本文的研究問題為「同樣在國家介入引導的經濟發展過程下，是什麼原因使台灣與韓國在1998-2008之間金融改革的政策制定過程出現差異？」。藉由Oliver Williamson的四層次研究法，本文將台灣與韓國的金融改革分為社會鑲嵌、制度環境、治理機制、資源分配四層次，並藉此了解制度環境設計對行為者的能力給與或限制，也通過檢視政策制定過程中行為者的互動來了解金融改革的推動與資源分配。本文分開檢視四個層次的內容，再綜觀探討層次間的相互影響。政策的制定雖然是行為者之間的角力，但是同時也必須看環境賦予行為者的能力與限制，這是在分析任何政策的制定與執行時都必須注意到的。在台灣與韓國，因為制度的設計，使得總統可以主導政策的立法與執行。但是因為非正式制度的環境因素影響，使陳水扁與金大中兩位總統在政策的推動上有很大的差異。同時，因為台灣與韓國的政黨體系、財團結構不一樣，加上金融改革推行時的環境也不同，因此最後兩國改革的成果呈現很大的差異。此外，針對金融改革是否解決了原本的問題，本文也藉由國家主權債信評等以及金融機構的逾放比等指標來做出評比。藉由分析比較文獻，本文討論出主要是由於兩國的制度環境給與兩國的行為者不同的能力與限制，致使行為者在政策制定的治理機制層次擁有不同的考量，進而影響了政策執行的結果。 / This thesis ponders over the following question: under the same process of state led economic development, what caused the difference in the policy-making process for financial reforms between Taiwan and Korea in the decade 1998 – 2008? Applying Oliver Williamson’s “four-levels of social analysis,” this thesis divides the financial reforms in Taiwan and Korea into embeddedness, institutional environment, governance and resource allocation and employment. Through level analysis, we will come to understand how design of the institution setting gives or restricts the capability of political actors. Even though policy making is a competition of force among actors, contextual restrictions and endowments on actor capability should be taken into account at the same time, as it is a notable factor in policy formation and execution. Due to institution design, the president dominates policy making and execution in both Taiwan and Korea. However, due to influence from informal institutional setting, Chen Shui-Bien and Kim Dae-Jung demonstrated great differences on the movement of policy. Moreover, because of differences in party system, conglomerates and the setting for financial reform, the outcome of reform shows a wide difference in the two countries. Regarding the issue of whether financial reform resolved the basic problem, this thesis grounds its evaluation based on indices such as sovereign rating and percentage of non-performing loans of financial units. Through comparison and analysis of existent literature, this author concludes that that the difference in institution setting provides actors in the two countries with different capabilities and restrictions, which generates different considerations in actors on the governing level and influence the outcome of policy execution.

自民國89年起政府將農地政策明訂為「落實農地農用」之方向，為配合此一目標而建立「集村農舍制度」，農舍議題遂成為各方矚目之焦點。由於農舍興建與「農地利用」、「農村景觀」與「農民生活」等議題關係密切，且實際的集村農舍制度規則與執行因涉及制度參與者互動情形，而影響制度執行與最後目標之實現。惟既有的集村農舍研究多以個別觀點，從管制與被管制者的政策、法律保留原則或住宅管制等面向切入，就制度實際運作情形甚少著墨，對於整體制度問 題亦無深入探討，而研究結果多僅表示贊同或反對意見，無法針對集村興建農舍制度獲得較完整的分析。爰此，本研究透過新制度經濟之觀點，探討集村興建農舍之主要制度理念、正式規則之制度環境、及主管農舍業務組織間制度安排問題，並以「新竹湖口」與「雲林斗六」兩個集村案例，進行案例分析與實地訪查，利用與相關承辦人員深度訪談等研究方法，檢驗目前制度之執行與其保護優良農地落實性。再者應用具動態性之制度變遷理論分析，探討我國加入WTO之調整與民國89年總統大選等重要政經因素對於集村農舍制度之影響。最後依據研究結論，對目前集村農舍制度問題提出對策與政策建議，希冀未來集村興建農舍之規則與執行更能落實保護優良農地之理念。本研究之主要結論與建議如下： 一、研究結論 （一） 集村農舍制度因加入WTO之調整與總統大選等政經因素影響，減弱保護優良農地之制度理念的落實性，呈現不合理的制度變遷趨勢。 （二） 規則欠缺農地利用面與引導農舍區位面之管制等制度環境問題，以及農地與農舍管理組織間業務重疊與職權模糊等制度安排問題，產生制度無效執行，甚至出現耗損優良農地資源之情形。 （三） 以「湖口」與「斗六」兩集村案例歸納其共同現象，目前集村興建農舍制度並未實質照顧農民，亦未能達到保護優良農地之制度目標，須加以研議調整。 二、政策建議 （一） 「落實制度理念」－降低建商介入炒作影響制度理念落實的可能、增加落實制度理念之依據、檢討「專案分割」對制度理念落實之影響。 （二） 「合理的制度環境」－使務農者成為制度主體、提升誘因機制之質量。 （三） 「有效的制度執行」－地方政府組成集村申請案審查小組、農地利用計畫報請農委會審查列管、加強地方審查人員對於集村制度理念之宣達與執行審查業務教育。 （四） 近程與中長程措施 1. 近程建議－明確釐清農舍之定位與推動「示範集村農舍」計畫 2. 中長程建議－調整制度方向為「以集村方式興建為主」 / Central government has defined the enforcement of farmland for agricultural use as the national farmland policy since 2000. In order to fit the objective of the policy, the central government adopts the institution of cluster farmhouse. The problems of farmhouse cause public attention because it raises other issues, such as ' utilization of farmland ', ' rural landscape ' and ' farmer's life. The enforcement of cluster farmhouse institution involves the interaction of the actors, which subsequently influence the realization of the ultimate goal. The existing studies on cluster farmhouse focus mainly on the viewpoints of the owners and regulators of farmland, the principal of law reservation or housing control. In contrast to existing studies, this study, based on the concept of Institutional Economics and deep interviews with the relevant officers who take charge of the cluster farmhouse, investigate the institutional environment; institutional arrangement and enforcement of cluster farmhouse. The political and economy factors that influence the institution will be explained. Finally, a prospective promise of improvement for cluster farmhouse will be provided. The main conclusions and policy suggestions are as follows: 1. The institutional change of cluster farmhouse is deeply influenced by the political economic factors such as to join WTO and to run presidential election which subsequently affects the implementation of the institution. 2. The institutional environment of cluster farmhouse which lacks the consideration of farmland use, location of farmhouses and its institutional arrangement results in its enforcement deviated from the original concept. 3. In essence, cluster farmhouse, from the two cases in this study, has not really looked after farmers. The institution also unable to reach its goal of protecting good farmland at present. 4. Policy recommendations: （1）To reduce the possibility for building traders becoming as a leading role in the process of cluster farmhouse . （2）To make the people who engage in farming become the subject of the institution, and enhance the quality of the incentive mechanism . （3） To promote the concept of cluster farmhouse more rigorously, and thoroughly educate people more on the regulation of enforcement and examination . （4）To clarify the role of farmhouse and to give an good example of cluster farmhouse, and then to modify the regulation for building the cluster farmhouse instead of individual farmhouse .