The use of violence in the Israel/Palestine conflict has been justified and legitimised by an appeal to religion. Militant Islamist organisations like Ramas have become central players in the Palestinian political landscape as a result of the popular support that they enjoy. This thesis aims to investigate the reasons for this support by analysing the Israel/Palestine conflict in terms of Ruman Needs Theory. According to this Theory, humans have essential needs that need to be fulfilled in order to ensure survival and development. Among these needs, the need for identity and recognition of identity is of vital importance. This thesis thus explores the concept of identity as a need, and investigates this need as it relates to inter-group conflict. In situating this theory in the Israel/Palestine conflict, the study exammes how organisations like Ramas have Islamised Palestinian national identity in order to garner political support. The central contention, then, is that the primary identity group of the Palestinian population is no longer nationalist, but Islamic/nationalist. In Islamising the conflict with Israel as well as Palestinian identity, Ramas has been able to justify its often indiscriminate use of violence by appealing to religion. The conflict is thus perceived to be one between two absolutes - that of Islam versus Judaism. In considering the conflict as one of identities struggling for survival in a climate of perceived threat, any attempt at resolution of the conflict needs to include a focus on needs-based issues. The problem-solving approach to negotiation allows for parties to consider issues of identity, recognition and security needs, and thus ensures that the root causes of conflicts are addressed, The contention is that this approach is vital to any conflict resolution strategy where identity needs are at stake, and it provides the grounding for the success of more traditional zero-sum bargaining methods. A recognition of Islamic identity in negotiation processes in Israel/Palestine may thus make for a more comprehensive conflict resolution strategy, and make the outcomes of negotiations more acceptable to the people of Palestine, thus undermining the acceptance of violence that exists at present.

This dissertation poses a set of six questions about one of the Israel Lobby’s particular components, a Potential Christian Jewish coalition (PCJc) within American politics that advocates for Israeli sovereignty over “Judea and Samaria” (“the West Bank”). The study addresses: the profiles of the individuals of the PCJc; its policy positions, the issues that have divided it, and what has prevented, and continues to prevent, the coalition from being absorbed into one or more of the more formally organized components of the Israel Lobby; the resources and methods this coalition has used to attempt to influence U.S. policy on (a) the Middle East, and (b) the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular; the successes or failures of this coalition’s advocacy and why it has not organized; and what this case reveals about interest group politics and social movements in the United States. This dissertation follows the descriptive-analytic case-study tradition that comprises a detailed analysis of a specific interest group and one policy issue, which conforms to my interest in the potential Christian Jewish coalition that supports a Jewish Judea and Samaria. I have employed participant observation, interviewing, content analysis and documentary research. The findings suggest: The PCJc consists of Christian Zionists and mostly Jews of the center religious denominations. Orthodox Jewish traditions of separation from Christians inhibit like-minded Christians and Jews from organizing. The PCJc opposes an Arab state in Judea and Samaria, and is not absorbed into more formally organized interest groups that support that policy. The PCJc’s resources consist of support and funding from conservatives. Methods include use of education, debates and media. Members of the PCJc are successful because they persist in their support for a Jewish Judea and Samaria and meet through other organizations around Judeo-Christian values. The PCJc is deterred from advocacy and organization by a mobilization of bias from a subgovernment in Washington, D.C. comprising Congress, the Executive branch and lobby organizations. The study’s results raise questions about interest group politics in America and the degree to which the U.S. political system is pluralistic, suggesting that executive power constrains the agenda to “safe” positions it favors.

This research seeks to understand the reasons for failures of Bill Clinton, Yasser Arafat, and Ehud Barak's Camp David Summit that was held in July, 2000. The Summit was arranged to complete the last phase of Oslo Peace Process. Numerous researches have attempted to reveal the facts of the summit but, so far, they have failed to present the complete details of what happened before, during, and after the summit. This research explores all aspects of the problem including the various variables that would have had effected the breakdown of the Middle East peace process. Finally, the researcher determines the parameters needed to maintain a substantial peace in the Middle East and what proposed strategies might be followed in order to avoid the previous mistakes in future peace negotiations.

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Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / Advancing the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians is of great interest to the United States. To this aim, an understanding of the main factors involved in Israel's foreign policymaking is needed. This thesis shows internal pressures are most significant and assesses the influence of domestic access points to Israel's Palestinian policy. For a complete and current analysis of Israel's policymaking process three areas are discussed. First are the fundamentals that makeup Israel's political system such as the Knesset, political parties, ruling coalition, and prime minister. Second is the role of the Israeli Defense Force and the balance in civil-military relations. Third is the mixture of players that color Israel's societal landscape including subcultures, interest groups, and public opinion. The key finding is a combined ranking of the most important domestic forces driving Israel's Palestinian policy formation in all three areas. / Lieutenant Junior Grade, United States Navy

This thesis offers a microcosmic insight into Britain's transition toward a world system without an Empire by exploring the life of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty (1946-57) via the prism of the British financed Jordanian Army, also known as the Arab Legion, and its British commander, Glubb Pasha. In so doing it puts the state of the relationship down to a system of mutual dependence. Britain's withdrawal from Jordan has primarily been linked either to the success of Arab nationalism or the loss of British will. By examining the Treaty relationship from construction to termination this thesis posits that it is imprudent to push any single factor too deeply, but identifies a shift in the balance of mutual dependence, caused by the changing geopolitical climate, as the driving force. A subsidiary aspect of this thesis concerns the partition of Palestine. The Arab Legion was the most important Arab army during the 1948 War. Based on unprecedented access to Glubb's private papers 'the most significant new documents to emerge since the opening of the official western archives in the late 1970s' this thesis provides the most accurate portrayal of the Arab Legion's conduct yet achievable. In so doing it reconciles inconsistencies within the controversial 'collusion' debate. It negates the revisionist argument that a firm Hashemite-Zionist agreement existed, but corroborates the notion that Britain approved the Arab Legion's use to implement an alternative form of partition to that proposed by the UN. It thus supports the revisionist argument that pre-war negotiations helped shape the 1948 War, but explains the Arab Legion's adherence to this secret scheme by emphasising Glubb's (limited) autonomy. Moreover, it reveals further details concerning the divisions within the Arab coalition, which further debunks the traditional David (Israel) versus Goliath (Arab coalition) portrayal of the conflict.

L’effondrement et le démantèlement de l’Empire ottoman à la suite de la Première Guerre mondiale ont conduit les Grandes puissances européennes à opérer un partage territorial du Proche-Orient, légitimé par le système des mandats de la Société des Nations (SDN). Sans précédent, cette administration internationale marqua le point de départ de l’internationalisation de la question de la Palestine, dont le droit international allait servir de socle à une nouvelle forme de colonialisme. Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l’Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) continua l’action entreprise par la SDN en s’occupant également de cette question sur la demande des Britanniques. En novembre 1947, l’ONU décida du partage de la Palestine en deux Etats pour résoudre les conflits entre sionistes et nationalistes arabes. Si ce partage fut accepté par les sionistes, il fut rejeté par les Etats arabes voisins et de nombreux Arabes palestiniens. Les affrontements opposant nationalistes arabes et sionistes de Palestine laissèrent place au conflit israélo-arabe après la proclamation d’Indépendance de l’Etat d’Israël en mai 1948. Au commencement de la guerre froide, les Etats-Unis et l’URSS prirent conscience de l’intérêt géostratégique de cette région, progressivement désinvestie par la France et la Grande-Bretagne. Dans cette étude, nous verrons comment la scène interétatique et la communauté internationale, successivement composée de la SDN puis de l’ONU, ont en partie scellé le sort du Proche et Moyen-Orient. Nous consacrerons également une analyse au rôle joué par les idéologies nationalistes arabes et sionistes, qui tiennent une place centrale au sein de ce conflit. / The collapse and dismantling of the Ottoman Empire following World War I, led the great European powers to engage in a territorial division of the Middle East, legitimized by the mandates system of the League of Nations. Without any precedents, that international administration marked the beginning of the internationalization of Palestine’s thorny issue. The international law would serve as the pillar for a new form of colonialism. The day after World War II, the United Nations continued the action taken by the League of Nations, as well as for the demand of the British. In November 1947, the UN decided to divide Palestine into two States. If the Zionists had accepted that split, their neighbors, Arab States and Palestinian Arabs, would have rejected it. The clashes opposing the Arab Nationalists and the Palestine Zionists gave space to the Arab-Israeli conflict after the independence of Israel, on May 14, 1948. At the beginning of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union became aware of the geo-strategic interest in this region, gradually divested by France and Great Britain. In this study, we will see how the interstate scene and the international community, successively composed by the League of Nations and the United Nations, have partially sealed the fate of the Near and the Middle East. We will also devote a preliminary analysis related to the role played by the Arabs and Zionists nationalist ideologies, which are central in this conflict.

Jordan due to its geographical location is located at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This fact significantly affects its domestic policy, foreign policy and economic development. An important aspect of Jordan's development is also the presence of Palestinians, who currently make up approximately half of the population. The aim of this thesis is to analyze the influence of internal and external factors on political and economic development of Jordan and especially on the formation of its foreign policy and then to assess the position of Jordan in actual international relations. Jordan's foreign policy is based on balancing between the relations with neighboring Arab states and the strategically important relationship with the Western powers, particularly the United States of America. Jordan is also a key participant in the Middle East peace process and is one of the few Arab countries that signed a peace treaty with Israel and maintains with Israel full diplomatic relations.

C’est avec le lancement de la Coopération Politique Européenne (CPE) en 1969/70 que les six États membres de la Communaute européenne (CE) ont tourné une page dans l’histoire de l’intégration européenne. À partir de cette date les membres de la CE se sont consultés sur des questions de politique étrangère afin d’harmoniser leurs vues et d’élaborer des positions communes. Dès le début la France avait le plus grand intérêt à mettre le Proche-Orient sur l’agenda des Six. Comme les deux chocs pétroliers de 1973/74 et de 1979 risquaient de peser lourd sur les relations euro-arabes, les autres États membres de la Communauté ont consenti en principe à développer une position commune envers le Proche-Orient. Ainsi une politique proche-orientale des Six, et àpartir de 1973 des Neuf, s’est institutionnalisée au cours des années 1970 qui était basée d’une part sur des déclarations communes sur la situation au Proche-Orient et d’autre part sur une coopération économique interrégionale plus étroite, notamment dans le cadre du dialogue euro-arabe. Sous la présidence de Georges Pompidou tout comme sous la présidence de Valéry Giscard d’Estaing la France a été le moteur dans le développement des relations euro-arabes des années 1970. Même si l’action française qui visait à faire adopter sa propre politique proche-orientale par ses partenaires européens n’était pas toujours couronnée de succès la déclaration commune du 6 novembre 1973 et surtout la déclaration commune de Venise du 13 juin 1980reflètent nettement position pro-palestinienne de la France. / By launching European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1969/70 the six member states of the European Community (EC) openend a new chapter in the history of European Integration. Henceforward the six member states consulted each other in foreign policy issues in order to develop commun positions where possible. From the beginning France showed the greatest interest in putting the Middle East on the European agenda. As the two oil price shocks of 1973/74 and 1979 put a strain on the euro-arab relations the other member states of the EC supported the French request to develop a commun European Near-Eastern policy. Consequently, the 1970ies were marked by a process of institutionalisation of commun policy towards that region that was, on theone side, based on common European declarations, and, on the other side, on a more intense euro-arab cooperation in the field of economics, and this especially within the framework of the euro-arab dialogue. Both under the presidency of Georges Pompidou and under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing France can be described as motor of the development and the extension of euro-arab relations. Even if the French diplomacy that tried to make her Near-Eastern policy a common European policy has not always been crowned with succes the common Brussels declaration of November 1973 and especially the common Venicedeclaration of June 1980 reflect clearly the pro-Palestinian stance of France.

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