No description available.

No description available.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-11-05T12:59:58Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Afonso Campos Bregalda.pdf: 1196444 bytes, checksum: e49e7ca4d5ac50958726df1bb58ccea0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-11-05T12:59:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Afonso Campos Bregalda.pdf: 1196444 bytes, checksum: e49e7ca4d5ac50958726df1bb58ccea0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-09-14 / Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico - CNPq / Carlos Lamarca was a Brazilian Army soldier between 1960 and 1969, who defected from the Armed Forces in January 1969 to shape and lead the guerrilla group Vanguarda Popular Revolucionaria (VPR), whose aim was to overthrow the military dictatorship and implement the socialist revolution in Brazil via armed struggle. The present study analyzes the documents written by Lamarca as leader of the clandestine organization, as well as official documents that compose the framework of its history and its memory. It´s an study on the understanding of its historical memory, trying to apprehend through the logic of documentary texts its objectives and their historical meanings. Being that the operation of Lamarca in the years of clandestine between 1969 and 1971 was revealed complex, as well as the participation of the Army in his capture and assassination. The research dealt with the relation he made of himself (from the documents of his own authorship) with the official military perspective (from documents produced by the official bodies), culminating in the construction of a complex historical character. The emblematic figure of Carlos Lamarca permeates the historical memory regarding the period of the Brazilian armed struggle against the authoritarianism of the military dictatorship. The focus was on the characterization of the character's memory, where it is treated in several different ways, depending on where the process of its action is analyzed / Carlos Lamarca foi militar do Exército brasileiro entre 1960 e 1969, que desertou das Forças Armadas em janeiro de 1969, para formatar e liderar o grupo guerrilheiro Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária (VPR), cuja finalidade era derrubar a ditadura militar para implantar a revolução socialista no Brasil via luta armada. O presente estudo analisa os documentos escritos por Lamarca enquanto líder da organização clandestina, bem como documentos oficiais que compõem o arcabouço da sua história e sua memória. Trata-se da compreensão da sua memória histórica, buscando apreender na lógica dos textos documentais seus objetivos e seus significados históricos. Sendo que se revelou complexa a atuação de Lamarca nos anos de clandestinidade (1969 e 1971), bem como a participação do Exército em sua captura e extermínio. A pesquisa aborda a relação que ele fez de si mesmo (a partir dos documentos de sua própria autoria) com a perspectiva oficial militar (a partir de documentos produzidos pelos órgãos oficiais), no que culminou para a construção de uma personagem histórica complexa. A figura emblemática de Carlos Lamarca permeia a memória histórica referente ao período da luta armada brasileira contra o autoritarismo da ditadura militar. O enfoque centrou-se na caracterização da memória da personagem, onde a mesma é tratada de diversos modos distintos, a depender de onde se analisa o processo de sua atuação

本論文其內容如下： 隨著七十年代期國際體制之多極化現象，進而美、中共和解以及日、中共和解。尤其 ，因尼克森主義而產生之美國軍事介入的變化，以及中共取得聯合國代表權，給朝鮮 半島帶來了巨大的衝繫。中共取得聯合國代表意味著認中共為侵略者的一九五一年聯 合國大會決議案事實上也隨之失效。隨之認定中共為侵略者之朝鮮半島的基本秩序， 也不得不變為中共也同意的一種新秩序。換言之，朝鮮半島上聯合國特性之消失，所 謂聯合國韓國統一善後委員會的解散和聯軍司令部的解體也明顯地成為一大問題。由 於聯合國的趨勢，以及應付北韓的對南韓戰略，大韓民國政府建立了追求朝鮮半島和 平統一的政策。

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Comunicação, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Comunicação, 2014. / Submitted by Laura Conceição (laurinha.to@gmail.com) on 2014-11-27T20:00:11Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_LauraMariaCoutinhoXavierNaves.pdf: 1517241 bytes, checksum: 55610a79d31e3926f7c5e01507c1f754 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Patrícia Nunes da Silva(patricia@bce.unb.br) on 2014-12-01T14:54:48Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_LauraMariaCoutinhoXavierNaves.pdf: 1517241 bytes, checksum: 55610a79d31e3926f7c5e01507c1f754 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-01T14:54:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_LauraMariaCoutinhoXavierNaves.pdf: 1517241 bytes, checksum: 55610a79d31e3926f7c5e01507c1f754 (MD5) / A dissertação apresenta um estudo sobre o relacionamento dos jornalistas, credenciados ou não, com a Secretaria de Imprensa da Presidência da República durante os governos Artur da Costa e Silva (1968-1969) e Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1970-1974). A partir de entrevistas qualitativas semi-dirigidas (ou semiestruturadas), foi possível ter um corpus para a reconstrução do contexto jornalístico dentro de um panorama marcado pelo AI-5. Para isso, foram entrevistados jornalistas políticos e os assessores dos dois períodos abordados nessa pesquisa. Foi percebido que sob o processo de cobertura política, existiam estratégias e manobras tanto nos processos de apuração como na redação do texto. Esse contexto de negociação marca a produção noticiosa. Assim, ser jornalista político durante o regime exigia novos procedimentos que manejavam os limites impostos pela censura além da própria política editorial dos veículos em que trabalhavam. Para contextualizar teoricamente, foi abordado o conceito de negociação de Strauss (1992) e uma abordagem etnoconstrucionista da notícia, como resultado de um conjunto de interações sociais simbólicas, representadas pela relação entre jornalista e fonte, e que dão origem ao produto final: a notícia. Dessa forma, o resultado apresentou um outro painel do jornalismo, aquele do viés institucional representado pela Secretaria de Imprensa da Presidência da República e a forma como se relacionou com os repórteres que cobriram o Palácio do Planalto. Também buscou confrontar as formas de representação de um jornalista que trabalha para o Governo militar e que, no seu cotidiano, precisava lidar com um outro jornalista, que tinha seu trabalho afetado diretamente pelos efeitos da Ditadura Militar.

This thesis is a study of national security decision making in the Ford Administration. The subject for study is the Kissinger- Schlesinger controversy in the Ford Administration. The thesis will attempt to prove that the differences that emerged over issues of national policy were due to deep theoretical disagreements as to the nature of the international system, the utility of power in the nuclear age and the means by which to preserve detente. An examination of the substantive policy differences will be preceded by an examination of the conceptual disagreements between the Secretaries on topics that are fundamental to any study of international politics. Studies on decision making in intemational politics will be used to show that each man had a different perception of the role that the United States should have in the international system and the usefulness of America's strategic arsenal for the preservation of peace. After having defined the theoretical differences between Kissinger and Schlesinger on issues in international politics, an analysis of the substantive policy disagreements between the two Secretaries will show that they can be directly related to each man's conception of the international system. Policy differences between the two will be shown to have evolved out of disagreements over policy goals, and not policy implementation. Any study of individual decision making in defense and foreign affairs stresses the importance of individual policy makers and of issues. Foreign nations perceive changes in foreign and defense policy goals when new leadership emerges with which they are uncomfortable. It will be shown, through an analysis of the foreign reaction to the Kissinger-Schlesinger controversy, that foreign nations expressed concern for the outcome of this policy split. In particular, it will be shown that the matter was of great interest to the Soviet Union. In conclusion the thesis will reiterate the point that national security decision making in the Ford Administration was unab1e to reach a compromise on issues of policy because of funamental differences between the Secretaries of State and Defense on detente, the definition of the national security in the nuclear age and the negotiating strategy that America should follow with the Soviets on arms limitations. These differences on policy were made inevitable due to differing models that each Secretary had on the nature of the international system. The study of their individual perceptions will help to give one an understanding as to why the policy disagreements made compromise impossible.

The Master's Thesis on the Inflow of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Western Security System, 1969-1974, consists of four and tied parts. The first part is an introduction, which has put the reader into the problem of this work. It also includes the methodology of processing of the archival sources and secondary literature and their evaluation too. The Second part is an analyses of the question of Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the importance of this Treaty for the future development and the position of the so-called Grand coaliton in relation to NPT. The third part is an analyses the question of détente policy and conception of Willy Brandt's European security policy, then the problem of the implications of the US/USSR Strategic Arms Limitation Talks for the security status of the Federal Republic of Germany and also the developing of mutual relationships of FRG with NATO in SALT process and involvement of the Nixon administrative in this policy. This chapter also includes the problem of the question of the importance of SPD/FDP security policy in an international context. The fourth chapter is a study of the internal political reasons of Willy Brandt's security policy, mainly the problem of existence of a terrorist group, the Red Army Faction. At the end of this...

Much discussed and little understood, Richard Nixon's southern strategy demands scrutiny. A brief survey of the literature suggests that study on this controversial topic has reached an impasse. Southern historians keen to emphasise the importance of class in the region's partisan development over the last fifty years insist that any southern strategy predicated on racialised appeals to disaffected white conservatives was doomed to failure. Conversely, conventional accounts of the Nixon era remain wedded to the view that the southern strategy represented a successful devil's bargain whereby an avaricious Californian exchanged the promise of racial justice for black southerners in return for white Dixie's electoral votes. Most sobering of all are political scientists concerned with executive power, who evidence the limited discretion enjoyed by presidents to implement any agenda inimical to the corporate will of the federal bureaucracy. Since Nixon's executive departments were brimming with Democratic holdovers from the Kennedy and Johnson years, the question of whether or not the President demanded concessions to southern racists apparently becomes more or less irrelevant: the 'fourth branch' of the federal government inevitably ensured that a southern strategy was simply impossible to execute. In reality, much of this stalemate is the product of academic territorial warfare on the battleground of a subject wide open to multiple interpretations. A southern historian keen to showcase the importance of his local research is likely to show little interest in evidence that a President based in Washington D.C. could initiate social change in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Similarly, political scientists fighting an unrewarding battle to emphasise the autonomy of federal departments are naturally disinclined to highlight examples of presidential willpower altering bureaucratic culture. Nevertheless, an intriguing paradox remains in evidence. Despite leaning more towards the political philosophy of antediluvian white southerners than the demands of black Americans, Richard Nixon presided over a period of such fundamental social reconstruction below the Mason-Dixie line that he could legitimately claim to have desegregated more southern schools than any other President in history. Whilst a raft of excellent monologues demonstrating the impact of local movements down South on national politics have been published over the last decade, few have even attempted to explain this peculiar phenomenon. As Matthew Lassiter observed in a Journal of American History roundtable on American conservatism in December 2011, 'the recent pendulum swing has overstated the case for a rightward shift in American politics by focusing too narrowly on partisan narratives and specific election cycles rather than on the more complex dynamics of political culture, political economy, and public policy.' The purpose of this thesis is to explain how a President notorious for pursuing the votes of white segregationists rested at the head of a federal government that ruthlessly dismantled Jim Crow. By incorporating the range of methodologies elucidated above, it will identify exactly how much influence President Nixon and his executive officers exerted over civil rights policy. Was Nixon's reactionary agenda thwarted by over-mighty bureaucrats? Or did the President act more responsibly than the majority of commentators have admitted?