Este estudo investiga a relação entre a estrutura de propriedade e controle e o valor e desempenho das empresas não-financeiras privadas brasileiras, listadas na Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo, entre os anos de 1998 a 2002. A análise busca investigar e compreender os conflitos de agência existentes nas empresas resultantes da separação entre propriedade e controle sob o ponto de vista da governança corporativa. As variáveis de estrutura de propriedade analisadas são a concentração de votos, concentração de capital e o grau de excesso de votos, sempre em relação aos acionistas controladores. O estudo parte da suposição de que a estrutura de propriedade é um fator determinante do valor e desempenho das empresas, observando-se a endogeneidade da mesma. As principais correntes teóricas propõem que em um contexto como no caso brasileiro, onde existe uma separação entre direito de controle e direito sobre fluxo de caixa através da emissão de ações sem direito de voto, a concentração de votos e de capital favorece o melhor monitoramento efetivo por parte do acionista controlador sobre os executivos de uma empresa. Entretanto, esse efeito seria ao mesmo tempo combinado a uma maior probabilidade de expropriação dos acionistas não controladores, pois os controladores teriam o poder de usufruir de benefícios privados da empresa enquanto os custos desses benefícios seriam compartilhados entre todos os demais acionistas. Na investigação empírica foram utilizados os métodos de Mínimos Quadrados Ordinários, Efeitos Aleatórios e Efeitos Fixos. Os resultados sugerem uma influência quadrática da concentração de votos no valor e uma influência negativa do excesso de votos no valor, mas positiva no desempenho. A concentração de capital não apresentou resultados significantes, e as evidências de endogeneidade da estrutura de propriedade se mostraram fracas e inconsistentes estatisticamente. / This study focuses on the relation between ownership structure, value and performance of non-financial Brazilian public companies listed in the São Paulo Stock Exchange during the period of 1998-2002. The aim of this research is to investigate the agency conflicts that arise from the separation of ownership from control in the meaning of corporate governance. The ownership structure variables used are the voting concentration, property concentration and excess-votes of controlling owners. The main hypothesis is that ownership variables are determinant of value and performance, testing for endogenous problems, concerning the Brazilian context where the separation of control rights from cash-flow rights are widely used by the issuing of non-voting shares. The costs and benefits of such concentration are a combined effect of improved monitoring and higher probability of non-controller owners’ wealth expropriation. The empirical evidence comes from Ordinary Least-Square, Random Effects and Fixed Effects models, suggesting a quadratic relation between voting concentration and value, a negative linear relation between excess-votes and value and a positive linear relation between excess-votes and performance. Property concentration has weak influence on value and performance variables and endogenous effects do not appear to be influential in the models.

Uppsatsen utgår ifrån Agency- och Stewardship Theory samt Project Governance som bakgrund till att beskriva hur projektorganisationer arbetar med styrning av projekt. Studien ämnar skildra hur styrning av projekt påverkar projektbeställares och projektledares arbete i projekt vad gäller tillsyn, tillit samt kommunikation. För att göra detta är studien baserad på sju kvalitativa semi-strukturerade intervjuer med respondenter som verkar inom olika branscher på arbetsmarknaden. Datan från intervjuerna bearbetades sedan med s.k. deduktiv tematisk analys för att göra den mer presenter- och hanterbar. Agency- och Stewardship Theory är nära sammankopplade med Project Governance, även om de i sig själva är helt skilda. Agency- och Stewardship theory berör den eventuella problematik som kan uppstå när en uppgift delegeras från en part till en annan, något som är högst aktuellt i en projektorganisation. Project Governance är däremot ett ramverk vari det framkommer hur moderorganisationen vill att projekt förhåller sig till rörande ett antal parametrar. Vi har valt att presentera fyra olika perspektiv på Project Governance och en sammanställning av gemensamma drag i perspektiven är att Project Governance involverar ett antal styråtgärder så som att anpassa projektets syfte och mål med moderorganisationens, olika former av kontrollmekanismer och styrgruppens sammansättning. Det framkom i intervjuerna och sedermera i resultatet att inslag av Project Governance är ständigt påverkande och återkommande i samtliga av respondenternas arbetssituation. Det rör sig om generella styrmedel så som ekonomimöten med kunder eller entreprenörer och rapporteringsskyldigheter till fasta beslutspunkter och kontinuerliga möten med styrgruppen. Det främsta och kanske mest utpräglade resultatet är hur pass mycket tilltro det finns i s.k. partneringssamarbeten och hur styrningen blir allt mer komplex när allt fler företag blandas in.

Abstract A major proposition of the agency theory is that the conflict of interests between an agent and a principal is reduced when the agent’s wealth and compensation are tied to the performance of the firm. Apart from the direct predicted relation to corporate performance, compensating managers with equity instruments has implications for corporate risk-taking and payout policy choices. Additionally, equity-based compensation practices are to a large extent shaped by institutional factors, such as accounting regulations. This dissertation seeks to enhance our understanding of the determinants and implications of equity-based compensation and equity-based ownership of public companies’ executives through four interrelated essays. First, the dissertation re-examines the performance and risk-taking consequences of executive equity-based compensation and equity ownership using novel approaches. Second, the dissertation studies the side effects of equity-based compensation and the ways in which companies respond to the accounting regulations in the area of equity-based compensation. The empirical results of the first essay show that CEO’s equity incentives are economically more significant when measured relative to her outside non-firm wealth rather than relative to the total market value of the firm. These results also suggest that there is a positive relation between CEO’s equity incentives measured relative to her outside wealth and future accounting performance. The second essay reports that executive risk-taking incentives resulting from stock options holdings are significantly positively related to the degree of risk a firm takes when offering its customers trade credit. The third essay provides empirical evidence that companies engage in timing equity grant dates before the release of favorable earnings news in order to minimize the subsequent compensation expense. The fourth essay documents an inverse relation between the executive cash dividend receipts resulting from the holdings of equity and the level of current cash compensation of CEOs, and suggests that equity ownership is indirectly interrelated with the structure of cash compensation via dividends. Collectively, the results of the dissertation are of interest to shareholders of public companies, executive compensation consultants and boards of directors. / Tiivistelmä Agenttiteorian mukaan agentin ja päämiehen intressien ristiriita pienenee, kun agentin varallisuus ja palkkaus on sidottu yrityksen suorituskykyyn. Tämän suoran vaikutuksen lisäksi ylimmän johdon osakesidonnainen palkitseminen vaikuttaa sekä yrityksen riskinottoon että voitonjaon muotoon. Institutionaaliset tekijät, kuten tilinpäätöstä koskevat säännökset, vaikuttavat myös yritysten osakepohjaisten palkitsemiskäytäntöjen muotoutumiseen. Tämän väitöskirjan tarkoituksena on lisätä ymmärrystämme pörssiyritysten ylimmän johdon osakepohjaisista palkitsemisjärjestelmistä ja osakeomistuksiin johtaneita syitä ja niiden seurauksia neljän osatutkimuksen avulla. Väitöskirjassa tarkastellaan ensinnäkin osakepohjaisten palkitsemisjärjestelmien ja osakeomistusten vaikutuksia yritysten suorituskykyyn ja riskinottoon lähestymällä kysymystä uudella tavalla. Toiseksi väitöskirja tarkastelee osakepohjaisten palkitsemisjärjestelmien sivuvaikutuksia ja yritysten reagointia palkitsemisjärjestelmiä koskeviin säännöksiin. Ensimmäisen osatutkimuksen empiiristen tulosten mukaan toimitusjohtajan osakekannustimet ovat taloudellisesti merkittävämpiä silloin, kun ne on mitattu suhteessa toimitusjohtajan varallisuuteen sen sijaan, että ne olisi mitattu suhteessa yrityksen markkina-arvoon. Tulosten mukaan toimitusjohtajan osakekannustimien ja yrityksen tulevan kannattavuuden välillä on positiivinen suhde. Toisen osatutkimuksen tulosten mukaan ylimmän johdon osakeoptioiden riskinottokannustimet lisäävät yrityksen riskinottoa asiakasluotoissaan. Kolmas osatutkimus antaa empiiristä näyttöä siitä, että yritykset ajoittavat osakeluovutuspäivät minimoidakseen palkitsemiskustannuksia tilinpäätöksissään. Neljännessä osatutkimuksessa havaitaan käänteinen suhde toimitusjohtajan käteisosinkojen ja -palkan välillä, mikä viittaa siihen, että osakeomistus ja käteispalkan rakenne ovat epäsuoranaisesti yhteydessä toisiinsa osinkojen kautta. Kokonaisuudessaan väitöskirjan tulokset ovat mielenkiintoisia pörssiyritysten osakeomistajille, yritysjohtajien palkitsemisneuvonantajille sekä yritysten hallituksien jäsenille.

Numerous studies have examined the relationship between a critical mass of women on corporate boards and firm performance. Despite convincing arguments that racially diverse board members contribute positively to the board's management oversight and strategy formulation responsibilities, literature examining race in the boardroom has been very scant and racial minority directors remain persistently under- represented on corporate boards. The purpose of this study was to examine whether a critical mass of 30% Black directors on boards and audit committees of public companies performed better than companies with less than 30% Black directors. The study was conducted using the mining and financial services companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Quantitative research methodology was utilized to test the financial ratios of ROA, ROE, Tobin's Q, Share Price, P: E Ratio and Dividend Payout with companies that had a minimum of 30% Black directors compared to companies with less than 30% Black directors. The study revealed that there was no relationship between either a critical mass of Black directors on boards and financial performance or between a critical mass of Black directors on audit committees and financial performance. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / ccgibs2014 / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / MBA / Unrestricted

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of Hotel, Restaurant, Institution Management and Dietetics / SooCheong Jang / Deborah D. Canter / In the last few decades, franchising has become a part of everyday life in the United States. Many firms in a variety of industries have adopted franchising as a method of doing business. Despite the importance of franchising, the literature on why firms initially choose to franchise and how franchising affects financial performance has been scant (Combs et al., 2004; Watson et al., 2005). The purposes of this study were 1) to examine how well agency theory, resource scarcity theory, risk-sharing theory, and specific knowledge theory justify the franchising decision, 2) to investigate whether franchising affects restaurant firms' market value and profitability, and 3) to investigate the relationship between the ownership mix, combination of franchised and company-owned outlets, and financial performance. For the statistical analysis, the data were collected from the Standard and Poor's COMPUSTAT database, Bond's Franchise Guide and 10 K reports. A logistic regression model was developed to identify a set of variables that best differentiated firms engaged in franchise contracts from those that were not. The statistical results indicated that: 1) Young and growing firms used franchise more to increase the flow of resources. This result supported resource scarcity theory. 2) The degree of geographic dispersion and involvement in foreign countries increased the probability of a firm's decision to franchise. These results supported agency theory. 3) The decrease of specific knowledge requirements increased the franchising probability. This result supported specific knowledge theory. T-tests and multivariate regression models were used to test how franchising affects firms' financial performance. The findings indicated that 1) franchised firms had better financial performance than non-franchised firms, 2) the relationship between ownership mix and financial performance was curvilinear and the inverted U-shaped relationship suggested the existence of optimal ownership mix that can maximize a firm's financial performance, and 3) ownership mix not only directly affected a firm's intangible assets, but also indirectly affected a firm's intangible assets through advertising. This study found that a purely company owned or a purely franchised chain did not produce the best financial performance. Restaurant companies could use both company-owned and franchised units to leverage the strengths of one another, which will yield a better overall financial performance than if either structure was to operate alone.

Denna studie handlar om målkonflikter och har haft som syfte att ta reda på hur målkonflikter hanteras grundskolor. Vi har använt oss utav en kvalitativ metod där vi har gjort intervjuer med två skolchefer och tre rektorer inom skolverksamheten. Vi har använt oss av två teorier, vilka är agentteorin och målsättningsteorin. Den första teorin som vi har använt oss av var agentteorin som menar att agenten handlar i egenintresse. Den andra teorin vi använde var målsättningsteorin som handlar om att undersöka individernas motivation till att uppnå de uppsatta målen samt vad som gör att målen uppnås. Tidigare forskning menar att individer kan uppleva att det uppstått en målkonflikt på olika sätt. Det beror på hur den enskilda individen känner kring de uppsatta målen för verksamheten, men forskningen tyder även på att om målen inte är självbestämmande upplevs en målkonflikt. Tidigare forskning har visat att en konflikt kan hanteras genom att tvinga, integrera, kompromissa, påverka och omvandla. Vi har i denna studie kommit fram till att konflikterna hanteras genom att kompromissa. Vi har även i vår analys kommit fram till att målkonflikter hanteras genom dialog, öppet klimat och delaktighet. En målkonflikt mellan budget- och kvalitetsmål hanteras genom att kvalitetsmålen prioriteras högst då alla elever på en grundskola ska ha rätt till utbildning samt ska kunna klara av sina studier. En målkonflikt mellan individuella- och verksamhetsmål hanteras genom att verksamhetsmålen prioriteras högst då de personliga målen oftast är desamma som verksamhetsmålen. En målkonflikt mellan mål och motivation hanteras genom att alla i skolverksamheten är delaktiga. / This study wants to get a deeper comprehension and knowledge about goal conflicts. The aim of our study was to research how goal conflicts are managed in elementary schools. We used a qualitative approach as a method and we decided to interview three principals and two chiefs in school sector. We have used two theories, which are agency theory and goal-setting theory. The first theory that we have used was the agency theory, which means that the agent is acting in his own interest. The second theory we used was the goal-setting theory, which investigate the motivation of individuals to achieve the goals that are set. Previous research indicates that individuals can experience that a goal conflict has occurred in different ways. It depends on how the individual feel about the goals that are set, but the research also indicates that if the goals aren't self-determination it often feels like a goal conflict. Previous research have shown that a conflict is managed by forcing, integrate, compromise, affect and convert. We have, in this study, showed that goal conflicts are managed by compromise. We have also showed in our analysis that goal conflicts are managed by dialogue, open climate and participation. Our conclusion in this study showed that goal conflicts are managed in the same way in both private- and public elementary schools. A goal conflict between budget and quality are managed the way that quality priorities higher than budget because all students in an elementary school are entitled to education and to be able to complete their studies. A goal conflict between individual- and operational goals are managed the way that the operational goals priorities higher than the individual goals. A goal conflict between goal and motivation are managed the way that everyone in school participate.

This paper proposes an agency model for headquarters subsidiary relationships in multinational organizations with headquarters as the principal and the subsidiary as the agent. As a departure from classical agency theory, our model is developed for the unit level of analysis and considers two root causes of the agency problem - self-interest and bounded rationality. We argue that in the organizational setting, one cannot assume absolute self-interest and perfect rationality of agents (subsidiaries) but should allow them to vary. We explain subsidiary level variation through a set of internal organizational and external social conditions in which the headquarters-subsidiary agency dyad is embedded. We then discuss several agency scenarios reflecting various levels of selfinterest and rationality that lead to different manifestations of the agency problem. The proposed framework can inform more relevant applications of the agency perspective in organizational studies and motivate future research.

Approximately 51.3% of small manufacturing businesses lack effective internal controls to deter fraud. Internal control strategies, when adequately implemented, can mitigate fraud and improve profitability in small manufacturing businesses. The objective of this single qualitative case study was to explore the internal control strategies used in a small manufacturing business to mitigate assets misappropriation fraud and improve profitability. Agency theory was the conceptual framework for this study. Five business managers in a small manufacturing firm in Cameroon participated in face-to-face semistructured interviews. The data analysis process included Yin's 5-step process. Identified themes included (a) governance at a higher management level, (b) vendor-related management approach, and (c) operational practices at the department level. Business leaders in small manufacturing firms could benefit from implementing the internal controls and procedures highlighted in this study to deter fraudulent billing from vendors, deceitful payment disbursement to vendors, and misrepresentation of financial statements by company executives. Fraud reduction might help business leaders to safeguard the company's assets and improve production goals by streamlining operational practices, leading to company profitability. In turn, business profitability would result in company leaders paying more taxes, which government officials may use for social amenities and change benefiting people in the community.

Approximately 51.3% of small manufacturing businesses lack effective internal controls to deter fraud. Internal control strategies, when adequately implemented, can mitigate fraud and improve profitability in small manufacturing businesses. The objective of this single qualitative case study was to explore the internal control strategies used in a small manufacturing business to mitigate assets misappropriation fraud and improve profitability. Agency theory was the conceptual framework for this study. Five business managers in a small manufacturing firm in Cameroon participated in face-to-face semistructured interviews. The data analysis process included Yin's 5-step process. Identified themes included (a) governance at a higher management level, (b) vendor-related management approach, and (c) operational practices at the department level. Business leaders in small manufacturing firms could benefit from implementing the internal controls and procedures highlighted in this study to deter fraudulent billing from vendors, deceitful payment disbursement to vendors, and misrepresentation of financial statements by company executives. Fraud reduction might help business leaders to safeguard the company's assets and improve production goals by streamlining operational practices, leading to company profitability. In turn, business profitability would result in company leaders paying more taxes, which government officials may use for social amenities and change benefiting people in the community.

Titel: Relationen mellan chefer och medarbetare - Ett principal-agent-perspektiv Universitet: Malmö Universitet Kurs: TR128C – Företagsekonomi: Examensarbete i Transport Management Författare: Jens Andersson, Olle Karlsson & Mattias Pettersson Handledare: Benedikte Borgström Nyckelord: Agentteori, agentproblem, måldivergens, informationsasymmetri, moral hazard, adverse selection, programmerbarhet Syfte: Att utifrån ett principal-agent-perspektiv studera hur relationen mellan chefer och medarbetare i den studerade miljön påverkas av förekomsten av informationsasymmetri och skilda målbilder, samt hur motivationen att prestera på arbetsplatsen kan påverkas av incitamentsstrukturer kopplade till kontraktsupplägget och olika nivåer av övervakning. Metod: Studien har genomförts via en kvalitativ ansats där data insamlats genom intervjuer, observationer och textanalys. Teori: Studiens teoretiska ramverk bygger på principal-agent-teorin och dess komponenter med fokus på informationsasymmetri och skilda målbilder. Slutsatser: I den studerade miljön där relationen mellan principal och agent kännetecknas av hög informationsasymmetri, hög programmerbarhet och parterna motiveras av olika målbilder står principalen inför valet att antingen komplettera ett beteendebaserat kontrakt med tillräckliga övervakningsmekanismer för att utröna agentens beteende, eller försöka upprätta ett resultatbaserat kontrakt. Hög informationsasymmetri kopplat till ett beteendebaserat kontrakt riskerar att lägga grunden för problem kopplade till moral hazard då agenterna blir helt fria att agera efter sina egna målbilder. / Title: The relationship between managers and workers - An agency perspective University: Malmö Universitet Course: TR128C – Business Administration: Bachelor thesis in Transport Management Writers: Jens Andersson, Olle Karlsson & Mattias Pettersson Mentor: Benedikte Borgström Keywords: Agency theory, agency problem, goal divergence, information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection, programmability Purpose: From an agency perspective study how the relationship between managers and workers in the studied environment is affected by the existence of information asymmetry and diverging goals, and also how the motivation to perform at the workplace can be affected by different incentive structures related to the contract form and different levels of surveillance. Methods: The study has been conducted via a qualitative approach and the data has been collected through interviews, observations and text analysis. Theories: The studies theoretical framework is based on the agency theory and its components with a focus on information asymmetry and diverging goals. Conclusion: In the studied environment the relationship between principal and agent is characterized by asymmetrical information flows, high programmability, and diverging goals. This leaves the principal to either reinforce a behavioral based contract with sufficient surveillance to uncover the agent’s behavior, or to try and establish a contract based on results. A high degree of information asymmetry in combination with a behavioral based contract runs the risk of laying the foundation for problems related to moral hazard as the agents are free to act according to their own personal goals.