The current research, across three studies, examined two social practices that involve processing and responding to others’ emotions, theory of mind (ToM) and empathy, and how they relate to dysphoria and the social impairments associated with dysphoria over time. Mildly depressed, or dysphoric, individuals, have been found to have heightened ToM when identifying others’ emotions, despite reporting widespread social impairments (Harkness et al., 2005). The first study (Chapter 2) examined if and how ToM is a mediator in the relationship between dysphoria and social functioning. Attribution style, specifically the internalizing attribution bias, was hypothesized to play a role. The interaction between ToM and internalizing attribution bias was independently associated with social functioning. For internalizing attributors, higher ToM was related to better social functioning, but no relationship was observed between ToM and social functioning among non-internalizing attributors. The second study (Chapter 3) examined the relationship between ToM and empathy, addressing the debate surrounding cognitive and affective aspects of ToM and empathy. Affective ToM and cognitive empathy both have been described as processes involving cognitive inferences about others’ emotions. Current results supported this link, showing that a specific component of empathy, perspective-taking, was related to ToM. Although ToM was associated with some aspects of empathy, empathy remained a separate construct that includes both cognitive and emotional responding to others’ emotions. Chapter 4 shifted focus to empathy to examine how this social practice relates to dysphoria and social functioning. The last study first examined how empathy relates to dysphoria. Results showed that only personal distress, one component of empathy, was associated with greater dysphoria. The final study also examined if the empathy x emotion regulation interaction mediates the relationship between dysphoria and social functioning. Different patterns were observed for different emotion regulation types. The interaction between maladaptive, but not adaptive, emotion regulation strategies and empathy was correlated directly with social functioning. For individuals with negative cognitive emotion regulation strategies, greater empathy was associated with better social functioning, a relationship not present for individuals who do not use negative cognitive emotion regulation. Finally maladaptive, but not adaptive, emotion regulation significantly predicted social functioning after controlling for dysphoria. / Thesis (Master, Psychology) -- Queen's University, 2008-10-22 15:25:33.573

This thesis presents a three-phase longitudinal study of naïve psychology and pretend play behaviour development between preschool children in the United Kingdom (UK) and Singapore. Research conducted in the Western contexts has shown that children develop an understanding of pretence and desires at 18 months of age (e.g. Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2004; Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997), before level-1 visual perspective-taking at 2½ years of age (e.g. Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981) and followed by level-2 visual perspective-taking, appearance-reality distinction and false-belief understanding at 4 years of age (e.g. Flavell et al., 1981; Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). A major issue that has dominated the field for many years concerns whether naïve psychology follows a universal developmental pattern. The majority of the studies to date have tended to rely heavily on false-belief understanding as an index of children’s understanding of mental representation. Some cross-cultural results have shown that the onset of false-belief understanding coincides with Western norms (e.g. Callaghan et al., 2005) whereas several non-Western studies have demonstrated a time lag in development across cultural groups (e.g. Vinden, 1999). To date no longitudinal study comparing the development of other naïve psychology concepts from 2 to 4 years of age between diverse cultures has been published. The present study aims to address the gap in the literature by tracking longitudinally and comparing the developmental patterns of children’s understanding of a range of naïve psychology concepts in the UK and Singapore at 2½, 3 and 3½ years of age (phases I, II and III respectively). Singapore with its mixed blend of Eastern and Western values represents a unique case for comparative study. This study employed a repeated-measures design, incorporating a large battery of established tasks that tapped children’s understanding of pretence, desires, visual perceptions and beliefs. In addition, a semi-structured observational approach was employed to study children’s naturally occurring pretend play behaviour. A total of 87 children were recruited in the UK (M = 28.60 months, SD = 1.90) and Singapore (M = 29.89, SD = 2.76) in the first phase of study. Of the initial sample, 36 children (M = 42.75, SD = 1.84) in the UK cohort and 38 children (M = 43.68, SD = 2.79) in the Singapore cohort participated in all three phases of the study. This thesis has five research questions. The first question relates to the extent to which acquisition of naïve psychology concepts differ between the two cultures at 2½ years of age. The baseline results reported in Chapter 5 indicate that 2½-year-old children in both cohorts acquired a rudimentary understanding of some aspects of pretence, discrepant desires, action prediction, emotion prediction and level-1 visual perspective-taking. The results showed no gross cross-cultural differences. However, subtle cross-cultural differences in children’s understanding of discrepant desires and action prediction were found. The second question addresses longitudinal cross-cultural differences in naïve psychology development between 2½, 3 and 3½ years of age. The results presented in Chapter 6 reveal cultural similarities in children’s performance on several pretence understanding, the level-2 visual perspective-taking, the appearance-reality distinction and the false-belief explanation tasks. Nonetheless, cultural differences were observed in some aspects of naïve psychology. The UK cohort performed significantly better than the Singapore cohort in the unexpected transfer false-belief prediction task at 3½ years of age, after verbal mental age (VMA) and gender were treated as covariates. Additionally, the UK cohort achieved significantly higher total mean for the level-1 visual perspective-taking task across the three phases and the mental representation in pretence task across phases II and III. In contrast, the Singapore cohort scored significantly higher in total mean for the discrepant desires task across the three phases. The third question considers longitudinal differences in children’s understanding of knowledge-ignorance and beliefs from 3 to 3½ years of age. The analysis in Chapter 7 indicates that the Singapore cohort performed significantly more poorly than the UK cohort in understanding knowledge-ignorance attribution (for the false-belief prediction and falsebelief explanation tasks) and true-belief ascription (for the false-belief explanation task) across phases II and III, after VMA and gender were considered as covariates. Comparison of children’s false-belief prediction and justification scores revealed that the cross-cultural difference in false-belief prediction related to an explicit ability to predict false-belief without concurrent ability to justify a naïve character’s behaviour based on false-beliefs. Twenty-four (66.7%) and 11 (28.9%) children in the UK and Singapore cohorts respectively were able to make correct false-belief prediction at 3½ years of age. Among these children, only six and five children from the UK and Singapore cohorts respectively provided correct justifications on the basis of false-beliefs. These findings therefore indicated cultural similarities in that the same number of children in both cohorts was able to predict and justify other’s behaviour in terms of false-beliefs. The fourth question explores the degree to which presence of sibling(s), birth order, language (VMA) and bilingualism contribute to individual differences in naïve psychology development. The results in Chapter 8 show no evidence that presence of sibling(s) and birth order facilitated understanding of action prediction, discrepant desires, level-1 visual perspective-taking, mental representation in pretence and false-belief prediction in either cohort. With respect to the role of language in children’s naïve psychology development, there were concurrent (within phase) associations between VMA and false-belief prediction at 3½ years of age and longitudinal associations between VMA at 2½ years of age and falsebelief prediction at 3½ years of age for both cohorts. These findings suggest that language ability contributes to individual differences in false-belief understanding. It is worth highlighting that not all aspects of naïve psychology and VMA were related. The fifth and final question focuses on longitudinal cross-cultural similarities and differences in pretend play behaviour and examines the links between pretend play behaviour and naïve psychology development. The observational data in Chapter 9 reveal that the Singaporean children spent significantly more time engaged in non-pretend play and non-social pretend play at 2½ years of age whereas the UK children spent significantly more time engaged in social pretend play. This finding contrasted with the marked cultural differences in naïve psychology development found at 3 and 3½ years of age. It is important to note that the UK and Singaporean children showed similar developmental sequences from non-pretend to non-social pretend and finally to social pretend play behaviour and from simple to complex forms of social pretend play behaviour. With respect to other pretend play behaviour, the UK children spent significantly more time engaged in positive complementary bids, negative conflict, other forms of pretence, metacommunication and in the pretend theme of outings, holiday and weather across all phases than the Singaporean children. The associations between some early pretend play behaviour and later acquisition of some naïve psychology concepts for both cultures provide partial support for the proposition that pretend play behaviour is an early marker of understanding mental representation.

Il presente lavoro di tesi intende affrontare un tema non ancora indagato in letteratura, vale a dire l’analisi dei legami tra la comprensione mentalistica e la fiducia relazionale in bambini di scuola elementare. Tale obiettivo è perseguito in tre differenti percorsi di ricerca. Nel primo studio la Candidata ha creato un nuovo strumento di misura della fiducia relazionale nel tentativo di integrare differenti prospettive teoriche che hanno considerato la fiducia o solo come un fenomeno cognitivo o solo affettivo. Lo strumento creato (Trust Story Task), somministrato a bambini di scuola elementare dai 6 ai 10 anni, valuta le rappresentazioni mentali della fiducia intesa in senso cognitivo/mentalistico e affettivo/relazionale. I risultati dello studio mostrano le discrete proprietà psicometriche di affidabilità e validità dello strumento. Nel secondo studio viene proposta la validazione italiana di uno strumento di valutazione delle credenze di fiducia, Children Generalized Trust Beliefs Scale (Rotenberg e al., 2005). La Candidata esamina le principali caratteristiche psicometriche di affidabilità e consistenza interna e di validità dello strumento, utilizzato poi nello studio successivo. La scala tradotta in italiano, CGTB-I, mostra discrete caratteristiche di affidabilità, di consistenza interna e di validità. La struttura fattoriale, valutata tramite alcune EFAs e CFAs, rispecchia solo in parte quella originale di Rotenberg e colleghi (2005) poiché rintraccia le tre basi di fiducia attese (reliability, emotional, honesty), ma non tutti i quattro target relazionali (madre, padre, insegnante, pari). Gli item dell’insegnante, infatti, non risultano essere significativi. Nel terzo studio, l’obiettivo è verificare se le competenze mentalistiche e le credenze di fiducia (nella madre, nel padre e nei pari) siano predittori del comportamento di fiducia e della trustworthiness (attribuzione di fiducia che i compagni fanno rispetto a un compagno target). Le variabili indipendenti dello studio saranno considerate sia in termini individuali sia in combinazione statistica tra loro nel predire. I risultati mostrano che una buona teoria della mente e delle buone credenze di fiducia predicono in modo significativo la trustworthiness. / This thesis considers the link between theory of mind and interpersonal trust in three different studies. First chapter outlines the crucial theoretical reflections on two constructs starting from theory of mind. First of all, I consider the meaning of the term “theory of mind”, the functions of this ability and same questions linked to terminology more often used. Moreover, I deal with the development of this ability in elementary school children, and then the most important theories on theory of mind development. As regards to the interpersonal trust, I consider the three main fields of research concerning trust as cognitive, affective and behavioural phenomenon. First paragraph shows the cognitive theories of trust that, overall, define it in term of individual’s beliefs on other’s reliability. In a second paragraph, I trait the affective face of trust starting from the point of view of the attachment theory; and, finally, in a third paragraph, I expose the studies of behavioural aspects of trust. In the second chapter, I present a first contribution of validation of a semi-projective task on trust dimension: the Trust Story task. The aim of this measure is to evaluates the mental representation of trust both in a mentalistic and in an affective sense, considering jointly conscious and unconscious aspects and adapted to subjects’ age and gender. In particular, in my first study, I considered some characteristics of this new measure, which are reliability and construct validity. In the third chapter, I present two studies linked each other. In the first of them, I deal with the Italian validation of the Children Generalized Trust Beliefs Scale (Rotenberg et a., 2005), questionnaire that evaluate three bases of trust beliefs (reliability, emotional, honesty) in four targets (mother, father, teacher and peer). The original version of the scale demonstrated good psychometric characteristics and an excellent flexibility of use. The CGTB-I scale derived was used in the second study that I propose in this chapter in which I examine if children’s theory of mind and their trust beliefs in others, individually, and in combination, statistically account for trustworthiness and trustworthy behaviour in children.

The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships among mentalizing abilities, self-reported autism traits, and two white matter tracts, uncinate fasciculus (UF) and inferior longitudinal fasciculus (ILF), in neurotypical adults. UF and ILF were hypothesized to connect brain regions implicated in a neuroanatomical model of mentalizing. Data were available for 24 neurotypical adults (mean age = 21.92 (4.72) years; 15 women). Tract-based spatial statistics (TBSS) was used to conduct voxelwise cross-participant comparisons of fractional anisotropy (FA) values in UF and ILF as predicted by mentalizing abilities and self-reported autism traits. Self-reported autism traits were positively related to FA values in left ILF. Results suggest that microstructural differences in left ILF are specifically involved in the expression of subclinical autism traits in neurotypical individuals.

Data from a growing number of research studies indicate that children with hearing loss are delayed in Theory of Mind (ToM) development when compared to their typically developing, hearing peers. While other researchers have studied the developmental trajectories of ToM in school-age students who are deaf and hard of hearing (DHH), a limited number have addressed the need for interventions for this population. The present study extends the current research on ToM interventions to the PreKindergarten and Kindergarten levels. This study used a single-case multiple-baseline multiple-probe across skills design with replications across classrooms to examine the effects of a ToM intervention on participants’ false belief understanding as well as outcomes on a near generalization measure (i.e., Sally-Anne Task, Baron-Cohen, Firth, Leslie, 1985) and a far generalization measure (i.e., five-task ToM developmental scale, Wellman & Liu, 2004). A thought bubble intervention (i.e., a visual representation of what people are thinking) developed by Wellman and Peterson (2013) was modified in key areas: (a) participants were substantially younger than the population in the original study and thus required a pre-teaching phase addressing vocabulary and materials, (b) manipulable materials were created from the description provided in the Wellman and Peterson (2013) study along with parallel materials used in assessment probes, (c) a certified teacher of DHH children provided direct instruction to participants in a small group setting, (d) study length was increased to 25 weeks, and (e) methodological design change (i.e., group design to single-case design). These modifications addressed the need for evidence-based ToM interventions that are both proactive and easily implemented by teachers in a classroom setting. Results from the single-case design portion of the study indicate a functional relation between the thought bubble intervention and the participants’ acquisition of the targeted skills in each stage, although progress was not uniform. Results from the pre-post assessments indicate that the children did make progress up the scale, however, children who used spoken language tended to proceed faster through the stages than those who used sign language. These results inform the field in regard to the efficacy and feasibility of a ToM intervention for young DHH children.

Impairments in both theory of mind (ToM; the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others) and executive function (EF; a group of high-level cognitive functions which help guide and control goal-directed behaviour) have been demonstrated in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). Both deficits have been proposed by different groups of researchers as being the single primary cognitive deficit of autism, which can subsume the other deficit as secondary or artefactual. However, few studies have examined the nature of the relationship between ToM and EF in ASDs or conducted a systematic investigation of their relative primacy. This research principally sought to establish the primacy and independence of impairments in ToM and EF in ASDs and thereby evaluate the validity of single versus multiple primary deficit models of autism. These aims were addressed in two studies, both broad in scope. The first study was an investigation of the profile, primacy, and independence of ToM and EF impairments in individuals with ASDs. The sample included 46 participants with ASDs and 48 control participants matched on age and non-verbal ability. The profile of impairments was examined by measuring ToM and a range of EF components using tasks employing, wherever possible, process-pure indices of performance. Primacy was measured by focussing on i) whether or not the deficits observed were universal among individuals with ASDs; ii) whether the deficits were able to discriminate individuals with ASDs from matched controls (i.e., predict group membership); and iii) the ability of ToM and EF deficits to explain the full range of autistic symptomatology, as measured by correlating cognitive performances with behavioural indices. The relationship between ToM and EF impairments was investigated by conducting correlations between ToM and EF variables as well as analysing the incidence of dissociations between impairments in the two domains. The ASD group was found to demonstrate significant impairments in ToM and several components of EF including planning, verbal inhibition, working memory (in a context where inhibitory control was required), and both verbal and non-verbal generativity. However, neither ToM nor EF impairments were able to meet all of the criteria for a primary deficit in ASDs. EF deficits were found to be more primary, but could not account for ToM as a secondary deficit, as ToM and EF were found to be independent (i.e., uncorrelated and dissociable) deficits in the ASD group. This pattern of results suggested that a multiple deficits model involving at least two independent impairments appeared to best characterise ASDs, but the data were compatible with several variants of such a model (e.g., involving distinct subtypes versus a multidimensional spectrum). The second study was an investigation of ToM and EF impairments in siblings of individuals with ASDs, who have previously been found to demonstrate a subclinical “broad autism phenotype”. The main aims of this study were i) to identify whether ToM or EF deficits could meet criteria for an “endophenotype” or vulnerability marker for the autism genotype in unaffected relatives, which would have further implications about the primacy of ToM and EF in ASDs; and ii) to further investigate the validity of various multiple deficits models of ASDs by examining the pattern of ToM and EF performance in those showing the broad phenotype. Participants were 108 siblings of individuals with ASDs and 67 siblings of controls, tested on the same ToM and EF tasks used in the first study. Confirming the superior primacy of EF deficits found in Study One, there was no significant difference in ToM performance between ASD and control siblings, but ASD siblings showed weaknesses on two measures of EF. Furthermore, there appeared to be different subgroups of siblings demonstrating different cognitive profiles, consistent with the heterogeneity evident in the first study. This research indicated that ASDs cannot be explained by a single primary cognitive deficit. These findings hold important theoretical and empirical implications and highlight further questions about which type of multiple deficits model might best explain ASDs.

abstract: The relations between aspects of social understanding (e.g., theory of mind, ToM, and emotion understanding, EU) were studied in relation to language and effortful control (EC). Data were collected when children were 30, 42, and 54 months of age (N's = 216, 192, and 168 for T1, T2, and T3, respectively). Children were assessed via mother and caregiver reports, and through observational measures. Although language and ToM did not relate within time, there was limited support for early language positively predicting later ToM. Language and EU were positively related within time, and there was some support for early language positively predicting later EU. Unexpectedly, significant positive relations were found for early EU predicting later language. ToM and EC were positively related within T3, and there was some support for early EC predicting later ToM. EU and EC were often positively related within time. Early EU also tended to positively predict later EC, whereas the opposite relation was not found. There was no support for significant a significant relation between EU and ToM. Findings suggest that children's early language may lead to later EC, and that early EU may help promote later EC and language; thus, it is important for parents and teachers to promote these early skills. / Dissertation/Thesis / M.A. Educational Psychology 2011

A teoria da mente é definida como a capacidade de atribuir estados mentais ao outro, como desejos, crenças e intenções e, assim, prever o comportamento. A literatura destaca a potencialidade das narrativas e histórias para favorecer conversas sobre estados mentais e para a consideração de diferentes pontos de vista, aspectos importantes para o desenvolvimento da teoria da mente e do discurso narrativo. O objetivo geral deste estudo foi verificar a relação entre a teoria da mente e o discurso narrativo de mães e crianças, especificamente, quanto à coerência, avaliação e emprego de termos mentais, no contexto da contação de histórias. A amostra foi constituída por 25 duplas de mães e de crianças, de nível socioeconômico médio, tendo as crianças idades entre quatro e cinco anos. Foram realizados três estudos: o primeiro objetivou verificar a relação entre os termos mentais utilizados pelas mães nas histórias contadas aos seus filhos e o desempenho destes em uma escala de tarefas de teoria da mente e na tarefa de crença falsa; o segundo estudo teve como foco as histórias contadas pelas mães e pelas crianças, as quais foram analisadas quanto à coerência narrativa, quanto ao uso de termos mentais e de explicações destes termos; o terceiro estudo enfoca o desenvolvimento sociocognitivo da criança, no que concerne à teoria da mente e à habilidade narrativa, buscando correlações entre teoria da mente, termos mentais e os indicadores de coerência e de avaliação narrativa. Quanto ao primeiro estudo, os resultados mostraram que o emprego de cognições clarificadas pelas mães em suas narrativas, isto é, termos ligados à cognição seguidos de explicação, apresenta relação significativa com a teoria da mente, avaliada através da escala de tarefas de teoria da mente e da tarefa de crença falsa. Os resultados do segundo estudo mostraram que as crianças cujas mães apresentaram indicadores elevados de coerência, também se mostraram mais coerentes em suas narrativas. Além disso, o emprego de cognições clarificadas pela mãe correlacionou-se com a habilidade narrativa da criança, quanto à coerência. Tanto no primeiro quanto no segundo estudo, as cognições clarificadas maternas mostraram-se como fator explicativo para a teoria da mente e para coerência narrativa das crianças. Os resultados do terceiro estudo indicaram que o emprego de termos mentais pelas crianças em suas narrativas não se correlacionou com o desempenho das crianças na escala de tarefas de teoria da mente e na tarefa de crença falsa. Por outro lado, o discurso de termos mentais das crianças correlacionou-se de forma significativa com os indicadores de coerência. Ao longo dos três estudos, os resultados mostram a importância do discurso de termos mentais seguidos de explicações para o desenvolvimento da teoria da mente e da habilidade narrativa. A contação de histórias mostrou-se como uma ferramenta efetiva para o desenvolvimento, tanto da teoria da mente como da habilidade narrativa da criança. / Theory of mind is defined as the ability to attribute mental states like desires, beliefs and intentions, to ourselves and others, and thus to predict behavior. The literature stresses the potential of narratives and stories in favoring conversations about mental states and for the consideration of different points of view, important aspects for the development of theory of mind and narrative discourse. The central aim of this study was to verify the relation between theory of mind and the narrative discourse of mothers and children, specifically concerning coherence, evaluation and the use of mental terms, in the context of telling stories. 25 middle-class mothers and their four to five old children composed the dyads used as sample. Three studies were carried out: the first study aimed to verify the relation between mental terms used by mothers in their stories while telling them to their children and children’s performance in the theory of mind scale and in the false belief task; the second study focused on the stories told by mothers and children, which were analyzed with reference to narrative coherence, mental terms use, and mental terms explanations; the third study dealt with children’s socio-cognitive development, relative to theory of mind and narrative ability. Correlations were searched among theory of mind, mental terms, and indicators of narrative coherence and narrative evaluation. Concerning the first study, the results showed that the mothers’ use of clarifying cognitions in their narratives, i.e., cognitive terms followed by explanations, related significantly with theory of mind ability, evaluated by the theory of mind scale and the false belief task. Results of the second study showed that children whose mothers presented high levels of coherence also produced more coherent narratives. Moreover, the mother’s use of clarifying cognitions correlated with the child’s narrative ability, with respect to coherence. In both, the first and the second studies, clarifying cognitions showed themselves as the explanatory factor for the theory of mind ability and narrative discourse. Results of the third study evinced that children’s use of mental terms in their narratives does not correlated with children’s performance in the theory of mind scale and the false belief task. On the other hand, children’s mental terms discourse displayed a significant correlation with coherence indicators. Throughout the three studies, the results revealed the importance of the mental terms discourse followed by explanations for the development of theory of mind and narrative ability. Telling stories were shown as an effective tool for the development of both, theory of mind and narrative discourse.

A teoria da mente é definida como a capacidade de atribuir estados mentais ao outro, como desejos, crenças e intenções e, assim, prever o comportamento. A literatura destaca a potencialidade das narrativas e histórias para favorecer conversas sobre estados mentais e para a consideração de diferentes pontos de vista, aspectos importantes para o desenvolvimento da teoria da mente e do discurso narrativo. O objetivo geral deste estudo foi verificar a relação entre a teoria da mente e o discurso narrativo de mães e crianças, especificamente, quanto à coerência, avaliação e emprego de termos mentais, no contexto da contação de histórias. A amostra foi constituída por 25 duplas de mães e de crianças, de nível socioeconômico médio, tendo as crianças idades entre quatro e cinco anos. Foram realizados três estudos: o primeiro objetivou verificar a relação entre os termos mentais utilizados pelas mães nas histórias contadas aos seus filhos e o desempenho destes em uma escala de tarefas de teoria da mente e na tarefa de crença falsa; o segundo estudo teve como foco as histórias contadas pelas mães e pelas crianças, as quais foram analisadas quanto à coerência narrativa, quanto ao uso de termos mentais e de explicações destes termos; o terceiro estudo enfoca o desenvolvimento sociocognitivo da criança, no que concerne à teoria da mente e à habilidade narrativa, buscando correlações entre teoria da mente, termos mentais e os indicadores de coerência e de avaliação narrativa. Quanto ao primeiro estudo, os resultados mostraram que o emprego de cognições clarificadas pelas mães em suas narrativas, isto é, termos ligados à cognição seguidos de explicação, apresenta relação significativa com a teoria da mente, avaliada através da escala de tarefas de teoria da mente e da tarefa de crença falsa. Os resultados do segundo estudo mostraram que as crianças cujas mães apresentaram indicadores elevados de coerência, também se mostraram mais coerentes em suas narrativas. Além disso, o emprego de cognições clarificadas pela mãe correlacionou-se com a habilidade narrativa da criança, quanto à coerência. Tanto no primeiro quanto no segundo estudo, as cognições clarificadas maternas mostraram-se como fator explicativo para a teoria da mente e para coerência narrativa das crianças. Os resultados do terceiro estudo indicaram que o emprego de termos mentais pelas crianças em suas narrativas não se correlacionou com o desempenho das crianças na escala de tarefas de teoria da mente e na tarefa de crença falsa. Por outro lado, o discurso de termos mentais das crianças correlacionou-se de forma significativa com os indicadores de coerência. Ao longo dos três estudos, os resultados mostram a importância do discurso de termos mentais seguidos de explicações para o desenvolvimento da teoria da mente e da habilidade narrativa. A contação de histórias mostrou-se como uma ferramenta efetiva para o desenvolvimento, tanto da teoria da mente como da habilidade narrativa da criança. / Theory of mind is defined as the ability to attribute mental states like desires, beliefs and intentions, to ourselves and others, and thus to predict behavior. The literature stresses the potential of narratives and stories in favoring conversations about mental states and for the consideration of different points of view, important aspects for the development of theory of mind and narrative discourse. The central aim of this study was to verify the relation between theory of mind and the narrative discourse of mothers and children, specifically concerning coherence, evaluation and the use of mental terms, in the context of telling stories. 25 middle-class mothers and their four to five old children composed the dyads used as sample. Three studies were carried out: the first study aimed to verify the relation between mental terms used by mothers in their stories while telling them to their children and children’s performance in the theory of mind scale and in the false belief task; the second study focused on the stories told by mothers and children, which were analyzed with reference to narrative coherence, mental terms use, and mental terms explanations; the third study dealt with children’s socio-cognitive development, relative to theory of mind and narrative ability. Correlations were searched among theory of mind, mental terms, and indicators of narrative coherence and narrative evaluation. Concerning the first study, the results showed that the mothers’ use of clarifying cognitions in their narratives, i.e., cognitive terms followed by explanations, related significantly with theory of mind ability, evaluated by the theory of mind scale and the false belief task. Results of the second study showed that children whose mothers presented high levels of coherence also produced more coherent narratives. Moreover, the mother’s use of clarifying cognitions correlated with the child’s narrative ability, with respect to coherence. In both, the first and the second studies, clarifying cognitions showed themselves as the explanatory factor for the theory of mind ability and narrative discourse. Results of the third study evinced that children’s use of mental terms in their narratives does not correlated with children’s performance in the theory of mind scale and the false belief task. On the other hand, children’s mental terms discourse displayed a significant correlation with coherence indicators. Throughout the three studies, the results revealed the importance of the mental terms discourse followed by explanations for the development of theory of mind and narrative ability. Telling stories were shown as an effective tool for the development of both, theory of mind and narrative discourse.

No description available.