國內外對BOT實質選擇權之研究，大多集中於BOT主體本身所隱含之各種選擇權價值，鮮少論及BOT附屬事業之選擇權價值。惟因交通運輸BOT主體之自償率往往偏低，故須以保證最小運量或特許經營附屬事業等方式，來吸引潛在投資者。附屬事業對整個BOT計畫價值的影響頗大，如何針對其選擇權之價值加以分析為本研究的主要課題。個案將以台灣南北高速鐵路計畫為例，對其附屬事業之放棄選擇權加以探討。 本研究將主要探討下列課題，並提出研究結果： 一、有限差分法及蒙地卡羅模擬法計算選擇權價值，其間之差異？本 文利用有限差分法及蒙地卡羅模擬法來各別求算BOT 附屬事業的 放棄選擇權價值，一來了解 BOT 附屬事業的放棄選擇權價的大 小，二來比較有限差分法及蒙地卡羅模擬法兩者間的差異。 二、BOT附屬事業的放棄選擇權是否受主體事業的經營績效所影響？ 三、BOT附屬事業是否須考量履約保證金之設計？ 四、BOT主體決定經營或放棄時，是否會影響其附屬事業之放棄選擇 權價值？ 本研究係以蒙地卡羅模擬法及有限差分法單獨估計台灣南北高速鐵路附屬事業之放棄選擇權價值，並建立運輸主體與附屬事業間價值的關聯，再以蒙地卡羅模擬法作更精確的估算。另使用單因子變異數分析及Tukey's Multiple Comparison Method之統計方法，驗證BOT主體與其附屬事業選擇權間之相關性，期能有助於日後BOT計畫之參與者評估及決策使用。 / The study of the Real Option Analysis (ROA) thesis of BOT generally focus is on the principal parts of the project only, rarely is considered the option of ancillary business of BOT. Because the self-liquidation-ratio of the transportation of BOT is low, it needs the government financial support (minimum traffic guarantee or revenue enhancements) to attract the interest of intended investors. The influence of the ancillary business of BOT is huge, so how to evaluate the option is the big issue of thesis. The case focus on the Taiwan High Speed Rail BOT project, and will study the option value of it’s ancillary business. Thesis will discuss the following issues, and develop the result of study. 1.The calculation difference between Monte Carlo Simulation & Finite Difference Method to work out option value, Thesis will use the Monte Carlo Simulation & Finite Difference Method to work out the abandon option value of ancillary business of BOT. To get the abandon option value and compare the calculation difference between Monte Carol Simulation & Finite Difference Method. 2.Will the abandon option value of ancillary business of BOT be influenced by the principal parts of the project？ 3.Is there a need to consider the performance security deposit of ancillary business of BOT？ 4.Will the decision of BOT impact the abandon option value of ancillary business or not？ The thesis will use the Monte Carol Simulation & Finite Difference Method to calculate the abandon option value of ancillary business of Taiwan North-South High-Speed Railway Project (THR), and create the relation between the BOT & it’s ancillary business. The thesis will use the ANOVA & Tuley’s Multiple Comparison Method to validate the relationship, and hope it will let the participator to consider in the future.

本論文包含兩篇獨立但主旨相關的文章， 目的均在探討融資契約與廠商投資的關聯，以分析融資契約的實質效果。第一篇文章「股價資訊外部性與新投資之採行」研究權益證券(股票)集訊、揭訊功能的實質效益，我們由股價資訊公開所產生的外部效果，分析股價資訊效率性與廠商投資效率之間的關聯。在1.眾多異質廠商，2.投資具實質選擇權(real options)特性的假設下，內生化廠商與股市交易者的資訊取得決策，發現1. 均衡時廠商的投資與資訊取得決策取決於廠商技術水準與股價效率性之高低：高股價效率性時，無廠商取得新資訊，皆根據股價判斷投資，低股價效率性時，僅較低技術廠商根據股價資訊投資。2. 股價有額外的資訊揭露效果：由於廠商僅能獲得新資訊的部份效益，且廠商利用資訊有機會成本，將投資證券化可提高新資訊被揭露的可能性，使得資訊可被充份利用，提昇投資效率。3. 股價資訊可提增投資效率，增加廠商期望報酬，但當體系平均技術水準落後，新資訊的實質效益低落時，股價資訊公開的外部淨效益亦趨薄弱，故經濟發展初期，股市資訊公開的外部效益相對不重要。 第二篇文章「抵押品、財務槓桿與廠商投資」研究借貸契約中，抵押品舒緩借貸限制的作用，及其可能產生的實質效果。我們採用Williamson(1986,1987)的狀態確認成本模型(costly state verification model)，在該訊息不對稱模型，廠商向外融資面臨借貸限制，僅較高自有資金廠商可獲融資。當借貸市場資金相當寬鬆，資金供給恆大於資金需求，資金成本(無風險利率)為一由模型外因素所決定的外生參數時，抵押融資不影響資金成本，此時抵押品具有舒緩借貸限制的作用，體系財務槓桿提高，期望查帳成本下降，投資的期望淨產出增加。若資金相對緊俏，無風險利率須由借貸市場均衡所內生決定時，長期而言，財務槓桿僅受體系資金寬鬆程度的影響，短期間抵押融資雖能提高財務槓桿，但隨槓桿之提高，資金需求增加，無風險利率上揚，在新的均衡，較低自有資金廠商投資的期望報酬下降，借貸利率上漲，反而增加其應負債務，資產狀況惡化，此即本文所欲突顯之抵押融資的潛在成本。 第一章 緒論 3 第一節 研究動機 3 第二節 研究內容與架構 5 第二章 文獻回顧 7 第一節 融資契約的功能 7 第二節 金融結構與實質經濟活動 13 第三節 股價資訊與廠商投資 18 第四節 抵押品與廠商投資 22 第三章 股價資訊外部性與新投資之採行 27 第一節 前言 27 第二節 基本模型 29 第三節 期中股市均衡與股價效率性 35 第四節 股價資訊外部效益 41 第五節 小結 46 附 錄 47 第四章 抵押品、財務槓桿與廠商投資 53 第一節 前言 53 第二節 基本模型 55 第三節 抵押融資模型-資金寬鬆時的抵押品效果 62 第四節 抵押融資模型-資金緊俏時的抵押品效果 66 第五節 小結 70 第五章 結論 72 第一節 研究限制 72 第二節 未來研究方向 77 參考文獻 79 / This dissertation collects two separate but related papers, both study the channel through which financing contracts can affect firms' investment decisions and the corresponding real effects. The first paper " Informational Externality of Stock Prices and Firms' New Investment Decisions" analyzes what real benefits the information acquisition and signaling function of stocks can produce. From the viewpoint of informational externality, stock prices may disclose some valuable information beneficial to firms' investment decisions. Under the assumptions of " heterogeneous technology" and "new investment as a real option", this paper finds 1. Firms' investment and information acquisition decisions are determined both by their own technology level and stock prices efficiency. With high price efficiency, no firms acquire information directly, all make investment decisions based on stock prices. With low price efficiency, most firms acquire information directly, only few low-tech firms make decisions according to stock prices. 2. Stock prices have additional signaling effect. Firms can ony get half benefits of new information, besides they have opportunity costs in using information. As a result, stock prices can enhance the possibility of information disclosure, improving investment efficiency. 3. When the economy is underdeveloped and the real benefit of new information is small, the net benefit produced by informational externality will be tiny. The stock prices externality effect is thus comparatively unimportant at the beginning stage of economy. The second paper " Collateral, Financial Leverage and Firms' Investment"analyzes the constraints-smoothing function of collateral and its real effects. By adopting Williamson's costly state verification model(1986,1987), I find that with this specific asymmetric information structure, there are financing constraints in capital markets, only firms whose own capital inputs are higher above some level can get borrowed capital. The question is " Can offering collateral smooth this kind of financing constraints?" In markets with abundant capital where capital supply always exceeds demand, capital cost(riskless interest rate)will be an exdogenously-determined parameter which won't be affected by collateral financing. In this scenario, collateral can smooth financing constraints, increase financial leverage and improve the net expected return of investment. On the contrary, if capital is not so abnudant that the capital cost should be determined endogenously by capital market equilibrium, then in the long run this economy's financial leverage depends only on the relative abundance of capital. Though collateral financing can increase financial leverage in the short run, as capital demand increases, capital cost will also increase. This will offset the initial smoothing effect of collateral. After full adjustment of capital cost, at the new equilibrium the financial leverage remains unchanged. However, the expected return of firms with lower own capital inputs become smaller, and their borrowing rates become higher which mean they have heavier debt burden and less net worth at the new equilibrium.