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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on February 14, 2008) Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / This study analyzes the effect of the Army Air Forces’ wartime experience on the selection and training of aviation cadets and the steps taken by the Army Air Forces to reduce the number of accidents and fatalities. Over the course of the war, the US Army Air Forces suffered over 54,000 accidents in the continental United States. These accidents accounted for over 15,000 fatalities, the equivalent of a World War Two infantry division. As a result of this wartime experience the Army Air Forces began instituting and enforcing stricter safety measures and emphasizing safety in all phases of training. By the end of the war, the Army Air Forces had transitioned from an organization with loose standards for selection, training, and safety to one with formal procedures for all three. In the process, the Army Air Forces established a new culture of professionalism for the US Air Force.

Detta arbete undersöker huruvida Försvarsmakten beskriver flygstridskrafterna utifrån ett revolutionärt eller evolutionärt synsätt. Ett revolutionärt synsätt grundar sig i föreställningen att flygstridskrafterna har ändrat krigets karaktär medan ett evolutionärt synsätt grundar sig i att flygstridskrafterna är en naturlig utveckling av krigföringen som exempelvis kulsprutan. De två synsätten representeras av varsin teoretiker. Det revolutionära synsättet representeras av John Warden och det evolutionära synsättet av Martin van Creveld. Genom att med kvalitativ textanalys undersöka den svenska doktrinserien samt försvarsmaktens utvecklingsplan och flygvapnets utvecklingsplan efter indikatorer som visar åt ena eller det andra hållet anser författaren att han fått fram ett resultat. Undersökningen visar att Försvarsmakten beskriver flygstridskrafterna ur ett evolutionärt synsätt när det gäller flygstridskrafternas integrering i den gemensamma myndigheten Försvarsmakten samt fokus på den gemensamma operationen och dess fördelar. Dock beskrivs flygstridskrafterna ur ett revolutionärt synsätt gällande deras förmåga att skapa luftöverlägsenhet samt hur de bör ledas. / This paper examines if the Swedish Armed Forces describes its air forces from a revolutionary or evolutionary approach. The idea of revolutionary approach derives from the thoughts that air forces have changed the character of war while the evolutionary approach rests on the idea that air forces is a development of warfare just like the machine gun. The two approaches are represented by two theorists, John Warden as the revolutionary and Martin van Creveld as the evolutionary.  The writer has, by examining the Swedish Armed Forces doctrines and the Armed Forces plans for development from a revolutionary and evolutionary point of view, got an answer to the question. The examination shows that the Swedish Armed Forces describes its air forces from an evolutionary approach when it comes to integration into the Armed Forces and the focus in joint operations with its benefits. The air forces are also described from a revolutionary approach when it comes to air superiority and command.

Thesis (M.S.)--School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. / "June 2008." Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 114-119). Also available via the Internet.

Depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale et la décolonisation, la France est la seule puissance extérieure au continent africain à avoir conservé en permanence des forces armées en Afrique subsaharienne. L'armée de l'air joue un rôle majeur dans la défense des territoires africains pendant la Guerre froide. Outil militaire de la puissance française, elle doit adapter son action en fonction des grands bouleversements internationaux et des crises locales. D'une force de présence pour assurer la sécurité de l'Union française, elle se transforme, après la décolonisation, en une force d'intervention capable d'agir depuis la métropole. L'armée de l'air devient un des moyens privilégiés par la France pour respecter les accords de défense bilatéraux avec ses anciennes colonies en cas d'agression par un Etat tiers. Toutefois, la fragilité des nouveaux Etats africains remet en cause la nouvelle stratégie militaire française en Afrique. Les forces aériennes françaises doivent alors être capables d'assurer à la fois la gestion de crises locales mais aussi la préparation de guerres modernes sur le théâtre d'opération africain. L'adaptation permanente de l'armée de l'air à la défense d'une zone d'action éloignée de la métropole requiert une réévaluation constante de ses choix doctrinaux, organisationnels, technologiques et de ses relations avec ses interlocuteurs africains. Si l'armée de l'air française a été un acteur crucial dans les relations internationales en Afrique, ses engagements outre-mer ont, en retour, largement modelé son évolution. L'armée de l'air porte ainsi en elle l'héritage de ses opérations sur le continent africain. / Since the end of World War II and the subsequent end of colonialism, France has become the sole external power engaged in Africa to have preserved a permanent military presence in the sub-Saharan region. The French Air Force played a major role in the defense of African territories during the Cold War. As a military tool of French power, its actions have had to be regulated according to major political upheavals and regional crises. Having first served as a stabilising presence protecting the security of the French Union, it transformed itself into a post-colonial intervention force able to react in Africa both locally and from airbases in metropolitan France. The French Air Force has become one of the most important means available to France to uphold its obligations to its bilateral defense agreements with its former colonies against third party aggression. Nonetheless, the fragility of newly created African states has frequently called into question this new French military strategy for Africa. French air forces in the African theatre of operations must be capable of conducting crisis management at the local level, but also remain ready to conduct high-level warfare in the African theater of operations. The decision to permanently commit the French Air Force to the defense of a zone of action far from metropolitan France requires a constant reevaluation of doctrinal, organisational and technological choices; and of its international relations with its African interlocutors. The French Air Force has played a critical role in French international relations in Africa and its overseas commitments have largely shaped its evolution. In this fashion, the French Air Force carries with it the legacy of its operations on the African continent.

This thesis examines how artists working for the War Artists' Advisory Committee (WAAC) represented aerial warfare. In contrast to the scholarly attention lavished on wartime films and posters, official war art remains a much neglected aspect of the propaganda war. The few studies that do exist, most notably by Brian Foss, survey the collection as a whole and consider it from an art history perspective. By focusing on the single theme of aviation, a central and defining experience of the Second World War, I embed the WAAC within the economic, social, military and cultural histories of the period and locate it within a longer time frame. Through bringing these usually disparate fields of study into dialogue, I am able to use the art to enrich broader understandings of the period, in particular, the ways in which aerial warfare was represented, how this image evolved during the war and how these cultural products related to economic, military and social factors. This thesis highlights the different roles the WAAC was expected to fulfil. Housed within the Ministry of Information, the WAAC was expected to perform a propagandist function. The committee distanced itself from propaganda and insisted that its primary function was to record for posterity the experience of living through the war. I assess exactly what kind of record the WAAC bequeathed by looking thematically at the key aspects of aerial warfare: aircraft production; the Battle of Britain; the Blitz and the bombing of Germany. I argue that whilst there was broad correlation between war art and propaganda, these images registered aspects of experience that were incongruent with and therefore absent from wartime propaganda, such as the fear of aerial bombardment and the true nature of the bombing of Germany. Moreover, propagandist constructions were not entirely separate to lived experience, rather they both reflected experience and shaped the way that individuals understood and made sense of the world around them. Therefore, in producing images that accorded with propagandist portrayals, the WAAC artists were recording a fundamental part of the experience of living through the war.

Den svenska Försvarsmakten brukar fråga sig om den är tillräckligt interoperabel för att kunna delta i internationella insatser. En minst lika berättigad fråga borde vara om den är tillräckligt interoperabel, mellan sina försvarsgrenar, för att kunna genomföra självständiga operationer utifrån teorin om gemensam krigföring. Den bristande förmågan till gemensam krigföring i försvarsmakter generellt och för Sveriges Försvarsmakt specifikt utgör uppsatsens grundläggande problem. Genom att anpassa och skapa ett analysverktyg utifrån Codners och Sjöbloms interoperabilitetsteori har Försvarsmaktens dokument analyserats för att belysa eventuella svagheter kopplat till gemensam krigföring och nationell interoperabilitet mellan mark- och flygstridskrafterna. Undersökningen visar på svagheter kopplat till den anpassade interoperabilitetsteorin och Försvarsmaktens styrande dokument. Förmågan till nationell interoperabilitet mellan mark- och flygstridskrafterna är begränsade. Främst beror det på svagheter i Försvarsmaktens strategiska koncept som inte tillräckligt beskriver betydelsen av gemensam krigföring på alla nivåer och vikten av interoperabilitet mellan försvarsgrenarna. En annan slutsats är att Försvarsmaktens doktrinära agerande riskerar att urvattna Försvarsmakten och dess försvarsgrenar på viktiga teoretiska och kulturella skillnader som behövs för att synergier skall kunna uppstå vid gemensam krigföring. / The Swedish Armed Forces tend to ask themselves if it is sufficiently multinational interoperablefor participation in international operations. An equally valid question today should be whether theSwedish Armed Forces are sufficiently nationally / internally interoperable, between their branchesof service, to be able to conduct independent operations based on the joint warfare theory.The lack of ability to joint warfare in the armed forces in general and the Swedish Armed Forcesspecially constitutes the essay´s fundamental problem. By using Codners and Sjöbloms custominteroperability theory, the Swedish Armed Forces documents were analyzed to highlight anyweaknesses related to joint warfare and national interoperability between Ground and Air Forces.The survey shows weaknesses linked to the custom theory and Swedish Armed Forces governingdocuments. The ability of a national interoperability is limited between Ground and Air Forcestoday, mostly because of weaknesses in the Swedish Armed Forces strategic concept which doesnot describe the importance of joint warfare at all levels sufficiently. This leads to deficienciesreflected in doctrines, regulations, technology, techniques and exercises. Lack of common documents,techniques, methods and exercises in turn affects armed services understanding of theirdifferent backgrounds and unique perspectives. The result will therefore be low national interoperabilityamong the armed services.

This thesis describes and evaluates the successes and failures of the use of strategic bombers through the abilities of one heavy bombardment group, the 389th. It examines the different missions that determined the effectiveness of the Group. When employed in a strategic bombing role, the 389th contributed significantly to the destruction of the German war industries and transportation system. When used as a tactical bomber, a mission for which it had neither proper training nor equipment, the 389th was generally a failure.

My research provides a historical and archaeological context for this thesis, in which I argue the JB-2 missile is historically significant as a unique example of the rapid duplication of enemy technology for both physical and psychological retaliation, as a crucial link in the chain of development for America’s cruise missile program, and for its role in early Cold War deterrence. Jet Bomb model number 2 (JB-2), America’s first operationally successful, mass produced cruise missile, developed as a direct copy of the German V-1, with slight variation in manufacture due to differences between German and American components, machinery and tooling. Continuing modifications of the JB-2 during its service life led to improvements in performance, control, and accuracy. From 1944 to 1953, the JB-2 transitioned from a weapon quickly prepared for wartime deployment to an essential test vehicle for the United States Army, Air Force and Navy while supporting the U.S. policy of containment during the early Cold War.