Small businesses are an important engine of economic growth and are essential to the stability and health of the national and global economies. U.S. Census Bureau data show that small businesses have poor survival rates, however. The literature on organizational failure contains no generally agreed-on list of the variables that separate success from failure. Although external factors are beyond a company’s control, internal factors such as business practices, management teams, and choice of business model are within its influence, and an effective board of directors can address many of the internal factors that cause failure.The majority of the literature focuses on the boards of large, publicly listed companies. The unique needs of owner-manager companies (OMCs), which are generally synonymous with small business, have not been studied sufficiently. Without a legal requirement for a board of directors, some OMCs establish panels of advisors. Using a quantitative method, the first study investigated the impact of the specific knowledge and experience that advisors possess on the performance of OMCs, as moderated by the company’s stage of growth. One key finding of this study is that the early stage of growth, managerial experience has a positive relationship to both measures of OMC performance and entrepreneurial experience has a negative relationship to both. The study also provided evidence that the impact of experience and knowledge on OMC performance is moderated by the company’s current stage of growth. The second study further explored the key findings of the quantitative study using a qualitative method. A series of thirty-two semi-structured interviews were conducted with owner-mangers and advisors. The second study corroborated the importance of managerial experience to both measures of OMC performance in the early stages of a company’s development. It also corroborated the negative relationship of entrepreneurial experience to one measure of OMC performance but contradicted its negative relationship to the other. This mixed-methods approach provided a deeper understanding of the actions that owner-managers take and how those ultimately affect OMC performance. / Business Administration/Interdisciplinary

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This dissertation consists of three studies related to corporate governance of equity mutual funds in a framework of relations between the three closely interrelated actors of mutual fund industry. The mutual fund advisers, the shareholders and the mutual fund board being the advocate of shareholders rights. The first study analyzes the advisory fee, using a survivorship bias free data set of 176 equity funds managed by 125 different advisers. The price of professional portfolio management provided by the mutual fund adviser depends not only on the fund characteristics but also on the fund objective, the adviser's portfolio related and management based decisions, and the portfolio performance. I find that the advisers may reduce their own costs through the use of derivatives or manipulate the actual fee contract by engaging in soft dollar agreements. Advisers actively manage the advisory fee contracts responding to the outcome of their management decisions. The advisory fee increases after voluntary fee reimbursement or if the adviser is not fully reimbursed for certain services. Risk taking behavior is the main motivation behind the structure of advisory contracts. Also, I show that non-surviving funds have higher advisory fees, suggesting competitive fee pricing may be necessary for survival. The second study focuses on the relation between general board characteristics, independent director characteristics and the advisory fee which is solely an outcome of the negotiations between the fund board and the adviser, thus a good proxy for the governance skills of the board. I also examine the impact of SEC's regulation change of 2000. Mutual fund scandals that took place after the regulation change of 2000 suggested that besides the fraction of independent seats, the individual characteristics of the members that occupy board seats are crucial for mutual fund board governance. I find that boards benchmark objective average fee but not necessarily for the best interest of shareholders. Shareholders are likely to benefit from the expertise of members with higher tenure and finance backgrounds. Although increase in board independence is likely to contribute to board governance, the effect of 2000 regulation change of board independence on its arguably target group is limited. Nominating committee improves the board governance. Although the results do not suggest that an independent chairman directly improves board governance, I find modest evidence that the impact of an independent chairman is likely to depend on the expertise of the member that would occupy the chairman seat. Third study analyzes a specific tool, soft dollar arrangements using a survivorship bias free data set of 432 equity funds managed by 129 different advisers. Soft dollar arrangements affect all three actors of mutual fund industry. They are widely used by the advisers, have to be monitored closely by the fund board and eventually affect the overall wealth of shareholders. Fund advisers determine the broker base, scope of brokerage services and whether to self produce or outsource brokerage services through soft dollar arrangements. In return, shareholders expect to benefit from better fund performance and reduction in advisory fee. I find that transaction execution not necessarily motivated by additional brokerage services is likely to be responsible for high turnover. Construction of brokerage base by the adviser is not arbitrary. Advisers ex ante construct the broker base in order to minimize the brokerage commissions and considering ex post soft dollar arrangements. Transaction execution related services lead to less brokerage commissions and soft dollar use while both increase if research is a consideration for broker participation. More concentrated broker base leads to lower brokerage fee and higher soft dollar use. Results indicate that advisers enforce competition within brokerage industry for lower cost of transaction execution. Shareholders benefit from increasing soft dollar use through performance improvement and reduction in advisory fee. Yet, the cost of soft dollar arrangements seems to exceed their benefit to shareholders. If the results indicate competition within brokerage industry for lower cost of transaction execution, the undisclosed premium paid for the additional services are likely to be responsible for this adverse effect.

Yes / This paper addresses groupwork processes with a group of prisoners advising a research project in a maximum-security prison in England. The research project (Appreciative Inquiry into the Diversity Strategy of HMP Wakefield. RES-000-22-3441) was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and lasted 9 months. The research explored the experiences of prisoners in diverse minority groupings and the strategies of the prison to accommodate the complex needs of these groups. The Prisoner Advisory Group (PAG) was made up of representatives from Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) prisoners; older prisoners (over 60s); Disabled prisoners (with physical disabilities, learning difficulties; and mental health problems); Gay, Bi-sexual and Transgender prisoners; and prisoners affiliated to Faith groups. It met regularly during the research. The paper considers the forming norming and performing aspects of establishing an effective participant voice in a prison-based project. It considers the contribution of the PAG to developing a research strategy that engaged prisoners in the research. It reflects on the nature of ‘participative research’ in general and whether such research is possible within a high-security prison environment.

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No / While there are many mythical stories of various kinds about the Phoenix it retains several features throughout all of them. In ancient Egypt, the Phoenix was the prodigy of the sun god Ra and appeared in the shape of a giant bird of fire, which was one of the most beautiful creatures on earth. It was remarkable in that it could not foster any offspring and at the end of its life would explode in a ball of fire. Out of the ashes, an egg is formed which then hatches the Phoenix again in its young form. The cry of a Phoenix was supposed to be of miraculous beauty. This chapter will explore if the Phoenix is a suitable metaphor for the recent re-emergence of the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), which was tasked with providing scientific expertise to the government on questions of the security risks of emerging science and technology in the life sciences. The analogy to the Phoenix suggests itself because the NSABB, chartered in 2004, had been inactive for over two years and only recently took up its work. The comparison between the Phoenix and the NSABB gives rise to several questions: first, has the re-emergence of the NSABB been met with an equally beautiful cry of joy among the scientists and security experts? Second, what happens when the Phoenix lies dormant? And third, what took place before the Phoenix was created?