Mental health professionals (MHPs) evaluate juveniles' competency to stand trial (JAC) for the courts more than any other psychological issue, but little research has been done about JAC. Only 2 previous studies have examined assessment procedures and tools used by MHPs to evaluate JAC. This quantitative nonexperimental study examined ratings by 44 MHPs in Wisconsin and Illinois for the importance of considering 6 different research-based factors linked to lifespan developmental theory and the usefulness of 3 assessment tools that have all been recommended previously by professional best practice guidelines to evaluate JAC. This study examined 2 levels of an independent variable, type of court, and how this affected ratings for importance of factors and usefulness of tools. When ratings were compared using paired t tests, the developmental factor that pertains to understanding court proceedings and working with one's attorney achieved statistical significance as more important for juvenile court than for adult court. Repeated measures ANOVA evaluated differences in ratings within groups for juvenile and adult court. The cognitive developmental factor was rated as statistically more important than other developmental factors for adult court. The results imply that, MHPs consider cognitive development and ability to understand and discuss court proceedings as critical to consider during JAC. Regarding ratings for usefulness of tools, there was not a statistically significant difference between the ratings for the 3 tools either between groups or within groups. These results could contribute to positive social change by increasing consistency in how JAC is evaluated and as a result, juveniles could be treated more fairly and in an equitable way during court proceedings.

Juveniles' right to be competent to stand trial has been increasingly recognized since In re Gault (1967) granted juveniles essential due process rights. One formulation of competence proposes two facets: competence to assist counsel (e.g., understanding the roles of legal actors, the adversarial system,) and decisional competence (Bonnie, 1992). The first goal of this project was to investigate the psychometric properties and relevant correlates of one instrument to assess competence to assist counsel, the Competence Assessment for Standing Trial for Defendants with Mental Retardation (CAST-MR; this study used only the first two scales). Results indicated acceptable internal consistency, although concerns were raised regarding the appropriateness of some items. Scores were related to age and intelligence, as in prior research. No relationship was found with most mental health scale scores, prior legal system involvement, contact with defense counsel, or learning problems. The second goal of the study centered on decisional competence and the role of immaturity; specifically whether age is associated with immature judgment (assessed using the Judgment in Legal Contexts instrument) and if immature judgment predicts decisions made about one's own case. The current study found few significant relationships between age or intelligence and variables coded from the JILC (including authority compliance, risk recognition, risk appraisal, future recognition, resistance to peer influence). Additionally, age and the perceived strength of evidence were not predictive of individuals' decisions to confess, to fully disclose to defense counsel, or to accept a plea bargain. Juveniles who had confessed scored higher on future recognition, those who fully disclosed to their attorney scored lower on authority compliance, and those who would accept a plea bargain scored higher on risk recognition and appraisal. While the results were modest, they suggest that immature performance on a judgment measure may predict individuals' legal decision-making. If a juvenile fails to appreciate the potential consequences of legal decisions, his or her decisional competence may be questioned. Generally, immaturity may need to be recognized as a basis for findings of incompetence if performance on relevant skills is shown to improve with age and immature performance is shown to interfere with competency.

As the courts have evolved over the past 30 years towards increasingly punitive sanctions for youthful offenders, the fundamental protections afforded to adult defendants have become increasingly relevant for youthful offenders. Among these protections, the right of juveniles to be competent to stand trial has gained nearly universal recognition throughout this country’s courts. Congruent with theory and previous research, we hypothesized that age, intellectual ability, psychiatric symptomatology, and maturity would all be directly related to adolescents’ competence. It was also anticipated that adolescents in the detention sample would evidence lower maturity and competency-related abilities compared to the community sample. Expanding on previous research that has consistently documented an association between age and competence, we hypothesized that psychosocial maturity would partially mediate this relationship. Further, we hypothesized that psychosocial maturity would moderate the direct relations between intellectual ability, psychiatric symptomatology, and competence. In order to test these hypotheses, we utilized a secondary sample from the MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study that included 927 male and female adolescents ages 11- to 17-years-old recruited from 11 juvenile detention facilities and their surrounding communities. Results demonstrated that age, intellectual ability, and maturity were each directly positively related to competence, and psychiatric symptomatology was negatively related to competence. Further, results provided some support for the hypothesis that maturity partially explains the relationship between age and competence. While the relationship between psychiatric symptomatology and competence did not vary across high and low levels of maturity, results supported the hypothesis that the relationship between intellectual ability and competence varies across high and low levels of psychosocial maturity. Findings suggest that intellectual ability plays an essential role in juveniles’ adjudicative competence and can serve as a protective factor against some aspects of immaturity. Given these findings, it is suggested that youth with deficient intellectual abilities facing the possibility of transfer be automatically referred for evaluations of adjudicative competence. Further, findings suggest that maturity appears to warrant further attention from researchers and clinicians involved in evaluating juveniles’ adjudicative competence. Results are discussed in terms of the legal and clinical implications of developmental immaturity on the prosecution of youthful offenders.

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本論文之主要論旨，在於探討公平正義是否可能在裁判之過程中獲得實現。筆者主要透過德沃金的法理論以及平等理論作為討論的出發點。筆者首先對於德沃金的理論進行相關的分析與討論。德沃金的法理論主要可區分為四個部分，包括：語義階段，法理階段，原理階段，以及裁判階段。在語義階段，德沃金指出，法律的概念，必須要作為一個詮釋性概念；在法理階段，德沃金將法律的概念當成一種政治價值的概念。德沃金認為，法律的概念所表彰的政治價值，便是「合法性價值」，亦即「法治」。進一步，德沃金指出，對於「合法性價值」與「法律的概念」的最佳理解，便是「整全性」。筆者認為，「整全性」是一個連接德沃金的「法理論」以及「平等理論」的關鍵概念。在《法律帝國》一書當中，德沃金主張：裁判的整全性，要求法官適用由公平與正義原則所推導出來的法律。這樣的主張，將我們帶向德沃金的平等理論。 德沃金的平等理論可以區分為兩個層面，一為討論關於分配正義的資源平等理論，另一為關乎政治權力分配的政治平等理論。這兩個概念，提供了司法裁判實踐公平正義的可能性。資源平等理論提供了相關的判準，可以使法院在裁判具體個案時得以援引，以判斷公民所擁有的具體權利，以及政府是否違反了在平等關懷下所需踐行的平等保護原則，而導致侵害人民的權利。同時，政治平等理論則為民主制度下的司法審查，提供其理論基礎。 最後，德沃金指出，關於裁判如何適用法律於具體個案的裁判過程，其與上述三階段有密切的關聯性。德沃金認為，在此一階段中，他與法實證主義者最大的不同，便是在於對於法官的裁量權的理解。德沃金認為，在其法理論體系當中，法官對裁量權的行使，是一種法律義務，而非如法實證主義者所稱，是一種道德責任。 不可避免的，對於德沃金的理論，存在有許多的反對意見。在此筆者援引了Joseph Raz以及Samuel Schaffler的論文，對德沃金的理論進行檢試。Raz指出，德沃金的理論本身，與其所主張的融貫並未有直接的關係，同時，德沃金的理論，忽略了權威在現代國家中所扮演的角色。Schaffler則指出，德沃金過份的強調經濟平等，因而致政治或社會平等遭到忽視。此外，Schaffler認為，德沃金的資源平等理論裡，欠缺對於境況與志向的區分標準。最後，Schaffler則是提到，德沃金的資源平等理論，隱藏著存在階級社會的可能性。 的確，Joseph Raz以及Samuel Schaffler的論文提供了反思性的觀點，不過，筆者認為，他們所提出的問題，無法成功的全然拒絕德沃金的理論。筆者認為，德沃金的法理論，成功的融合了「法治」以及「正義」與「公平」，因此，其理論也確實為司法裁判實踐公平正義的理念，提供了可能了路徑。 關鍵字：公平、正義、語義階段，法理階段，原理階段，裁判階段、法理論、平等、整全性、融貫、平等關懷 / The main issue of my thesis focuses on whether realization of the ideal of justice and fairness in adjudication is possible. I discuss this main issue by means of Dworkin’s legal theory and his theory of equality. First of all, I start my discussion with analysis of Dworkin’s legal theory, which includes four stages: the semantic stage, the jurisprudential stage, the doctrinal stage, and the adjudicative stage. In semantic stage, Dworkin points out that the concept of law should be interpretive concept. In jurisprudential stage, he deems the concept of law as a concept of political values, and what the value presented by concept of law is the value of legality. Furthermore, he considers the best concept of the value of the legality, so as the best conception of law, is integrity. I believe this is the key concept which connects Dworkin’s legal theory with theory of equality. In Law’s Empire, Dworkin said that integrity in adjudication asks judges apply the laws which come from the principle of justice and fairness. This leads us to Dworkin’s theory of equality. Dworkin presents his theory of Equality with two dimensions. One is equality of resources, which could be narrowly seen as a theory about distributive justice. The other is political equality concerning the distribution of political power. These two dimensions of his theory of equality offer the possibility of realizing the justice and fairness in adjudication. The theory of equality of resources offers the guidelines for courts to follow when deciding if citizens have some sort of concrete rights, and if government violates the equal protection of citizen’s rights that demanded by the ideal of equal concern. According to political equality, it offers the basis of judicial review in democracy. Finally, Dworkin points out that how judges apply laws to concrete case is something related to those three stages as mentioned above. Dworkin distinguishes himself from the legal positivists, such as Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart. The different between Dworkin and legal positivists is discretion power of judges. In his theory, it is judge’s legal obligation rather than moral responsibility as positivists regard. Inevitably, there are some critics to Dworkin’s theory of equality. Here I cited the research of Joseph Raz and Samuel Schaffler to exam Dworkin’s theory. Their articles offer reflective points of view to me. Joseph Raz criticizes Dworkin’s theory as something irrelative to the coherence that Dworkin himself requests. He further criticizes that Dworkin’s theory of adjudication ignores the role of authority in modern state. Samuel Scheffler criticizes that Dworkin’s theory of equality ignores the importance of political and social equality. Besides, how to distinguish circumstance and ambition is not clear enough in Dworkin’s theory. Furthermore, Scheffler considers that Dworkin’s theory of equality may allow a heirachy administration exists. Although they point out some defects, I do not think they did fulfill significant challenges to Dworkin’s theory. After all, I consider that Dworkin’s legal theories build up a perfect framework for realizing the value of legality, which can also be referred as the rule of law. Most importantly, his legal theories are coherent the other moral values and convictions of ethics. I think Dworkin’s theories of law and equality may offer the best possibility to realize the ideal of justice and fairness in adjudication. Key Words: justice, fairness, the semantic stage, the jurisprudential stage, the doctrinal stage, the adjudicative stage, integrity, coherence, legal theory, equality, equal concern