Thesis advisor: Jeffrey Bloechl / According to Catholic social doctrine, there are two principles which serve as foundational pillars of social thought and action: the dignity of human being and the primacy of the common good. Each human person has unique and endless worth in the eye of God, since “God created each human person in His image, in the image of God he created humankind, male and female. He created them” (Genesis, 1: 27). God creates all things and wanted them to participate in His glory and happiness (well-being). Thus, by their nature, all human beings want to be happy. To reach happiness is “something final and self-sufficient and the end of our actions” (NE 1097b20), but we should not forget that by nature man is a part of the greater order. How can one defend both the dignity of the human person and the primacy of the common good? To defend the dignity of human person the first question must be answered what is meant a human person, since the ways in which we understand ourselves as persons have direct effects on the ways in which we organize ourselves collectively in the political communities. To answer what is a human person we will understand how Maritain makes the distinction between individual and person, and what it is that constitutes a human person. It leads to understand the whole human being, soul and body, is a person. Man is as a part of the greater order. According to Aristotle and followed by Aquinas, every creature is only a part of the whole perfection of the universe, just as one instrument in an orchestra is a part of the whole perfection of the harmony. “Society is a whole composed of persons is to say that society is a whole composed of wholes” (Evans and Ward, The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, p. 85). Because the relationship between the common good and the dignity of the human person is the relationship of our dignity of finality and our dignity of nature. We distinguish between the human acts and the acts of human being in order to understand the notion of Aquinas’s the human act. Then, we will understand why Maritain defends natural law as an antidote for a secular society and present crisis of pluralist society. According to Maritain, the deepest result of the crisis from the modern to the present time is man’s natural community in the natural law and his innate ordination to the transcendent as the source of ultimate value have been casted into doubt. Thus, the only appropriate way to reconcile the common good and my good is to turn God into my private good as a kind of a good infinitely shareable, as if there were commensurability between my finite and infinite goodness. To make this reconciliation into the present age, “you must love your neighbor as, like yourselves,” ordered to a common good. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

This essay explores the phenomenological features of the passional response to evil that Aquinas calls 'hatred of sin' in Summa Thelogiae II-II Q34 A3 and I-II Q23 A1, among other places. Social justice concerns and philosophical objections, however, challenge the notion that one can feel hatred toward an agent's vice or sin without it being the agent who is hated. I argue that a careful, contextual reading of these texts shows that Aquinas cannot be read as commending 'hate' in any form. The texts under consideration offer no comfort to those who appeal to hatred of sin or vice to legitimate sentiments or actions that can be reasonably taken to express hatred of persons.

This essay explores the phenomenological features of the passional response to evil that Aquinas calls 'hatred of sin' in Summa Thelogiae II-II Q34 A3 and I-II Q23 A1, among other places. Social justice concerns and philosophical objections, however, challenge the notion that one can feel hatred toward an agent's vice or sin without it being the agent who is hated. I argue that a careful, contextual reading of these texts shows that Aquinas cannot be read as commending 'hate' in any form. The texts under consideration offer no comfort to those who appeal to hatred of sin or vice to legitimate sentiments or actions that can be reasonably taken to express hatred of persons.

L'épistémologie péripatéticienne de l’Aquinate suppose l'existence d'une distinction ontologique entre la partie sensitive et la partie intellective de l'âme. L'âme sensitive est mobile et corruptible alors que l'intellect est immobile et incorruptible. Considérant cela, il semble évident que la saisie des données de l'intellect, à savoir les espèces intelligibles, ne devrait pas être affectée par la corruption du corps. Or, la réalité est tout autre: les pertes de mémoire sensible affectent l’activité de la mémoire intellective. Étant donné que l’intellect est immuable, le fait que celui-ci puisse oublier laisse présager une dépendance structurelle de l'intellect en regard à son corps, qui serait le foyer de l’oubli. Cette recherche tente de mettre au jour la nature et la logique de cette dépendance structurelle. Plus précisément, elle tâche de répondre à la question suivante : est-ce que l’âme doit toujours se tourner vers les phantasmes lorsqu’elle pense les intelligibles et, si tel est le cas, comment le fait-elle? Les littératures premières et secondaires montrent sans équivoque que Thomas croit que l’intellect doit toujours se retourner vers les phantasmes pour penser. Or, déterminer la manière dont ce retour s’exécute est une autre paire de manches. Comme le montre Piché (2019), la conversio ad phantasmata, ou reflexio, est décrite de deux manières différentes tout au long du corpus thomasien : soit le retour aux phantasmes s’effectue par accident lorsque l’intellect agent saisit l’universel, soit la conversio est un processus d’autoréflexivité de l’intellect sur son propre acte d’intellection. Bien que les commentateurs (Gilson, Kretzmann, Lonergan et Pasnau) n’aient pas catégorisé dichotomiquement les explications de Thomas tel que l’a fait Piché, tous semblent abonder dans le sens de la première explication que fournit l’Aquinate. Nous entendons construire notre texte selon le plan qui suit : après une brève introduction, nous exposerons les traits saillants de l’épistémologie telle que développée par Thomas d’Aquin afin de révéler les liens structuraux présents entre les puissances de l’intellect et de la sensibilité. Ensuite, nous montrerons que l’intellect effectue toujours un recours aux phantasmes lors de son activité. Puis, nous confronterons les explications possibles quant à la manière dont s’exécute ce recours. Enfin, en guise d’ouverture, nous exposerons l’aporie, relative aux modalités, qui découle nécessairement du rapport existant entre la sensibilité et l’intellect. / The Peripatetic epistemology of Aquinas supposes an ontological distinction between sensitivity and the intellect within the soul. The sensitive soul is mobile and corruptible while the intellect is immobile and incorruptible. In regard to this, it seems evident that the grasp of intellectual data, the species intelligibiles, shouldn’t be affected by the body’s corruption. However, it isn’t the case : the sensible memory losses affect the intellective memory’s activity. Since the intellect is immutable, the fact that it forgets points to a structural dependency of the intellect to its body, which would be the origin of omission. This research tries to excavate the nature and the logic of this structural dependency. More precisely, it tries to answer the following question : does the soul always need to turn towards phantasms when it thinks the intelligible species and, if so, how does it do it? The first and second literature show distinctly Thomas’ belief that the soul must always turn toward phantasms to think. Nevertheless, how it happens is a whole different issue. As shown by Piché (2019), the conversio ad phantasmata, also called “reflexio”, is described in two different ways all along the Thomasian corpus : either the return toward phantasms happens by accident when the intellect grasps the universal, either the conversio is an autoreflexive process achieved by the intellect toward its own intellectual act of thinking. Although the commentators (Gilson, Kretzmann, Lonergan and Pasnau) haven’t categorized Thomas’ explanations in terms of a dichotomy as Piché did, they all seem to agree with the first explanation provided by Aquinas. We will build our text according to the following plan : after a brief introduction, we will expose the salient features of Thomas Aquinas’ epistemology to reveal the structural links in between the intellect and the sensible soul. Then, we will show that the intellect always turns toward phantasms while it’s active. Thereafter, we will confront the possible explanations relative to the way this turn occurs. Finally, we’ll expose the modality aporia, as I call it, which ensues necessarily from the relationship in between the sensible soul and intellect.

Alasdair MacIntyre argues in favor of a historicist Thomism in ethics and political philosophy. In his theory, sociological categories take up much of the space traditionally occupied by metaphysics. This peculiar feature of MacIntyre's Thomism, and its merits and demerits, is already a subject that has been taken up by many critics. In this thesis, these criticisms are supplemented and unified by identifying what is perhaps the most fundamental difficulty with MacIntyre's ethics: his version of Thomism is problematic because it treats epistemology as first philosophy. This misstep compromises MacIntyre's ability to provide a defense of moral objectivity, while also undermining his theory's usefulness in deriving moral rules. The result is an ethics of doubtful coherence. If Thomism is to offer a viable alternative to Enlightenment morality and Nietzschean genealogy, it must defend the priority of metaphysics with respect to epistemology.

Ever since they were formulated in the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas' famous Five Ways to demonstrate the existence of God have been frequently debated. During this process there have been several misconceptions of what Aquinas actually meant, especially when discussing his cosmological arguments. While previous researchers have managed to tease out why Aquinas accepts some infinite regresses and rejects others, I attempt to add on to this by demonstrating the centrality of his metaphysics in his argument from motion. Aquinas cannot be properly understood or debated with a contemporary view of causality, but rather must wrestle with the concepts he actually employs in the arguments. To demonstrate this, I will compare the Thomistic argument from motion to the contemporary Kalām cosmological argument of William Lane Craig. Although some may consider it beneficial to base theistic arguments on more modern principles, this analysis shows that the metaphysical framework used by Aquinas is much less vulnerable to the rebuttals that otherwise challenge the Kalām argument, and that their differences in strength rest on their differences in metaphysics.

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This dissertation analyzes the shape and scope of the virtuous life as it is made possible by and oriented toward God in the thought of two of the most consequential philosophical and theological thinkers in Christianity and Islam, Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) and Abu Hamid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), respectively. My analysis reveals that they share a commitment to the importance and reality of divine agency in shaping human moral action but sharply diverge in their vision of what constitutes a good human life. I argue that attending to these convergences and divergences in their ethics presents contemporary scholars and practitioners with a wide set of resources to theorize or navigate questions and challenges related to loving God, living well, and making moral decisions. This dissertation is a work of comparative theological ethics and engages in historical and rational reconstruction alike. I analyze Aquinas’s and al-Ghazālī’s central arguments on their own terms before extending them into contemporary conversations about divine agency, human happiness, and love. I clarify ongoing disputes about virtue in Aquinas scholarship by arguing for the compatibility of the acquired and infused moral virtues through a more robust appreciation of his account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the beatitudes. I also contribute to burgeoning analyses of al-Ghazālī’s neglected account of virtue by arguing that his varied use of terms like good character traits (khulq), states of the soul (aḥwāl), and stations (maqāmāt) are united by his commitments to habituation and to his conception of happiness as grounded in the love of God alone. I argue that al-Ghazālī’s insights regarding eternal happiness can inform ongoing debates about the compatibility of acquired and infused moral virtues in Aquinas scholarship and can help Christian theologians and practitioners better appreciate the necessity of the presence of both kinds of virtue in the Christian moral life. I utilize Aquinas’s well-developed account of the infused theological virtue of charity (caritas) to illumine al-Ghazālī’s station of love (maḥabba) as a virtuous activity that can structure a moral way of life oriented toward the end of knowing and loving God. Aside from its contributions to our understanding of these figures and these dimensions of moral thought and life, this dissertation also demonstrates the value of comparison more generally as a tool to clarify debated and neglected concepts in moral philosophy and theology, to enrich ethical deliberation, and to deepen love of God and neighbor. / 2026-05-16T00:00:00Z

This thesis offers a constructive account of the doctrine of divine simplicity in Christian theology. In its methodology, the thesis aims to present this divine perfection as an implicate of the scriptural portrayal of God, to draw upon the insights and conceptual resources of Thomas Aquinas and various Reformed orthodox theologians, and to respond to some objections to divine simplicity. The focus on exegetical elaboration of biblical teaching and the use of Thomas and the Reformed orthodox distinguish this work from a number of recent accounts of God in both systematic theology and analytic philosophy. The case for God's simplicity is made by examining God's singularity, aseity, immutability, infinity, and act of creation in Holy Scripture and then tracing the ways in which these descriptions of God imply that he is (negatively) not composed of parts. Rather, he is (positively) actus purus and really identical with his own essence, existence, and attributes, each of which is identical with the whole being of the triune God considered under some aspect. In light of the constructive work, this study then addresses the three most pressing objections to divine simplicity: (1) that it denigrates God's revelation of his many attributes in the economy; (2) that it eliminates God's freedom in creating the world and acting in history; and (3) that it does not cohere with the doctrine of the Trinity.