yes / Since April 1998, the Vienna-based UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice has been negotiating the draft Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (hereafter referred to as the Firearms Protocol). This Protocol will be the first global measure regulating international transfers of small arms and light weapons, and should have a tremendous impact on both the legal and the illicit manufacture and trade in firearms. The draft agreement seeks to combat and criminalise trafficking in firearms, through the development of harmonised international standards governing the manufacture, possession and transfer of commercial shipments of these weapons. While the final outcome of the Protocol relies on the outcome of negotiations in February 2001, the draft agreement contains provisions which commit states, among other things, to: l Adopt legislative measures to criminalise the illicit manufacture, trafficking, possession and use of firearms; l Maintain detailed records on the import, export and in-transit movements of firearms; l Adopt an international system for marking firearms at the time of manufacture and each time they are imported; l Establish a harmonised licensing system governing the import, export, in-transit movement and re-export of firearms; l Exchange information regarding authorised producers, dealers, importers and exporters, the routes used by illicit traffickers, best practice in combating trafficking in order to enhance states ability to prevent, detect and investigate illicit trafficking; l Co-operate at the bilateral, regional and international level to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms; and l Consider developing systems to require arms brokers, traders and forwarders to register and obtain licences for their transactions. The Protocol places a premium on international co-operation, information exchange and transparency. The provisions in the Firearms Protocol are an important complement to those being developed for the UN 2001 Conference. Issues such as improving the ability to trace small arms and light weapons through effective marking systems, regulating the activities of arms brokers and building international norms on the responsible disposal of surplus small arms are common to both initiatives.

yes / Efforts to combat and prevent illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weaponsEfforts to combat and prevent illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) are obstructed by lack of capacity to trace sources and lines of supply for arms. Such efforts are necessary in order to identify points of diversion or loss of responsible control so that actions can be taken to tackle the problems. This hampers efforts to prevent future loss and diversion, for example, or to close down unauthorised or destabilising arms supply networks. Measures to enable tracing of sources and lines of supply of SALW are therefore a priority. Because of the international scope of the flows of SALW, such measures need to be taken by all states and all other relevant members of the international community. International standards and mechanisms to enable tracing need to be established and developed as a priority. An effective international system to enable tracing of sources and flows of SALW requires three essential elements: adequate marking to uniquely identify each weapon; detailed and accessible record-keeping; and mechanisms for international co-operation in tracing sources and lines of supply of SALW. At present there are substantial weaknesses and problems in each of these three areas. (SALW) are obstructed by lack of capacity to trace sources and lines of supply for arms. Such efforts are necessary in order to identify points of diversion or loss of responsible control so that actions can be taken to tackle the problems. This hampers efforts to prevent future loss and diversion, for example, or to close down unauthorised or destabilising arms supply networks. Measures to enable tracing of sources and lines of supply of SALW are therefore a priority. Because of the international scope of the flows of SALW, such measures need to be taken by all states and all other relevant members of the international community. International standards and mechanisms to enable tracing need to be established and developed as a priority. An effective international system to enable tracing of sources and flows of SALW requires three essential elements: adequate marking to uniquely identify each weapon; detailed and accessible record-keeping; and mechanisms for international co-operation in tracing sources and lines of supply of SALW. At present there are substantial weaknesses and problems in each of these three areas.

yes / A prerequisite for effective international action to prevent and combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) is that states develop a common understanding of what constitutes the ¿legal¿ trade and therefore what is ¿illicit¿. At the same time, failure to exert e ffective control over the legal trade in SALW opens up possibilities for diversion to illicit markets and end-users and blurs the lines between the legal and illicit trade. All governments are potential suppliers of SALW, since even those with no manufacturing capacity will have the potential to export surplus weapons once owned by their police and/or armed forces. A major concern for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects should thus be to define clear parameters for and to agree on a comprehensive mechanism for controlling the legal trade in these weapons. / British American Security Information Council (BASIC), International Alert

yes / Small arms and light weapons have become the weapons of choice in conflicts around the world and figure prominently in crime. Recently, considerable attention has been focused on the proliferation of SALW at the national, regional and international level. The recognition that m o s t illicit SALW began as legal weapons is, however, fundamental to efforts to reduce the proliferation and misuse of SALW and the diversion of civilian weapons is one source of supply. Indeed, it is estimated that there are as many SALW in the hands of civilians worldwide as there are in the possession of states, and that in many parts of the world diversion from civilian stocks is the principal source of the illicit supply. Consequently, strengthening domestic regulation, which reduces the diversion of legal weapons to illegal markets, is a critical part of any strategy to address illicit trafficking. It is also consistent with resolutions from the United Nations Security Council and other Commissions as well as regional initiatives. This briefing reviews the ways in which SALW are diverted from legal to illegal markets and the measures which can be used to reduce this diversion. In addressing illicit trafficking in all its aspects, it is imperative that the UN Conference not does neglect this significant problem.

yes / Efforts to combat and prevent illicit trafficking in, and proliferation and misuse of, small arms and light weapons (SALW) are hampered by lack of relevant information-exchange and transparency. International information exchange and transparency arrangements are key elements of each of the main elements of the international action programme on SALW to be launched at the UN 2001 Conference. There is great scope to develop information management and distribution arrangements to disseminate and exchange of relevant information on SALW without seriously compromising national security, necessary commercial secrecy, or law enforcement. Indeed, national security, commerce, crime prevention and law enforcement are generally enhanced by appropriate transparency and information exchange

yes / Small arms and light weapons can enter the illicit market at many stages in their lifecycle. From manufacture, to sale/export, to import, and then to final end use, States must establish and enforce stringent and comprehensive licensing and monitoring systems to ensure that small arms and light weapons (SALW) remain under legal control. The UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and ensuing follow-up process provide States with important opportunities to analyse and compare how existing systems governing the manufacture and trade in SALW are working. They further provide the context in which best practice can be agreed and implemented internationally, and for the discussion of how future trends and developments in SALW manufacture and transfer can be more effectively brought within State control. To this end, this briefing paper covers two separate but closely related issues. The first section of the report will analyse existing State and regional controls on SALW manufacture and examine how international measures, including the UN Conference, can reinforce such controls. In this regard, the growth of licensed production and co-production agreements is highlighted, together with implications for the development of adequate regulations. The second section examines those systems that are currently in place for the authorisation of SALW transfers and for the certification and monitoring of their ultimate end-use. Recommendations for best practice and implications for the UN Conference process are also discussed.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This is a study of the growmg importance of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in global governance. Global governance is defined as a complex and dynamic process that deals with issues that go beyond the capacity of national governments, that is distinguished from global government because of an absence of a central authority that can ensure compliance and the presence of a wide range of actors including non-state actors. The theory of Complex Multilateralism captures the role of NGOs and NGO coalitions well. Using this theory as a theoretical framework, this study focuses on two recent transnational NGO campaigns (The International Campaign to Ban Landmines [fCBL) and the NGOs against Arms Trade) to determine why some NGO campaigns are more successful than others. The theory of Complex Multilateralism in combination with extensive information on different types of NGOs and their activities on national and international levels, makes it possible to identify criteria that can determine success. These criteria are: a realistic goal, the issue area (type, number, salience and techniques used to frame the issue), government and intergovernmental organisation (lGO) commitment, access to IGOs, extensive expertise, effective use of the media, effective use of information technology, activity variance, leadership, persuasive and influential spokespersons, membership and funds. These criteria are described, defined and then applied to the above-mentioned transnational NGO campaigns. The main finding was that the ICBL was the more successful of the two campaigns because it had more of the criteria for success. In this case the most important reasons for success is: a realistic goal, the focus on a single issue and the effective framing of the issue, significant government commitment as well as good leadership. Although, the criteria that were developed can hardly be universalised, they do provide a useful starting point for further research into this important field in International Studies. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie werkstuk bestudeer die toenemende belangrikheid van Nie-Regerings Organisasies (NROs) in "global governance" Laasgenoemde konsep word gedefinieer as 'n komplekse en dinamiese proses wat behels die hantering van vraagstukke wat buite die beheer is van 'n enkele staat, wat onderskei word van 'n wereld regering as gevolg van die afwesigheid van sentrale gesag en die aanwesigheid van 'n wye reeks van akteurs of rolbekleers insluitente nie-staatlike rolbekleers. Komplekse Multilateralisme bied 'n goeie teoretiese begrip van die rol van NROs en NRO koalisies in hierdie proses. Hierdie studie maak gebruik van Komplekse Multilateralisme as 'n teoretiese raamwerk om te fokus op twee onlangse transnasionale NRO veldtogte ( Die internasionale veldtog om landmyne te verban en die NROs teen wapenhandel) en sodoende te bepaal hoekom sekere NRO veldtogte meer geslaag is as ander. Reedsgenoemde teorie in kombinasie met inligting oor verskillende tipes NROs en hul aktiwiteite op nasionale en internasionale vlakke maak dit moontlik om kriteria vir 'n suksesvolle NRO veldtog te identifiseer. Hierdie kriteria bestaan uit die volgende: 'n realistiese doel, die aard van die vraagstuk (tipe, hoeveelheid, "salience", en tegnieke wat gebruik is om die vraagstuk te formuleer, toewyding van regerings en tussen-regerings-organisasies, toegang tot tussenregerings -organisasies, veelsydige kundigheid, effektiewe gebruik van die media, effektiewe gebruik van inligtingstegnologie, verskeidenheid van aktiwiteite, leierskap, oorredende en invloedryke segspersone, lidmaatskap en fondse. Die bevinding is dat die internasionale veldtog om landmyne te verban die meer geslaagde veldtog is. Die belangriskste redes hiervoor is: 'n realistiese doel, die fokus op enkele vraagstukke en die effektiewe formulering van die vraagstuk, die toegewydheid van baie regerings, sowel as goeie leierskap. Alhoewel die kriteria wat in die studie ontwikkel is nie veralgemeen kan word nie dien dit as 'n nuttige basis vir vedere navorsing oor hierdie belangrike tema in die veld van Internasionale Studie.

Analyses of US/Soviet arms control have usually focused on domestic variables to explain US/Soviet arms control behavior. Partly because the number of negotiating parties is only two, there is a propensity to focus on the bilateral relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective domestic political situations. Only superficial attention has usually been given to international systems variables that may well influence the domestic political situation and arms control policy. This thesis broadens the explanatory scope of US/Soviet arms control by showing how the political environment of a trilateral relationship (a subsystem that includes the West European members of NATO as a single actor as well as the United States and the Soviet Union) is a primary motivator of US/Soviet arms control behavior.

<p>The purpose of this thesis is to explain why states obtain nuclear weapons and the role various</p><p>actors and interests play in the making of states´ nuclear policies. The main questions are as</p><p>follows: (1) What big theories exist concerning states obtaining nuclear weapon and nuclear</p><p>armament in International Relations and what relevance do they have of the post cold-war period?,</p><p>(2) What is the meaning of the perspective of the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC)?, and (3)Are</p><p>there empirical studies which supports the existence of a MIC in the United States?</p><p>The focus lies on actors and driving forces that are internal to states and it is also important to</p><p>investigate if the theories have relevance for the post 9/11-era. The study uses the method of</p><p>qualitative literature-study with some quantitative segments. It is claimed that states might be</p><p>interested in justifying their behaviour in a morally appealing way and that real reasons may be</p><p>hidden. There are many reasons for states to obtain and keep nuclear weapons and related</p><p>technology (which includes many of the most lucrative elements of the arms industry´s sales).</p><p>Among this reasons are that arms and related technology may be used to influence other states and</p><p>nuclear weapons-construction and modernisation might be used to protect the state from external</p><p>threats, stop unwanted interference from other actors, secure job and gain recognition and prestige</p><p>in world politics. For security reasons states might hold onto their own nuclear weapons and try to</p><p>hinder other actors from getting access to them. The internal actors and driving forces we look at</p><p>are bureaucratic, economical and political, and the MIC-perspective. The military can be said to</p><p>have interests in as much resources and capabilities as possible, which includes advanced</p><p>weaponary such as nuclear weapons and related technologies, at its disposal because of the goal to</p><p>defend the state from all possible threats and for officers career reasons. Much of its influence is</p><p>said to come from its expert knowledge and position and it is said to be especially influential in</p><p>matters of foreign policy, military spending and foreign policy. The major economical actors</p><p>mentioned are big corporations involved in military spending and these have interests in</p><p>maximizing profits. Nuclear weapons making and maintenance and the related areas of missile</p><p>defense and delivering methods for nuclear weapons seem to be areas with high changes of being</p><p>profitable for the involved major companies. The actors wield influence for example through</p><p>lobbying and campaign contributions. An economic driving force claim is that state spending is</p><p>necessary for stimulating the economy and defense spending is easily justified in other ways.</p><p>Political actors and driving forces concerns politicians interest in promoting the interests of</p><p>supporting groups, there are indications that the weapon industry is such a group. Research have</p><p>shown various results about the extent politicians tend to further the interests of supporting groups.</p><p>The MIC-perspective talks about groups with interest in high levels of military spending. Most</p><p>researchers seem to agree that the complex exists but there are different opinions about what actors</p><p>belongs to it and its power on various issues. There is some mention of the core of the complex</p><p>consisting of such internal actors as mentioned above. MIC-related empirical research has been</p><p>conducted and this author finds that the MIC is a relevant analytical tool for the post cold war – and</p><p>9/11 era.</p>

The foreign policy of Sweden is based on peace, security, human rights and democracy. In the documents of the foreign policy, the government writes: The purpose of the foreign policy of Sweden is to create security in our country, and in the world. There is no security without democracy, and there is no democracy without human rights and Sweden has to protect and defend these values. Along with these values, Sweden is the 15th biggest arms trader in the world (2015-2020) and has the highest exportation of arms per capita in the world. Many of these exportations also go to non-democratic states.  The purpose of this study is to provide knowledge about why Sweden acts different when it comes to arms trade towards non-democratic states. The research being conducted is a case study of Sweden’s arms trade to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates and why Sweden acts different in the two cases. Sweden stopped the arms trade to Turkey in 2019 due to the lack of democracy and the violations of human rights, but continues to export arms to the United Arab Emirates. Furthermore the study will be using Kjell Goldmann’s theories regarding real idea politics to explain why Sweden acts different in the two situations. The methods that are used in this study are text analysis and case study. The material has been analyzed on the basis of real and idea politics. The main sources are IPSs’ reports, the laws, government documents and parliament document.  The conclusion of the study is that Sweden still exports arms to United Arab Emirates because they still export on old treaty and no new treaty has been issued since 2017. Furthermore, the cases are a combination of the theory’s, but one of them is more prominent in the different cases. Sweden’s actions to stop arms trade to Turkey is an example of when idea politics is more prominent and Sweden’s actions to continue arms trade to United Arab Emirates is an example of when real politics is more prominent.