for staff auditors. I find that general affect (i.e., mood) rather than interpersonal affect (i.e., likability), drives the negative effect of exposure to generational stereotypes on willingness to collect more audit evidence. I also find that high levels of negative mood can negatively impact participants' self-efficacy. I, however, failed to find evidence of a moderated mediation. The presence of an attribute affirmation results in an insignificant increase in positive affect. When staff auditors are exposed to a negative generational stereotype, attribute affirmation does not evoke enough positive affect to help auditors overcome the generational stereotype threat.

In this essay, I examine the interplay between history, progress, and morality, as it is discussed explicitly or implicitly in the metaethical literature. At first sight, it is perhaps intuitive that these three are necessarily intertwined and mutually dependent, as if they were casually connected. For instance, few would deny that moral progress has occurred throughout history. The abolishment of slavery and the political emancipation of certain groups are seen as obvious signs that morality does indeed progress. Those who believe in de facto moral progress would point to such 'facts' by comparing two states of affairs according to their moral status. Moral progress thus occurs when we move from a "worse" state of affairs to a "better". However, this simple algorithm becomes increasingly untenable once we ask what it means for something to be "better". Better by what measure, better according to whom, better in what sense? Some – moral realists– will argue that as we become increasingly aware of moral truths and as these truths steadily accumulate, progress occurs. Others will argue that there are no moral truths and no moral facts, and a comparison between different states of affairs is impossible because it involves a sort of moral 'historical imperialism' in which we assert our convictions and prejudices upon a time and culture with completely different beliefs. Taken to the extreme, this view gives rise to the idea that moral progress is nothing but a mirage, a psychological necessity without justification. I conclude the essay by arguing that several positions fall short when addressing questions regarding moral progress, and that there are other ways of discussing it which might be more fruitful.