Background: Earnings management has been a popular topic of discussion for many decades, and researchers always look for underlying factors that can reduce the phenomenon. A common subject for this has been board independence, and the implications that independent directors have on earnings management. Additionally, researchers have argued that legal protection is a big part in how independent directors can exercise their monitoring, as well as the use of control-enhancing mechanisms (CEM). Purpose: To investigate the relationship between board independence and earnings management. This thesis will also examine if shareholder protection and CEMs respectively affect independent directors´ ability to reduce earnings management. Method: This thesis adopts a positivistic view with a deductive approach using a quantitative method where data was collected using databases, websites, and annual reports. Further, the data was analyzed using a Spearman correlation matrix and an OLS regression for each hypothesis. Findings: The findings show that there exists no relationship between board independence and earnings management. Furthermore, the thesis does not find support that shareholder protection has a moderating influence on the relationship, and thus has no effect on independent directors’ability to reduce earnings management. However, the thesis finds indications that firms who have the CEM of dual-class shares experience increase in earnings management as the share of independent directors increases.

This study examines the relationship between abnormal stock returns around acquisition announcements and the ownership structure of the buyers on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Previous research has been focused on the impact of family ownership to market reactions around acquisition announcements. This study, however, performs a comprehensive analysis of the three most common owner types in Sweden: family, institutional and foreign owners. To measure the relationships between market reaction and ownership, an event study is carried out which measures the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for Swedish firms six days [-1,+5] around the acquisition announcements. Through a sample of 296 listed Swedish firms and 1145 acquisition announcements during 2015-2023, the results show a positive relationship between family ownership and acquisition announcement returns. For foreign ownership, we found implications for a negative relationship with announcement returns and for institutional ownership no relationship was found. In all, the findings imply that the ownership structure of the acquirer impacts the market reactions to acquisition announcements in Sweden.

Bakgrund: Den tredje januari 2018 trädde EU-direktivet Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) i kraft. Direktivet ämnar öka investerarskyddet genom att eliminera informationsasymmetri och intressekonflikter på finansmarknaden, och samtidigt harmonisera reglerna mellan EU-länder. Inom investeringsrådgivning innebär det nya regelverket ökad dokumentation, ett större fokus på att försäkra sig om att investerarna förstår risker, hårdare krav på hur avgifter kommuniceras och striktare regler kring incitament. Allt detta för att skydda investerarna, som ofta visat sig ha en bristfällig finansiell kunskap och ett lågt intresse för privatekonomi. Syfte: Syftet med uppsatsen är att utifrån värdepappersföretagens perspektiv skapa förståelse för vilken påverkan EU-direktivet MiFID II har haft på principal-agent problem som uppstår vid investeringsrådgivning. Genomförande: Uppsatsen är en kvalitativ fallstudie. Vidare har ett fenomenologiskt forskningsperspektiv använts, med en abduktiv ansats. Det empiriska materialet har samlats in genom semistrukturerade intervjuer med sammanlagt sju respondenter som alla jobbar på värdepappersföretag, vilka valdes ut med ett målstyrt bekvämlighetsurval. Resultat: Uppsatsen kommer fram till att principal-agent problemen inom investeringsrådgivning inte har eliminerats. Informations- asymmetrin är enligt vår tolkning av de traditionella teorierna närmast obefintlig, men utgör fortfarande ett stort problem på grund av investerarnas ointresse och relativt låga förmåga att ta till sig informationen. Vi argumenterar därav att dessa dimensioner bör inkluderas i teorin för vilka trösklar som kan orsaka informationsasymmetrin. Intressekonflikterna har reducerats, men finns till viss mån fortfarande kvar. Motivationen att agera i ett egenintresse har dock inte påverkats. Uppsatsen visar således på att MiFID II inte har förflyttat principal-agent relationen till en stewardship relation. Kunskapsbidrag: Det teoretiska bidraget gällande informationsasymmetri utmanar antagandet om att principalen vill ha information som är relevant för denne. Uppsatsen visar att så inte alltid är fallet. Förutom att det uppstår informationsasymmetri om det är kostsamt eller svårt att ta reda på agentens handlingar, kan det även uppstå i situationer där principalen är ointresserad av, eller oförmögen att ta till sig av informationen enligt vår mening. Vidare har MiFID II inneburit att det är svårare för agenten att tillgodose sitt egenintresse om detta strider mot principalens. Däremot har direktivet inte inneburit att den interna motivationen ändrats och det går därför inte att förutsätta att ett kontraktsförhållande som haft en principal-agent relation övergår till en stewardship relation när dessa problem elimineras. Genom en ökad förståelse för hur tvingande lagstiftningar påverkar principal-agent problem kan det empiriska bidraget hjälpa tillsynsmyndigheter i sitt arbete att hantera principal-agent problem. Uppsatsen skulle således kunna underlätta vidareutveckling av regleringen som finns idag, likväl som utformningen av framtida direktiv och lagar. Med ett utomstående perspektiv på vilka intressekonflikter som kan uppstå vid investeringsrådgivning skulle det empiriska bidraget också kunna vara gynnsamt för värdepappersföretag och deras arbete för att hantera intressekonflikter. / Background: On January 3, 2018, the EU directive Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) came into effect. The directive is intended to expand investor protection through eliminating information asymmetry and conflicts of interest in the financial market, while also harmonizing the regulations between nations within the EU. For investment advising, the directive results in more extensive documentation and stricter regulation of how fees and risks are communicated, as well as how incentives are handled; all with the aim of protecting investors. At the same time, the general public shows low interest in personal finance, as well as inadequate financial knowledge. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to further the understanding of how the introduction of the EU directive MiFID II has affected the principal-agent problem that arises during investment advising, from an investment firm perspective. Completion: This is a qualitative case-study which utilizes a phenomenological research perspective and an abductive approach. The empirical material has been collected through semi-structured interviews at investment firms with a total of seven respondents, whom were selected through goal-oriented convenience sampling.  Conclusion: The study concludes that the principal-agent problems in investment advising have not been eliminated. According to our interpretation of the traditional theories, information asymmetry is nearly non-existent. Yet it remains a significant problem due to lack of interest and an inability to assimilate the information. Thus, we argue that the theoretical framework should be revised to include these barriers, as they may lead to information asymmetry. Conflicts of interest have been reduced, but still remain to some extent. Furthermore, the motivation to act based on self-interest still remain. Hence, the study shows that MiFID II has not turned the principal-agent relationship into a stewardship relationship. Contribution: The theoretical contribution to information asymmetry challenges the assumption that the principal is interested in all the information that is of relevance for them. The study show that this is not always the case. Apart from information asymmetry arising when ascertaining the actions of the agent is expensive or difficult, it can also arise due to the principal’s lack of interest or inability to assimilate the information. Moreover, MiFID II has made it more difficult for the agent to act in their own self-interest, should it deviate from the interest of the principal. The directive has not, however, affected the intrinsic motivation of the agent. Thus, we cannot assume that the elimination of these problems causes a principal-agent relationship to transform into a stewardship relationship. Through an increased understanding of how binding legislation affects principal-agent problems, the empirical contribution can help regulatory bodies in their work to mitigate the aforementioned problems. Hence, the study may help to not only expand existing legislation, but also in the development of future legislation and directives. By providing an outside perspective of what conflicts of interests could arise in investment advising, the empirical contribution could also be of use for investment firms in their work to identify and manage conflicts of interest

Revisorsyrket utvecklas ständigt. Från att tidigare ha ansetts vara en räknande ensamvarg sittandes på sitt kontor är nu revisorn en fullfjädrad konsult med kommunikation som sin vardagliga huvudsyssla. Allteftersom revisorns arbetsuppgifter byts ut från att till största del bestå av revision till att bestå mer och mer av konsulttjänster, kan revisorns ställning som en oberoende granskare av företags räkenskaper ifrågasättas.Syftet med uppsatsen är att först utforska vilka konsulttjänster, eller Non-Audit Services (NAS), som erbjuds av en revisionsbyrå. Sedan tar studien reda på vad olika intressentgrupper tycker om att revisionsbyråer bistår sina revisionskunder med NAS. Avslutningsvis undersöks intressentgruppernas uppfattning om biståendet av NAS påverkan på oberoendet. Studien byggs upp av agentteorin och intressentteorin, där revisorn ses som en oberoende granskare som ska säkerställa att företagsledningen agerar optimalt för företagets ägare och intressenter.För att få reda på vilka tjänster som NAS innefattar görs först en pilotstudie med intervjuer av fyra revisorer med varierande erfarenhet. Sedan görs en enkätundersökning där frågorna tas fram utifrån informationen från pilotstudien. De intressenter som enkäten skickas ut till är Bankanställda, Investerare/Aktieägare, Revisor/Revisorsassistent/Redovisningskonsult, Skatteverket, Studenter och Andra företag.Resultatet av studien visar att samtliga intressentgrupper ställer sig positiva till att revisionsbyråer bistår sina revisionskunder med NAS, där gruppen Revisor var mest positiva och Studenter och Investerare/Aktieägare minst positiva. Vidare anser samtliga intressentgrupper att biståendet av NAS endast påverkar oberoendet i liten utsträckning, där Revisor anser att det påverkar minst och Investerare/Aktieägare anser att det påverkar mest. Slutsatserna är att intressenterna ser NAS som något positivt och att dess påverkan på oberoendet är lägre än dess positiva sida för företagare.

Research question- This thesis investigates the determinants of capital structure of the Swedish companies. In order to do so, the two dominant theories of the corporate structure are studied and their assumptions are tested. Thus, the study researches which one of the two theories is more appealing for the Swedish market. Methodology-The study follows a purely quantitative study, by conducting an econometric analysis. The data are collected from a secondary source and more particularly the "Retriever" database, which contains financial data of the Swedish companies. Findings- The findings indicate that the determinants of the corporate structure for the Swedish market do not differ from other studies which have been conducted in other countries. However, there is a difference when it comes to tax and non-tax shields. The results suggest that in most cases the Pecking Order Theory appears to be more representative for the Swedish market, since most of the coefficient appear to be in favour of it. Moreover, the significance of the effect of the industry for the financial leverage is confirmed.

Having the author been involved in banking and finance for almost 25 years, this thesis intends to reflect on the role of banks with emphasis on cross border lending and credit rating, their effectiveness and the impacts of cultural differences. Perhaps this would not differ substantially from a researcher or a scholar, yet the exploratory approach taken in this research will be somewhat different as it deliberately seeks to answer a number of questions relevant to practitioners in today’s banking. In trying to achieve this goal, this thesis hopefully may find its way to international bankers wondering about the perspectives of their business in general and their profession in specific. It even may perhaps improve the understanding of their clients. The Basel committee which published the new Basel II framework on bank regulation and supervision was the result of long and careful discussions, wide consultations and comprehensive impact studies. Whereas Basel II covers the entire risk profile and supervision of financial institutions, this research is limited to the cross border lending by banks to companies and provides the views from both practicing international bankers and their customers on their 3 expectations regarding Basel II, credit rating and the relevance of context and culture differences. Bankers all over the world are being trained on how to read balance sheets, yet less attention is being paid as to by whom they are being created and how precisely these balance sheets came into existence, other than the accountancy standards applied. Bankers furthermore seem to agree on the fact that credit risks in large part are related to the management competencies, effective corporate governance and integrity of management and organization. The argument could be made that the assessment of management capabilities, governance and integrity may be hindered in those cases where the culture is little understood. In a three days conferences titled; “The Future of Relationship Banking”, 80 senior executives from international banks and large companies were gathered in Punta del Este, Uruguay and were asked to speak about these aspects. A transcript of the conference is provided as annex to this thesis (Annex 1) and serves to triangulate the findings of the research. Main findings of three management papers were presented by the researcher during the conference. A survey was performed during the conference and in addition, through an online survey, in total over 100 practitioners in the field participated in the survey. Results show a variation of conclusions, but very especially seem to confirm the view, contrary to the approach taken in Basel II, that cultural differences and context are felt to be highly relevant in cross border lending.

During the past decades, CEO and board compensation has increased substantially. Top management compensation and firm performance has been an extensively researched subject, and a large amount of previous studies have examined the relation of top management pay and firm performance. However, the findings and discussions have been contradictory and inconsistent. The purpose of this thesis is to examine if there is a relationship between the top management variable compensation and firm performance. We aim to explore this subject in further depth by focusing on the Swedish context and by studying if contextual issues, in terms of different industries, have an impact on this relation. In order to examine this relation multiple regression analysis were performed. The empirical evidence displays that on a general level, incentive systems of the top management have no significant effect on firm performance. We also conclude that the relation of variable pay and performance is contingent on industry. We therefore argue that the context in which the firm operates has an impact on the investigated relation in this thesis. Furthermore, the Swedish context and the Swedish governance model can be considered as one of the main explanations of the attained result.

<p>In society today large corporations are striving to regain the trust, which has been lost dur-ing the many accounting scandals that occurred lately. As a response to minimize the con-flicts countries have introduced codes of corporate governance. It is common knowledge that a company’s stakeholders and shareholders have different knowledge and interest in the company and the annual report is the agent’s main communication channel towards the principals. The Swedish code of corporate governance was implemented in July 2005 in an attempt to reduce the information gap between the managers of the company and the own-ers.</p><p>The purpose of this thesis is to examine if and how the Swedish code of corporate govern-ance has affected the content in annual reports in Sweden. We will evaluate and explain why listed companies have changed the information provided in their annual reports from the year 2001 prior to the codes existence, during the code’s implementation in year 2005, and after the implementation in 2006.</p><p>A deductive method created our research model, which was used as a tool to gather the empirical findings. Agency Theory, Institutional Theory and the Swedish code constitute the foundation for our evaluation of 65 companies’ annual reports from three individual years. Once our research model was created, an explorative and inductive method was used analyse and interpret the empirical findings.</p><p>Our conclusion is that corporate governance information in annual reports has increased, and the implementation of the Swedish code of corporate governance has affected the in-formation provided to the shareholders. Between 2001 and 2005 a rapid growth in infor-mation can be view, while only minor improvement can be found between 2005 and 2006. The Swedish code has been successful in its implementation as stakeholders and share-holders have received more information from the annual reports. However, we are ques-tioning the Swedish code for its extensive dimensions. Some areas of the Swedish code are provided with sufficient guidelines, while others would bring with it improved information to the shareholders by more detailed instructions. Many of the investigated companies have had their corporate governance information reviewed by an external auditor in 2005 and it is unexpected to see that this has been excluded in 2006. The examined companies provide information regarding many of the Swedish code’s rules, but we found the information re-lated to internal control, managing director and attendance at the general meeting insuffi-cient.</p>

Finansiella rådgivare är en yrkesgrupp som ofta beskrivs hamna i en svår position mellan sin arbetsgivare och kunden. Arbetsgivaren kan sätta press på att sälja produkter, medan kunder eftersträvar att få en lämplig rådgivning som är anpassad utifrån kundens förutsättningar. Få studier har studerat hur olika finansiella rådgivare tänker och agerar i en rådgivningssituation mellan de två parterna, samt även hur rådgivarens professionalism påverkar. Vi skapade därför en modell som belyser hur arbetsgivare, professionalism och kundvärde påverkar en finansiell rådgivare. Syftet med denna studie är att skapa förståelse om hur faktorer från arbetsgivaren, professionalism och kundvärde påverkar finansiella rådgivares agerande utifrån rådgivarens olika individuella egenskaper. Teorierna som används i studien är nära relaterade till vad som kan påverka och förklara en finansiell rådgivares agerande. Agentteorin används för att visa på svårigheten i relationen rådgivare har till sina kunder och sin arbetsgivare. Teorin förklarar även hur belöningssystem används för att påverka finansiella rådgivare till att agera enligt arbetsgivarens önskningar. Metoden som användes för att erhålla data var först en förstudie med två intervjuer, som användes för att få information inför skapandet av studiens undersökningsmodell. Därefter användes en kvantitativ metod i form av webbenkäter som skickades ut till 348 finansiella rådgivare, vilka ligger till grund för studiens empiriska data. Slutsatsen visade att det existerar ett samband mellan rådgivare med lite erfarenhet, ung ålder, och till viss del även kvinnor vad gäller att känna sig pressade av arbetsgivaren. Erfarna finansiella rådgivare agerade mer utifrån kundvärde och värderar sin professionalism högre. Framtida forskning kan göra en kvalitativ studie som grundligt undersöker om studiens resultat är samma och utforska om det existerar fler faktorer inom undersökningsmodellen som kan påverka en finansiell rådgivare. / Financial advisors are a profession that is viewed as having a difficult position between their employer and the costumer. This position is a result of the employer wanting the financial advisor to create profitability, meanwhile, the customer on the other hand is looking for advice that is best suited for them. Few studies however, have explored how different financial advisors think and act between these two factors, also professionalism is a factor. We have therefore in this study, created a model that emphasizes key qualities in each factor. The purpose of this study is to create a better understanding about how financial advisors are effected by factors from the employer, their professionalism and costumer value. The theories used in this study are related to what might affect and explain financial advisor's behavior in their working situation. Agency theory is used to show the difficulty for an advisor in the relationship between clients and employers. The reward system theory is used to explain how employers can control financial advisors. The method used to obtain data was first through a preliminary study with two interviews. Then we used a quantitative approach in the form of surveys that were sent to 348 financial advisers. This data was then analyzed in SPSS. The conclusion shows that there is a link between advisors with little experience, young age, and to some extent gender to feel pressured by their employer. Experienced financial advisors acted more towards customer value and value their professionalism higher. Future research can make a qualitative study about the same subject, but explore it more in detail and examine if there are new factors that can exist in the model. They can also investigate if a qualitative study will result in the same as our study.

Executive pay research has traditionally focused on salary, severance payments and longterm incentives. A systematic rigorous empirical examination of short-term annual bonuses is lacking. To address this omission, this research empirically examines the relationship between short-term bonuses and firm performance (TSR and EPS), in the UK. It also considers the association between form of bonus payment (i.e. cash/shares), and type of performance target (i.e. hard/soft and simple/complex) with bonus and performance. Furthermore, firm size and particular corporate governance factors are included (i.e. NED ratio on remuneration committee, CEO presence on nominations committee, CEO/Chair duality, tenure, and power) to examine their relationship with bonus value. From a sample of 299 firms listed in the FTSE-350 (1,542 executives including 300 CEOs), this study uses two competing theories (i.e. agency and power theory) to provide a fuller explanation of the subtleties of the pay-performance relation. The main findings support the agency view, since bonus is positively and significantly associated with financial performance. As with previous studies on executive bonus pay this association remains weak. By implication, power theory is not supported. However, other findings indicate: (1) although firm size may change, the proportion of bonus pay relative to salary does not vary. This suggests that large and small firms pay out proportionally similar bonuses; (2) cash bonuses are not positively related with the total value of bonus pay, suggesting that they are not any more open to abuse than other methods of compensation, as agency theory would predict; (3) cash bonuses encourage short-term achievement, as predicted by power theory; (4) consistent with agency theory, share-based bonuses are positively related to bonus pay and performance (weak association), suggesting that share-based bonuses (rather than cash bonuses) may be more effective at aligning pay with performance; (5) in line with agency theory, transparency (i.e. hard (external/published) and simple bonus conditions) is positively associated with performance, providing support for the alignment between principals' and agents' interests; (6) detailed bonus scheme characteristics are generally insensitive to performance and are becoming increasingly softer (i.e. more internal/unspecified targets) and complex (i.e. multiple targets). On the power view, these may create opportunities for executives to mask weak performance and extract greater rents; (7) governance factors are insignificant, suggesting that efforts to improve this area may be wasted, since they mainly leave pay-performance sensitivities unaffected. However, based on power theory, weak governance may foster the rise of powerful executives and widen the pay-performance gap. Therefore, it is suggested that close monitoring of executive pay must continue and shareholders should remain vigilant.