Can explicitly Christian principles be invoked and put into practice in political life without thereby rendering that politics fideistic, exclusionary and immoderate? Could such principles in fact strengthen the rule of reason in politics? Many secular and Christian thinkers agree that the answers to these questions must be no, only parting ways on their practical conclusions. But Aquinas' much-neglected De Regno suggests the matter is not so simple. In his careful pedagogical structuring of De Regno, Aquinas opens up the possibility of a kind of dialogue between convention, reason and revelation, one that permits him to propose and reformulate his political teachings according to diverse but convergent principles. I aim to develop an account of Aquinas' political teaching that reveals itself as indebted to revelation for its principles but grounded in and open to reason, and thus neither irrational, exclusionary nor immoderate. I will focus particularly on his treatment of the natural law. / text

Precipitated by important work in recent natural law political theory, this research revisits the relationship between political association and human flourishing. Does the political community itself realize some aspect of human sociability intrinsic to our full flourishing or is it simply an instrumental good? The inquiry begins with a thorough examination of the merits of John Finnis’s influential argument for an instrumental political common good, pointing to a significant lacuna in his inattention to the value of political activity, as opposed to the operation of government and law. In building an alternative positive account the argument relies upon both formal and substantive considerations, generally employing an Aristotelian methodology of understanding the whole via a consideration of its constitutive parts. First, drawing from Aquinas’s Aristotelian commentaries to unpack the basic structure of part/whole relationships within the “body politic,” I argue that political community is partially defined by the nature of its basic constitutive parts. The next chapter considers the substantive good of familial association, particularly in light of longstanding concerns with the family’s particularity and inequality. I argue that the intrinsically liberal and educative character of parental love rightly orients children to virtuous activity and invests familial association with an intrinsic rationality. The final two chapters bring direct focus onto the political common good: First, I argue that a normatively compelling account of the political common good must be both inclusivist, i.e., including within its purpose the irreducibly diverse goods of every individual and basic association within the community, and distinctive, i.e., including within the calculus of practical reason the good of the political association as such. Lastly, I argue that the political common good is intrinsically—though only partially—constitutive of the human social good. Aquinas makes a crucial shift away from Aristotle’s political primacy in his more pluralistic account of human sociability and emphasis on the extensiveness of the political good over the superiority of political activity per se. Nevertheless, there are essential human virtues—justice, love, generosity—that are uniquely, if not exclusively, fostered in political community and potentially realized in civic friendship. / text

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This study articulates a God-concept in the tradition of classical Christian theism, contending with calls to modify significantly or revise classical constructions. Attention falls upon two closely related divine attributes that have, especially in recent decades, come under philosophical and theological attack – God’s timelessness and impassibility (inability to suffer). Is the “classical” Lord truly Immanuel, i.e. with us? This general question motivates the study. The opening three chapters analyze aspects of the God-concepts put forth by Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin. Apparent tensions between a timeless transcendence and an affirming union of the Trinity with creation are countenanced, with an eye to doing justice to both doctrines. Chapter One examines the idea of divine timelessness and corresponding thoughts about temporal reality found in the Confessions, supplementing Augustinian transcendence with the creational and eschatological insights of two other Church Fathers. Chapter Two documents Aquinas’s affirmation of both God’s strong immutability and the non-necessity of creation, while questioning whether he affirms these in a logically consistent way. Chapter Three then follows the contours of Calvin’s Trinitarianism and Christology, reflecting on the Triune Creator’s gracious “wedding” of himself to the whole work of creation. The final three chapters operate within the fields of philosophy and philosophical theology. Chapter Four commends a tenseless (or B) theory of time, highlighting several problems surrounding tensed (or A) theories of time. But this former view implies that there is no “official present,” leaving no apparent room for the presence of the timeless God with times and temporally located agents. Thus Chapter Five seeks to address classical eternalism’s “present problem.” The conclusion is reached that the temporally absent God’s “present problem” can be resolved by embracing a “risk-free” understanding of divine providence, best understood in terms of a “Reformed decree” that strongly actualizes all non-divine entities and events. Chapter Six begins by wrestling with what implications the timelessness doctrine might have for “responsive” divine compassion and ends by proposing that the infinite God “embraces” the finite world not by way of a panentheistic inclusion but in some ways more akin to a husband’s attentive care for his wife.

In this dissertation, I argue for the philosophical consistency of Aquinas’ hybrid view of human souls - that is, the idea that human souls, and only human souls, are at once substantial forms and subsistent things. I contend that the best way to understand the ontological status of human souls according to Aquinas is by means of the concept of ‘subsistent parts’. Since Aquinas characterizes souls as parts of substances, I propose a mereological analysis of the different types of part in Aquinas, and I conclude that souls should be seen as metaphysical parts of substances. An influential contemporary view holds that Aquinas’ doctrine is inconsistent on the grounds that nothing could be an abstract (form) and a concrete (subsistent) at the same time. I respond to this view by denying the widespread notion that substantial forms are purely abstract entities. I hold that the best way to make sense of Aquinas’ twofold approach to human souls is by saying that substantial forms possess an element of concreteness which is accounted for by the fundamental relationship between form and being. Finally, I address the question of taxonomy: how can we classify Aquinas’ view of the soul-body relation in light of the concepts that are currently used in philosophy of mind. I argue that the notion of a subsistent part entails the concept of ‘part-dualism’, which I present as standing midway between substance-dualism and nonreductive materialism, and also as being ontologically richer than property-dualism. I conclude this dissertation with a refutation of the idea championed by some prominent scholars that the existence of the soul is sufficient for the existence of the person.

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O presente estudo propõe uma análise sobre o tema da usura no pensamento de São Tomás de Aquino de forma a determinar sua aplicabilidade à questão dos juros remuneratórios tal qual se apresenta hodiernamente no Direito Brasileiro. Inicialmente a concepção de Aquino é avaliada à luz da tríplice base que a compõe: a Lei Natural, segundo a qual se considera a esterilidade do dinheiro e a justiça natural; a Lei Humana, tida aqui como o Direito Romano, do qual se absorve a noção de fungibilidade do dinheiro e a conceituação dos contratos de mútuo; e a Lei Divina, tomada por São Tomás de forma a corroborar aquilo que se depreende das demais leis. Na sequencia, a problemática dos juros e da sua extrapolação usurária é avaliada no âmbito do ordenamento jurídico pátrio, tanto sob o prisma de sua evolução histórica quanto das discussões que envolvem a matéria em nossos dias. Finalmente, partindo de uma conceituação de juros e usura compatível com o pensamento do Doutor Angélico, avaliaremos o que viria a determinar o preço justo nos contratos de mútuo financeiro com vistas a estabelecer parâmetros indicativos para a limitação das taxas de juros no Direito Brasileiro, tanto nas operações praticadas no âmbito civil quanto naquelas contratadas junto ao Sistema Financeiro Nacional / This study proposes an analysis of the theme of usury in the thinking of St. Thomas Aquinas to determine its applicability to the question of compensatory interest as it is now understood under Brazilian Law. Initially Aquinass concept is evaluated in the light of its triple base: Natural Law, which considers the sterility ofmoney and natural justice; Human Law, seen here as Roman Law, from which the notion offungibility of money and the conceptualization of mutuum agreements are derived; and Divine Law, taken by St. Thomas as a means of corroborating what is deduced from the other laws.Next, the critical issues involving interest and their usurious extrapolation are evaluated in the sphere of our national legal system, from both the perspectives of its historical evolution and of the discussions that involve the subject today. And finally, beginning with an appraisal of interest and usury compatible with the thinking of the Angelic Doctor, we will evaluate what woulddetermine the just price in mutuum contracts,seeking to establish parameters for an eventual limitation ofinterest rates in Brazilian Law, both in transactions involving non-banking entities and in those contracted within the National Financial System.

Os estudos sobre o direito natural costumam dividi-lo em três períodos característicos, cosmológico, teológico e racional, a depender do critério usado para a sua fundamentação, respectivamente, o kósmos, Deus ou a razão humana, sendo que Tomás de Aquino e Hugo Grotius podem ser considerados, cada um, grandes expoentes dos dois últimos períodos. Um dos objetivos do jusracionalismo foi buscar uma fundamentação do direito natural, e do direito como um todo, apenas na razão e natureza humanas, prescindindo-se de Deus. Entretanto, as mudanças nas mais diversas áreas ocorrem cada uma a seu tempo e não todas de uma vez. Por isso, apesar dos esforços empreendidos para se separar os campos do direito e da teologia, é possível que eles continuassem mais interligados do que se imaginava na passagem do jusnaturalismo teológico para o racional. No intuito de identificar se permaneceram algumas características, e quais, da fundamentação teológica nas doutrinas do direito natural racional, será feita uma comparação entre os sistemas de Tomás e Grotius, avaliando também se o holandês foi influenciado pelo italiano. Os resultados alcançados mostram que é possível se afirmar que Grotius, tendo feito mais de cinquenta referências a Tomás em apenas uma obra, foi por ele influenciado, havendo grandes semelhanças entre a fundamentação dos autores em questões cruciais de suas doutrinas, uma vez que concordam que a finalidade do homem não está nesse mundo, que Deus é o criador de tudo o que existe, especialmente do homem, cuja natureza e instrumentos peculiares, notadamente a razão, a linguagem e a vontade, são reflexo da própria natureza divina expressa na Trindade, que é dada aos homens a dignidade de criar, por si mesmos, regras para a organização da sociedade, com grande liberdade de ação dentro de uma moldura divina da lei, uma vez que a Providência não interfere ou suprime o livre-arbítrio, ainda que a Revelação seja um auxílio não apenas para a obtenção da beatitude, mas também para a convivência social e conhecimento da lei natural, e que mesmo o exercício da função de poder só existe por autorização divina, pois se os soberanos não podiam ser julgados por qualquer outra vontade humana, eles o seriam por Deus. Com isso, desde Tomás já se pode reconhecer que a lei natural é campo de atuação por excelência da criatura racional, e ela só adquire significado próprio quando aplicado a elas, bem como que o caráter teológico da obra de Grotius não pode ser negligenciado, e deve ser levado em conta em sua teoria. / Studies on natural rights tends to divide it into three characteristic periods, cosmological, theological and rational, depending on the criteria used as their fundament, respectively, the kósmos, God or the human reason, being possible to account Thomas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius as two major thinkers in the latter, and each, periods. Amongst the goals of the jusrationalism was to seek for a foundation of natural right, and right as a whole, based solely on reason and human nature, with no recourse to God. However, changes in diverse areas occur each at its own time and not altogether. Hence, despite the efforts taken to split rights and theologys fields, it is possible that they remained more interconnected than one imagined in the transition from theological to rational jusnaturalism. In order to identify if some characteristics, and which, of theological fundament remain in rational natural laws doctrines, a comparison shall be made between Aquinas and Grotius systems, assessing whether or not the Dutch was influenced by the Italian. The results achieved show that is possible to say that Grotius, having made more than fifty references to Aquinas in just one work, was influenced by him, acknowledging great similarities in the fundament used by both in crucial aspects of their doctrine, since they agree that mans end is not in this world, that God is the creator of everything there is, specially man, whose nature and peculiar instruments, notably reason, language and will, are a reflect of divine nature itself as expressed in the Trinity, that is given to men the dignity to create the rules to organize, by themselves, society, with great freedom of action within the laws divine frame, inasmuch as Providence does not interfere or suppress free-will, although Revelation is meant to assist not only in beatitudes acquisition, but also in social life and natural laws knowledge, and that even exercising functions of power only exists in virtue of divine authorization, therefore if sovereigns couldnt be judged by any other human will, they would by God. Henceforth, since Aquinas it is possible to recognize that natural law is by excellence the acting field of rational creature, and it only acquires proper meaning when applied to them, as well as the theological character of Grotius works cannot be neglected and must be accounted in his theories.

A questão da existência de Deus acompanha o desenvolvimento intelectual de Tomás de Aquino e tem papel central em sua Suma de Teologia, na qual o filósofo desenvolve sua resposta através das conhecidas cinco vias para a prova da existência de Deus. O objetivo desta dissertação é percorrer o caminho traçado por Tomás de Aquino para chegar às cinco vias, mostrando a necessidade e a possibilidade da prova da existência de Deus como sujeito da Doutrina Sagrada. / The question of the existence of God follows the intellectual development of Saint Thomas Aquinas. It also plays a central role in his Summa Theologica, where the philosopher develops his answer trough “the five ways” of proving the existence of God. This dissertations aims to follow Saint Thomas Aquinas through the journey in developing \"the five ways\", by showing the need and the possibility to prove the existence of God as subject of the holy doctrine.