管理當局與利害關係人(stakeholders)之間，透過會計資訊的提供，可降低代理問題及資訊不對稱。惟會計資訊的提供，依管理當局介入的程度不同，會有層次上的差別。 本文即從層次開始，界定了盈餘管理(Earnings Management)與盈餘操縱(Earnings Manipulation)的不同，而透過營運政策中的營業活動(operational activities)來影響盈餘的方式地處兩者之間的灰色地帶，目前至今尚少討論。Roychowdhury(2006)則以美國市場為對象，首開先例發展了如何偵測公司透過營業活動的實質盈餘管理行為。 本文同樣選定避免報導損失為盈餘門檻，考量台灣市場的特性後，偵測台灣企業是否有真實營業活動的盈餘管行為。實證結果顯示，無論是透過銷貨操縱、降低裁決性支出還是過量生產以降低銷貨成本的實質交易操作，都得到顯著地支持。進一步分析那些特性的企業，較容易透過真實營業相關的活動來從事盈餘管理行為時發現，債務契約壓力高、成長性機會高及利害關係人緊密度高者符合預期，而製造業性質則與預期相反，盈餘管理彈性則未得到支持。另外在機構投資人持股方面，則發現高機構投資人持股可降低過量生產實質交易操作的可能，但未能有效防止降低裁決性支出的操作。 / Through providing accounting information for stakeholders , management could somewhat reduce agency problem and information asymmetry.But accounting information quality could be different depending on how management intervene in . This article begins from distinguishing between Earnings Management and Earnings Manipulation.To intervene in business policy through real operational activities is not only one way that is hard to categorize in Earnings Management or Earnings Manipulation but also receives little attention to date. Roychowdhury(2006), taking American market as observation values,was the first one who developed how to detect real operational activities earnings management. Following Roychowdhury(2006),I define avoiding reporting loss as earnings threshold to detect whether real operational activities earnings management exists in Taiwan business.There is obvious evidence suggesting sales manipulation、reduction of discretionary expenditures and overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold to improve reported margins.To go a step further,I test observation values of what characters are inclined to manipulate earnings through real operational activities. I find supporting evidence in observation values with higher debt stress、higher growth opportunity、higher connection with stakeholders and samples on non manufacturing industry.But I find no evidence in observation values with higer earnings management elasticity.In addition,I find observation values with higher instutional holding shares could abate the possibilities of overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold,but fail to avoid the manipulation of reduction of discretionary expenditures.

本研究以遞延所得稅費用作為衡量盈餘管理之代理變數，探討遞延所得稅費用及其組成項目與避免報導虧損行為間之關聯性，並加入股權結構、獨立董監及審計品質，檢視公司治理特性是否可有效降低管理當局利用遞延所得稅費用之會計處理達成避免報導虧損行為的傾向。 本研究之實證結果顯示，遞延所得稅費用及其具裁決性之組成項目如與銷貨有關的遞延所得稅費用、未實現費用產生的遞延所得稅費用及與資產評價科目有關的遞延所得稅費用，均與避免報導虧損行為間存在顯著的關聯性，顯示管理當局利用裁量性遞延所得稅費用之認列及沖轉來調整盈餘，以達成特定的盈餘目標。本研究發現，遞延所得稅費用項目在裁量性應計項目外，對管理當局避免報導虧損之行為，提供了增額的解釋能力。此外，本研究發現公司治理變數與避免報導虧損之行為不存在顯著為負的關係，僅機構投資人持股與獨立董監席次比率對降低管理當局透過遞延所得稅費用項目達成避免報導虧損之行為，具有邊際的增額解釋能力。 / We assess the usefulness of deferred tax expense (DTE) in detecting earnings management. We investigate the relation between changes in deferred tax liability components using data hand-collected from firm’s income tax footnote disclosures and avoid reporting a loss. We also explore the relationship between the structure of ownership, the independent members of broad, audit quality and the usefulness of deferred tax expense (DTE) in detecting earnings management. Our empirical results show the changes in the net deferred tax liability (DTL) component related to sales accruals, revenue and expense accruals and reserves can be used to detect earnings management to avoid an earnings loss. We evaluate the deferred tax expense can be used to meet the earnings target: to avoid reporting a loss. Deferred tax expense is incrementally useful to modified Jones model abnormal accruals in detecting earnings management to avoid a loss. Our empirical results show institutional investors and the independent members of broad have negative relationship with earning management.