This dissertation investigates self-projection (i.e., future and past preferences reasoning) and possible underlying mechanisms [Theory of Mind (ToM), executive function (EF)] in early development. All children were tested in person prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Our first objective was to explore preschoolers' understanding that the preferences they may hold in the future (Future Preferences task, adapted from Bélanger, Atance, Varghese, Nguyen, & Vendetti, 2014; Experiment 1), and likely held in the past (Past Preferences task; Experiment 2), differ from their current preferences. To do so, we implemented a novel continuous measure of children's preferences (faces rating scale; Kopp et al., 2017; adapted from; Wong & Baker, 1988) in addition to the more standard categorical response measure (item selection) used in children's future preferences reasoning research (Bélanger et al.). In addressing our second objective to investigate children's past preferences reasoning, we designed a new task (Past Preferences task) to complement our Future Preferences task. In Chapter 2 (Experiments 1 & 2), we found 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds' success in reasoning about their future and past preferences generally improved with age. Results from our continuous preferences measure further revealed subtle developments in preschoolers' preferences reasoning not gleaned from our categorical data alone. We found that, around age 4, children demonstrate some understanding that they will prefer child items less and adult items more in the future (as an adult) than they do now and, around age 3, children similarly demonstrate some understanding that they preferred child items less in the past (as a baby) than they do now. While cross-experiment comparison in Chapter 2 revealed asymmetry in preschoolers' preferences reasoning (future, relative to past, preferences reasoning was more challenging), this asymmetry was not replicated in Chapter 3 using a more rigorous within-subjects design. Besides clarification of asymmetry in preferences reasoning, our final objectives were to confirm the relation between preschoolers' reasoning about changes in their future and past preferences and explore possible mechanisms underlying children’s self-projective abilities. In Chapter 3, children's ability to reason about their future and past preferences were significantly correlated - but not after controlling for their receptive language ability. Unexpectedly, we did not find support for asymmetry in children's self-projection abilities; that is, children did not find it more difficult to reason about their future as compared to their past preferences. Finally, children's future and past preferences reasoning were not related to or predicted by their performance on the ToM and EF tasks after controlling for age, language ability, and sex. Taken together, this dissertation provides unique and timely contributions to the literature on self-projection and, specifically, how this capacity develops, as well as children’s reasoning about how preferences change over time.

Theory of Mind (ToM) has repeatedly been defined as the ability to understand that others believe their own things based on their own subjective interpretations and experiences, and that their thoughts are determined independently from your own. In this study, we wanted to see if individual differences in ToM are capable of causing different perceptions of an individual's interactions with human like robotics and highlight whether or not individual differences in ToM account for different levels of how individuals experience what is called the "Uncanny Valley phenomenon" and to see whether or not having a fully developed theory of mind is essential to the perception of the interaction. This was assessed by inquiring whether or not individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) perceive robotics and artificially intelligent technology in the same ways that typically developed individuals do; we focused on the growing use of social robotics in ASD therapies. Studies have indicated that differences of ToM exist between individuals with ASD and those who are typically developed. Comparably, we were also curious to see if differences in empathy levels also accounted for differences in ToM and thus a difference in the perceptions of human like robotics. A robotic image rating survey was administered to a group of University of central Florida students, as well as 2 surveys - the Autism Spectrum Quotient (ASQ) and the Basic Empathy Scale (BES), which helped optimize a measurement for theory of mind. Although the results of this study did not support the claim that individuals with ASD do not experience the uncanny valley differently than typically developed individuals, there were significant enough results to conclude that different levels of empathy may account for individual differences in the uncanny valley. People with low empathy seemed to have experienced less of an uncanny valley feeling, while people with higher recorded empathy showed to experience more of an uncanny valley sensitivity.

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Yes / To understand the executive demands of the false-belief (FB) task relative to an alternative theory-of-mind (or mechanical causality) task, picture sequencing, the present study used path analyses. One hundred and sixty-six children between 3 and 6 years old completed the FB and picture-sequencing tasks, three executive function tasks (updating, inhibition, and shifting), and the receptive language test. The model with the best fit indicated that FB performance had a direct contribution from shifting of attention and inhibitory control, which was independent of the significant contribution made by picture sequencing. This model indicates that FB inference requires more executive processing than picture sequencing, which is used as an alternative task to measure theory of mind. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? The majority of researchers use the false-belief task to assess mentalizing ability in young children. Sources of information used in various different mentalizing tasks require different levels of cognitive demand. Many executive functions (EFs) are involved in children's judgements of false belief. What does this study add? A statistical model was created to compare processing requirements of false-belief and picture-sequencing tasks. The model supported the claim that the false-belief task involves considerably more than just mentalizing. Shifting the focus of attention was an EF that was found to be a key component of performance in the false-belief task. / Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science: KAKENHI Grant No. 16K04327.

Perception of moral violations and people’s misbehaviours are crucial elements that allow people to live in the society. The literature suggested that both explicit and implicit processes are involved in the moral cognition (Cameron et al., 2012). However still nowadays, the majority of the literature focused only on the explicit aspects of morality, while scarce attention was given to the study of implicit moral attitudes (Cameron et al., 2018). Furthermore, researchers on morality are currently attracting by the investigation of moral cognition in people with impairments in social cognition (e.g., people with autism spectrum disorder; ASD) who may process the moral violations differently compared neurotypical people (see e.g., Gallese, 2006), However, this line of research is at the beginning stage, and the use of implicit measures to understand the mechanisms underpinning the morality in autism (or in people with high autistic traits) have not yet been considered in previous studies. The present dissertation aimed to investigate important aspects of moral cognition that currently are still under-investigated in literature, offering a wider view on implicit aspects of morality in autism. Through six experiments, this work wanted to provide new empirical findings concerning the implicit mechanisms underpinning moral cognition in both neurotypical and autistic people without intellectual disability. Experiment 1 and 2 According to Moral Foundation Theory (Graham et al., 2013) specific emotions are associated to different types of moral violations. For instance, when people perceive that a victim is physically or emotionally harmed by someone else, they feel anger against the perpetrator. By contrast, people feel disgust when they perceive that someone ate inedible food or made blasphemous practices (Haidt et al., 1993). However, empirical finding that assessed the link between different types of moral violations and specific emotions showed mixed results. Indeed, it was suggested that other important factors might also modulate the relations between different moral violations and emotions (Atari et al., 2020; Kemper & Newheiser, 2018). Specifically, the benign violation hypothesis (McGraw & Warren, 2010) claimed that sometimes people could perceive moral violations as amusing, and this specific emotion seems elicited by specific contextual (e.g., psychological distance) as well as interpersonal factors (e.g., humor traits). However, previous studies never tested whether people perceive amusement in response to all types of moral violation, or whether amusement emerged only in response to specific norm violations (e.g., purity violations). Furthermore recently, Dempsey and colleagues (2020a) emphasized the importance to test the assumptions of Moral Foundation Theory in autistic spectrum disorder (ASD). Interviewing six autistic participants, the authors found that the participants endorsed all moral domains as morally relevant. However, the relations between emotional reaction and moral domains in autism have never been tested, as well as whether autistic people perceive moral violations as benign and amusing. In the first two experiments of this thesis, it was assessed the amusement reaction in response to different types of moral violations (purity vs. harm) and extending such investigation involving a group of autistic participants. Furthermore, the studies conducted so far on moral cognition has prevalently used explicit methodology. By contrast, in these experiments it was assessed the emotional reaction in response to different types of moral violations analysing the spontaneous facial expressions in neurotypical people (experiment 1), and the cardiac response of both typical and autistic individuals (experiment 2). The aim of these experiments was to investigate whether neurotypical people perceive specific types of moral violations as benign and amusing, and then whether autistic people expressed different emotions compared neurotypical people in response to different types of moral violations. Experiment 3, 4 and 5 As opposite of Moral Foundation Theory, the Dyadic Model claimed that a sine qua non for moral perception is the implicit activation of harm (Gray et al., 2012). In other words, always immorality automatically activates perceptions of harm regardless of someone is harmed (acts which involve physical and emotional damage; harm violations) or not (i.e., acts which involve impure and degradation behaviour; purity violations). Indeed, empirical evidence suggested that, during the reading of a scenario depicting a harmless moral violation in the domain of purity, people nevertheless implicitly infer that harm was involved. Across three experiments, we tested whether ostensibly harmless moral violations activated implicitly the harm concept. In all these three experiments the participants’ implicit attitude in response to moral violations was tested by using the affective misattribution paradigm (AMP; Payne et al., 2014), which is one of the most reliable methods to assess individual unconscious mental processes in psychology (Znanewitz et al., 2018). Specifically, Experiment 3 aimed to replicate previous findings which highlighted the implicit role of harm in response to harmless moral violations (Gray et al., 2014). Experiment 4 extended previous results with an investigation aimed to verify whether people with high autistic traits showed less implicit activation of harm in response to harmless scenarios than people with low autistic traits. Finally, Experiment 5 aimed to investigate whether autistic people (without intellectual disability) implicitly activated the harm concept in response to harmless scenarios as well as neurotypicals. Experiment 6 The majority of the studies which investigated the moral cognition in autism started to the premise that autistic people have a selective impairment in Theory of Mind (ToM; Moran et al., 2011), which is also a fundamental skill to understand the moral behaviours (e.g., Hamlin, 2015). However, the literature is far to show the role of Theory of Mind in the moral processing. Recently, it was suggested that ToM is a cognitive skill that involves both explicit and implicit processes (e.g., Southgate et al., 2007). The born of new implicit measures to assess the ToM brought an initial enthusiasm in this area of study. For instance, studies on clinical psychology, using both explicit and implicit ToM measures in order to understand selective ToM difficulties by autistic individuals without intellectual disability showed that, although this population presented high performance to explicit ToM tasks, they showed lower performance in the newer implicit ToM tasks compared to neurotypical participants (e.g., Schuwerk et al., 2015; Senju et al., 2009). Late unfortunately, these interesting results were put into question by other studies, which argued against the reliability of these new implicit measures (Kulke et al., 2018b). Moreover, another important gap in implicit ToM literature was that, while previous models in developmental psychology and psychopathology have suggested a link between attachment and the development of ToM, the relationship between attachment and implicit ToM has been so far neglected. In this experiment, we assessed both implicit and explicit mental state attribution, by means of a new implicit ToM task, as well as some attachment dimensions, comparing a group of autistic participants, without intellectual disability, and a control group. Specifically, in this experiment it was investigated participants’ spontaneous anticipatory look in response to false beliefs tasks using the eye-tracking methodology (one of the most used implicit ToM paradigms in literature). This study aimed to investigate the Theory of Mind (ToM) at both explicit and implicit level (Southgate et al., 2007), investigating possible differences between neurotypical individuals and autistic people. Furthermore, in the same study it was also investigated the link between the participants’ attachment and the explicit and implicit ToM skills. Moral cognition is a complex object of study that should be investigated with a multi-dimensional approach. In the experiments described in this thesis it was proposed a combined methodology that allowed to gather both explicit and implicit cognitive and emotional mechanisms that stay at the root of the moral judgment. Thanks to this approach it was found that deliberate and involuntary processes did not present convergent responses in the moral cognition of participants. Indeed, self-reported emotions seem to show divergent responses compared to the spontaneous facial expressions and the cardiac response to moral violations. These results support extant literature that raises concerns about the intuitionist assumptions of the moral cognition based on the assessment of only explicit responses of participants (e.g., Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Nosek, 2007). Furthermore, this thesis highlighted the importance of studying the moral cognition in people affected by the autism spectrum disorder. Despite the social impairments that this neurodevelopmental disorder presents, we found that autistic people with cognitive level in average with the typical population, did not show any differences compared to the control group in both explicit and implicit mechanisms of moral cognition. These interesting findings may bring important theoretical reflections in moral and clinical psychology.

Yes / Evidence has shown that older adults have lower accuracy in Theory-of-Mind (ToM) tasks compared to young adults, but we are still unclear whether the difficulty in decoding mental states in older adults stems from not looking at the critical areas, and more so from the ageing Asian population. Most ToM studies use static images or short vignettes to measure ToM but these stimuli are dissimilar to everyday social interactions. We investigated this question using a dynamic task that measured both accuracy and error types, and examined the links between accuracy and error types to eye gaze fixation at critical areas (e.g. eyes, mouth, body). A total of 82 participants (38 older, 44 young adults) completed the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition task on the eye tracker. Results showed that older adults had a lower overall accuracy with more errors in the ipo-ToM (under-mentalising) and no-ToM (lack of mentalisation) conditions compared to young adults. We analysed the eye gaze data using principal components analysis and found that increasing age and looking less at the face were related to lower MASC accuracy in our participants. Our findings suggest that ageing deficits in ToM are linked to a visual attention deficit specific to the perception of socially relevant nonverbal cues. / This study was funded by the Ministry of Higher Education Malaysia (FRGS/1/2016/SS05/SYUC/03/2) awarded to M.H.Y.