近年來，生物技術的快速進步，逐漸被公認為是繼資訊產業之後最具發展潛力的產業。生技產業不同於傳統的製造業或電子產業，前者之進入障礙高、產品研發時程長及研發投入成本高。雖然生技產品開發成功後，投資報酬率高、產品的生命週期長，但由於其研發過程較長，具有相當高的不確定性，加上研發的失敗率高，致使生技產業成為投資風險極高的產業。 生技產業屬於知識密集的知識型產業，其主要價值來自於研發創新的無形資產，而難以傳統的評價方法及標的來估算。因此，探討如何評估生技公司的價值，是本研究之主要目的。 本研究範圍以「生技醫藥產業」為研究重點，生技產業的應用範圍包括醫藥開發、醫療器材、診斷試劑、農業生技、健康食品及生技服務業等領域。醫藥品的開發是生物技術最早應用的領域，目前全球生技產業中，也以生技醫藥領域的市場最大，是目前發展較為成熟且成功的領域。 但因生技醫藥公司之投資的評估考量與傳統評價模式有差異，生技醫藥公司之營運，通常需要先投入數年的研發，開發出具有市場潛力的產品或技術、並取得專利後，再透過授權或合作方式，向有意承接之單位或藥廠收取前期金(up-front payment)或研究經費(research fund)，以及收取各階段的里程金(milestone payment)，待產品成功上市後，生技醫藥公司再依銷售金額，分配到一定比率的授權金。上述的收入或獲利過程，往往長達4到7年，而其收入結構因合作模式的差別而有不同的組合變化。如果依一般公認的會計原則認列損益，將造成公司某一年有一大筆收入，但接下來幾年收入可能都掛零的現象。不但無法反映生技公司的真正營運狀況，亦可能造成投資人或主管單位的誤解，這正是生技公司價值無法依傳統評價模式進行評估的原因。 然而，究竟應該如何對一生技公司進行評價？本研究使用目前最佳的生技公司評價方法：風險調整淨現值法(rNPV)，並以一個案公司為題，探索生技醫藥產業的投資與評價過程。此法的評估結果，對生技公司的現有價值，即使仍在R&D的早期階段，仍能運用於生技公司投資、授權、取得等交易之需要。 關鍵字：生技產業、公司評價、風險調整淨現值、折現率 / Due to the rapid growth of the biotechnology industry, it is now considered the hottest industry after the information technology industry. Unlike the traditional production industry (the labor intensive) or the electronic industry, the biotechnology requires higher R&D costs, and usually the life span of its product lasts longer, which leads to a certain barrier in this particular field. Although the return of investment tends to be profitable if the product succeeds, yet the lengthy R&D process still makes the business highly risky. The innovation of intangible assets is the main value of biotechnology; in other words, this is a knowledge-intensive industry, and it is hard to measure the potential risks and returns through traditional evaluation models. Hence, the main purpose of this study is to evaluate how a biotechnology company is worth. This study will be mainly focus on “Bio-Pharmaceutical”, which includes New Drugs, Medical Devices and Instruments, Diagnostic Reagents and Platforms, Agricultural Biotech, Health Care Products, and Contract Services. A large number of biotechnology companies have viewed pharmaceuticals as their target market since 1997. Cleary, the Bio-Pharmaceutical is regarded as the mainstream of this industry. Owing to the different models of evaluation as mentioned earlier, biotechnology industry is different from the traditional ones. Biotech companies usually need to go through a long-range research process before developing a success product or technique, and they will usually authorize the selling rights to a partner in order to demand the up-front payment, research funds, and the follow up milestone payments. If the product hits the market, the companies will be paid with a certain ratio royalty. The process generally takes about 4 to 7 years, and the revenue varies depending on the partnership. It is possible for a company to have a huge gain in one particular year and then a deficit for the coming years if the financial condition is viewed from the general accepted accounting principles. Not only does it not reflect the real situation of a biotech company, but also misleads investors and regulatory authorities. This is why the value of a biotech company needs to be reconsidered in different ways, not the traditional ones. How, then, can we put a price tag on biotechnology? The best solution is to evaluate a biotechnology by estimating its risk-adjusted net present value (rNPV). To illustrate the rNPV method, the study has created a hypothetical scenario. Through the case study, we have arrived at a realistic value of a bio-company even at early R&D stages. Using the rNPV, researchers and potential investors can price the bio-company that they are considering selling, investing in or acquiring. Keywords：Biotechnology Industry、Evaluation、rNPV、Discount Rate

根據美國生技產業協會（Biotechnology Industry Organization, BIO）的資料顯示，純研發型的生技公司難以取得投資資金，且投資者對公司的現金部位益發看重。而我國的台灣經濟研究院調查也指出國內生技廠商在研發階段所面臨到的重大困難是「資金取得不易」，這些正反應出國內外投資者對生技產業特殊性的疑慮，進而不願意投入大量資金。 為解決國內生技研發型公司資金不足之問題，本論文分析了美國生技公司籌資狀況及常使用之工具，並考量台灣生技產業所面臨之整體環境，為國內生技企業建立了具實用價值的特殊籌資工具及發行模式，以滿足不同的籌資需求及降低投資者的風險。而為驗證此一籌資工具之可行性，本論文也挑選國內一家生技研發型公司，以其業務及財務現況，進行特殊籌資工具之定價，並提供發行前後應注意之相關事項。 / According to the research report from BIO（Biotechnology Industry Organization）, it is hard for research-based biotech companies to get financing and investors are more concerned about whether the company has enough cash or not .The same result can be found in the investigation of Taiwan Institute of Economic Research（TIER）.They find out the research-based biotech companies in Taiwan encounter one difficult problem - hard to get enough money to support their R&D .All these facts just reflect the special characteristics of biotech industry and the investment trend among biotech field. The goal of this thesis is to resolve the financing problem faced by the research-based biotech companies in Taiwan, so we analyze how American biotech companies get enough financing to support their R&D, and then, construct the special financing tool for the research-based biotech companies under the economical situation in Taiwan, in order to fulfill the needs of biotech companies and reduce the investment risk. In this thesis, we use a case study to verify the pricing model of special financing tool and propose some material facts should be resolved when stocks issuing.

隨著金融市場的整合、金融控股公司的成立，保險公司、銀行與證券機構等的經營不再只是各自為政，其經營變化皆會影響到整體的經營成敗。子公司的經營應不再只是注重經營績效，還應納入各項經營風險的考量，在報酬與風險之間取得一個平衡點。 本研究主要是透過風險調整資本報酬(RAROC)，來測量在金控旗下產物保險公司經營績效之優劣。本文利用民國73年至93年的產物保險年鑑的財報資料，以RAROC及傳統財務比率，比較富邦公司與本國老公司經營績效之差異。 本文之實證研究結果發現如下： 1. 在傳統財務比率之下，富邦產物保險公司的經營能力與本國老公司大致相同，但獲利能力明顯優於本國老公司。 2. 在風險調整資本報酬比率下，營運部分之績效比較結果為： (1) 在全部業務之下，富邦產物保險公司與本國老公司大致相同。 (2) 在扣除分保業務之後，富邦產物明顯優於本國老公司 3. 在風險調整資本報酬比率下，富邦產物之投資方面的經營績效明顯優於本國老公司。 / After the renovation of financial market and the establishment of financial holding company in Taiwan, insurance companies, banks and security institutes will not operate independently, and their efficiency on operation will affect themselves. Subsidiary companies not only focus on efficiency on operation, but also measure variation of risk on operation to achieve a balance between risk and return. This study applies the concept of Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC) to measure efficiency on operation of non-life insurance company in financial holding company. The empirical analysis is conducted based on the financial data of non-life insurance companies in Taiwan during the period of 1984-2003. The empirical results are summarized as follow. 1. Base on traditional financial ratios, the underwriting efficiency of Fubon is the same as the other companies, but in the part of investment, Fubon is more efficient than other companies. 2. Based on Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital for measuring underwriting efficiency: (1) Fubon and old local companies are the same efficient for total business. (2) Fubon is significantly more efficient than other companies for the retained business. 3. Based on Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital for measuring investment efficiency, Fubon is better than other companies.

人壽保險業為特許行業，各國基於不同監理目的而有不同會計處理規定，導致各國會計差異問題的浮現。台灣自 2011 年 1 月 1 日起正式 適用國際財務報導準則保險合約第一階段規範與國際接軌，其為過渡性準則，乃說明保險合約之定義、合約之認列與衡量及其揭露等，實施後影響不大。但實施後保險業仍存在對資產採公平價值評價，而對負債 (責任準備金) 採成本法評價之不一致現象。因此，為達資產負債 管理的一致性，將實施 IFRS 4 Phase II，對保險負債採公平價值評價並 規定保險負債須以無風險利率評價。本研究將在 IFRS 4 Phase II 對負債公平價值的規範架構下，以壽險 業商品的準備金為例，評估 IFRS 4 Phase II 實施後其準備金價值及公 司財報損益所會產生的差異。此外，探討 IFRS 4 Phase II 實施後對壽 險業的評價影響，諸如服務邊際、現金價值與風險調整，包含此財務揭露改變是否將對壽險業之商品類型造成影響。 / Life insurance corporation should be granted a franchise by the government in every countries. The purpose of supervision based on different countries have different accounting rules, leading to differences in national accounting problems. Taiwan has officially adopted the framework of International Financial Reporting Standards 4 Phase I since January 1, 2011. IFRS 4 Phase I is a transitional guidelines, which includes some definitions of insurance contracts. The principles of IFRS Phase I doesn’t cause serious effects for life insurance corporations. However, the problem of mismatching between the fair value of assets and the book value of liabilities still exists. Therefore, in order to achieve consistency management in asset and liability, the fair value valuation for liabilities is required under the frame work of IFRS 4 Phase II In our research, we would take a policy for example to evaluate the fair value of liabilities under the framework of IFRS 4 Phase II. Besides, we also analyze the the influences for life insurance companies after applying the IFRS 4 Phase II.

銀行風險管理架構的建立必須與銀行的經營管理相結合，如資產品質管理、資本分配、績效評估與發展策略等。面臨新的風險管理觀念與架構趨勢，銀行的資訊系統也必須做結構化的調整，以有效支援銀行風險控管的決策與執行。 本研究以銀行信用風險管理整合需求為出發點來推導信用風險管理資訊架構： 一、銀行信用風險管理資料蒐集、風險量化與驗證、風險監控與審核， 必須建立資訊運作流程。 二、因應系統平台的多元性，銀行必須建置整合性信用風險控管系統， 以建立即時監控風險機制。 三、風險預警機制與風險定價決策支援整合至現有銀行資訊系統。 四、建立資本配置與績效衡量決策支援與管理系統，以建立風險與績 效之連結機制，提升銀行經營績效。

基金經理人與投資人間的代理問題起源於兩者目標的不一致，前者要求個人薪酬財富的極大化，後者要求投資組合價值的極大化。造成目標歧異的原因有兩個：其一是在資訊不對稱的環境下，投資人無法觀察到經理人投資組合是否真正從投資人利益角度出發，因此引發了經理人的道德危險；其二是在競爭激烈的基金產業□，年度定期績效評比結果與經理人薪酬紅利多寡相連結等制度的設計，加重經理人選擇持有一個高風險投資組合的逆誘因，特別是期中累積績效較差的輸家，隨著年終總績效結算日期的接近，在自利動機的驅使下可能會透過較高的操作風險調整幅度，企圖扭轉頹勢以求反敗為勝。 本研究首先利用卡方檢定、t檢定與Logistic迴歸模式，實證國內基金經理人是否具有自利性風險調整的行為傾向，接著從契約設計的觀點，以理論模式推導命題的方式，探討三種不同型態的誘因費契約對於抑制經理人自利性風險調整行為的作用，並間接利用問卷調查的方式來驗證其效果。研究的結果發現： 1.國內基金經理人不管是贏家或輸家，在越接近年終總績效的結算時，都會偏向選擇一個高風險的操作水準，同時，上述特性在非外資型投信公司所發行的基金、新基金、小規模基金、資淺經理人所操盤的基金特別明顯。 2.基金投資人對於季等短期績效的過分重視，是導致國內經理人操作風險調整幅度偏高的主要原因之一。 3.純粹誘因費契約以及只加上「上限條款」設計的契約，這兩種契約都無法抑制經理人冒高風險的傾向；而純粹誘因費契約加上「懲罰條款」的設計，有抑制經理人自利性調高操作風險行為的效果。 本研究成果的貢獻主要有兩點： 1.在政策應用上，本研究提出契約條款設計的理念，對於我國擬開放勞退等大型基金委託代客操作，雙方契約該如何設計以確保投資人的權益，有相當參考的價值，本研究同時也對投信公司、基金經理人等提出相關的制度性建議。 2.在理論推導上，本研究融合一般化均衡分析法與選擇權理論的應用，將不同型態的誘因費契約化成經理人向投資人所購買的歐式買權，標的資產為經理人所持投資組合的價值，履約價格為比較基準指數的價值，執行日期為一年期的績效評比，模型導証的重點是經理人所選擇投資組合的風險程度與該類比選擇權價值的關係。 / An important question for the contracting literature is the extent to which real behavior is driven by the financial incentives contained in compensation schemes. To address this issue, (1) we use the tournament concept as the framework, and focus on the competitive nature of mutual fund environments how to affect the managers' portfolio decision-making processes. (2) we also use the Black-Scholes option pricing model as the framework, and analyze the impact on the mutual fund managers' risk-manipulation behavior of a performance-based incentive plan. Given the asymmetric information financial markets, most investors of mutual funds can not measure the funds' risk without error, thus, agent-divergent behavior may potentially arise. In a tournament reward structure, the managers' rational attempting to maximize their expected compensation may revise the risk level or alter the composition of their portfolio during the assessment period. While there will be times when such changes don't serve the best interest of funds' investors. Our research demonstrates the following results: 1. An empirical investigation of 86 open-type mutual funds during 1995 to 1998 with the methods of test, t test and the Logistic regression shows fund managers with poor performance would become aggressive and tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period. The effect is obviously clear toward the end of the year and it is involved with the investors' myopic of the assessment to the managers' performances. 2. In our model, the bonus is similar to a call option on the funds' portfolio. Three types of incentive contracts are compared. The results show that the incentive contract with penalty can reduce managers to adversely alter the risk of the portfolio they manage. It dominates the pure incentive contract and only with a ceiling incentive contract. Questionnaires investigated by fund managers will support some hypothesis.