以往有關公共設施保留地制度的相關研究，往往著重於問題解決的導向，而較少立法及制度執行互動過程，因此有關於立法互動過程與立法結果的關係，以及制度未被完全執行的原因，並未被釐清。賽局理論考慮到行為人間的互動行為對立法行為及制度執行的影響，因此本研究基於制度變遷理論，以賽局理論的分析方法，建立行政及立法部門互動的理論模式，以及制度執行的理論模式，提供分析相關問題的理論架構。其次，本研究將前述所建立之理論模式，應用於探討公共設施保留地制度的立法及執行問題，獲得以下幾點結論： 一、從保留地立法過程分析可以瞭解，而在民國六十二年及民國七十七年兩次立法過程中，因立法部門的生態結構以及行政部門對議程的掌控，使得行政部門在強制力及訊息充分程度上具有優勢，大體掌握了雙方互動上的優勢。然隨政治生態的改變，行政部門對立法部門的控制能力降低，而使行政部門對聲譽之考量以及懲罰成本改變，且亦影響到立法部門對行政部門修法意向的認知，而使得民國六十二年及民國七十七年兩次的立法結果有所差異。 二、由公共設施保留地制度的執行受到中央政府、地方政府及地方優勢選民間的共有代理關係影響。就民國六十二年至民國七十七年間的情況而言，中央政府取得地方政府執行保留地制度成效的相關訊息，受到本身財力及人力上的諸多限制，監督成本相對較高；而地方政府提供不涉及保留地徵收的公共設施，因有較具成效而能討好地方選民，有利於地方選舉，因此具有較佳的生產力。在前述兩個原因下，造成當時公共設施保留地制度趨向未被完全執行的路徑。 三、隨著行政部門所可動用懲罰資源的減少、行政部門與立法部門相對結構的改變，以及立法部門與地方選民間的關係愈趨緊密，未來公共設施保留地制度若再度修法時，在目前政治生態下，極可能出現立法僵局或協商時程上的延遲，甚至產生立法部門主導的現象；而若在執行方式上及執行機制上未有重大改變，則公共設施保留地制度仍將繼續趨向於未能被完全執行的路徑。

我國都市土地採用土地使用分區管制制度，然而於此制度下，卻出現許多違規使用情形。而違規使用將可能破壞土地使用分區管制對社會財產權之配置，故考量整體社會福利，違規使用之問題實有必要妥善處理。 但面對違規使用，過去文獻與實務多就問題直接提出解決方式，而未討論問題肇因於制度的哪一個階段、或是制度階段之間是否存在矛盾，才進而導致違規使用，如此之解決方式將可能無法有效對症下藥，甚至產生新的問題。 又，隨著都市人口增加、商業活動趨於頻繁，住宅與商業使用在有限的土地競爭下，住宅區與商業區土地違規使用問題趨於明顯，有其必要加以重視。 因此，本研究利用住商違規使用代表個案—住宅區作不當商業違規使用之師大商圈，以及特定商業區作住宅違規使用之基隆河截彎取直地區，運用文獻歸納法，以及制度經濟之制度層次理論為基礎，將案例問題分為三階段，包含(1)制度制定：政府有限理性與機會主義之公共選擇問題、(2)制度本身：不完全制度之闕漏、(3)制度執行：政府內部與對外資訊不對稱、目標不一致之代理問題，將案例就各階段進行分析，找出問題根源；在釐清違規使用問題根源後，利用文獻之歸納找出可能解決方式，並對過去提出解決方式之應用限制加以改善，嘗試研擬個案問題之對策，並對類似之通案建立完整策略。 本研究分析結果發現 (1)師大商圈：制度本身、制度執行存在問題，而本研究針對制度本身問題提出重疊分區管制與投票式分區管制互相配合加以解決；至於制度執行問題短期應對地方政府給予監督及誘因，並可建立民眾檢舉違規使用資訊揭露之平台，改善制度環境，長期則應從改革政治機制做起。(2)基隆河截彎取直地區：制度制定、制度本身、制度執行三階段皆存在問題；由於制度制定問題既已產生，則短期內應從制度本身與制度制定階段改善，彌補制度制定之缺陷；至於制度本身問題，當前作法可採用浮動式規劃允許修改制度之限制；制度執行問題解決方式則同師大商圈。此外，本研究亦利用上述案例結果對未來通案建立完整解決對策，而本研究發現，在擬定完整對策前，必須先釐清制度之立法本意(即初始財產權賦予對象)，才能擬定一套完整對策，令不同階段制度之解決對策在應用上能相互串連、呼應。 本研究冀利用制度階段分析與解決對策之整合，嘗試建構住商違規使用問題之完整對策，以期未來能預防違規使用問題產生，或於問題產生時能有效處理，減少違規使用對財產權之損害。 / The land institution of urban land in Taiwan is “Zoning”. Even with the strict rules of zoning to control land use, there are still a lot of illegal land use cases. These illegal land uses may break the arrangements of social property rights and the entire social welfare. While most of the studies focus on finding the solution to the illegal land use problems, the causes of those problems are rarely discussed., which may not solve the illegal land use problems efficiently, or lead to more problems. Also, due to the increase of population in the cities and the business activities in the limited land, the illegal land use problems between housing and business land become more serious and need more attention. This research analyzes typical cases of illegal land use between housing and business in Taiwan. One of the cases is “Shida Business District”, where the business activities over used the land in the mixed residential commercial district. The other case is “Kee-Lung River Short Cut District”, which is low used as housing in the special business district. The research method is literature induction. On the basis of Institutional Economics (IE), this research divides the illegal land use problems into three levels: the institution making, the institution, and the institution performing. This research tries to analyze each level, find the source of the problems, and improve the restriction of past proposed solutions as well as build comprehensive strategies to these typical type cases. The results of the research show in the case of “Shida Business District”, the reasons of illegal land use problems exist in the level of the institution making and institution. The overlying zone and voting zone can solve the problems in the level of the institution making. The public oversight and intensive are the strategies to the institution performing problems in the short term. But in the long run, the political system needs improving. In the case of “Kee-Lung River Short Cut District”, the reasons of illegal land use problems exist in all three levels. In the short term, the institution correction by floating zone can modify the institution making and the institution problems. The solution of the institution performing problems is the same with the case of “Shida Business District”. Moreover, the analysis process of this research indicates that, before making any strategy, the most important thing is to clarify the original intention of the institution. It will be used to decide that who should won the initial property rights and develop complete strategies. This research analyzes the institution levels and integrates the solutions of illegal land use between housing and business to develop the strategies. We hope that in the future, this research can prevent the causes of illegal land use, or deal with illegal land use problems effectively to cut down the damages of property rights.

集村興建農舍制度是2000年農地政策劇烈轉變的重要一環。制度執行涉及代理關係，以往集村農舍相關文獻大多偏重於特定地區個案及建築景觀或住宅功能的探討，也缺乏探討政府內部執行分工及互動對制度執行成效的影響，而代理理論中的多重委託多重代理觀念，不僅更貼近社會的真實情況，也能解析集村農舍制度的執行結構與執行結果間的關係。因此本研究從中央主管機關的委託及地方政府的執行代理結構，就集村農舍制度設計初始農地政策目標，分別探討制度執行規則與政府同一層級及不同層級的委託代理安排，調查分析整體執行現況及不同區域案例對農地利用與管理的影響，以釐清制度執行的問題真相，期望作為農地政策與農舍制度執行相關研究之基礎。 傳統的委託代理研究途徑，都描述了一部分制度或政策執行的現象。多重委託多重代理理論可以更完整作為分析階層政府推動政策或制度執行過程中複雜的互動與回應基礎，而政府內部多重委託代理及複雜的訊息問題，也比模型化的理論更加複雜。除了制度環境以外，也因為集村農舍制度執行分工安排不當，致使組織職能目標及資訊傳遞太過複雜，且未建立協商平台，加深執行結果偏離維護完整農業生產環境之政策目標。本研究建議必須回歸集村興建農舍制度原本立法目的調整中央農業主管機關內部制度安排，並透過多重委託代理雙方協商平台機制，促進正確資訊流通及共同合作。最後，如果執行一再偏離農地政策目標且陷於無效率狀態，也必須考慮制度予以廢除。 / The Concentrated Farmhouses Institution was an important part in the drastic change of Farmland Policy in 2000. As the institution implementation was conceded involved agency relationship, previous literatures mostly only focused on explorations of specific regional cases and structure landscape or residential functionalities. Furthermore, it also lacked explorations on the influence of institution implementation effects from government internal implementation of work diversification and interaction. Therefore, from principal of the central government authority to implementing agency structure of the regional government, and by basing on the initial Farmland Policy aim of the Concentrated Farmhouses Institution plan, this study explored on the institutional implementation regulation and principal agent arrangement within same-level and different levels of government. It investigated the entire implementing status and cases in different regions that influence on farmland utilization and management, and expected to clarify the actual problems of institutional implementation. The outcome seeks to be the foundation of relevant studies on Farmland Policy and farmhouses institution implementation. The approach of traditional principal agency studies all described a part of institution or norms of policy implementation. The concept of Multi-Principal and Multi-Agent could be more complete in analyzing various levels of the government in promoting the policy, or the complex interaction and response basis of institutional implementation process. In addition, the problem of governmental internal multi-principal agency and complicate messages were more complex in comparison to the model theory. Despite of the institutional environment, inappropriate diversification of work in implementation of the Concentrated Farmhouses Institutional has led to over-complexity of organizational function aim and message transmission. As there was no establishment of consultation platform, the implemented outcome has intensified the deviation on policy aim of maintaining a complete agriculture production environment. This study suggested that the internal institution arrangement in agriculture authority of the central government was required to readjust its original legislative aim of the Concentrated Farmhouses Institution. Through multi-principal agency of consultation platform mechanism of both parties, it would encourage accurate information circulation and cooperation. Lastly, if the implementation deviated constantly from Farmland Policy aim, it would fall into an ineffective status, and eventually the consideration of institution abolishment would be required.

自民國89年起政府將農地政策明訂為「落實農地農用」之方向，為配合此一目標而建立「集村農舍制度」，農舍議題遂成為各方矚目之焦點。由於農舍興建與「農地利用」、「農村景觀」與「農民生活」等議題關係密切，且實際的集村農舍制度規則與執行因涉及制度參與者互動情形，而影響制度執行與最後目標之實現。惟既有的集村農舍研究多以個別觀點，從管制與被管制者的政策、法律保留原則或住宅管制等面向切入，就制度實際運作情形甚少著墨，對於整體制度問 題亦無深入探討，而研究結果多僅表示贊同或反對意見，無法針對集村興建農舍制度獲得較完整的分析。爰此，本研究透過新制度經濟之觀點，探討集村興建農舍之主要制度理念、正式規則之制度環境、及主管農舍業務組織間制度安排問題，並以「新竹湖口」與「雲林斗六」兩個集村案例，進行案例分析與實地訪查，利用與相關承辦人員深度訪談等研究方法，檢驗目前制度之執行與其保護優良農地落實性。再者應用具動態性之制度變遷理論分析，探討我國加入WTO之調整與民國89年總統大選等重要政經因素對於集村農舍制度之影響。最後依據研究結論，對目前集村農舍制度問題提出對策與政策建議，希冀未來集村興建農舍之規則與執行更能落實保護優良農地之理念。本研究之主要結論與建議如下： 一、研究結論 （一） 集村農舍制度因加入WTO之調整與總統大選等政經因素影響，減弱保護優良農地之制度理念的落實性，呈現不合理的制度變遷趨勢。 （二） 規則欠缺農地利用面與引導農舍區位面之管制等制度環境問題，以及農地與農舍管理組織間業務重疊與職權模糊等制度安排問題，產生制度無效執行，甚至出現耗損優良農地資源之情形。 （三） 以「湖口」與「斗六」兩集村案例歸納其共同現象，目前集村興建農舍制度並未實質照顧農民，亦未能達到保護優良農地之制度目標，須加以研議調整。 二、政策建議 （一） 「落實制度理念」－降低建商介入炒作影響制度理念落實的可能、增加落實制度理念之依據、檢討「專案分割」對制度理念落實之影響。 （二） 「合理的制度環境」－使務農者成為制度主體、提升誘因機制之質量。 （三） 「有效的制度執行」－地方政府組成集村申請案審查小組、農地利用計畫報請農委會審查列管、加強地方審查人員對於集村制度理念之宣達與執行審查業務教育。 （四） 近程與中長程措施 1. 近程建議－明確釐清農舍之定位與推動「示範集村農舍」計畫 2. 中長程建議－調整制度方向為「以集村方式興建為主」 / Central government has defined the enforcement of farmland for agricultural use as the national farmland policy since 2000. In order to fit the objective of the policy, the central government adopts the institution of cluster farmhouse. The problems of farmhouse cause public attention because it raises other issues, such as ' utilization of farmland ', ' rural landscape ' and ' farmer's life. The enforcement of cluster farmhouse institution involves the interaction of the actors, which subsequently influence the realization of the ultimate goal. The existing studies on cluster farmhouse focus mainly on the viewpoints of the owners and regulators of farmland, the principal of law reservation or housing control. In contrast to existing studies, this study, based on the concept of Institutional Economics and deep interviews with the relevant officers who take charge of the cluster farmhouse, investigate the institutional environment; institutional arrangement and enforcement of cluster farmhouse. The political and economy factors that influence the institution will be explained. Finally, a prospective promise of improvement for cluster farmhouse will be provided. The main conclusions and policy suggestions are as follows: 1. The institutional change of cluster farmhouse is deeply influenced by the political economic factors such as to join WTO and to run presidential election which subsequently affects the implementation of the institution. 2. The institutional environment of cluster farmhouse which lacks the consideration of farmland use, location of farmhouses and its institutional arrangement results in its enforcement deviated from the original concept. 3. In essence, cluster farmhouse, from the two cases in this study, has not really looked after farmers. The institution also unable to reach its goal of protecting good farmland at present. 4. Policy recommendations: （1）To reduce the possibility for building traders becoming as a leading role in the process of cluster farmhouse . （2）To make the people who engage in farming become the subject of the institution, and enhance the quality of the incentive mechanism . （3） To promote the concept of cluster farmhouse more rigorously, and thoroughly educate people more on the regulation of enforcement and examination . （4）To clarify the role of farmhouse and to give an good example of cluster farmhouse, and then to modify the regulation for building the cluster farmhouse instead of individual farmhouse .