Cette thèse est composée de 3 essais. Le 1er essai traite de la problématique du risque de pertes extrêmes dans le secteur bancaire dans un contexte du problème d'agence entre les actionnaires et les top managers des banques. Pour pouvoir inciter les banques à ne pas prendre le risque de pertes extrêmes, il est proposé d'appliquer la régulation des fonds propres sous forme d'une politique de recapitalisations obligatoires, dont les paramètres sont choisis pour inciter les actionnaires à rémunérer leurs managers de la manière à les détourner des stratégies au risque de pertes extrêmes.Le 2ème essai développe le design de la supervision bancaire qui vise à éliminer le problème d'aléa moral au sein d'une banque, tout en assurant un coût minimum de supervisions. Les banques, dont la situation financière commence à se dégrader, doivent être soumises à des audits aléatoires. Les banques, dont la valeur de l'actif s'est dégradée considérablement, doivent être mises sous tutelle pour un redressement financier. Les auditeurs externes peuvent être impliqués dans le processus de supervision, mais ne doivent pas complètement remplacer les régulateurs. Le 3ème essai étudie comment la capacité d'emprunt de l'entreprise non-financière affecte sa politique d'investissement en présence des coûts d'émission de la dette. Il est montré que les entreprises, dont la capacité d'emprunt est moyenne, ont intérêt à réaliser un investissement plus important par rapport aux entreprises dont la capacité d'emprunt est relativement faible/forte. Cela est entièrement dû à l'effet des coûts fixes d'émission de la dette, qui émerge dans le contexte dynamique d'investissement. / This dissertation consists of 3 self-contained theoretical essays.Essay 1 brings into focus the problem of "manufacturing" tail risk in the banking sector. This work shows that, in order to prevent banks from engaging in tail risk, bank capital regulation should account for the internal agency problem between bank shareholders and bank top managers. It is proposed to design bank capital requirements in the form of incentive-based recapitalization mechanism which would induce bank shareholders to shape executive compensation in such a way as to prevent top managers from engaging in tail-risk.Essay 2 deals with the problem of moral hazard in bank asset management. It proposes the concept of incentive-based bank supervision aimed at preventing moral hazard at a minimum cost to the regulator. It is shown that the intensity of supervision efforts should be gradually adjusted to the bank's financial health: banks in the mild form of distress should be subject to random audits, whereas deeply distressed banks should be placed under temporary regulatory control. To prevent double moral hazard, external auditors involved in supervision should be offered the optimal incentive contract.Essay 3 examines the impact of credit rationing (debt capacity) on corporate investment in the setting with costly debt financing. It is shown that, when credit constraints are binding, the firms with intermediate levels of debt capacity will establish larger investment projects than the firms with relatively low or high debt capacity. This non-monotonicity of investment on debt capacity arises due to the effect of the lump-sum debt issuance costs in the dynamic context of investment.

已開發國家中，無論個人或是法人所擁有之財富大多透過金融中介機構管理，因此，財富委由他人管理衍生出現代資本市場中重要的委託關係。委託人與基金管理人產生委任契約時，也必然產生代理問題，即雙方利益不一致所額外增加的成本。為降低代理成本，於委任合約加入對管理人下檔投資風險的要求成為降低代理成本的重要機制。本研究因此探討當基金管理人面對契約存在最低報酬要求時，如何進行最適資產配置決策，並同時分析下檔風險限制改變時對管理人投資行為的影響。研究結果顯示，委任合約增加經理人最低保證收益時，基金管理人傾向增加持股，而經理人風險趨避程度增加時，將減少風險性股票資產，進而持有債券；如果投資目標收益於受委託期間皆不改變，將造成經理人持有債券組合以規避下檔風險，同時卻喪失追求資本利得。 / In most developed countries, financial wealth is not managed directly by the investors, but through a financial intermediary. Hence, the delegated portfolio management is one of the most important principal-agency relationships in the current economy. In addition to that, the principal-agency relationships between the investor and portfolio manager must produce agency cost. In order to reduce these costs, the mandates in the contract become an important factor in reducing the principal-agent problem in a delegated portfolio management framework. In this research, we study how fund managers do asset allocation when they face some guaranteed returns and the relationships between the choices of mandates and the behavior of fund managers. We suppose that the objective of the delegated fund managers is to maximize the expected utility of wealth of the long-term fund at the end of each period and fund managers also have to fulfill some constrains given at the beginning. Finally, we explain how fund managers do optimal asset allocation by our model and some numerical analysis.

功能性委員會－薪酬委員會之設置可被認為是強化公司治理的關鍵之一， 其主要功能是在於協助公司完成健全高階經理人之考核與薪酬管理制度，並讓 公司治理結構更加完善。薪酬委員會之設置已在歐美國家行之有年，而我國至 最近 2011 年才強制上市櫃及興櫃公司設置薪酬委員會，目的在於希望藉由薪 酬委員會之設置能有助於屏除公司經營團隊存有肥貓之疑慮。而距離實施已有 一年之時間，本研究主要在於探討現階段上市櫃公司薪酬委員會組成及品質與 代理問題之關聯性。實證結果發現：由公股主導之上市櫃公司，委員會委員擁 有學術背景之佔比愈高；專業經理人治理及盈餘分配比愈高之上市櫃公司，委 員會委員擁有企業界背景之佔比愈高；機構投資人持股比愈高之上市櫃公司， 委員會委員擁有學術及企業兩者經驗之佔比愈高；經理人持股愈高、機構投資 人持股比愈高之上市櫃公司，薪酬委員會品質愈佳；盈餘分配比愈高、有交叉 持股行為之上市櫃公司，其薪酬委員會品質愈差。 / The compensation committee plays an important role in enhancing cooperate governance. The purpose of the compensation committee is not only to administer and evaluate the company's compensation policies for the board of directors, but also to set appropriate and supportable pay programs for the CEO and other executive officers of the company. The existence of compensation committee is common in developed countries, but was just required in Taiwan since 2011. Therefore, this paper mainly focuses on the composition of compensation committee and its quality associated with agency problem. By using sample of 1,440 listed companies in Taiwan, the result shows that government-owned corporations tend to have a higher proportion of their compensation committee members from academic background; companies ruled by managers tend to have a higher proportion of their compensation committee members with business background; the higher the proportion of institutional investors in the company, the higher the proportion of the compensation committee members possess both academic and business experience. In addition, CEO’s shareholding and institutional investors’ shareholding are positively associated with the quality of the compensation committee. However, the cash flow right is negatively associated with the quality of the compensation committee; a company with cross-shareholding characteristic is also negatively associated with the quality of the compensation committee. Key

The main goal of this dissertation was to obtain an understanding as to the true economic nature of employee share options and the problems surrounding the accounting thereof. The main conclusion of this study is that employee share options should be expensed in the income statement as and when the employee's services are performed. The reason is that employee share options are valuable financial instruments which the employer has used to compensate the employee for his services. It was also concluded that exercise date accounting and classification of outstanding employee share options as liabilities on the balance sheet is the most appropriate accounting treatment. Such accounting treatment trues up the accounting of employee share options with that of cash-settled share appreciation rights, which are economically equivalent transactions. The measurement of employee share options should be based on their fair value using an option-pricing model adapted for the specific features of employee share options. / Accounting / Thesis (M. Com. (Accounting Science))

We present three chapters on theoretical issues of banking. These deal with bank runs, risk sharing, lending and profitability. In the first chapter, we examine the agency problem in the bank-depositor relationship. Depositors are the principals and banks are the agents. Banks choose investment portfolios and are subject to moral hazard in that they have incentive to take on more risk than desirable to depositors because they are residual claimants. We study an incentive-compatible mechanism that prompts banks to follow a safe investment policy. This mechanism leaves the bank a profit margin in a similar manner to a CEO being paid a bonus by a company. In the second chapter, we extend Allen and Gale (1998) by adding a long-term riskless investment opportunity to the original portfolio of a short-term liquid asset and a long-term risky illiquid asset. Through portfolio diversification, we identify the risk-sharing deposit contract in a three-period model that maximizes the ex-ante expected utility of depositors. Unlike Allen and Gale, there are no information-based bank runs in equilibrium. In addition, our model can improve consumers' welfare over the Allen and Gale model. I also show that the bank will choose to liquidate the cheaper investments, in terms of the gain-loss ratios for the two types of existing long-term assets, when there is liquidity shortage in some cases. Such a policy reduces the liquidation cost and enables the bank to meet the outstanding liability to depositors without large liquidation losses. In the third chapter, we study the role of banks in providing loans to borrower firms. This paper extends the theory of designing optimal loan contracts (for profits) in the Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) model to a setting where asymmetry of information exists. Based on the verifiability of information structure, we analyze complete and incomplete contracts. Through this analysis, optimal, incentive-compatible loan contracts that maximize the expected profit of the bank are characterized. Our analysis suggests that a bank could be induced to liquidate a borrower's project under specific conditions. Furthermore, we identify implementable mechanisms for the renegotiation game given the bargaining power between a borrower and a bank.

Cette thèse, en portant une attention particulière sur les entreprises familiales turques et par l'utilisation d'une approche fondée sur la théorie de l'agence, a pour objectif de mettre en lumière les implications du capital familial sur la performance, la distribution de dividendes et les avoirs étrangers. Elle étudie premièrement en s'appuyant sur une méta-analyse, la relation entre l'impact net du capital familial sur la performance de l'entreprise et l'effet de modérateurs sur cette relation. Ensuite, elle examine si, en Turquie, le capital familial comble ou profite des lacunes institutionnelles et étudie comment les entreprises familiales diminuent les préoccupations relatives à l'expropriation des actionnaires minoritaires. Enfin, elle explore comment dans le cas turc, les investisseurs étrangers perçoivent le capital familial et les pratiques de gouvernance appliquées par les entreprises familiales pour éliminer les préoccupations de ces investisseurs concernant l'expropriation de leurs droits. Les principaux résultats de cette thèse démontrent que l'impact du capital familial sur la performance des entreprises est positif mais faible. Le niveau de développement des institutions formelles du pays dans lequel les entreprises familiales opèrent, modère la relation entre le capital familial et la performance des entreprises. En Turquie, un niveau modéré de détention du capital par la famille est bénéfique car la performance comptable atteint un pic à ce niveau de détention et les investisseurs valorisent un tel niveau de détention du capital par la famille. En outre, lorsque les familles détiennent un niveau substantiel de droits de vote et participent activement au management de l'entreprise, le versement de dividendes se réduit et la gouvernance familiale profite des lacunes institutionnelles pour exproprier les autres actionnaires de leurs droits. Enfin, en Turquie, le recours effectif par les entreprises familiales à des pratiques de gouvernance diminue les inquiétudes des investisseurs étrangers concernant l'opportunisme de la famille. / Using insights mainly from agency theory, this dissertation intends to shed light on performance, dividend payout and foreign holdings' implications of family involvement in firm with an emphasis on Turkish family firms. The dissertation first investigates the net effect of family involvement on firm performance and the effect of moderators on that relationship by conducting a meta-analysis. It then shifts the focus on Turkey to examine whether family governance fills or abuses institutional gaps and look into how family firms alleviate concerns of expropriation of minority shareholders. Finally, it investigates how foreign investors perceive family involvement in firm and firm-level governance practices of family firms to mitigate investors' expropriation concerns in Turkey. The main findings of this dissertation show that the impact of family participation on firm performance is positive but modest. The development level of formal institutions in countries in which family firms operate moderates the relationship between family involvement and firm performance. In Turkey, moderate levels of family involvement in ownership are beneficial since accounting profitability reaches a peak at these levels and foreign investors value these levels of family participation in firm. On the other hand, when families have substantial voting rights and actively participate in management, dividend payouts reduce and family governance abuses institutional voids by expropriating other shareholders. Additionally, the effective use of firm-level governance practices by family firms mitigates foreign investors' concerns about family opportunism in Turkey.

This thesis consists of three essays on the behavior of corporate insiders and the optimal regulation of insider trading. The first of these three essays examines the welfare effects of insider trading and its attributes as an executive compensation mechanism; in addition, an optimal regulation of insider trading in the light of the model is proposed. The second essay analyzes another facet of insider trading: whether insiders can be a source of liquidity and act as traders of last resort on their companies' stock; moreover, the effects of transactions by insiders and by the company itself on the distribution of stocks returns are compared empirically. Finally, the topic of the third essays is the dynamics of insiders' holdings, and how these dynamics are a function of the number of large shareholders in the firm; the conclusions are empirically tested for Real Estate Investment Trusts.Aquesta tesi conté tres assajos sobre el comportament dels agents corporatius y la regulació de la compravenda d'accions amb informació privilegiada. El primer examina l'efecte de la negociació amb informació privilegiada y la seva utilitat com a mecanisme de compensació; es proposa una regulació de la negociació amb informació privilegiada. El segon assaig analitza si els agents corporatius són una font de liquiditat y actuen com a comerciants d'últim recurs per a les accions de la seva companyia; també es comparen empíricament els efectes de la negociació per part dels actors corporatius amb els de la negociació per part de les mateixes empreses en la distribució dels rendiments de les accions. L'últim assaig estudia la dinàmica de les carteres d'aquest actors en accions de les seves pròpies empreses, i com aquesta dinàmica es funció del nombre d'actors corporatius a l'empresa; les conclusions es testegen empíricament per a fons d'inversió immobiliària.

台灣不動產投資信託（T-REITs）自2005年發行至今已逾六年，然其市場表現仍不如發行之初所預期。過去國內已有許多研究針對T-REITs市場發展進行探討，然而目前就T-REITs與直接不動產投資市場價格表現間之相關研究尚付之闕如。有鑑於此，本研究藉由共整合與Granger因果關係檢定，檢視REITs與直接不動產市場間之關聯性，了解台灣與美國之REITs市場表現差異及其影響因素，進而作為改進T-REITs運作機制或架構之參考依據。 實證結果發現，美國之REITs與直接不動產市場之間存在共整合關係。此結果表示，長期而言，這兩者可能具有相似之風險分散效益。此外，透過Granger因果關係檢定發現REITs領先於直接不動產，乃因前者市場較具效率。另一方面，台灣之REITs與直接不動產市場之間則不具有共整合以及領先或落後關係，然直接不動產當期價格仍會受到本身與REITs之前期價格影響。 本研究進一步分析台、美兩國實證結果之差異原因如下：資料的樣本期間、REITs市場規模、存在於T-REITs市場之集中性風險以及潛在的代理問題。其中，針對T-REITs潛在代理問題，本研究藉由分析股票與T-REIT報酬率之波動性，發現T-REIT之不動產管理機構若與母集團相關者，則其市場表現較差。因此，我們得出T-REITs市場發展主要是受限於代理問題之結論。本研究成果不僅有助於改善T-REITs市場效率，亦可提供學術與實務之參考。 / The mechanism of Real Estate Investment Trusts in Taiwan (or T-REITs) was launched in 2005, however, T-REITs market did not perform as expected. What caused the limited development of T-REITs market? Current literature on the performance between T-REITs and direct real estate investment is limited. Through the cointegration and Granger causality tests, the purpose of this study is hence to explore the short-term and long-term dynamics between REITs and direct real estate markets in the U.S. and Taiwan, respectively. This study presents evidence of the cointegration relationship between REITs and direct real estate in the U.S. It implies that the diversification properties of these two assets are likely to be similar over the long horizon. According to the Granger causality test, REITs leads direct real estate due to the market information efficiency. These findings are consistent with those of previous studies. On the other hand, we find no cointegration and lead-lag relation between T-REITs and commercial real estate. Moreover, the current commercial transaction price is affected by both its and T-REIT previous price. By comparing the difference between the results of these two countries, there are several possible explanations for the different results between the U.S. and Taiwan, including difference in sample period, market capitalization, concentrated risk, and most importantly, the potential agency problem existing in T-REITs market. Finally, the underperformance of parent-related management T-REIT is verified through the volatilities of stock and T-REIT returns. Therefore, we conclude that the limited development of T-REITs is caused by the agency problem in REITs market. Results of this study may provide T-REITs market for improving its efficiency, as well as for the reference for both academics and real practices.