Humanitarian intervention becomes a focal point of international debate because it seems to be morally right but legally wrong. It challenges the principle of non-intervention and non-use of force encompassed in the Charter of the United Nations (UN), which was established in 1945 to prevent aggressions that led to the two world wars. However, since the 1990s, state practices of military intervention to protect human rights increased dramatically, many of which were even endorsed by the UN or in close cooperation with it. In other words, the UN is the most important, or insofar the only acceptable, body to authorize and legitimize any military operations with humanitarian rationale. This research aims at investigating the limitations of the UN in coordinating its responsibilities of maintaining peace and security and of protecting human rights. Two cases, Rwanda in 1994 and Sudan from 2003 on, are chosen as examples to probe into the practice of the UN and try to determine what has changed and what remains steadfast of the UN practice in humanitarian intervention in these ten years. By focusing on the cases of Rwanda and Sudan, this thesis is intended to address the following questions: (1) In the past decade, has the UN system become more comfortable with humanitarian intervention? (2) What are the limitations of the UN in conducting “humanitarian intervention”? What causes these limitations? And why? (3) What can be done to improve the incompetence of the UN in terms of humanitarian intervention? How to harmonize the UN’s conflicting responsibilities of upholding human rights and defending the principle of non-intervention? This research concludes that the new approach of the “responsibility to protect” that was created in recent years shows that a normative change is on the way. Besides, from Rwanda to Sudan, the UN has made progress in addressing grave humanitarian issues. However, all the efforts still have to depend on the political will of the member states of the UN. Since this issue is still more a political one than a legal one, in the years to come, the UN will still face the difficulty of fulfilling its responsibility.

本文研析2011年至2016年期間，中國在人道干預立場上對利比亞和敘利亞的差異比較，試圖分析中國在「國家保護責任」（Responsibility to Protect）上的態度轉變。中國於安理會1970號和1973號針對利比亞內戰所涉及的人道干預決議案，不但同意將利比亞情勢送交國際刑事法院，更間接默許西方軍事干預利比亞，此與一向不干預他國內政、尊重他國主權為外交原則的中國相違背。然而，發生於同時期、同受到阿拉伯之春影響、同為推翻獨裁政權的敘利亞內戰，中國卻多次否決對其進一步軍事干預，形成人道干預立場上的矛盾。 而本文試圖利用「國家利益」和「形象建構」兩大分析途徑，探究中國隨著負責任大國的形象建立，和在國際事務上話語權漸增的情況下，於人道干預立場的考量是否有所改變或偏向。本文認為中國在利比亞案例上突破以往不干預他國內政的立場，並不代表中國對「國家保護責任」態度的轉變。其次，中國當前在人道干預立場上，仍以國家利益為主，形象建構為輔，特別是中共政權維穩、國家安全為首要。此外，中國也正試圖擺脫俄羅斯和西方國家的單方影響，建立一套獨立自主的人道干預外交原則。