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The legal humanitarian regime, set out in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, strives to alleviate human suffering through the provision of emergency goods and services, such as food supplies, water, temporary shelter, and medical treatment. This thesis examines how international non-government organizations (INGOs) contribute to the contestation of this regime in political emergencies, the effects of this contestation, and the factors driving INGO contestation. The thesis develops an analytical framework for understanding the nature and functioning of the legal humanitarian regime, and argues that INGO contestation occurs through the two processes of regime interpretation and regime implementation. It then goes on to identify the substantive content and effects of contestation, and the factors driving INGO contestation of the regime, through a detailed study of the policies and practices of CARE, Médecins Sans Frontiers, Oxfam, and World Vision, in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, from 1990-2010. The thesis argues that contestation has constitutive effects, as it re-defines the meaning of the formal humanitarian regime, and the underlying rules and norms that specify the regime’s function, scope, and operating principles. Contestation also has causal effects, as it can make INGOs participants in the conflict, eroding thereby the basis on which they negotiate access and their ability to respond to humanitarian needs, and the security of their staff. It has also facilitated the subordination of humanitarian assistance by donor states and combatants to their political and security objectives. INGO identity - expressed in terms of the constituent rules and norms that define INGO membership, their mandate and goals, and the manner in which they distinguish themselves from other actors - is argued to be a necessary factor for explaining INGO contestation. The focus on identity highlights the agency of INGOs in shaping the humanitarian regime and demonstrates that INGOs are not simply at the mercy of more powerful actors or external constraints.

Over the last two decades, the international community has taken on the task of rebuilding societies in the aftermath of mass-atrocities. Through a combination of trial and error and vigorous academic research, a relatively clear (and semi-malleable) blueprint of post-atrocity peacebuilding has developed. This includes setting up a temporary international transitional authority, establishing democracy, facilitating economic development, and holding war crime trials. Though there are volumes of studies which address the pragmatic strengths and weaknesses of these key elements of peacebuilding, to date political theorists have not critically analyzed the moral legitimacy of these policies. My thesis aims to fill this gap. The overarching question of this thesis is this: What moral duties does the international community have to post-atrocity societies? To answer this question, I critically examine the normative issues involved in the four key aspects of peacebuilding (identified above). Using the framework of just war theory and a cosmopolitan theory of fundamental human rights, I argue that, in most post-atrocity cases, the international community has duties to remove atrocity-committing regimes from power, occupy the target-state and act as a transitional authority, help facilitate the creation of democracy and economic development, and hold war crimes trials. These duties, of course, are extremely complicated and limited and these qualifications are examined and developed throughout. Running through the construction of my theory of post-atrocity duties is a clear message: we – the international community – have obligations to the victims and survivors of atrocities. In other words, providing assistance in the wake of mass-atrocities is not a supererogatory act of charity, rather, it is a duty which we owe to the victims of these horrible crimes.

Values matter in both legal decision (lawmaking and lawapplying) and discourse (lawshaping and lawinfluencing). Yet, their purported subjectivity means that gaining or improving knowledge about values (whether they be epistemic, legal, moral, ethical, economic, political, cultural, social, or religious) in the context of analytic legal thought and understanding is often said to be at odds with its goal of objectivity. This phenomenon is amplified at the international level where the infusion of seemingly subjective political values by sovereigns, and the decisionmakers to whom they delegate, can, and does, interfere with an idealized and objective rule of law. The discourse on value subjectivity, and its relation to the purpose and function of the law, is particularly apparent in evolving international legal orders such as investment treaty arbitration. The primary aim of this work is to provide a new method for gaining empirical knowledge about value subjectivity that can help close a weak link in all nonpositivist (value-laden) legal theory: a weakness that has manifest itself as skepticism about the possibility of measuring value objectively enough to permit its incorporation as a necessary component of analytic jurisprudence. This work proposes a theory of configurative fairness for addressing the problem related to the development or evolution of legal regimes, and how legal regimes perceived as subjectively unfair can be remedied. Such a theory accepts the premise that perceptions of fairness matter in directing the way that legal orders develop, and that perceptions of fairness relate to the manner in which values are distributed and maximized in particular legal orders. It is posited that legal orders perceived as fair by their participants are more likely to be endorsed or accepted as legally binding (and are therefore more likely to comply with the processes and outcomes that such laws mandate). The purpose of a theory of configurative fairness is an attempt to provide a methodological bridge for improving knowledge about value in the context of legal inquiry through the employment of a technique called Q methodology: an epistemological and empirical means for the measurement and mapping of human subjectivity. It is a method that was developed in the early twentieth century by physicist-psychologist William Stephenson: the last research student of the inventor of factor analysis, Charles Spearman. What Stephenson did was to create a way for systematically measuring subjective perspectives, and although not previously used in jurisprudential thought, Q methodology will facilitate a means for the description and evaluation of shared subjectivities. In the context of law generally, and in investment treaty arbitration specifically, these are the subjectivities that manifest themselves as the conflicting perspectives about value that are omnipresent in both communicative lawshaping discourse and authoritative and controlling lawmaking and lawapplying decision. Knowledge about these shared value subjectivities among participants in investment treaty arbitration will allow the legal analyst to delineate and clarify points of overlapping consensus about the desired distribution of value as they relate to the regime-building issues of evolving legal orders. The focus for a theory of configurative fairness pertains to the identification of the various value positions that participants hold about a particular legal order and to configure those values, through its rules and principles, in a manner that is acceptable (and perceived as fair) by all of its participants. If such a value consensus can be identified, then particular rules in the legal order can be configured by decisionmakers in a way so as to satisfy participants’ shared value understandings. To engage such a theory, a means for identifying shared value subjectivities must be delineated. This work conducts a Q method study on the issues under debate relating to regime-building questions in investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study asked participants knowledgeable about investment treaty arbitration to rank-order a set of statements about the way that the values embraced by this legal order ought to be configured. The results of the study demonstrate that there is significant overlap about how participants in investment treaty arbitration perceive the desired distribution of values across the regime. The Q method study identified six distinct perspectives that represent shared subjectivities about value in the context of the development of investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study was also able to identify where there is an overlapping consensus about value distribution across the distinct perspectives. It is these areas of overlapping consensus that are most likely to reflect shared value understandings, and it is proposed that it is upon these shared value understandings that the future development of investment treaty arbitration ought to aim.

Par l'étude comparative de différents conflits africains, cette recherche a pour but de démontrer l'importance des pratiques traditionnelles africaines de justice au sein des processus de résolution de conflit. De nombreux exemples tels que la Sierra Leone, la République Centrafricaine, le Rwanda, l'Ouganda, le Darfour, ou encore le Mozambique, démontrent que chaque État possède sa propre expérience de justice transitionnelle. Lorsque les victimes deviennent les bourreaux, et que les bourreaux sont eux-mêmes des victimes, il devient alors impossible de se reposer sur des modèles de justice préconçus. Sur le continent africain, comme ailleurs, la justice transitionnelle nécessite d'être adaptées aux spécificités des contextes politiques, historiques et structurels de chaque conflit. Par ailleurs, les mécanismes qui composent aujourd'hui la justice transitionnelle, que ce soit à l'échelon international, national, ou local, se doivent de travailler de concert au service de la reconstruction d'un pacte social entre les populations. Il faudra donc réussir à créer des liens entre ces mécanismes, afin que la justice post-conflit représente un atout efficace pour la paix et la réconciliation. L'ambition de ce projet est d'adopter une vision plurielle et renouvelée de la Justice au service de la réconciliation en Afrique et répondant davantage aux attentes des populations impliquées, et de formuler des propositions en vue d'une complémentarité plus efficace entre les différents instrument de la justice transitionnelle. / Through a comparative study of different African conflicts, this research aims at underlying the need for complementarity between the different judicial and extra-judicial mechanisms of the transitional justice process. Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Uganda, Darfur, Mozambique, every post-conflict situation has its own experience of Transitional Justice. There is no pre-conceived solution to solve a conflict, where the frontier between victims and perpetrators is constantly shaken, and with mass atrocities committed by both sides. Be it International Justice, National Justice, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, or Local and Traditional Justice, none of these mechanisms of Transitional Justice can be efficient if they aren't any linkage between them and if they are not adapted to each specific contexts. For post-conflict justice to be a catalyst toward Reconciliation and a Sustainable Peace, peacemakers have to look deep into the political, the historical, and structural reasons that led to the commission of international crimes. The purpose of this PhD project is to encourage the adoption of a renewed plural vision of Justice in Africa, which would meet more specifically the needs of the war-torn population for a long-term peaceful society.

Cette thèse analyse la question relative au cas où, dans l'arbitrage international en matière d'investissements, dont le but principal est l'application des normes visées à la protection des investisseurs, l’État défendeur soutient que l'investissement pour lequel la protection est demandée a été obtenu au moyen d'une forme de criminalité. Dans ce contexte, la défense de l'illégalité soulevée par les État dans les contentieux d'investissement est de plus en plus courante. Cette défense fonctionne selon le schéma suivant : un État hôte enfreint les dispositions de fond que le droit international accorde aux investissements effectués dans un pays étranger, par exemple en expropriant un investisseur étranger de son investissement sans indemnité. Dans le différend qui s'ensuit devant un tribunal arbitral d'investissement, l'État défendeur invoque l'illégalité commise par l'investisseur lors de la réalisation de l'investissement pour se défendre contre la procédure arbitrale intenté contre lui. Le but principal de cette étude est celui de démontrer que des considérations systématiques de nature strictement juridique, aussi bien que de politique juridique, exigent que la défense d'illégalité dans l'arbitrage d'investissement soit strictement restreinte et qu'un tribunal ne puisse décliner d'exercer sa compétence / juridiction que dans des cas exceptionnels. Cette étude aboutit à la conclusion d'après laquelle les tribunaux d'arbitrage devraient plutôt examiner au cas par cas au stade du fond l'ensemble des circonstances soumises devant lui et procéder à une mise en balance appropriée entre les comportements de l'investisseur et ceux de l'État hôte. / This thesis addresses the question as to how an investment Tribunal is to react if, in the context of a case brought before it for breach of standards of protection of an investment, the respondent argues that the investment for which protection is sought has been secured by resorting to some form of criminality. Against this background, a defence by the Host State that has become increasingly common is the so-called Defence of Illegality. It operates on the basis of the following scheme : a Host State breaches the substantive provision that international law accord to investments made in a foreign Country, for instance by means of expropriating without compensation the investor's investment. In the ensuing dispute before an investment Tribunal, the defendant Host State raises the illegality committed by the investor in the making of the investment as defence against the breach of the substantive provisions on the protection of the investment, of which it is accused, to avoid responsibility. This thesis intends to demonstrate that both legal and policy consideration dictate that the Defence of Illegality in investment arbitration should be strictly curtailed and that a Tribunal should only decline to exercise its jurisdiction in exceptional cases. Rather, Tribunals should look at the entire set of circumstances at the merits stage and perform a proper balancing test between the conduct of the investor and the Host State.

Today we live in a world where international trade accounts for a significant proportion of the daily trade for an enormous number of companies and institutions. The number of international commercial deals that are made every day is countless. The sheer scale of international trade invariably results in an increase in the number of disputes between international partners. However, where there are problems, methods to resolve the disagreements will invariably appear. One of the main and mostly preferred methods is arbitration. Arbitration is preferred for it is convenient and cost-effective method to resolve disputes between business partners. Saudi Arabia has recently reformed its Arbitration Regulations through the implementation of new regulations in 2012. This replaces previous regulations dating from 1983 and the implementation rules of 1985. This thesis examines, analyses and criticises these regulations and compare them to the English and the Scottish arbitration laws. Throughout this study, the old Saudi regulations and implementation rules are examined in order to determine how the rule of arbitration worked in the country. Following this, the new regulations are presented to see what has changed and if there has been any improvement. This is subsequently followed by a discussion on the scale of the improvement and whether further improvements are required in Saudi Arabia. This thesis will also carry out a comparison with the English Act of 1996 and the Arbitration Scotland Act of 2010. The conclusion address and highlight the main differences between the regulations, when present and highlights what the Saudi legislator can benefit from the laws under consideration. One of the main aims of this study was to find if the Saudi Arbitration Regulations have improved and addressed the issues that concerned researchers and commentators in the past. The research finds that there are significant improvements in the Saudi regulations.

L’injonction anti-suit ou anti-procédure est le seul moyen susceptible d’empêcher une partie de s’engager, de mauvaise foi, dans une procédure initiée devant un tribunal étatique de son choix dans le but d’entraver l’arbitrage. Sa forme la plus efficace est celle d’une mesure provisoire. Cet outil juridictionnel peut, conformément aux lois et règlement d’arbitrage modernes, être obtenu des tribunaux arbitraux, qui jouissent habituellement d’un imperium suffisant pour le prononcer ainsi que pour sanctionner tout non-respect de l’ordre. S’il peut être octroyé « avant dire droit », l’arbitre doit néanmoins le fonder sur une base légale se trouvant dans le champ de sa compétence juridictionnelle. L’apparence d’une possible violation de l’une des obligations découlant de la clause compromissoire, comme celle de l’exécuter de bonne foi, ou d’un manquement à une cause de confidentialité insérée dans le contrat principal en sont des exemples. Cette mesure d’interdiction est, en outre, disponible au juge étatique français, l’injonction « de ne pas faire » n’étant guère inconnue en droit français. En matière d’arbitrage, elle pourrait par ailleurs être autorisée, en dépit de l’arrêt West Tankers, au regard du nouveau Règlement Bruxelles I bis et, surtout, lorsqu’elle prend la forme d’une mesure provisoire. Lorsque son émission paraît légitime, il revient principalement au juge étatique du siège d’un arbitrage de décider si une injonction anti-suit doit être prononcée en soutien de l’instance arbitrale. Cependant, pour des raisons d’efficacité, la juridiction d’un autre Etat qui serait en mesure de mieux faire respecter l’injonction anti-suit peut aussi l’ordonner. / The anti-suit injunction is the only means capable of preventing a party from being involved in proceedings commenced before a domestic court of its choice in bad faith and with the only objective of disrupting arbitration. It is most efficient in the form of an interim measure. In accordance with modern arbitration laws and rules, this jurisdictional tool may be obtained, in this form, from arbitration tribunals, which normally have sufficient imperium to order it, as well as to impose sanctions on any non-compliant party. Although it can be issued before the parties’ rights have been determined, the arbitrator must nevertheless make sure that its legal basis falls under his jurisdiction. Examples of such legal bases are the prima facie potential breaches of one of the obligations contained in the arbitration clause, such as to perform it in good faith, or of a confidentiality clause contained in the main contract. This restraining measure is also available to the French judge, since prohibitory injunctions are hardly unknown to French law. In the field of arbitration, it appears that its use may be permitted under the new Brussels 1 bis Regulation in spite of the West Tankers case and, especially, where it takes the form of an interim measure. When its issuance appears to be legitimate, it is primarily for the court of the seat of an arbitration to decide whether it should be ordered in support of the arbitration proceedings. However, for reasons of efficiency, if the court of another country happens to be in a better position to ensure compliance with the anti-suit injunction, it may also order it.

Le rôle que joue le tribunal arbitral dans l'établissement du contenu du droit applicable n'est pas déterminé dans la plupart des législations d'arbitrage. Cette défaillance du cadre légal conduit à l'interprétation du principe jura novit curia en matière d'arbitrage international. Certes, une transposition pure et simple dans cette matière dudit principe, tel qu'il est appliqué devant les tribunaux étatiques, n'est pas sans difficulté. Néanmoins, en vue de consolider la confiance des parties dans la justice arbitrale et améliorer sa qualité, le tribunal arbitral doit avoir un rôle prépondérant vis-à-vis du droit applicable. En outre, l'office de l'arbitre doit intégrer l'emprise croissante des principes procéduraux fondamentaux. L'administration de la preuve juridique durant l'instance arbitrale s'accomplit à travers différents outils et méthodes. Ces derniers sont, de nos jours, très harmonisés dans les différentes législations et ce grâce à l'effort considérable déployé par les différentes institutions d'arbitrage. Néanmoins, en dépit de leur utilisation fréquente, de leur évolution croissante et leurs avantages indéniables, certains inconvénients persistent et contredisent parfois les besoins d'efficacité et de célérité recherchés par les compromettants. D'autres méthodes, spécifiques pour la preuve juridique, devraient émerger pour une meilleure administration de la justice. Il ne faut toutefois pas privilégier simplement une solution rapide du litige. Il faut qu'elle soit également acceptable et juste aux yeux des parties. Un outil de contrôle de la phase post-arbitrale, qui vise à vérifier si le contenu «censé» établi du droit applicable est correctement appliqué par l'arbitre aux faits de l'espèce, doit pouvoir exister et être efficace. Une telle mesure doit cependant être respectueuse du principe de non révision au fond des sentences. / The role of the arbital tribunal in the establishment of the content of the applicable law on the merits is not envisaged in most of the arbitration statutes. This brings us to examine the principle ''jura novit curia" and the opportunity of its application to international arbitration. Applying this principle in the same way it is applied before state courts to international arbitration has led to several difficulties. However in order to encourage the parties to resort to arbitration and to increase their trust in this conflict resolution mechanism, the arbitrator must be actively involved in the establishment of the content of the applicable law. Moreover, the "ex officia" attributions of the arbitrator should always comply with the due process principles. The administration of the proof of the applicable law during an arbitration procedure is nowadays standardized in most of the different law systems, due to the continuous efforts of the arbitration institutions. However, and despite the numerous advantages of the current methods of establishment of the applicable law, many difficulties are still encountered, which is diminishing the efficiency and the celerity expected by the parties from the arbitration process. Therefore, news methods should be developed, without however compromising the quality of the justice rendered: a post arbitral control must be implemented in order to verify whether the arbitrator has correctly applied the law on the merits "as previously established" to the case at hand, while respecting the principle of non review of the award on the merits.