本研究之目的可分為二，第一個是希望探討具有不同特性之仲介員，在交易過程中是否有某些特性對於議價能力有顯著影響。第二個目的，希望探討在不同房屋類型之交易案件中，是否由更為適任之仲介員經手交易，能獲得更好的成果。透過模型設計，將特徵價格模型配合本研究目的加以修改，以實證迴歸分析那些仲介員特性更能夠在交易過程中，展現議價能力使買家提高願付價格（willingness to pay），讓委託人取得更好之賣價，同時也為公司創造更高價值。 根據實證結果顯示，仲介員性別、年齡對於議價達成率所產生的影響並不顯著，教育水準、年資與血型才是影響議價達成率的關鍵。仲介員教育程度越高議價能力越強，也越能達成委託人所委託之目標。同時本研究也發現年資高之仲介員容易產生代理人問題（agency problem），年資高之仲介員傾向於利用訊息優勢，左右買賣雙方之交易決策，使交易價格降低，不但背離委託人初衷，亦對公司造成負面影響。另一方面，血型為AB型之仲介員在議價能力上的表現最佳，該類仲介員普遍具有好的協商能力、邏輯分析能力，其次是順從、負責的A型仲介員，表現最差的反而是一般認為積極熱情的B型與O型。 / There are two purposes of this article. The first one is to identify the correlation between characteristics of a real estate agent and power of negotiation/bargain. The second one is to find if there are some characteristics of a real estate agent that are more suitable for dealing certain type of housing, including apartment, mansion and high-rise. Using the method of hedonic house pricing as a basic model, the article takes a bargain rate as dependent variable instead of housing prices, while characteristics of real estate agents are included in independent variables. It should be noted that higher bargain rate means greater power of negotiation. The results of this article are (a) education, blood type are positively significant, (b) seniority is negatively significant, (c) gender, age, astrology are not. It is also found that there are agency problems in housing markets since agents with more seniority are more likely to have poor power of negotiation, which is opposite of our expectations. The study findings may serve as a guide for further research on management and leadership of real estate industries.

借款公司與銀行間彼此往來關係以及議價能力是否是決定聯合貸款契約中依績效調整利率條款內容的重要因素? 本研究嘗試利用1993至2010美國聯貸案之資料來檢視此一關係是否確實存在。 實證結果發現，當借款公司與銀行已有往來關係且公司之籌資選擇較少時，會比較傾向簽訂利率向上調整之績效條款。此外，由於單一主辦行於聯貸案中無法向借款公司剝削所有利益，因此對於已和借款公司有往來關係的主辦行來說，其較不傾向簽訂利率向上之調整績效條款。最後，本研究發現，對於主辦行排名較後面的銀行來說，其更傾向簽訂利率向下之調整績效條款來吸引客戶(借款公司)。 / It is shown in this thesis that long-term banking relationships and bargaining power are important determinants of performance-pricing covenants (PPC) inclusions in syndicated loan contracts. Using a large sample of syndicated loans data (1993-2010), I find that syndicated loans tend to include more interest-increasing PPC when a long-term banking relationship exists and when borrowers have fewer financing alternatives. The presence of banking relationship with lead arrangers reduces the odds of using interest-increasing PPC, because lead arrangers might not be able to capture all rents from holding-up borrowers. Finally, I find lenders with lower league table ranking are likely to use more interest-decreasing PPC to attract borrowers, which again is consistent with the hold-up hypothesis.

本文研究重點為探討跨國公司對在地國之影響，分析與比較俄羅斯天然氣工業集團(Gazprom Group)在烏克蘭與白俄羅斯兩國之議價關係。 Gazprom為全球壟斷性天然氣公司，在2006年冬季俄、烏天然氣談判破局而發生歐洲大規模斷氣事件後，其對在地國的特殊影響力才逐漸成為各界熱烈討論之議題。一般而言，在全球化下的跨國公司研究多半聚焦在跨國公司的經濟影響力，然而Gazprom在母國政府的支持下，在全球市場上除了經濟面外，還對其他國家發揮著政治面向上的影響力，特別是在烏克蘭與白俄羅斯的例子上格外明顯。學界目前對於Gazprom的主流評論認為Gazprom為母國外交工具，然而追溯Gazprom、在地國與俄羅斯三方之天然氣關係背景，發現Gazprom在烏、白兩國之作為不能單純將Gazprom設想為「母國外交工具」，Gazprom與兩國之天然氣衝突是俄羅斯政府「外交目標」與Gazprom「商業獲利」考量下之綜合結果；以Gazprom為主體方向下思考，對Gazprom來說，俄羅斯政府是企業對在地國的「產業政策影響工具」，更正確地來說，Gazprom與俄羅斯政府是屬於互相為用的關係。 為破除既定「外交工具」思考方向，本文採議價能力衰減模型(Obsolescing Bargaining Model)作為基礎研究架構，以Gazprom為研究主體，突破以往傳統上單層議價模型中只論跨國公司與在地國之議價過程，加入母國政府與在地國政府之議價關係，分析俄與烏、白兩國政府議價結果與Gazprom影響力之關聯，以貼合本文案例實際研究需要。 / This paper examines the impact of multinational corporations (MNC) on host country, analyzes and compares the two cases in Ukraine and Belarus of bargaining relations between Gazprom Group and host governments. Gazprom is a global natural gas monopoly, after the breakup of gas negotiation between Russia and Ukraine and cut-off of Russian gas to Europe, its special impact on host country has attracted people of all the different circles to discuss it. In most cases of globalization researches on MNC’s role, people concentrate on the economic impact of MNC; however, with the support from home government, Gazprom has shown not only its economic power, but also its political impact on host country, especially on Ukraine and Belarus. Till now, the academic circle has seen Gazprom as an instrument of Russian foreign policy, but after tracing back the historical background of gas relations between Gazprom, host country, and Russia, we can figure out Gazprom can’t be simply regarded as the policy instrument, in fact, the Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Belarus gas disputes between are the complex of Russian foreign policy consideration and Gazprom commercial actions. For Gazprom, Russian government is an instrument as well to influence host country’s policy in gas sector. More correctly, Gazprom and Russian government use each other for their own purposes. To break through the existing “instrument of foreign policy” research direction, this paper uses obsolescing bargaining model as the basic framework, regarding Gazprom as the main subject, changing the traditional one-tier bargaining model into two-tier, including bargaining relationship between home government and host government, then analyzes the correlation between the governmental bargaining results and Gazprom’s bargaining power for the practical case study needs.

由於國際連鎖速食業地區經營者（Market Operator）的主要資本投入，包括：原料採購、餐飲設備投資、設計裝修、人員訓練、以及租用不動產時，都牽扯到被陷入或轉換成本偏高的問題，以致對於既有資源供應商之續約談判時處於不利的地位。 　　本研究主要從交易成本理論、陷入成本及專屬資產、買賣方之交易關係等理論解析國際連鎖速食店的地區經營者提高取得上述資源的議價能力（Bargaining Power）的管理策略，並透過業界專家實證其可行性。 　　經研究結果顯示，國際速食連鎖業地區經營者可以從「降低專屬陷入成本的投入」、「促使主要供應商投入專屬資產」、「善用其他交易影響者的力量」等三個方向來提高議價能力，並可根據資源特性的不同，而採取不同的策略行動。