Submitted by Cássia Santos (cassia.bcufg@gmail.com) on 2014-09-08T13:42:22Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertacao Mohana R Barbosa.pdf: 539532 bytes, checksum: 57beaeb1d45ba9a4985699e40a245922 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-09-08T13:42:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertacao Mohana R Barbosa.pdf: 539532 bytes, checksum: 57beaeb1d45ba9a4985699e40a245922 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-30 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This work aims to understand the definition given by Alexandre Koyré for the experimental science of the seventeenth century, exploring the importance of this concept within the historiography of science. Assuming that the opposition made by Koyré of Auguste Comte’s positivism, theoretical conception dominant in the history and philosophy of sciences in the first half of the twentieth century, engenders a new meaning for science and its course. In his work as a historian of science, developed primarily between 1930 and 1961, Koyré formulates precise concepts for various elements considered essential to the history and philosophy of sciences, such as: scientific revolution, experimentation, tools and instruments. I intend to demonstrate the intellectual trajectory and epistemological debates present in the formation of these concepts. / Este trabalho tem por objetivo compreender a definição atribuída por Alexandre Koyré à ciência experimental do século XVII, explorando a importância deste conceito no interior da historiografia das ciências. Entende-se que a oposição feita por Koyré ao positivismo de Auguste Comte, concepção teórica dominante na história e filosofia das ciências na primeira metade do século XX, engendra um novo significado para a ciência e seu curso. Em seus trabalhos como historiador das ciências, desenvolvido fundamentalmente entre 1930 e 1961, Koyré formula conceitos precisos para vários elementos considerados essenciais para a história e filosofia das ciências, tais como: revolução científica, experimentação, instrumentos e ferramentas. Procuro demonstrar a trajetória intelectual e os debates epistemológicos presentes na formação desses conceitos.

Le mérite et la gloire de Galilée sont largement reconnus par ses commentateurs. La grande majorité des historiens lui octroie la paternité de la science moderne. Mais les lieux communs s’arrêtent à ces considérations. Tout se passe comme si le physicien florentin refusait tout enfermement méthodologique préférant prendre la couleur idéologique de ses exégètes. Il constitue un sujet de premier ordre en philosophie des sciences. Le développement de cette dernière, conçue comme discipline à part entière au début du XXe Siècle, s’est accompagnée en France d’une réflexion accrue sur lascience moderne et la philosophie qui la sous-tend. La glorification rationaliste des Lumières et du positivisme avait fait de Galilée le héros qui a permis de mettre la mécanique classique en lieu et place de l’ancienne physique aristotélicienne. Il était considéré par Comte comme l’inventeur de la Science. Au début du XXe S., le temps des révisions était venu. L’empirisme des Lumières et les faits généraux d’Auguste Comte laissent place à une conception aprioriste de la physique moderne défendue par Paul Tannery. La philosophie des sciences en France telle que nous la connaissons estnée avec les travaux de Tannery et de Gaston Milhaud. Si l’image de Galilée dans la pensée de Tannery est très proche de la perception d’Alexandre Koyré de la science moderne, Pierre Duhem, lui, se met en désaccord avec ses deux compatriotes en défendant l’idée d’une continuité entre la science médiévale et la science classique. / Galileo’s merit and fame are largely acknowledged by his commentators. The majority of philosophers refer to him as the father of modern science. But commonplaces stop with these considerations. Everything takes place as if the Florentine physicist refused any methodological imprisonment and did not mind taking the ideological color of his interpreters. His work constitutes a first-rate subject in philosophy of science. The development of the latter as a full-fledged discipline at the beginning of the 20th Century was accompanied in France with an intense reflection on modern science and the philosophy which underlies it. The rationalistic glorification of the Enlightenment and positivism had made Galileo the hero who allowed classical mechanics to replace astrological physics. He was considered by Comte to be the creator of Science. At the beginning of 20th Century it was time for a reevaluation. The empiricism of the Enlightenment and the general facts of Auguste Comte yielded to an aprioristic comprehension of modern physics defended by Paul Tannery. Philosophy of science as it is practiced today in France was shaped by the endeavours of Tannery and Gaston Milhaud. If the image of Galileo in Tannery closely resembles that found in Alexandre Koyré, Pierre Duhem, who defended the idea of a continuity between Medieval Science and Classic Science, stands apart.

Submitted by Erika Demachki (erikademachki@gmail.com) on 2014-09-03T18:43:57Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Renato_Fagundes_Pereira1.pdf: 1047292 bytes, checksum: fabc31b42b910d519bbf6788f80918dd (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-09-03T18:43:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Renato_Fagundes_Pereira1.pdf: 1047292 bytes, checksum: fabc31b42b910d519bbf6788f80918dd (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-19 / The present study has the proposal to analyze the way in which the birth of modern science was articulated within Renaissance’s historiography, particularly the relationship between science, philosophical thought and the various forms of writing history of thought in the first half of twentieth century. The first part we analyze the debate between Burckhardt and Cassirer and theirs interpretive differences. In the second we analyze a set of fundamental interpretations: from scientific Renaissance to absence of science in the very Renaissance. By studying this historiographical route we intend to think over the peculiarity of Alexandre Koyré’s interpretation and historiography of thought. / O presente estudo tem como propósito analisar o modo como o nascimento da ciência moderna foi articulado no interior da historiografia do Renascimento e particularmente a relação entre a ciência, o pensamento filosófico e as diversas formas de escrita da história do pensamento na primeira metade do século XX. Na primeira parte, analisamos o debate entre Burckhardt e Cassirer e suas diferenças interpretativas. Na segunda analisamos um conjunto de interpretações fundamentais: do Renascimento científico até a inexistência de ciência no Renascimento. Pretendemos, por meio do estudo desse percurso historiográfico, refletir sobre a singularidade da interpretação e da historiografia do pensamento de Alexandre Koyré.

Cette thèse vise à analyser, préciser et évaluer quel fut le rôle exact joué par Alexandre Koyré dans l'institutionnalisation de l'histoire des sciences aux Etats-Unis. Il s'agit de comprendre comment Koyré a renouvelé le paysage intellectuel dans lequel il s'insère au début des années 1940 et comment les historiens américains se sont approprié ses idées pour servir à la professionnalisation de l'enseignement de l'histoire des sciences aux États-Unis. / This dissertation aims at analyzing, specifying and estimating the exact role played by Alexandre Koyré in the institutionalization of the history of science in the United States. The goal is to understand how Koyré renewed the intellectual landscape in which he was inserted at the beginning of the 1940s, and how a number of American historians and philosophers did appropriate his ideas in their efforts to professionalize the history of science teaching in the United States.