This research addresses the subject of conventional arms transfers in the Post Cold War Era. ("Conventional arms" herein are defined as high cost, state-of-the-art weapons systems in aerospace, land vehicles, missiles and naval vessels.") The rapid and startling changes in the international political environment that took place in the late 1980's forced the U.S. and her Western Allies to reexamine their national defense budgets. The Bush Administration responded to the situation with new policy initiatives or "jolts" that aligned the annual U.S. Department of Defense's budget with Post Cold War realities. (A "jolt" is defined here as a sudden "shock" to a system that has the potential to alter radically one or more of its established structural components or behavioral patterns.) The word "jolt" is specifically used because while the policies reducing force strength and decreasing defense spending had been introduced on earlier occasions since the end of World War II, these particular jolts were driven by different circumstances than previous drawdowns. The Cold War that had dominated and shaped international affairs was over; the Post Cold War era promised to be a radical departure from the 50-year long status quo. Some phases of the policy jolts were directly related to U.S. Department of Defense operations, such as base closings and reductions in force, while others affected the U.S. defense industrial base through the weapons acquisition process. Domestic acquisition programs have important linkages to transferable weapons systems. Such linkages were so deeply embedded that despite severe reductions in weapons acquisition programs, most prime defense contractors did not conceptually redefine or reconstitute themselves although they went through a long period of mergers and acquisitions. This research explores how U.S. governmental stakeholders interpreted the utility of conventional arms transfers in managing the "aftershocks" of the policy jolts experienced by defense contractors. Their behaviors indicate that U.S. policy-making institutions, for the most part, tried to direct favorable outcomes for U.S. sales in the world market. Ultimately, the policy initiatives undertaken to assure favorable outcomes for defense corporations and their unforeseen consequences could lead to new policies or issue transformation. / Ph. D.

This briefing aims to clarify and highlight ways in which the spread, possession and (mis)use of SALW and related armed violence issues can be relevant in conflict assessments, and how they can be integrated better within such assessments. It employs the conflict assessment framework set out in DFID¿s conflict assessment guidelines, and thus aims particularly to assist people who may be: commissioning and developing terms of reference for a specific assessment; undertaking a desk-based and/or field assessment; and those taking forward the analysis to the development of programming responses. There already exists the potential for SALW issues to be addressed within DFID¿s existing conflict assessment guidelines, and thus this paper does not suggest that DFID¿s methodology has to change but rather `opened-up¿ to include SALW more fully within their analyses and the strategies they generate.

This briefing paper seeks to increase awareness of and review the linkages between disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and small arms and light weapons (SALW) reduction in the context of post-conflict reconstruction (PCR). It is targeted at those working on poverty reduction at both the policy and programme level, particularly those with comparatively modest engagement in these areas. Its objective is to outline the types of activities that have been undertaken under these rubrics, the difficulties and constraints encountered at the level of implementation, and, in particular, to identify opportunities in linking SALW programmes and DDR. It also seeks to highlight the problems created by widespread arms availability and usage in PCR. This briefing paper is not intended as a comprehensive review of the state of DDR/SALW/PCR programming and policy, but rather an introduction to some of the core issues.

yes / The 1990s witnessed a change in the way wars were fought as the amount of available weaponry increased and the types of actors engaged in warfare multiplied. The opening up of the international arms trade, in particular with new buyers and more channels of supply, has raised concerns about who purchases weapons and for what use. Afeature of this changing nature of conflict has been the continuing, if not growing, presence of mercenaries and the emergence of private companies contracted to provide military and security services. These range from logistical support and training to advice and procurement of arms and on-the-ground intervention. This briefing highlights how the activities of mercenaries and private military and security companies can contribute to small arms proliferation and misuse and examines steps the international community can take at the UN Small Arms Conference and elsewhere to effectively combat mercenarism and regulate the activities of private military and security companies. The role played by these companies relates not only to provisions contained in the contracts they sign with their clients to provide large amounts of weaponry, but also how the military and security services and training that they provide contributes to the demand for weapons in the regions where they operate. There are a number of ways in which mercenaries and private military and security companies are involved in small arms proliferation. These include: l Arms brokering and transportation activities l Violations of UN arms embargoes l Impact on human rights and humanitarian law l Driving demand for small arms Various measures already exist to ban the activities of mercenaries and regulate some of the activities of private military and security companies either through national legislation or international agreements. However, there is concern these efforts are neither comprehensive nor accepted widely enough to effectively control the activities of mercenaries and private military and security companies.

yes / The majority of small arms and light weapons currently in circulation are in civilian possession1. An estimated fifty-nine percent of weapons around the world are in civilian hands and in some regions such as Europe this is closer to eighty per cent.2 While the majority of these arms are used for lawful purposes a significant percentage are not. The misuse of these arms by civilians can cause major damage to people¿s livelihoods, health and security as well as broader repercussion such as hampering economic, social and political development and the provision of health care. One of the more controversial outcomes of the UN Small Arms conference was the failure of states to explicitly commit to more effective regulation of civilian possession and use of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Despite clear evidence of the opportunities for diversion of SALW from civilian possession to illicit trade and the serious impact of this on human security, opposition from some states to any mention of this issue within the Programme of Action (PoA) prevented the inclusion of language concerning the regulation of privately owned SALW. Nevertheless, the Programme of Action does contain limited provisions including the criminalisation of illicit possession of SALW and a requirement that states ensure responsibility for SALW issued by them. This Policy Briefing elaborates on how these and other international commitments should be interpreted and implemented so as to enhance human security.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. / The Persian Gulf region is, in all likelihood, going to remain crucial to American interests through the next several decades. The world depends on the petroleum reserves of the Gulf region to fuel its economic engine. The recent history of the region has been rife with conflict, and the U.S. has had to intervene militarily on several occasions to ensure its vital interests were protected. This thesis examines the strategic circumstances in the Gulf region and ways in which American political, diplomatic, and military policy can help shape the environment to conform to its interests. Several scenarios are developed which attempt to forecast the results of different environments on regional stability. The thesis reaches the conclusion that the United States must take a proactive role if its short- and long-term interests are to be protected. The short-term goal of U.S. policy must be to maintain a balance of power and regional correlation of forces which serves to deter any would-be aggressor nations. In the long run, the United States must seek a comprehensive regional peace. Various methods of achieving these goals are examined. / http://archive.org/details/strategicplanfor00ward / Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

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Efforts to control small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the periods following violent conflict can have positive or negative impacts on peacebuilding efforts. Similarly, peacebuilding activities can both support or endanger efforts to place SALW under greater control. Despite the regular occurrence of SALW control and peacebuilding activities in the same time and space in post violent conflict contexts, there is insignificant analysis of how the two sets of activities interrelate, and how these interelationships can be strengthened to improve the contribution that SALW control efforts make to peacebuilding, and vice-versa. The effects of interrelationships over time (contingency); in the same geographic space (complementarity) and the effects of public perceptions and social construction are particularly important and provide a framework for establishing these interrelationships through analysing a wide universe of cases of SALW control attempted in countries emerging from violent conflict, five mini-cases studies and a major analysis of interrelationships in Kosovo.

This thesis aims at deepen our understanding of the Swedish arms exports, especially the relationship between the spoken words of politicians and actual policy outcome. The research question for the thesis is “To what extent do specific frames deployed by the media and politicians about the character of the importing state, the type of arms exported, the inter-state relationship and the economic interests lead to a legitimation crisis in an arms exporting nation which ends arms exports and military cooperation?” This thesis is especially looking at Swedish arms deals with Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Thailand. In a content analysis of the Swedish media and politicians, and by using theories of legitimation and framing, the thesis analyses how these frames can affect the legitimation of an arms deal, and explaining different policy outcomes. The analysis shows that the most common frame to use to frame a receiving country or an arms deal negatively is to frame the character of the importing state in negative terms and also connect the arms exports to the regime in the receiving country. On the other side, to defend an arms deal it is most common to frame it as an economic interest that are of national interest. Lastly, the thesis can show that the Swedish arms deal with Saudi Arabia created a legitimation crisis, which was not the case for the deals with Thailand and South Africa, and this can help us understand why the military cooperation agreement between Sweden and Saudi Arabia was ended.

This study is designed to assess the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and analyze theories for effectively analyzing countries that are a risk for proliferating nuclear armaments. The initial phase of my research is designed to assess the existing literature and primary theoretical approaches for analyzing nuclear non-proliferation initiatives and potential nuclear proliferators. My main means of analysis will be to examine the national and international actors involved in each case. With this method, I plan to analyze a government at the level of each of its ruling institutions. Each of these institutions will be analyzed in the context of Joseph Cirincione's five drivers and barriers: security, prestige, domestic politics, technology, and economics. This study will then review multiple historical cases of countries and treaties related to the nuclear non-proliferation issue in the context of my method of analysis. In particular, each historical study will discuss major actors and institutions with respect to the five major proliferation concepts, as a means of demonstrating the validity of my method. The primary section of my thesis will be the application of my method to one of the preeminent nuclear proliferation threats today: Iran. After a discussion of the physical status of Iran's nuclear program, I will begin my analysis in terms of my concepts, and will examine the principal actors involved in the Iranian nuclear dispute. These will be the Iran's moderate and conservative factions, as well as the U.S., Israel, the EU-3, and IAEA, and they will be examined in the context of the five drivers and barriers. The final section will be my overall risk analysis for Iran. My preliminary analysis is that regime survival is the most critical issue when it comes to the principal motivations of a state to develop nuclear arms. If this is correct, policy options designed to take advantage of the actors' positions in Iran can be formulated based on the specific conditions that prevail in Iran.