本研究以企業現金持有之理論結合經理人股票選擇權是否使經理人有不同的投資決策。並提出在超額現金情境之下，經理人具有股票選擇權的風險誘因將會傾向透過執行併購的方式，增加非系統性風險的投資，並貢獻長遠的經濟利潤。本研究蒐集於 1992 年至 2014 年的 S&P1500 企業，根據是否具有超額現金將公司進行分組，並對選擇權誘因進行回歸分析。實證結果顯示具中有風險誘因的經理人在具有超額現金的公司中會有顯著更高的傾向執行併購，尤其當公司同時是屬於舊產業。此外當排除全額股票支付的併購與公開上市的被併公司後，投資人會給予顯著的正面反應。 / This study combines the cash holdings theory and executive stock options (ESOs), and investigates whether excess cash holdings could enlarge the risk incentive effect of ESOs on idiosyncratic-risk investments with positive NPV via mergers and acquisitions (M&As). By examining the Standard and Poor indexed 1500 firms from 1992 to 2014, we find that CEO with ESOs in cash-rich firm is significantly more likely to make M&As especially when the cash-rich firm is in old economy. In addition, investors give positive reaction when CEO with ESOs in cash-rich firm acquires a non-public target and doesn’t adopt the all-stock payment.

本研究使用固守職位理論(Entrenchment theory)解釋在經理人更替後因風格不同及代理人問題造成繼任者有現金持有動機的轉換，此項交乘效果將造成公司現金持有決策的轉變。同時本研究使用多角化公司的財務決策轉變作為例子，解釋在能力配對理論(Ability-matching theory)中不同公司性質造成CEO更替之後決策轉變的原因。研究結果顯示在兩種理論之下，被強制替換或自動離職的狀況將會帶來經理人風格轉變、前任代理人問題減輕或在公司狀況不同下使得現金持有因素有顯著的增減。然而整體實證結果因增減效果彼此抵消，CEO更替對於現金持有的影響並不顯著。 / Our research used entrenchment theory to explain the changing in cash holding after CEO turnover can be caused by different managerial style and agency problem. The interaction of turnover and entrenchment effect will transform motivations of holding cash and further changing the liquidity policy. Meanwhile, we used the ability-matching theory to explain the changing of financial decision in diversified companies to show how different company characteristics affect corporate financial strategy after CEO turnover. Our results showed that based on the two theory, CEO characteristics, agency problem and firm characteristic will significantly affect the financial variables. However, the total effect of CEO turnover on cash holding policy is insignificant because the different effects off set the total effect.

本研究主要採用Francis et al.（2005）所提出之應計品質衡量模型作為應計品質的衡量指標，以2003-2007國內上市櫃公司為研究對象，探討應計品質與公司現金持有間之關聯性。本研究另將應計品質拆為裁量性應計品質與非裁量性應計品質，分別探討其對公司現金持有之影響。 　　本研究實證結果顯示，應計品質與公司現金持有率呈顯著負相關。亦即公司應計品質越高，越能有效降低公司及投資者之間的資訊不對稱，進而使公司籌資成本降低，而可持有較少的現金。此外，裁量性應計品質、非裁量性應計品質與公司現金持有率之間均呈顯著負相關，且非裁量性應計品質對公司現金持有率之影響大於裁量性應計品質。 　　根據上述結果，本研究建議管理階層應重視公司之應計品質，並利用裁量性應計項目來提升盈餘數字的品質，以作為公司績效的適當指標。亦即管理階層應使盈餘數字更能可靠、更即時的反映公司的經營績效，並避免以投機目的使用裁量性應計項目。換言之，公司可藉由應計品質之提升，降低資訊不對稱的程度，進而改善公司的現金管理、減少資源閒置及增進投資的效果。 / This study mainly uses the accruals quality measurement model proposed by Francis et al. (2005) to empirically examine the effect of accruals quality on cash holdings of the sampled listed companies at the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and the Gre Tai Securities Market (GTSM) from 2003 to 2007. This study also distinguishes between accruals quality driven by economic fundamentals (Innate AQ) versus management choices (discretionary AQ) and assesses their individual effects on corporate cash holdings. The empirical results show that accruals quality is negatively associated with cash holdings. That is, the firms with good accruals quality may reduce the negative effect of information asymmetry and adverse selection and, therefore, reduce their level of cash holdings as a result of lower cost of raising capital. In addition, discretionary accruals quality and innate accruals quality are significantly negatively related to cash holdings, and, on average, the innate component of accruals quality has a significantly larger effect on cash holdings than the discretionary component of accruals quality. Our findings suggest that management should be concerned about accruals quality because a higher accruals quality may help firms to improve their cash management, reduce unproductive cash levels, and increase their investment effectiveness.

在現今關於公司現金決策的文獻中，多數文獻以預防性動機 (precautionary motive) 或是代理問題動機 (agency motive) 來解釋公司為何要存錢，但至今對於公司存錢的動機仍未有一致的定論。在本篇文章中，我們用籌資不易公司 (financially constrained firm) 在2000年網路泡沫以及2008年金融海嘯的表現來證明現金的預防性價值。我們發現事先有存錢的公司在上述事件期間仍能維持其原有的投資支出，反之事先沒存錢的公司在上述期間會擁有較低的股票報酬以及較高的違約風險。此外，本研究也發現曾在2000年網路泡沫期間遭遇資金問題的公司比較容易在2000年後開始存錢，這些預先存錢的公司在2008年金融海嘯來臨時也有相對較小的違約風險，顯示了公司在現金管理方面的學習行為及其好處。綜上所述，本文以外生事件突顯了現金的預防性價值，證明公司的未雨綢繆確實有用。 / This article examines the role of pre-saved cash in helping financially constrained firms during the 2000 dot-com crash and the 2008 financial crisis, both of which were exogenous shocks to industrial firms. The results show that constrained firms tended to increase capital investments during these severe economic downturns if they had pre-saved more cash. Constrained firms instead exhibited lower excess returns and incurred higher likelihoods of financial distress during the severe downturns if they had saved less cash prior to the events. Firms that experienced the 2000 dot-com crash and saved cash thereafter were less likely to default during the 2008 financial crisis, indicating the existence and benefit of learning effects. This study supports a precautionary motive for cash savings, showing that pre-saved cash helps financially constrained firms fund investment and reduces the likelihood of financial distress during severe market downturns. It demonstrates that saving for a rainy day really is valuable.