Die Borderline-Persönlichkeitsstörung (BPS) ist eine schwere psychiatrische Störung, die durch tiefgreifende Probleme in Emotionsregulation und zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen gekennzeichnet ist. In der vorliegenden Dissertation wurde die Beziehung zwischen Leitsymptomen der BPS und kognitiven Fähigkeiten, die für die Bewältigung eines gut funktionierenden Alltags notwendig sind (Aufmerksamkeit, adäquate Belohnungsverarbeitung), untersucht. Weiter wurde für zukünftige Untersuchungen der interpersonellen Instabilitäten und Empathiefähigkeit ein neues Stimulus Set zur Erforschung von sozialer Kognition im Alltag erstellt: die ToMenovela. Mittels fMRT-Untersuchungen konnte gezeigt werden, dass das Ausmaß an selbstberichteter Ängstlichkeit positiv mit der Verarbeitung von emotionalen, ablenkenden Reizen in konfliktbehafteten Bedingungen korreliert. Dies ist ein Hinweis darauf, dass Patientinnen möglicherweise eine erhöhte unbewusste Verarbeitung von irrelevanten Informationen haben, die emotional negativ besetzt sind. Weiter wurde gezeigt, dass das Ausmaß von selbstberichteter Impulsivität negativ mit der neuronalen Signatur der Erwartung von (vermeidbaren) aversiven Konsequenzen korreliert. Dieser Befund steht im Einklang mit dem bei BPD bekannten Phänomen von riskanten Entscheidungen oder selbstschädigendem Verhalten. Die dritte Studie stellt die ToMenovela vor, eine Sammlung von 190 emotional aufgeladenen Photographien mit hoher ökologischer Validität, die von einem fiktiven Freundeskreis handeln. Fragestellungen zur 1. und 3.-Person-Perspektive sowie affektiven und kognitiven Theory of Mind sind durch die Komposition der Fotos möglich. Die Bilder wurden von einer gesunden Kontrollgruppe nach emotionaler Valenz bezüglich der 6 Basis-Emotionen nach Ekman (Freude, Trauer, Wut, Angst, Überraschung, Ekel) bewertet, und stehen nun für den experimentellen Einsatz in der Empathie- und Emotionsforschung, auch über das BPS-Klientel, hinaus zur Verfügung. / Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a severe mental health disorder characterized by severe problems in emotion regulation and interpersonal relationships. In this dissertation, the relation between core symptoms of BPD and two cognitive abilities that are necessary for a well-functioning daily life, attention and adequate reward processing, were investigated. Furthermore, a new stimulus set for the investigation of social cognition in daily life that is suitable for future research on relational instabilities and trait empathy was generated: the ToMenovela. Using fMRI, it could be shown that self-reported trait anxiety and neural BOLD-response correlated positively during conflict processing in an experimental flanker task with emotional distractors. These results indicate that patients might exhibit more pronounced implicit processing of irrelevant negative emotional information. In a second study, using a reward paradigm, a negative relationship was observed between self-reported impulsivity and neural signature of loss anticipation. This result is in line with recent findings on BPD patients’ tendency towards disadvantageous, risky choices or self-harming decisions. The third publication introduces the ToMenovela, a new stimulus set for the assessment of social interaction in daily life. The ToMenovela presents a set of 190 emotionally charged pictures of a fictitious circle of friends with high ecological validity. The stimulus set is suitable for experimental designs on 1st and 3rd person perspectives, as well as for affective and cognitive Theory of Mind tasks. The stimulus set was rated by healthy control subjects according to emotional valence with respect to Ekman’s basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise and disgust) and is available for further use in experiments on empathy and emotions within and beyond the context of research on BPD.

Kundenorientierung ist ein maßgeblicher Erfolgsfaktor für Unternehmen. Entscheidenden Einfluss hierauf besitzen Mitarbeiter mit Kunden-Kontakt, die sich in Bedürfnisse der Kunden einfühlen können und die ihr Wissen mit anderen Mitarbeitern im Unternehmen teilen. In einem schrittweisen und systematischen Vorgehen werden in dieser Arbeit betriebswirtschaftliche und neurowissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse zusammengeführt und hierdurch dargelegt, welche Faktoren im Unternehmen diese Gehirnleistung des Einfühlens begünstigen. Die Mehr-Ebenen-Analyse erfolgt ausgehend von der Unternehmensebene, insbesondere Phänomenen der Unternehmenskultur, über die Ebene der Beziehungen zwischen Kunden und Mitarbeitern bis hin zur Ebene des sozialen Gehirns.

Kundenorientierung ist ein maßgeblicher Erfolgsfaktor für Unternehmen. Entscheidenden Einfluss hierauf besitzen Mitarbeiter mit Kunden-Kontakt, die sich in Bedürfnisse der Kunden einfühlen können und die ihr Wissen mit anderen Mitarbeitern im Unternehmen teilen. In einem schrittweisen und systematischen Vorgehen werden in dieser Arbeit betriebswirtschaftliche und neurowissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse zusammengeführt und hierdurch dargelegt, welche Faktoren im Unternehmen diese Gehirnleistung des Einfühlens begünstigen. Die Mehr-Ebenen-Analyse erfolgt ausgehend von der Unternehmensebene, insbesondere Phänomenen der Unternehmenskultur, über die Ebene der Beziehungen zwischen Kunden und Mitarbeitern bis hin zur Ebene des sozialen Gehirns.

Beeinflusst unsere Variabilität, wie wir über andere denken? Betrifft die Veränderung unserer Persönlichkeitszustände mehr als uns selbst? Wie beeinflussen andere unsere Persönlichkeitsentwicklung? Wie wirkt sich Selbstbezug auf das Denken über andere aus? In dieser Arbeit werden die vielfältigen Beziehungen zwischen unserer Persönlichkeit und der Beziehung zu und Interaktion mit anderen Menschen in verschiedenen Bereichen der Persönlichkeitspsychologie untersucht. Neben der Zusammenfassung der vier Veröffentlichungen, wird der theoriegeleitete Ansatz erläutert und in Persönlichkeitsdynamik und -prozesse eingeführt. Zentral sind die Konzepte der Persönlichkeitsmerkmale, der innerpersonellen Variabilität, der Persönlichkeitsentwicklung, des Selbstfokus, des Egozentrismus und der egozentrischen Verzerrung–im Rahmen ihrer Bedeutung für die Theory of Mind (ToM). Publikation 1 schlägt ein zweistufiges Model vor, wie die innerpersonelle Variabilität die ToM durch Erweiterung und Relativierung des Egozentrismus einer Person erleichtern kann. Publikation 2 fürht die Terminologie und die statistischen Werkzeuge der dynamischen Systemtheorie für die Untersuchung von Persönlichkeitszuständen ein und diskutiert Anwendungsfälle. Publikation 3 stellt ein Klassifizierungssystem vor, mit dem systematisch zwischen persönlichen und kollektiven Lebensereignissen unterschieden werden kann, wobei die unterschiedlichen Mechanismen berücksichtigt werden, durch die beide Arten von Lebensereignissen die Persönlichkeitsentwicklung beeinflussen können. Publikation 4 präsentiert Belege für eine kleine, aber robuste positive Beziehung zwischen achtsamer Selbstfokussierung und ToM. Nach der Reflektion der Beiträge zum Fachgebiet werden drei Forschungsansätze aus dem Risikomanagement, der Persönlichkeitspsychologie und den Neurowissenschaften diskutiert, die auf die Forschung zu innerpersönlicher Variabilität und Persönlichkeitsentwicklung sowie zu Egozentrismus und ToM einzahlen könnten. / Does our own variability affect how we think about others? Do personality states changes involve more than ourselves? How do others affect our personality development? How does focusing on oneself affect thinking about others? This dissertation explores the many relationships between an individual’s personality and ther relation to and interaction with other people across multiple areas of personality psychological research. Before summarizing four publications of this cumulative project, I explain my theory-driven approach and introduce the field of personality dynamics and processes. In particular, I focus on the concepts of personality traits, within-person variability, personality development, self-focus, egocentrism, egocentric bias–often in light of their relevant for Theory of Mind. The first publication proposes a two-tier framework of how within-person variability can facilitate Theory of Mind by broadening and relativizing a person’s egocentrism. The second publication introduces the terminology and statistical tools of dynamic systems theory to the investigation of personality state levels and presents possible use cases. The third publication introduces a classification system to differentiate between personal and collective live events in a systematic way that is sensitive to the different mechanisms by which both kinds of life events can affect personality development. The fourth publication presents evidence for a small but robust positive relationship between mindful self-focus and Theory of Mind. Finally, I reflect on the publications’ contributions to the field and suggest three lines of research stemming from risk management, personality psychology, and neuroscience that could inform research on within-person variability and personality development as well as on egocentrism and Theory of Mind further in the future.

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Psychological research suggests that children acquire cultural concepts through early developing cognitive mechanisms combined with specific cultural learning. An understudied area of cultural acquisition is children’s understanding of non-human minds, such as God. This thesis gives evidence that young children need not anthropomorphize non-human minds in order to understand them. Instead, children have a general “theory of mind” that is tailored through experience to accommodate the various important minds in their cultural environment. The intuitive default is toward super-attributes, making children naturally inclined or “prepared” to acquire god concepts. Four empirical studies were conducted with 75 British and 66 Israeli preschool-aged children. In Study 1, children participated in an ignorance-based theory-of-mind task and were asked to consider the mental states of human and supernatural agents. Children at all ages attributed correct knowledge to the supernatural agents and ignorance to the human agents. In Study 2, children participated in two perception-based theory-of-mind tasks and were asked to consider the perspective of two super-perceiving animals, God, and two human agents. Three-year-olds attributed knowledge to the animals and God and, by age four, children could distinguish among agents correctly. Also, by age four, children recognized that aging limits the perception of human agents but not God’s. In Study 3, children participated in a memory-based theory-of-mind task in which they were asked to consider the memory of God and differently aged agents Children at all ages responded that God would remember something that the children themselves had forgotten. By age five, children responded that a baby and granddad would have forgotten. These results propose that preschool-aged children regard individual constraints when considering mental states. Study 4 focused on children’s notions of immortality. Cultural differences were found. British children attributed immortality to God before correctly attributing mortality to human agents, and Israeli children attributed immortality to God and mortality to humans more consistently than did British children. Collectively, these studies indicate that children do not have to resort to anthropomorphism to reason about non-human agents but instead have the cognitive capacity to represent other types of minds because of early cognitive capacities. It appears that concepts vary in their degree of fit with early-developing human conceptual systems, and hence, vary in their likelihood of successful cultural transmission.

Research suggests that children are only able to flexibly apply more than one label (e.g. mouse and animal) in one situation with one conversational partner after they pass standard false belief tasks. Both abilities have been attributed to the understanding of perspective. The aim of the studies was to extend previous research to examine the disambiguation effect, children’s tendency to select an unfamiliar object in the presence of another but familiar object as referent for a novel word. Theoretical considerations suggest this effect initially results from a lack of understanding perspective. Five studies were conducted in Scotland and Austria, involving 243 children between the ages of 2.5 and 6.5. Studies 1 to 3 compared the standard disambiguation task with a task in which a strong pragmatic cue indicates the familiar object is the correct referent. Performances on these tasks were compared with performances on the false belief task, the alternative naming task, as well as tests of executive functioning. Studies 4 and 5 extended these methods to examine bilingual children’s metacognitive abilities in relation to word learning. Children become able to suspend the disambiguation effect when presented with strong pragmatic cues at the same time as they pass false belief and alternative naming tasks (Experiment 1). This can neither be attributed to impulsivity or the ability to inhibit a response, nor order effects of pragmatic cues and novel words (Experiment 2). Children’s ability to apply two labels to one object in a correction task also related to their perspectival understanding. Previous findings that suggested that younger children could produce multiple labels in a misnaming paradigm were not replicated (Experiment 3 a, b). The developmental change in children’s metalinguistic behaviour was demonstrated to follow the same trajectory in monolinguals, bilinguals and children exposed to another language (Experiment 4 and 5). Bilinguals show a marginally better ability to recall novel foreign language labels. The disambiguation effect is the result of cognitive immaturity in young children. Older children show a change in behaviour at the same time as they present more metacognitive maturity. Common development with theory of mind and metalinguistic abilities is attributed to an understanding of perspective.

Much is known about when children acquire an understanding of mental states, but few, if any, experiments identify social contexts in which children tend to use this capacity and dispositions that influence its usage. Social exclusion is a common situation that compels us to reconnect with new parties, which may crucially involve attending to those parties’ mental states. Across two studies, this line of inquiry was extended to typically developing preschoolers (Study 1) and young children with and without anxiety disorder (AD) (Study 2). Children played the virtual game of toss “Cyberball” ostensibly over the Internet with two peers who first played fair (inclusion), but eventually threw very few balls to the child (exclusion). Before and after Cyberball, children in both studies completed stories about peer-scenarios. For Study 1, 36 typically developing 5-year-olds were randomly assigned to regular exclusion (for no apparent reason) or accidental exclusion (due to an alleged computer malfunction). Compared to accidental exclusion, regular exclusion led children to portray story-characters more strongly as intentional agents (intentionality), with use of more mental state language (MSL), and more between-character affiliation in post-Cyberball stories. For Study 2, 20 clinically referred 4 to 8-year-olds with AD and 15 age- and gender-matched non-anxious controls completed stories before and after regular exclusion. While we replicated the post regular-exclusion increase of intentional and MSL portrayals of story-characters among non-anxious controls, anxious children exhibited a decline on both dimensions after regular exclusion. We conclude that exclusion typically induces young children to mentalize, enabling more effective reconnection with others. However, excessive anxiety may impair controlled mentalizing, which may, in turn, hamper effective reconnection with others after exclusion.

Understanding intentionality, i.e. coding the object directedness of agents towards objects, is a fundamental component of Theory of Mind abilities. Yet it is unclear how it is perceived and coded in different species. In this thesis, we present a series of comparative studies to explore human adults' and Capuchin monkeys' ability to infer intentional objects from actions. First we studied whether capuchin monkeys and adult humans infer a potential object from observing an object-directed action. With no direct information about the goal-object, neither species inferred the object from the action. However, when the object was revealed, the monkeys retrospectively encoded the directedness of the object-directed action; unexpectedly, in an adapted version of the task adult humans did not show a similar ability. We then adapted another paradigm, originally designed by Kovács et al (2010), to examine whether the two species implicitly register the intentional relation between an agent and an object. We manipulated an animated agent and the participants' belief about a ball's presence behind a hiding screen. We found no evidence showing that humans or monkeys coded object-directedness or belief. More importantly, we failed to replicate the original results from Kovács et al's study, and through a series of follow up studies, we questioned their conclusions regarding implicit ToM understanding. We suggested that, instead of implicit ToM, results like Kovacs et al's might be interpreted as driven by “sub-mentalizing” processes, as suggested by Heyes (2014). We conclude that so called ‘implicit ToM' may be based upon the computation of intentional relations between perceived agents and objects. But, these computations might present limitations, and some results attributed to implicit ToM may in fact reflect “sub-mentalizing” processes.

Comment les conventions sociales se développent-elles dans les jeux entre enfants de 3 à 7 ans ? L’objectif de cette recherche est de mieux comprendre la co-construction de significations à travers l’étude des détournements d’usages d’objets. Très peu d’études s’intéressent au développement des usages d’objets chez l’enfant après 3 ans au sein de situations sociales et communicatives. La présente thèse vise donc à combler ce vide et suppose que les compétences symboliques enfantines examinées via les usages d’objets se développent entre 3 et 7 ans.Trois études ont été réalisées avec des dyades d’enfants de 3, 4, 5 et 7 ans. Les mêmes objets sont présentés dans chaque étude. La première étude est un jeu libre, sans contrainte. La deuxième invite les enfants à faire de l’humour avec les objets. La troisième est la plus contraignante du point de vue des détournements d’usages d’objets. Les enfants doivent prétendre préparer un repas n’ayant que des objets inadéquats pour le faire. Dans le jeu libre, les principaux résultats montrent que les enfants de 3 ans sont déjà très compétents pour détourner les objets. En revanche, la création d’usages détournés humoristiques est moins élaborée à 3 et 4 ans qu’à 7 ans. Enfin, dans le jeu du repas, les enfants de 3, 4 et 5 ans développent des significations moins complexes que les enfants de 7 ans. Ainsi, plus le jeu est contraint, plus les enfants de 3, 4 et 5 ans ont des difficultés à détourner et s’accorder sur de nouvelles fonctions pour les objets. Ces résultats apportent un regard nouveau sur les relations entre conventions sociales, jeu entre pairs, usages d’objets et théorie de l’esprit dans le champ de la psychologie du développement. / How do social conventions develop in children’s play between the ages of 3 and 7 years? The aim of the present research was to improve current understanding of the co-construction of meanings by investigating symbolic uses of objects. Very few studies have focused on the use of objects in social and communicative situations among children beyond the age of 3 years. The purpose of the current thesis was thus to fill this gap, based on the assumption that children's symbolic skills, examined here via the use of objects, develop between the ages of 3 and 7. Three studies were conducted with dyads of 3-, 4-, 5- and 7-year-old children. The same objects were used in each study. The first study consisted of free, unrestricted play. In the second one, the children were invited to play in a humoristic way with objects. The third one was the most constraining in terms of symbolic uses of objects, as the children had to pretend that they were preparing a meal, but were not given the appropriate objects. Results for the unrestricted play study, showed that the 3-year-olds were already very skilled at using objects in a symbolic way. However, the creation of humoristic symbolic uses was less elaborated in the 3- and 4-year-olds than in the 7-year-olds. Finally, for the pretend meal, the 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds developed less complex meanings than the 7-year-olds. Thus, the greater the level of constraint, the greater the difficulty for the 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds in using objects in a symbolic way, and the greater the difficulty in agreeing on new functions for such objects. These results shed new light on the relationship between social conventions, children’s play, object uses and theory of mind in the field of developmental psychology.